Chapter 4
pp. 135–17993 passagespart 2 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Again we might further add, that it is the most abstracted Being, or is Being in the very 1abstract. A thing much insisted on by some of the School-men. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue (after their manner) may carry some such sense as this (if it may throughout be called sense) That whereas no created nature is capable of any other, than mere mental abstraction, but exists all ways in concretion with some subject, that, be it never so refined, is grosser and less perfect than it self; so that we can distinguish the mentally abstracted essence, and the thing which hath that essence, by which concretion essence is limited, and is only the particular essence of this or that thing, which hath or possesses that essence. The necessary Being is, in strict propriety, not so truly said to have essence, as to be it; and exist separately by it self; not as limited to this or that thing. Whence it is, in it self universal essence, containing therefore (not formally, but eminently) the being of all things in perfect simplicity. ⟨p. 153⟩Whence all its own attributes are capable of being affirmed of it in the abstract, *that it is Wisdom, Power, Goodness, and not only hath these, and that, upon this account, that it is a Being which is necessarily and of it self. For that which is necessarily and of it self, is not whatsoever it is by the accession of any thing to it self; whereof necessary Being is uncapable. But by its own simple and unvariable essence. Other Being is upon such terms powerful, wise, yea, and existent, as that it may cease to be so. Whereas to necessary Being it is manifestly repugnant and impossible either simply not to be, or to be any thing else, but what and as it is. And though other things may have properties belonging to their essence not separable from it, yet they are not their very essence it self: And, whereas they are in a possibility to loose their very existence, the knot and ligament of whatsoever is most intimate to their actual being, all then falls from them together: Here essence, properties, and existence are all one simple thing that can never cease, decay, or change, because the whole being is necessary. Now, all this being supposed, of the force of that form of speech, when we affirm any thing in the abstract of another, we may admit the common sense of men to be the interpreter.
Again we might further add, that it is the most abstracted Being, or is Being in the very 1abstract. A thing much insisted on by someof the School-men. And the notion which with much obscurity they pursue (after their manner) may carry some such sense as this (if it may throughout be called sense) That whereas no created nature is capable of any other, than meer mental abstraction, but exists al ways in concretion with some subject, that, be it never so refined, is grosser and less perfect than it self; so that we can distinguish the mentally abstracted essence, and the thing which hath that essence, by which concretion essence is limited, and is only the particular essence of this or that thing, which hath or possesses that essence. The necessary Being is, in strict propriety, not so truly said to have essence, as to be it; and exist separately by it self; not as limited to this or that thing. Whence it is, in it self universal essence, containing therefore (not formally, but eminently) the being of all things in perfect simplicity.
For every body can tell (though they do not know the meaning of the word abstract) what we intend when we use that phrase or manner of speaking. As when we say, by way of hyperbolical commendation, ⟨p. 154⟩such a man is not only learned, but learning it self; or he not only hath much of Virtue, Justice, and Goodness in him, but he is Virtue, Justice, and Goodness it self (as was once said of an excellent Pagan Virtuoso, that I may borrow leave to use that word in the moral sense) every one knows the phrase intends the appropriating all Learning, Virtue, Justice, Goodness to such a one. Which, because they know unappropriable to any man, they easily understand it to be, in such a case, a rhetorical strain, and form of speech. And yet could not know that, if also they did not understand its proper and native import. And so it may as well be understood what is meant by saying of God, he is being it self. With which sense may be reconciled that of (the so named Dionysius the Areopagite; †That God is not so properly said to be of, or be in, or to have (or partake) of Being as that it is of him, &c. Inasmuch as he is the pre-existent Being to all Being, i. e. If we understand him to mean all besides his own. In which sense taking Being, for that which is communicated and imparted, He may truly be said (as this Author and the Platonists generally speak) *to be super-essential or super-substantial. But how fitly being is taken in that restrained sense we may say more hereafter.
- †[Greek or Hebrew]. De Divinis Homi Co. 5.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. De Divinis Homi Co. 5.
- *Proclus in Plot. Theol. l. 2. c. 4.Proclus in Plat. Theol. l. 2. c. 4.
In the mean time, what hath been said concerning this abstractedness of the necessary Being, hath in it some things so unintelligible, and is accompanied with so great (unmentioned) ⟨p. 155⟩difficulties (which it would give us, perhaps, more labour than profit to discuss) and the absolute perfection of God appears so evidenceable otherwise, by what hath been and may be further said, that we are no way concerned to lay the stress of the cause on this matter only.
In the mean time, what hath been said concerning this abstractedness of the necessary Being, hath in it some things so unintelligible, and is accompanied with so great (unmentioned) ⟨p. 155⟩difficulties (which it would give us, perhaps, more labour than profit to discuss) and the absolute perfection of God appears so evidenceable otherwise, by what hath been and may be further said, that we are no way concern'd to lay the stress of the cause on this matter only.
Moreover, necessary Being is the cause and author of all Being besides. Whatsoever is not 1necessary is caused; for not having Being of it self, it must be put into Being by somewhat else. And inasmuch as there is no middle sort of Being betwixt necessary and not necessary, and, all that is not necessary is caused, 'tis plain that which is necessary must be the cause of all the rest. And surely what is the cause of all being besides its own, must needs, one way or other, contain its own and all other in it self; and is, consequently, comprehensive of the utmost fullness of Being. Or is the absolutely perfect Being, (as must equally, be acknowledged) unless any one would imagine himself to have got the notice of some perfection that lies without the compass of all Being.
Moreover, necessary Being is the cause and author of all Being besides. Whatsoever is not 1necessary is caused; for not having Being of it self, it must be put into Being by somewhat else. And inasmuch as there is no middle sort of Being betwixt necessary and not necessary, and, all that is not necessary is caused, 'tis plain that which is necessary must be the cause of all the rest. And surely what is the cause of all being besides its own, must needs, one way or other, contain its own and all other in it self; and is, consequently, comprehensive of the utmost fulness of Being. Or is the absolutely perfect Being, (as must equally, be acknowledged) unless any one would imagine himself to have got the notice of some perfection that lies without the compass of all Being.
- 1VII.
Nor is it an exception worth the mentioning, that there may be a conception of possible being or perfection, which the necessary being hath not caused. For it is, manifestly, as well the possible cause of all possible Being and perfection, as the actual cause of what is actual. And what it is possible to it to produce it hath within its productive power, as hath been said before.
And, if the matter did require it, we might say further, that the same necessary Being, which hath been the productive cause, is, also the continual root and basis of all Being, which is not necessary. For what is of it self and cannot, by the special privilege of its own Being, but be, needs nothing to sustain it, or needs not trust to any thing besides its own eternal stability. But what is not so seems to need a continual reproduction every moment, and to be no more capable of continuing in Being by it self, than it was by it self of coming into Being. For (as is frequently alleged by that so often mentioned Author) since there is no connection betwixt the present and future time, but what is easily capable of rupture, it is no way consequent that, because I am now, I shall therefore be the next moment further than as the free Author of my Being shall be pleased to continue his own most arbitrary influence for my support. This seems highly probable to be true, whether that reason signify any thing or nothing. And that thence also continual conservation differs not from creation. Which, whether (as is said by the same Author) it be one of the things that are manifest by natural light; or whether a positive act be needless to the annihilation of created things; but only the withholding of influence, let them examine that apprehend the cause to need it. And if upon enquiry they judge it at least evidenceable by natural light to be so, (as I doubt not they will) they will have ⟨p. 157⟩this further ground upon which thus to reason, That, inasmuch as the necessary Being subsists wholly by it self, and is that whereon all other doth totally depend. It hereupon follows, that it must, some way, contain in it self all Being. We may yet further add,
And, if the matter did require it, we might say further, that the same necessary Being, which hath been the productive cause, is, also the continual root and basis of all Being, which is not necessary. For what is of it self and cannot, by the special priviledge of its own Being, but be, needs nothing to sustain it, or needs not trust to any thing besides its own eternal stability. But what is not so seems to need a continual reproduction every moment, and to be no more capable of continuing in Being by it self, than it was by it self of coming into Being. For (as is frequently alledged by that so often mentioned Author) since there is no connexion betwixt the present and future time, but what is easily capable of rupture, it is no way consequent that, because I am now, I shall therefore be the next moment further than as the free Author of my Being shall be pleased to continue his own most arbitrary influence for my support. This seems highly probable to be ture, whether that reason signifie any thing or nothing. And that thence also continual conservation differs not from creation. Which, whether (as is said by the same Author) it be one of the things that are manifest by natural light; or whether a positive act be needless to the annihilation of created things; but only the withholding of influence, let them examine that apprehend the cause to need it. And if upon enquiry they judge it at least evidenceable by natural light to be so, (as I doubt not they will) they will have
That the necessary Being we have evinced, though it have caused, and do continually sustain all things, yet doth not, it self, in the mean time suffer any diminution. It is not possible, nor consistent with the very terms necessary Being that it can. 'Tis true, that if such a thing as a necessary Atom were admitted, that would be also undiminishable (it were not else an atom.) But as nothing then can flow from it (as from a perfect parvitude nothing can) so it can effect nothing. (And the reason is the same of many as of one.) Nor would undiminishableness, upon such terms, signify any thing to the magnifying the value of such a trifle.
That the necessary Being we have evinced, though it have caused, and do continually sustain all things, yet doth not, it self, in the mean time suffer any diminution. It is not possible, nor consistent with the very terms necessary Being that it can. 'Tis true, that if such a thing as a necessary Atom were admitted, that would be also undiminishable (it were not else an atom.) But as nothing then can flow from it (as from a perfect parvitude nothing can) so it can effect nothing. (And the reason is the same of many as of one.) Nor would undiminishableness, upon such terms, signifie any thing to the magnifying the value of such a trifle.
But this is none of the present case. For our eyes tell us here is a world in being, which we are sure is not it self necessarily; and was therefore made by him that is. And that, without mutation or change in him; against which the very notion of a necessary Being is most irreconcilably reluctant; and therefore 1without diminution, which cannot be conceived without change.
But this is none of the present case. For our eyes tell us here is a world in being, which we are sure is not it self necessarily; and was therefore made by him that is. And that, without mutation or change in him; against which the very notion of a necessary Being is most irreconciliably reluctant; and therefore 1without diminution, which cannot be conceived without change.
- 1[Greek or Hebrew]. Plotinus Enn. 6. l. 9. c. 9.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plotinus Enn. 6. l. 9. c. 9.
Wherefore how inexhaustible a fountain of life, being, and all perfection have we here represented to our thoughts! from whence this vast Universe is sprung, and is continually springing, and that in the mean time, receiving no recruits or foreign supplies, yet suffers no impairment or lessening of it self! What is this but absolute all-fullness! And it is so far from arguing any deficiency or mutability, in his nature, that there is this continual issue of power and virtue from him, that it demonstrates its high excellency that this can be without decay or mutation. For of all this, we are as certain as we can be of any thing: That many things are not necessarily, That the Being must be necessary from whence all things else proceed, and that with necessary Being change is inconsistent. It is therefore unreasonable to entertain any doubt that things are so, which most evidently appear to be so; only because it is beyond our measure and compass to apprehend, how they are so. And it would be to doubt (against our own eyes) whether there be any such thing as motion in the world, or composition of bodies, because we cannot give a clear account (so as to avoid all difficulties, and the entanglement of the common sophisms about them) how these things are performed. In the present case, we have no difficulty but what is to be resolved into the perfection of the Divine Nature, and the imperfection of our own. And how easily conceivable is it, that somewhat may be more perfect ⟨p. 159⟩than that we can conceive it. If we cannot conceive the manner of Gods causation of things, or the nature of his causative influence, it only shows their high excellency, and gives us the more ground (since this is that into which both his own revelation and the reason of things most naturally lead us to resolve all) to admire the mighty efficacy of his all-creating and all-sustaining Will and Word; that in that easy unexpensive way by his mere fiat, so great things should be performed.
Wherefore how inexhaustible a fountain of life, being, and all perfection have we here represented to our thoughts! from whence this vast Universe is sprung, and is continually springing, and that in the mean time, receiving no recruits or foreign supplies, yet suffers no impairment or lessening of it self! What is this but absolute all-fulness! And it is so far from arguing any deficiency or mutability, in his nature, that there is this continual issue of power and virtue from him, that it demonstrates its high excellency that this can be without decay or mutation. For of all this, we are as certain as we can be of any thing: That many things are not necessarily, That the Being must be necessary from whence all things else proceed, and that with necessary Being change is inconsistent. It is therefore unreasonable to entertain any doubt that things are so, which most evidently appear to be so; only because it is beyond our measure and compass to apprehend, how they are so. And it would be to doubt (against our own eyes) whether there be any such thing as motion in the world, or composition of bodies, because we cannot give a clear account (so as to avoid all difficulties, and the entanglement of the common sophisms about them) how these things are performed. In the present case, we have no difficulty but what is to be resolved into the perfection of the Divine Nature, and the imperfection of our own. And how easily conceivable is it, that somewhat may be more perfect
We only say further, That this necessary Being 1is such to which nothing can be added; so as that it should be really greater, or better, or more perfect than it was before. And this not only signifies that nothing can be joined to it, so as to become a part of it, (which necessary Being, by its natural immutability manifestly refuses.) But we also intend by it, that all things else, with it, contain not more of real perfection than it doth alone. Which (though it carries a difficulty with it that we intend not wholly to overlook when it shall be seasonable to consider it) is a most apparent and demonstrable truth. For it is plain that all being and perfection which is not necessary, proceeds from that which is, as the cause of it. And that no cause could communicate any thing to another which it had not some way in it self. Wherefore it is manifestly consequent that all other being was wholly before comprehended in that which is necessary, as having been wholly produced by it. And what is wholly ⟨p. 160⟩comprehended of another (i. e. within its productive power) before it be produced, can be no real addition to it, when it is.
We only say further, That this necessary Being 1is such to which nothing can be added; so as that it should be really greater, or better, or more perfect than it was before. And this not only signifies that nothing can be joyned to it, so as to become a part of it, (which necessary Being, by its natural immutability manifestly refuses.) But we also intend by it, that all things else, with it, contain not more of real perfection than it doth alone. Which (though it carries a difficulty with it that we intend not wholly to overlook when it shall be seasonable to consider it) is a most apparent and demonstrable truth. For it is plain that all being and perfection which is not necessary, proceeds from that which is, as the cause of it. And that no cause could communicate any thing to another which it had not some way in it self. Wherefore it is manifestly consequent that all other being was wholly before comprehended in that which is necessary, as having been wholly produced by it. And what is wholly ⟨p. 160⟩comprehended of another (i. e. within its productive power) before it be produced, can be no real addition to it, when it is.
Now what can be supposed to import fullness of Being and perfection, more than this [impossibility of addition] or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect?
Now what can be supposed to import fulness of Being and perfection, more than this [impossibility of addition] or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect?
And now these considerations are mentioned without solicitude, whether they be so many exactly distinct heads. For admit that they be not all distinct, but some are involved with others of them; yet the same truth may more powerfully strike some understandings in one form of representation, others in another. And it suffices, that (though not severally) they do together plainly evidence, that the necessary Being includes the absolute entire fullness of all Being and perfection actual and possible within it self.
And now these considerations are mentioned without solicitude, whether they be so many exactly distinct heads. For admit that they be not all distinct, but some are involved with others of them; yet the same truth may more powerfully strike some understandings in one form of representation, others in another. And it suffices, that (though not severally) they do together plainly evidence, that the necessary Being includes the absolute entire fulness of all Being and perfection actual and possible within it self.
Having therefore thus dispatched that former part of this undertaking; the eviction of an every way perfect Being, we shall now need to labour little in the other, viz.
Having therefore thus dispatcht that former part of this undertaking; the eviction of an every way perfect Being, we shall now need to labour little in the other, viz.
Secondly, the more express deduction of the infiniteness and onliness thereof.1
- 1X.
For as to the former of these it is in effect the same thing that hath been already proved. Since to the fullest notion infiniteness, absolute perfection seems every way most fully to correspond. For absolute perfection includes all conceivable perfection, leaves nothing excluded. And what doth most simple infiniteness import, but to have nothing for a boundary, ⟨p. 161⟩or (which is the same) not to be bounded at all?
We intend not now, principally, infiniteness extrinsically considered, with respect to time and place, as to be eternal and immense do import: But intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection without bound or limit. This is the same with absolute perfection Which yet, if any should suspect not to be so, They might, however, easily and expressly prove it of the necessary Being upon the same grounds that have been already alleged for proof of that.
We intend not now, principally, infiniteness extrinsically considered, with respect to time and place, as to be eternal and immense do import: But intrinsically, as importing bottomless profundity of essence, and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection without bound or limit. This is the same with absoute perfection Which yet, if any should suspect not to be so, They might, however, easily and expresly prove it of the necessary Being upon the same grounds that have been already alledged for proof of that.
As that the necessary Being hath actuality answerable to the utmost possibility of the creature; That it is the only root and cause of all other Being. The actual cause of whatsoever is actually; The possible cause of whatsoever is possible to be. Which is most apparently true. And hath been evidenced to be so, by what hath been said, so lately, as that it needs not be repeated. That is, in short, that nothing, that is not necessarily, and of it self, could ever have been or can be, but as it hath been, or shall be put into Being by that which is necessarily and of it self. So that this is as apparent as that any thing is, or can be.
But now let sober reason judge, whether there can be any bounds or limits set to the possibility of producible Being, either in respect of kinds, numbers, or degrees of perfection? Who can say or think, when there can be so ⟨p. 162⟩many sorts of creatures produced (or at least individuals of those sorts) that there can be no more? Or that any creature is so perfect as that none can be made more perfect? which indeed to suppose were to suppose an actual infiniteness in the creature. And then it being, however, still, but somewhat that is created or made, how can its Maker but be infinite? For surely no body will be so absurd as to imagine an infinite effect of a finite cause.
Either therefore the creature is (or sometime may be actually made) so perfect that it cannot be more perfect, or not. If not, we have our purpose; that there is an infinite possibility on the part of the creature always unreplete; and, consequently, a proportionable infinite actuality of power on the Creators part. Infinite power, I say, otherwise there were not that (acknowledged) infinite possibility of producible being. For nothing is producible that no power can produce. And I say infinite actual power, because the Creator being what he is necessarily, what power he hath not actually, he can never have, as was argued before.
But if it be said, the creature either is, or may sometime be, actually so perfect as that it cannot be more perfect. That, as was said, will suppose it actually infinite, and therefore much more that its cause is so. And therefore in this way our present purpose would be gained also.
But we have no mind to gain it this latter way, as we have no need. 'Tis in it self plain to any one that considers that this possibility on ⟨p. 163⟩the creatures part can never actually be filled up; That it is a bottomless abyss, in which our thoughts may still gradually go down deeper and deeper without end: that is, that still more might be produced, or more perfect creatures, and still more, everlastingly without any bound, which sufficiently infers what we aim at, that the Creators actual power is proportionable.
And indeed the supposition of the former can neither consist with the Creators perfection, nor with the imperfection of the creature, it would infer that the Creators productive power might be exhausted, that he could do no more, and so place an actual boundary to him and make him finite. It were to make the creature actually full of being, that it could receive no more, and so would make that infinite.
But it may be said, since all power is in order to act, and the very notion of possibility imports that such a thing, of which it is said, may some time be actual; it seems very unreasonable to say that the infinite power of a cause cannot produce an infinite effect. Or that infinite possibility can never become infinite actuality. For that were to say and unsay the same thing of the same. To affirm omnipotency and impotency of the same cause, possibility and impossibility of the same effect.
How urgent soever this difficulty may seem, there needs nothing but patience and attentive consideration to disentangle our selves, and get through it. For if we will but allow our ⟨p. 164⟩selves the leisure to consider, we shall find that [power] and [possibility] must here be taken not simply and abstractly, but as each of them is in conjunction with [infinite.] And what is [infinite,] but [that which can never be travelled through] or whereof no end can be ever arrived unto? Now suppose infinite power had produced all that it could produce, there were an end of it, (i. e. it had found limits and a boundary beyond which it could not go.) If infinite possibility were filled up there were an end of that also, and so neither were infinite.
How urgent soever this difficulty may seem, there needs nothing but patience and attentive consideration to disintangle our selves, and get through it. For if we will but allow our ⟨p. 164⟩selves the leasure to consider, we shall find that [power] and [possibility] must here be taken not simply and abstractly, but as each of them is in conjunction with [infinite.] And what is [infinite,] but [that which can never be travell'd through] or whereof no end can be ever arriv'd unto? Now suppose infinite power had produced all that it could produce, there were an end of it, (i. e. it had found limits and a boundary beyond which it could not go.) If infinite possibility were filled up there were an end of that also, and so neither were infinite.
It may then be further urged that there is therefore no such thing as infinite power or possibility. For how is that cause said to have infinite power, which can never produce its proportionable effect, or that effect have infinite possibility, which can never be produced. It would follow then that power and possibility which are said to be infinite, are neither power nor possibility; and that infinite must be rejected as a notion either repugnant to it self or to any thing unto which we shall go about to affix it.
I answer, it only follows, They are neither power or possibility, whereof there is any bound or end; or that can ever be gone through. And how absurd is it that they shall be said (as they cannot but be) to be both very vast, if they were finite; and none at all, for no other reason but their being infinite! And for the pretended repugnancy of the very notion of infinite, it is plain, that, though it cannot be, to ⟨p. 165⟩us, distinctly comprehensible, yet it is no more repugnant, than the notion of finiteness. Nor when we have conceived of power in the general, and in our own thoughts set bounds to it, and made it finite, is it a greater difficulty, (nay, they that try will find it much easier) again to think away these bounds, and make it infinite. And let them that judge the notion of infiniteness inconsistent, therefore reject it if they can. They will feel it re-imposing it self upon them, whether they will or no, and sticking as close to their minds as their very thinking power it self. And who was, therefore ever heard of, that did not acknowledge some or other infinite? Even the Epicureans themselves though they confined their Gods, they did not the universe. Which, also, though some Peripatetic Atheists made finite in respect of place, yet in duration they made it infinite. Though the notion of an eternal world is encumbered with such absurdities and impossibilities, as whereof there is not the least shadow in that of an every way infinite Deity.
I answer, it only follows, They are neither power or possibility, whereof there is any bound or end; or that can ever be gone through. And how absurd is it that they shall be said (as they cannot but be) to be both very vast, if they were finite; and none at all, for no other reason but their being infinite! And for the pretended repugnancy of the very notion of infinite, it is plain, that, though it cannot be, to ⟨p. 165⟩us, distinctly comprehensible, yet it is no more repugnant, than the notion of finiteness. Nor when we have conceived of power in the general, and in our own thoughts set bounds to it, and made it finite, is it a greater difficulty, (nay, they that try will find it much easier) again to think away these bounds, and make it infinite. And let them that judge the notion of infiniteness inconsistent, therefore reject it if they can. They will feel it re-imposing it self upon them, whether they will or no, and sticking as close to their minds as their very thinking power it self. And who was, therefore ever heard of, that did not acknowledge some or other infinite? Even the Epicureans themselves though they confined their Gods, they did not the universe. Which, also, though some Peripatetique Atheists made finite in respect of place, yet in duration they made it infinite. Though the notion of an eternal world is incumbred with such absurdities and impossibilities, as whereof there is not the least shadow in that of an every way infinite Deity.
Briefly, it consists not with the nature of a contingent being to be infinite. For what is upon such terms, only, in being, is reducible to nothing, at the will and pleasure of its maker; but 'tis a manifest repugnancy, that what is at the utmost distance from nothing (as infinite fullness of being cannot but be) should be reducible thither.
Briefly, it consists not with the nature of a contingent being to be infinite. For what is upon such terms, only, in being, is reducible to nothing, at the will and pleasure of its maker; but 'tis a manifest repugnancy, that what is at the utmost distance from nothing (as infinite fulness of being cannot but be) should be reducible thither.
Therefore actual infinity cannot but be the peculiar privilege of that which is necessarily.
Therefore actual infinity cannot but be the peculiar priviledge of that which is necessarily.
Yet may we not say, that it is not within the compass of infinite power to make a creature that may be infinite. For it argues not want of power that this is never to be done, but a still infinitely abounding surplusage of it, that can never be drained, or drawn dry. Nor, that the thing it self is simply impossible. It may be (as is compendiously expressed by that most succinct and polite Writer D. Boyle) in fieri, not in facto esse. That is, it might 1be a thing always in doing, but never done. Because it belongs to the infinite perfection of God, that his power be never actually exhausted; and to the infinite imperfection of the creature, that its possibility or capacity be never filled up. To the necessary self-subsisting being to be always full and communicative, to the communicated contingent Being, to be ever empty and craving. One may be said to have that, some way, in his power, not only which he can do presently, all at once, but which he can do by degrees, and supposing he have sufficient time. So a man may be reckoned able to do that, as the uttermost adequate effect of his whole power, which it is only possible to him to have effected with the expiration of his life's-time. Gods measure is eternity. What if we say then, this is a work possible to be accomplished, even as the ultimate proportionable issue of Divine Power (if it were his will, ⟨p. 167⟩upon which all contingent being depends, that the creature should be ever growing in the mean while) at the expiration of eternity? If, then, you be good at suppositions, suppose that expired, and this work finished both together.
Yet may we not say, that it is not within the compass of infinite power to make a creature that may be infinite. For it argues not want of power that this is never to be done, but a still infinitely abounding surplufage of it, that can never be drained, or drawn dry. Nor, that the thing it self is simply impossible. It may be (as is compendiously exprest by that most succinct and polite Writer D. Boyle) in fieri, not in facto esse. That is, it might 1be a thing always in doing, but never done. Because it belongs to the infinite perfection of God, that his power be never actually exhausted; and to the infinite imperfection of the creature, that its possibility or capacity be never filled up. To the necessary self-subsisting being to be always full and communicative, to the communicated contingent Being, to be ever empty and craving. One may be said to have that, some way, in his power, not only which he can do presently, all at once, but which he can do by degrees, and supposing he have sufficient time. So a man may be reckoned able to do that, as the uttermost adequate effect of his wohle power, which it is only possible to him to have effected with the expiration of his lifes-time. Gods measure is eternity. What if we say then, this is a work possible to be accomplished, even as the ultimate proportionable issue of Divine Power (if it were his will,
Wherefore if you ask, why can the work of making created being infinite never be done? The answer will be, because eternity (in every imaginable instant whereof the inexhaustible power of God can if he will be still adding either more creatures or more perfection to a creature) can never be at an end.
We might further argue the Infinity of the necessary Being from what hath been said of its undiminishableness by all its vast communications. Its impossibility to receive any accession 1to it self by any its (so great productions) both which are plainly demonstrable (as we have seen) of the necessary Being, even as it is such, and do clearly (as any thing can) bespeak infinity. But we have thence argued its absolute perfection which so evidently includes the same thing that all this latter labour might have been spared, were it not that it is the genius of some persons not to be content that they have the substance of a thing said, unless it be also said in their own terms. And that the express asserting of Gods simple infiniteness, in those very terms, is, in that respect, the more requisite as it is a form of expression more known and usual.
- 1For howsoever disputable it may be, whether whatsoever is infinite can have nothing added to it; yet it is without dispute, that whatsoever is so full as that nothing can be added to it is infinite.
There are yet some remaining difficulties in the matter we have been discoursing of; ⟨p. 168⟩1which partly through the debility of our own minds we cannot but find; and which partly the subtlety of sophistical wits doth create to us. It will be requisite we have some consideration of, at least, some of them, which we will labour to dispatch with all possible brevity. Leaving those that delight in the sport of tying and loosing knots, or of weaving snares, wherein cunningly to entangle themselves, to be entertained by the School-men; among whom they may find enough upon this subject to give them exercise unto weariness; and (if their minds have any relish of what is more savoury,) I may venture to say unto loathing.
There are yet some remaining difficulties in the matter we have been discoursing of; ⟨p. 168⟩1which partly through the debility of our own minds we cannot but find; and which partly the subtilty of sophistical wits doth create to us. It will be requisite we have some consideration of, at least, some of them, which we will labour to dispatch with all possible brevity. Leaving those that delight in the sport of tying and loosing knots, or of weaving snares, wherein cunningly to entangle themselves, to be entertained by the School-men; among whom they may find enough upon this subject to give them exercise unto weariness; and (if their minds have any relish of what is more savory,) I may venture to say unto loathing.
- 1XII.
It may possibly be here said in short; But what have we all this while been doing? we have been labouring to prove that necessary Being comprehends the absolute fullness of all Being: And what doth this signify, but that all being is necessary? That God is all things, and so that every thing is God. That we hereby confound the being of a man, yea, of a stone, or whatever we can think of with one another, and all with the Being of God.
It may possibly be here said in short; But what have we all this while been doing? we have been labouring to prove that necessary Being comprehends the absolute fulness of all Being: And what doth this signifie, but that all being is necessary? That God is all things, and so that every thing is God. That we hereby confound the being of a man, yea, of a stone, or whatever we can think of with one another, and all with the Being of God.
And again, how is it possible there should be an infinite self-subsisting Being. For then how can there be any finite? since such infinite Being includes all Being, and there can be nothing beyond all.
Here therefore it is requisite, having hitherto only asserted and endeavoured to evince that some way necessary Being doth include all being, to show in what way. And it is ⟨p. 169⟩plain it doth not include all in the same way. It doth not so include that which is created by it, and depends on it, as it doth its own, which is uncreated and independent.
Here therefore it is requisite, having hitherto only asserted and endeavoured to evince that some way necessary Being doth include all being, to shew in what way. And it is ⟨p. 169⟩plain it doth not include all in the same way. It doth not so include that which is created by it, and depends on it, as it doth its own, which is uncreated and independent.
The one it includes as its own or rather as it self, the other, as what it is, and ever was, within its power to produce. If any better like the terms formally and virtually they may serve themselves of them at their own pleasure, which yet, as to many, will but more darkly speak the same sense.
We must here know, the productive power of God terminates not upon himself, as if he were by it capable of adding any thing to his own appropriate Being; which is (as hath been evinced already) infinitely full and incapable of addition, and is therefore all pure act: But on the creature, where there is still a perpetual possibility never filled up; because Divine power can never be exhausted. And thus all that of Being is virtually in him, which, either having produced, he doth totally sustain, or, not being produced, he can produce.
Whereupon it is easy to understand how necessary being may comprehend all Being and yet all being not be necessary. It comprehends all Being besides what it self is, as having had within the compass of its productive power whatsoever hath actually sprung from it, and having within the compass of the same power whatsoever is still possible to be produced. Which no more confounds such produced or producible Being with that necessary being ⟨p. 170⟩which is its cause, than it confounds all the effects of humane power with one another, and with the being of a man, to say that he virtually comprehended them (so far as they were producible by him) within his power. And is no wiser an inference from the former, than it would be from this latter, that an house, a book, and a child are the same thing with one another, and with the person that produced them, because so far as they were produced by him, he had it in his power to produce them. And that the effects of Divine power are produced thereby totally, whereas those of humane power are produced by it but in part only, doth, as to the strength and reasonableness of the argument, nothing alter the case.
Whereupon it is easie to understand how necessary being may comprehend all Being and yet all being not be necessary. It comprehends all Being besides what it self is, as having had within the compass of its productive power whatsoever hath actually sprung from it, and having within the compass of the same power whatsoever is still possible to be produced. Which no more confounds such produced or producible Being with that necessary being ⟨p. 170⟩which is its cause, than it confounds all the effects of humane power with one another, and with the being of a man, to say that he virtually comprehended them (so far as they were producible by him) within his power. And is no wiser an inference from the former, than it would be from this latter, that an house, a book, and a child are the same thing with one another, and with the person that produced them, because so far as they were produced by him, he had it in his power to produce them. And that the effects of Divine power are produced thereby totally, whereas those of humane power are produced by it but in part only, doth, as to the strength and reasonableness of the argument, nothing alter the case.
And as to the next, that infinite being should seem to exclude all finite. I confess that such as are so disposed might here even wrangle continually, as they might do about any thing, in which infiniteness is concerned: And yet therein show themselves (as Seneca I remember speaks in another case) not a whit the more learned, but the more troublesome. But if one would make short work of it, and barely deny that infinite being excludes finite (as Scotus doth little else; *besides denying the consequence of the argument by which it was before enforced, viz. [that an infinite body would exclude a finite; for where should the finite be when the infinite should fill up all space? And therefore by parity of reasons, why should not infinite being exclude finite?] showing the disparity ⟨p. 171⟩of the two cases) it would perhaps give them some trouble also to prove it. For which way would they go to work? Infinite self-subsisting Being includes all Being, very true, and therefore we say it includes finite. And what then? doth it because it includes it, therefore exclude it? And let the matter be soberly considered, somewhat of finite being and power we say (and apprehend no knot or difficulty in the matter) can extend so far as to produce some proportionable effect, or can do such and such things. And what, doth it seem likely then that infinite being and power can therefore do just nothing? Is it not a reason of mighty force, and confoundingly demonstrative, that an Agent can do nothing, or cannot possibly produce any the least thing, only because he is of infinite power?
And as to the next, that infinite being should seem to exclude all finite. I confess that such as are so disposed might here even wrangle continually, as they might do about any thing, in which infiniteness is concern'd: And yet therein shew themselves (as Seneca I remember speaks in another case) not a whit the more learned, but the more troublesom. But if one would make short work of it, and barely deny that infinite being excludes finite (as Scotus doth little else; *besides denying the consequence of the argument by which it was before inforced, viz. [that an infinite body would exclude a finite; for where should the finite be when the infinite should fill up all space? And therefore by parity of reasons, why should not infinite being exclude finite?] shewing the disparity
For if there be a simple inconsistency, between an infinite Being and a finite, that will be the case; that, because the former is infinite, therefore it can produce nothing. For what it should produce cannot consist with it (i. e. even not being finite; and then certainly if we could suppose the effect infinite, much less.) But what, therefore, is power the less for being infinite? or can infinite power, even because it is infinite, do nothing? what can be said or thought more absurd or void of sense? Or shall it be said that the infiniteness of power is no hinderance but the infiniteness of Being? But how wild an imagination were that of a finite being that were of infinite power? ⟨p. 172⟩And besides, is that power somewhat or nothing? surely it will not be said it is nothing. Then it is some Being. And if some power be some being, what then is infinite power, is not that infinite being? And now therefore if this infinite can produce any thing, which it were a strange madness to deny, it can at least produce some finite thing. Wherefore there is no inconsistency between the infinite and finite beings? unless we say the effect produced even by being produced must destroy, or (even infinitely) impair its cause, so as to make it cease at least to be infinite. But that also cannot possibly be said of that which is infinite and necessary, which, as hath been shown, cannot, by whatsoever productions, suffer any diminution or decay. If here it be further urged. But here is an infinite being now supposed, let next be supposed the production of a finite. This is not the same with the other; for surely infinite and finite are distinguishable enough, and do even infinitely differ. This finite is either something or nothing; nothing it cannot be said; for it was supposed a Being, and produced; but the production of nothing is no production. It is somewhat then; here is therefore an infinite Being, and a finite now besides. The infinite it was said cannot be diminished; the finite, a real something is added. Is there therefore nothing more of existent Being than there was before this production? It is answered, nothing more than virtually was before; for when we suppose an infinite Being, ⟨p. 173⟩and afterwards a finite.
For if there be a simple inconsistency, between an infinite Being and a finite, that will be the case; that, because the former is infinite, therefore it can produce nothing. For what it should produce cannot consist with it (i. e. even not being finite; and then certainly if we could suppose the effect infinite, much less.) But what, therefore, is power the less for being infinite? or can infinite power, even because it is infinite, do nothing? what can be said or thought more absurd or void of sense? Or shall it be said that the infiniteness of power is no hinderance but the infiniteness of Being? But how wild an imagination were that of a finite being that were of infinite power?