Chapter 4
pp. 135–17993 passagespart 3 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
This finite is not to be looked upon as emerging or springing up of it self out of nothing, or as proceeding from some third thing as its cause, but as produced by that infinite, or springing out of that, which it could not do, but as being before virtually contained in it. For the infinite produces nothing, which it could not produce. And what it could produce was before contained in it as in the power of its cause. And to any one that attends and is not disposed to be quarrelsome, this is as plain, and easy to be understood, as how any finite thing may produce another, or rather more plain and easy, because a finite Agent doth not entirely contain its effect within it self, or in its own power, as an infinite doth. If yet it be again said, that which is limited is not infinite, but suppose any finite thing produced into being after a pre-existent infinite, this infinite becomes now limited; for the being of the finite is not that of the infinite, each hath its own distinct Being.
This finite is not to be lookt upon as emerging or springing up of it self out of nothing, or as proceeding from some third thing as its cause, but as produced by that infinite, or springing out of that, which it could not do, but as being before virtually contained in it. For the infinite produces nothing, which it could not produce. And what it could produce was before contained in it as in the power of its cause. And to any one that attends and is not disposed to be quarrelsome, this is as plain, and easie to be understood, as how any finite thing may produce another, or rather more plain and easie, because a finite Agent doth not entirely contain its effect within it self, or in its own power, as an infinite doth. If yet it be again said, that which is limited is not infinite, but suppose any finite thing produced into being after a pre-existent infinite, this infinite becomes now limited; for the being of the finite is not that of the infinite, each hath its own distinct Being.
And it cannot be said of the one, it is the other; therefore each is limited to it self. I answer, that which was infinite becomes not hereby less than it was; for it hath produced nothing but what was before virtually contained in it, and still is (for it still totally sustains the other.) But whatsoever it actually doth, it can do, or hath within its power: therefore if it were infinite before, and is not now become less, it is still infinite.
Wherefore the true reason why the position of a finite thing after a supposed all-comprehending infinite doth no way intrench upon or detract from the others all-comprehensive infinity, is, that it was formerly contained, and still is, within the virtue and power of the other.
Whefore the true reason why the position of a finite thing after a supposed all-comprehending infinite doth no way intrench upon or detract from the others all-comprehensive infinity, is, that it was formerly contained, and still is, within the virtue and power of the other.
It is true, that if we should suppose any thing besides that supposed infinite to be of it self that would infer a limitation of the former. Infer, I say, not cause it, that is, it would not make it cease to be all-comprehendingly infinite, but it would argue it not to have been so before; and that the supposition of its infinity was a false supposition, because it would then appear, that the former did not comprehend all being any way in it self. Somewhat being now found to be in Being, which hath no dependence thereon: whence it would be evident neither can be so. Of which some good use may be made to a further purpose by and by.
Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corollary from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of necessary self-subsisting matter was before shown to be a vain, it now also appears plainly to be altogether an impossible supposition. For since the necessary self-subsisting Being, is infinite, and all-comprehensive; and if matter were supposed necessary, we must have another necessary being to form the world inasmuch as matter is not self-active, much less intelligent (as it hath ⟨p. 175⟩both been proved it cannot be, and that the Former of this world must be.) It is therefore out of question, that because both cannot be all-comprehensive, they cannot both be necessary; Nor can the vastly different kinds or natures of these things salve the business; for be they of what kinds they will, they are still Beings. Besides, if matter were necessary, and self-subsisting, every particle of it must be so. And then we shall have not only two, but an infinite number of such infinites, and all of the same kind. But Being only of this or that sort (as is apparent where more sorts do exist than one) could not be simply infinite, except as the other depends thereon; and as this one is radically comprehensive of all the rest, that can come under the general and most common notion of Being. For that there is some general notion, wherein all being agrees, and by which it differs from no being, is, I think, little to be doubted; how unequally soever, and dependently, the one upon the other, the distinct sorts do partake therein. Whereupon the expressions [super-essential] and others like it, spoken of God, must be understood, as rhetorical strains, importing more reverence, than rigid truth. Except by essence (as was formerly said) only that which is created be meant. And that only a purer and more noble kind of essence were intended to be asserted to him, ⟨p. 176⟩*which yet seems also unwarrantable and injurious that a word of that import should be so misapplied and transferred from the substance, to signify nothing but the shadow, rather, of Being. And that they who would seem zealously concerned to appropriate all Being unto God, should, in the height of their transport, so far forget themselves, as to set him above all being, and so deny him any at all. For surely that which simply is above all being is no being.
Here only we may by the way annex, as a just corollary from the foregoing discourse, that as the supposition of necessary self-subsisting matter was before shewn to be a vain, it now also appears plainly to be altogether an impossible supposition. For since the necessary self-subsisting Being, is infinite, and all-comprehensive; and if matter were supposed necessary, we must have another necessary being to form the world inasmuch as matter is not self-active, much less intelligent (as it hath
And as to the unity or onliness rather of this 1being (or of the God-head) the deduction thereof seems plain and easy from what hath been already proved; that is from the absolute perfection thereof. For though some do toil themselves much about this matter; and others plainly conclude that it is not to be proved at all in a rational way, but only by divine revelation. Yet I conceive, they that follow the method (having proved some necessary self-subsisting being, the root and original spring of all Being and perfection actual and possible; which is as plain as any thing can be) of deducing from thence the absolute all comprehending perfection of such necessary being will find their work as good as done. For nothing seems more evident than that there cannot be two (much less more) such Beings. Inasmuch as one comprehends in it self all being and perfection; for there can be but one all, without which is nothing. So that, one such being supposed, another can have nothing remaining to ⟨p. 177⟩it. Yea so far is it therefore, if we suppose one infinite and absolutely perfect being, that there can be another independent thereon (and of a depending infinity we need not say more than we have, which if any such could be, cannot possibly be a distinct God) that there cannot be the minutest finite thing imaginable, which that supposed infinity doth not comprehend, or that can stand apart from it, on any distinct basis of its own. And that this matter may be left, as plain as we can make it; supposing it already most evident.
And as to the unity or onliness rather of this 1being (or of the God-head) the deduction thereof seems plain and easie from what hath been already proved; that is from the absolute perfection thereof. For though some do toil themselves much about this matter; and others plainly conclude that it is not to be proved at all in a rational way, but only by divine revelation. Yet I conceive, they that follow the method (having proved some necessary self-subsisting being, the root and original spring of all Being and perfection actual and possible; which is as plain as any thing can be) of deducing from thence the absolute all comprehending perfection of such necessary being will find their work as good as done. For nothing seems more evident than that there cannot be two (much less more) such Beings. Inasmuch as one comprehends in it self all being and perfection; for there can be but one all, without which is nothing. So that, one such being supposed, another can have nothing remaining to
That there is actually existing an absolute entire fullness of Wisdom, Power, so of all other perfection.
That there is actually existing an absolute entire fulness of Wisdom, Power, so of all other perfection.
That absolute entire fullness of perfection is infinite.
That absolute entire fulness of perfection is infinite.
That this infinite perfection must have its primary seat somewhere.
That its primary original seat can be no where but in necessary self-subsisting Being.
We hereupon add, that if we suppose multitude, or any plurality, of necessary self-originate Beings concurring to make up the seat or subject of this infinite perfection. Each one must either be of finite, and partial perfection; or infinite, and absolute. Not infinite and absolute; because one self-originate infinitely and absolutely perfect being, will necessarily comprehend all perfection and leave nothing to the rest. Not finite, because many finites can never make one infinite; much less can many broken parcels or fragments of perfection, ever make ⟨p. 178⟩infinite and absolute perfection: Even though their number (if that were possible) were infinite. For the perfection of unity, would still be wanting, and their communication and concurrence to any work (even such as we see is done) be infinitely imperfect, and impossible.
We might, more at large, and with a (much more pompous) number and apparatus of arguments, have shown, that there can be no more Gods than one. But to such as had rather be informed than bewildered and lost, clear proof that is shorter and more comprehensive, will be more grateful.
We might, more at large, and with a (much more pompous) number and apparatus of arguments, have shewn, that there can be no more Gods than one. But to such as had rather be informed than bewildered and lost, clear proof that is shorter and more comprehensive, will be more grateful.
Nor doth this proof of the uniting of the God-head any way impugn the Trinity, which is by Christians believed therein (and whereof some Heathens, as is known, have not been wholly without some apprehension, however they came by it) or exclude a sufficient uncreated ground of Trinal distinction. As would be seen if that great difference of Beings necessary and contingent, be well stated; and what is by eternal necessary emanation of the Divine Nature, be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the Divine Will. And the matter be throughly examined, whether, herein, be not a sufficient distinction of that which is increated, and that which is created. In this way it is possible it might be cleared, how a Trinity in the God-head may be very consistently with the unity thereof. But that it is, we cannot know, but by his telling us so. It being among the many things of God which ⟨p. 179⟩are not to be known, but by the Spirit of God revealing and testifying them, in and according to the holy Scriptures. As the things of a man are not known but by the spirit of a man. And what further evidence we may justly and reasonably take from those Scriptures, even in reference to some of the things hitherto discoursed, may be hereafter shown.
Nor doth this proof of the uniting of the God-head any way impugn the Trinity, which is by Christians believed therein (and whereof some Heathens, as is known, have not been wholly without some apprehension, however they came by it) or exclude a sufficient uncreated ground of Trinal distinction. As would be seen if that great difference of Beings necessary and contingent, be well stated; and what is by eternal necessary emanation of the Divine Nature, be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the Divine Will. And the matter be throughly examined, whether, herein, be not a sufficient distinction of that which is increated, and that which is created. In this way it is possible it might be cleared, how a Trinity in the God-head may be very consistently with the unity thereof. But that it is, we cannot know, but by his telling us so. It being among the many things of God which ⟨p. 179⟩are not to be known, but by the Spirit of God revealing and testifying them, in and according to the holy Scriptures. As the things of a man are not known but by the spirit of a man. And what further evidence we may justly and reasonably take from those Scriptures, even in reference to some of the things hitherto discoursed, may be hereafter shewn.