A44683:460
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The greatest difficulty that hath troubled some in this matter hath been, How it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon a free and self-determining cause. But methinks we should not make a difficulty to acknowledge that to know these things, imports greater perfection, than not to know them; and then it would be very unreasonable, because we cannot show how this or that thing was performed, which manifestly is done; therefore to deny that it is done at all. So far is it that we can with any show of reason conclude against any act of God from our ignorance of the manner of it, that we should reckon it very absurd to conclude so, concerning any act of our own, or our ability thereto. What if it were hitherto an unknown ⟨p. 264⟩thing, and impossible to be determined; how the act of vision is performed by us: were it a wise conclusion, that therefore we neither do nor can see? r How much more rash and presuming a confidence were it to reason thus concerning the Divine acts and perfections! would we not in any such case be determined rather by that which is more evident, than by what is more obscure? As in the assigned instance: we should have but these two propositions to compare [that I do (or have such a perfection belonging to me that I can) see] and [that whatsoever act I do or can do, I am able to understand the course and method of natures operation therein.] And thereupon to judge which of these two is more evident. Wherein it may be supposed there's no man in his wits to whom the determination would not be easy. Accordingly in the present case we have only these two assertions that can be in competition in point of evidence, between which we are to make a comparison and a (consequent) judgment, viz. [whatsoever perfection belongs to a Being absolutely perfect, enabling it to do this or that, the wit of man can comprehend the distinct way and manner of doing it] and [it imports greater perfection to know all things, than to be ignorant of some] and here surely whosoever shall think the determination difficult, accounts the wit of man so exceeding great that he discovers his own to be very little. For what can the pretence of evidence be in the former assertion?
The greatest difficulty that hath troubled some in this matter hath been, How it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come, that depend upon a free and self-determining cause. But methinks we should not make a difficulty to acknowledge that to know these things, imports greater perfection, than not to know them; and then it would be very unreasonable, because we cannot shew how this or that thing was performed, which manifestly is done; therefore to deny that it is done at all. So far is it that we can with any shew of reason conclude against any act of God from our ignorance of the manner of it, that we should reckon it very absurd to conclude so, concerning any act of our own, or our ability thereto. What if it were hitherto an unknown