A44683:473
The Living Temple
The living temple, or, A designed improvement of that notion that a good man is the temple of God by John Howe ...
London: printed for John Starkey, 1675
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Some indeed have so over-done the business here as to deny any intrinsical possibility of any thing, and say that things are only said to be possible because God can do them; which is the same thing as thus to explain Gods omnipotency, i. e. that he can do all things which he can do. And makes a Chimaera no more impossible in it self to be produced than a not yet existent man. And the reason of the denial is that what is only possible is nothing; and ⟨p. 276⟩therefore can have nothing intrinsical to it. As if it were not sufficient to the intrinsical possibility of a thing, that its Idea have no repugnancy in it. Yet entire and full possibility connotes a reference to the productive power of an Agent; so that it is equally absurd to say that things are only possible, because there is no repugnancy in their Idea's, as it is to say they are only possible because some Agent can do them. Inasmuch as the entire possibility of their existence imports both, that there is no repugnancy in their Idea's (which if there be, they are every way nothing, as hath been said before) and also, that there is a sufficient power to produce them. Therefore, whereas we might believe him sufficient every way for us, though we did not believe him simply omnipotent; how much more fully are we assured when we consider that he is? Whereof also no place of doubt can remain, this being a most unquestionable perfection, necessarily included, in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being. But here we need not further insist, having no peculiar adversary (in this matter singly) to contend with, (as indeed he would have had an hard province who should have undertaken to contend against omnipotency.)
Some indeed have so over-done the business here as to deny any intrinsecal possibility of any thing, and say that things are only said to be possible because God can do them; which is the same thing as thus to explain Gods omnipotency, i. e. that he can do all things which he can do. And makes a Chimaera no more impossible in it self to be produced than a not yet existent man. And the reason of the denial is that what is only possible is nothing; and ⟨p. 276⟩therefore can have nothing intrinsecal to it. As if it were not sufficient to the intrinsecal possibility of a thing, that its Idea have no repugnancy in it. Yet entire and full possibility connotes a reference to the productive power of an Agent; so that it is equally absurd to say that things are only possible, because there is no repugnancy in their Idea's, as it is to say they are only possible because some Agent can do them. Inasmuch as the entire possibility of their existence imports both, that there is no repugnancy in their Idea's (which if there be, they are every way nothing, as hath been said before) and also, that there is a sufficient power to produce them. Therefore, whereas we might believe him sufficient every way for us, though we did not believe him simply omnipotent; how much more fully are we assured when we consider that he is? Whereof also no place of doubt can remain, this being a most unquestionable perfection, necessarily included, in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being. But here we need not further insist, having no peculiar adversary (in this matter singly) to contend with, (as indeed he would have had an hard province who should have undertaken to contend against omnipotency.)