Chapter 6
pp. 226–287111 passagespart 3 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
if we did industriously set our selves to compare the effects of Divine Power with those of humane art and skill. As is the ingenious and pious observation of the most worthy Mr. Hooke, who upon his viewing with his Microscope 1the point of a small and very sharp needle (than which we cannot conceive a smaller thing laboured by the hand of man) takes notice of sundry sorts of natural things, That have points many thousand times sharper: those of the hairs of insects, &c. That appearing broad, irregular and uneven, having marks upon it, of the rudeness and bungling of art. So unaccurate (saith he) is it in all its productions, even in those that seem most neat, that, if examined truly with an organ more acute than that by which they were made, the more we see of their shape the less appearance will there be of their beauty; Whereas in the works of Nature the deepe• discoveries show us the greatest excellencies. An evident Argument that he that was the Author of these things was no other than omnipotent, being able to include as great a variety of parts in the yet smallest discernible point, as in the vaster bodies (which comparatively are called also points) such as the Earth, Sun, or Planets. And I may add, when those appear but points, in comparison of his so much vaster work, how plainly doth that also argue to us the same thing?
if we did industriously set our selves to compare the effects of Divine Power with those of humane art and skill. As is the ingenious and pious observation of the most worthy Mr. Hooke, who upon his viewing with his Microscope 1the point of a small and very sharp needle (than which we cannot conceive a smaller thing laboured by the hand of man) takes notice of sundry sorts of natural things, That have points many thousand times sharper: those of the hairs of insects, &c. That appearing broad, irregular and uneven, having marks upon it, of the rudeness and bungling of art. So unaccurate (saith he) is it in all its productions, even in those that seem most neat, that, if examined truly with an organ more acute than that by which they were made, the more we see of their shape the less appearance will there be of their beauty; Whereas in the works of Nature the deepe• discoveries shew us the greatest excellencies. An evident Argument that he that was the Author of these things was no other than omnipotent, being able to include as great a variety of parts in the yet smallest discernable point, as in the vaster bodies (which comparatively are called also points) such as the Earth, Sun, or Planets. And I may add, when those appear but points, in comparison of his so much vaster work, how plainly doth that also argue to us the same thing?
And let us strictly consider the matter. Omnipotency as hath been said imports a power ⟨p. 275⟩of doing all things possible to be done, or indeed, simply all things; unto which passive power, an active one must necessarily correspond. That is, there is nothing in it self possible to be done, but it is also possible to some one or other to do it. If we should therefore suppose God not omnipotent, it would follow some one or other were able to do more than God. For though possibility do import a non-repugnancy in the thing to be done; yet it also connotes an ability in some Agent to do it. Wherefore there is nothing possible which some Agent cannot do. And if so, that Agent must either be God or some other. To say it is God, is what we intend. That is, there is nothing possible which God cannot do. Or he can do all things. But to say it is some other and not God, were to open the door to the abovementioned horrid consequence; which no one that acknowledges a God (and we are not now discoursing with them who simply deny his Being) would not both blush and tremble to avow.
And let us strictly consider the matter. Omnipotency as hath been said imports a power ⟨p. 275⟩of doing all things possible to be done, or indeed, simply all things; unto which passive power, an active one must necessarily correspond. That is, there is nothing in it self possible to be done, but it is also possible to some one or other to do it. If we should therefore suppose God not omnipotent, it would follow some one or other were able to do more than God. For though possibility do import a nonrepugnancy in the thing to be done; yet it also connotes an ability in some Agent to do it. Wherefore there is nothing possible which some Agent cannot do. And if so, that Agent must either be God or some other. To say it is God, is what we intend. That is, there is nothing possible which God cannot do. Or he can do all things. But to say it is some other and not God, were to open the door to the abovementioned horrid consequence; which no one that acknowledges a God (and we are not now discoursing with them who simply deny his Being) would not both blush and tremble to avow.
Some indeed have so over-done the business here as to deny any intrinsical possibility of any thing, and say that things are only said to be possible because God can do them; which is the same thing as thus to explain Gods omnipotency, i. e. that he can do all things which he can do. And makes a Chimaera no more impossible in it self to be produced than a not yet existent man. And the reason of the denial is that what is only possible is nothing; and ⟨p. 276⟩therefore can have nothing intrinsical to it. As if it were not sufficient to the intrinsical possibility of a thing, that its Idea have no repugnancy in it. Yet entire and full possibility connotes a reference to the productive power of an Agent; so that it is equally absurd to say that things are only possible, because there is no repugnancy in their Idea's, as it is to say they are only possible because some Agent can do them. Inasmuch as the entire possibility of their existence imports both, that there is no repugnancy in their Idea's (which if there be, they are every way nothing, as hath been said before) and also, that there is a sufficient power to produce them. Therefore, whereas we might believe him sufficient every way for us, though we did not believe him simply omnipotent; how much more fully are we assured when we consider that he is? Whereof also no place of doubt can remain, this being a most unquestionable perfection, necessarily included, in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being. But here we need not further insist, having no peculiar adversary (in this matter singly) to contend with, (as indeed he would have had an hard province who should have undertaken to contend against omnipotency.)
Some indeed have so over-done the business here as to deny any intrinsecal possibility of any thing, and say that things are only said to be possible because God can do them; which is the same thing as thus to explain Gods omnipotency, i. e. that he can do all things which he can do. And makes a Chimaera no more impossible in it self to be produced than a not yet existent man. And the reason of the denial is that what is only possible is nothing; and ⟨p. 276⟩therefore can have nothing intrinsecal to it. As if it were not sufficient to the intrinsecal possibility of a thing, that its Idea have no repugnancy in it. Yet entire and full possibility connotes a reference to the productive power of an Agent; so that it is equally absurd to say that things are only possible, because there is no repugnancy in their Idea's, as it is to say they are only possible because some Agent can do them. Inasmuch as the entire possibility of their existence imports both, that there is no repugnancy in their Idea's (which if there be, they are every way nothing, as hath been said before) and also, that there is a sufficient power to produce them. Therefore, whereas we might believe him sufficient every way for us, though we did not believe him simply omnipotent; how much more fully are we assured when we consider that he is? Whereof also no place of doubt can remain, this being a most unquestionable perfection, necessarily included, in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being. But here we need not further insist, having no peculiar adversary (in this matter singly) to contend with, (as indeed he would have had an hard province who should have undertaken to contend against omnipotency.)
And now join herewith again the boundlessness of his goodness; which upon the same ground of his absolute perfection, must be infinite also, (and which it is of equal concernment to us to consider, that we may understand he not only can effectually provide about ⟨p. 277⟩our concernments, but is most graciously inclined so to do.) And then what rational inducement is wanting to Religion and the Dedication of a Temple? If we consider the joint encouragement that arises from so unlimited power and goodness? or what man would not become entirely devoted to him, who, by the one of these, we are assured, can do all things, and by the other, will do what is best.†
And now joyn herewith again the boundlessness of his goodness; which upon the same ground of his absolute perfection, must be infinite also, (and which it is of equal concernment to us to consider, that we may understand he not only can effectually provide about ⟨p. 277⟩our concernments, but is most graciously inclined so to do.) And then what rational inducement is wanting to Religion and the Dedication of a Temple? If we consider the joynt encouragement that arises from so unlimited power and goodness? or what man would not become entirely devoted to him, who, by the one of these, we are assured, can do all things, and by the other, will do what is best.†
- †[Greek or Hebrew]. Phil. Jud. de Abr.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Phil. Jud. de Abr.
Nor therefore is there any thing immediately needful to our present purpose, the eviction of Gods conversableness with men, more than hath been already said. That is, there is nothing else to be thought on, that hath any nearer influence thereon. The things that can be supposed to have such influence being none else than his Power, Knowledge and Goodness, which have been particularly evinced from the Creation of the world, both to have been in some former subject, and to have all originally met in a necessary being, that alone could be the Creator of it. Which necessary Being, as it is such, appearing, also, to be infinite and absolutely perfect; the influence of these cannot but the more abundantly appear to be such as can and may most sufficiently and fully correspond both in general to the several exigencies of all creatures, and more especially to all the real necessities and reasonable desires of man. So that our main purpose seems already gained.
Yet because it may be grateful when we are persuaded that things are so, to fortify (as ⟨p. 278⟩much as we can) that persuasion. And because our persuasion concerning these attributes of God will be still liable to assault unless we acknowledge him every where present. Nor can it well be conceivable, otherwise, how the influence of his knowledge, power, and goodness can be so universal, as will be thought necessary to infer an universal obligation to Religion. It will be therefore requisite to add somewhat concerning his Omnipresence, or, because some that love to be very strictly critical will be apt to think that term restrictive of his presence to the universe (as supposing to be present is relative to somewhat, one may be said present unto, whereas they will say without the universe is nothing) we will rather choose it to call it immensity. For though it would sufficiently answer our purpose that his presence be universal to all his creatures; yet even this is to be proved by such arguments as will conclude him simply immense. Which therefore will with the greater advantage infer the thing we intend.
Yet because it may be grateful when we are perswaded that things are so, to fortifie (as ⟨p. 278⟩much as we can) that perswasion. And because our perswasion concerning these attributes of God will be still liable to assault unless we acknowledge him every where present. Nor can it well be conceivable, otherwise, how the influence of his knowledge, power, and goodness can be so universal, as will be thought necessary to infer an universal obligation to Religion. It will be therefore requisite to add somewhat concerning his Omnipresence, or, because some that love to be very strictly critical will be apt to think that term restrictive of his presence to the universe (as supposing to be present is relative to somewhat, one may be said present unto, whereas they will say without the universe is nothing) we will rather chuse it to call it immensity. For though it would sufficiently answer our purpose that his presence be universal to all his creatures; yet even this is to be proved by such arguments as will conclude him simply immense. Which therefore wil with the greater advantage infer the thing we intend.
This part of Divine perfection we will acknowledge to have been impugned by some that have professed much devotedness to a Deity and Religion; we will therefore charitably suppose that opposition to have been joined with inadvertency of the ill tendency of it, that is, how unwarrantably it would maim the notion of the former and shake the foundations of the latter. Nor therefore ought that charity to be any allay to a just zeal for so great concerns.
This part of Divine perfection we will acknowledge to have been impugned by some that have professed much devotedness to a Deity and Religion; we will therefore charitably suppose that opposition to have been joyned with inadvertency of the ill tendency of it, that is, how unwarrantably it would maim the notion of the former and shake the foundations of the latter. Nor therefore ought that charity to be any allay to a just zeal for so great concerns.
It seems then, first, manifestly repugnant to the notion of an infinitely perfect Being to suppose it less than simply immense. For, upon that supposition, it must either be limited to some certain place, or excluded out of all. The The latter of these would be most openly to deny it; as hath, with irrefragable evidence, been abundantly manifested by the most learned Dr. More; whereto it would be needless 1and vain to attempt to add any thing. Nor is that the thing pretended to by the sort of persons I now chiefly intend.
- 1Both in his Dialogues and Enchiridion Metaphys.
And for the former, I would enquire; Is amplitude of essence no perfection? or were the confining of this Being to the very minutest space we can imagine, no detraction from the perfection of it? what if the amplitude of that glorious and ever-blessed Essence were said to be only of that extent (may it be spoken with all reverence, and resentment of the unhappy necessity we have of making so mean a supposition) as to have been confined unto that one Temple to which of old he chose to confine his more solemn Worship; that he could be essentially present only here at once and no where else, were this no detraction? They that think him only to replenish and be present by his essence in the highest heaven (as some are wont to speak) would they not confess it were a meaner and much lower thought to suppose that presence circumscribed within the so unconceivably narrower limits, as the walls of an house? If they would pretend ⟨p. 280⟩to ascribe to him some perfection beyond this; by supposing his essential presence commensurable to the vaster territory of the highest heavens, even by the same supposition should they deny to him greater perfection than they ascribe. For the perfection which in this kind they should ascribe were finite only, but that which they should deny were infinite.
Again, they will however acknowledge omnipotency a perfection included in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being; therefore they will grant, he can create another world (for they do not pretend to believe this infinite; and if they did, by their supposition, they should give away their cause) at any the greatest distance we can conceive from this: therefore so far his power can extend it self. But what, his power without his being? what then is his power? something, or nothing? nothing can do nothing; therefore not make a world. It is then some Being, and whose Being is it but his own? Is it a created Being? That is to suppose him first impotent, and then to have created omnipotency, when he could do nothing. Whence by the way, we may see to how little purpose that distinction can be applied in the present case of essential and virtual contact, where the essence and virtue cannot but be the same.
Again, they will however acknowledge omnipotency a perfection included in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being; therefore they will grant, he can create another world (for they do not pretend to believe this infinite; and if they did, by their supposition, they should give away their cause) at any the greatest distance we can conceive from this: therefore so far his power can extend it self. But what, his power without his being? what then is his power? something, or nothing? nothing can do nothing; therefore not make a world. It is then some Being, and whose Being is it but his own? Is it a created Being? That is to suppose him first impotent, and then to have created omnipoteecy, when he could do nothing. Whence by the way, we may see to how little purpose that distinction can be applyed in the present case of essential and virtual contact, where the essence and virtue cannot but be the same.
But shall it be said, he must in order to the creating such another world, locally move thither where he designs it? I ask then, but can he not at the same time create thousands of ⟨p. 281⟩worlds at any distance from this round about it? No man can imagine this to be impossible to him that can do all things. Wherefore of such extent is his power and consequently his Being.
Will they therefore say he can immensely if he please diffuse his Being but he voluntarily contracts it; 'Tis answered that is altogether impossible to a Being that is whatsoever it is by a simple and absolute necessity: for whatsoever it is necessarily it is unalterably and eternally, or is pure act and in a possibility to be nothing which it already is not. Therefore since God can every where exert his power, he is necessarily, already, every where. And hence Gods immensity is the true reason of his immobility; there being no imaginable space which he doth not necessarily replenish.
Will they therefore say he can immensly if he please diffuse his Being but he voluntarily contracts it; 'Tis answered that is altogether impossible to a Being that is whatsoever it is by a simple and absolute necessity: for whatsoever it is necessarily it is unalterably and eternally, or is pure act and in a possibility to be nothing which it already is not. Therefore since God can every where exert his power, he is necessarily, already, every where. And hence Gods immensity is the true reason of his immobility; there being no imaginable space which he doth not necessarily replenish.
Whence also the supposition of his being so confined (as was said) is immediately repugnant to the notion of a necessary Being, as well as of an absolutely perfect, which hath been argued from it.
We might moreover add that, upon the same supposition, God might truly be said to have made a creature greater than himself (for such this universe apparently were) and that he can make one (as they must confess who deny him not to be omnipotent) most unconceivably greater.
Nothing therefore seems more manifest than that God is immense; or (as we may express it) extrinsically infinite, with respect to place; ⟨p. 282⟩as well as intrinsically, in respect to the plenitude of his being and perfection. Only it may be requisite to consider, briefly, what is said against it, by the otherwise minded, 1that pretend not to deny his infinity in that other sense. Wherein that this discourse swell not beyond just bounds, their strength, viz. of argument (for it will not be so seasonable here to discuss with them the Texts of Scripture wont to be insisted on in this matter) shall be viewed as it is collected and gathered up in one of them. And that shall be Curcellaeus, 2who gives it, as succinctly and fully, as any I have met with of that sort of men.
Nothing therefore seems more manifest than that God is immense; or (as we may express it) extrinsecally infinite, with respect to place; ⟨p. 282⟩as well as intrinsecally, in respect to the plenitude of his being and perfection. Only it may be requisite to consider, briefly, what is said against it, by the otherwise minded, 1that pretend not to deny his infinity in that other sense. Wherein that this discourse swell not beyond just bounds, their strength, viz. of argument (for it will not be so seasonable here to discuss with them the Texts of Scripture wont to be insisted on in this matter) shall be viewed as it is collected and gathered up in one of them. And that shall be Curcellaeus, 2who gives it, as succinctly and fully, as any I have met with of that sort of men.
- 1XI.
- 2De Vocibus Trinit. Psov. &c.
The Doctrine it self we may take from him thus. First (on the negative part by way of denial of what we have been hitherto asserting) he says, The foundation (that is of a distinction of Maresius's to which he is replying, for so occasionally comes in the discourse) viz. the infinity of the Divine Essence, is not so firm as is commonly thought.
And that therefore it may be thought less firm, he thinks fit to cast a slur upon it, by making it the Doctrine of the Stoics, expressed by Virgil, Jovis omnia plena (as if it must needs be false because Virgil said it, though I could tell, if it were worth the while where Virgil speaks more agreeably to this sense than ours, according to which he might as well have interpreted this passage as divers Texts of Scripture. And then his Authority might have been of some value) And by Lucan, who helps ⟨p. 283⟩it seems to disgrace and spoil it, Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris (he might if he had a mind to make it thought Paganish, have quoted a good many more, but then there might have been some danger it should pass for a common notion). Next he quotes some passages of Fathers that import dislike of it. About which we need not concern our selves. For the question is not what this or that man thought.
And that therefore it may be thought less firm, he thinks fit to cast a slur upon it, by making it the Doctrine of the Stoicks, exprest by Virgil, Jovis omnia plena (as if it must needs be false because Virgil said it, though I could tell, if it were worth the while where Virgil speaks more agreeably to this sense than ours, according to which he might as well have interpreted this passage as divers Texts of Scripture. And then his Authority might have been of some value) And by Lucan, who helps ⟨p. 283⟩it seems to disgrace and spoil it, Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris (he might if he had a mind to make it thought Paganish, have quoted a good many more, but then there might have been some danger it should pass for a common notion). Next he quotes some passages of Fathers that import dislike of it. About which we need not concern our selves. For the question is not what this or that man thought.
And then for the positive account of his own judgment in the case, having recited divers Texts out of the Bible that seemed as he apprehended to make against him. He would have us believe, that these all speak rather of Gods providence and power by which he concerns himself in all our works, words, and thoughts, wheresoever we live, than of the absolute infinity of his Essence.
And afterwards, That God is by his Essence 1in the supreme heaven, where he inhabits the inaccessible light, but thence he sends out from himself a spirit or a certain force, whether he pleases, by which he is truly present and works there.
- 1Unto which purpose speaks at large Volkelius de vera Relig. Quia enim Dei & potentia & sapientia ad res omnes extenditur, uti & potest as five imperium; ideo ubique praesens, omniaque numine suo complere dicitur, &c. l. 1. c. 27. Schliclingius Artic. de filio Dei. Ad Ps. 139. 6, 7. Nec loquitur David de spiritu sancto, qui peculiaris quidem Dei spiritus est, sed de spiritu Dei simpliciter. Nec dicit spiritum istum ubique re esse sed tantum docet nullum esse locum, ad quem is nequeat pertingere, &c. So also F. Socin. Smalcius. And (though not altogether so expressly as the •est) Vorstius, Creblius, &c.Unto which purpose speaks at large Volkelius de vera Relig. Quia enim Dei & potentia & sapientia ad res omnes extenditur, uti & potest as five imperium; ideo ubique praesens, omniaque numine suo complere dicitur, &c. l. 1. c. 27. Schliclingius Artic. de filio Dei. Ad Ps. 139. 6, 7. Nec loquitur David de spiritu sancto, qui peculiaris quidem Dei spiritus est, sed de spiritu Dei simpliciter. Nec dicit spiritum istum ubique re esse sed tantum docet nullum esse locum, ad quem is nequeat pertingere, &c. So also F. Socin. Smalcius. And (though not altogether so expresly as the •est) Vorstius, Creblius, &c.
But proceed we to his Reasons, which he saith are not to be contemned. We shall therefore ⟨p. 284⟩not contemn them so far as not to take notice of them; which trouble also the Reader may please to be at; and, afterward, do, as he thinks fit.
1. That no difference can be conceived between God and creatures, if God as they commonly speak, be, wholly, in every point; or do fill all the points of the universe with his whole Essence. For so whatsoever at all is will be God himself.
Answ. And that is most marvellous that the in-being of one thing in another must needs take away all their difference, and confound them each with other: which sure would much rather argue them distinct. For certainly it cannot, without great impropriety, be said that any thing is in it self: And is both the container and contained. How were these thoughts in his mind? and these very notions which he opposes to each other, so as not to be confounded with his mind, and consequently with one another? So that it's a great wonder he was not of both opinions at once. And how did he think his soul to be in his body, which, though substantially united with it (and that is somewhat more, as we will suppose he knew was commonly held, than to be intimately present) was not yet the same thing. However himself acknowledges the power and providence of God to be every where. And then at least every thing must it seems be the very power and providence of God. But he thought it may be only of confuting the words of Lucan, and ⟨p. 285⟩chastising his poetic liberty. And if he would have been at the pains to turn all their strains and raptures into propositions, and so have gravely fallen to confuting them, he might perhaps have found as proper an exercise for his Logic as this. As for his talk of a whole, whereof we acknowledge no parts (as if he imagined the Divine Essence to be compounded of such, he should have said so and have proved it) 'tis an absurd scheme of speech which may be left to him, and them that use it to make their best of.
Answ. And that is most marvellous that the in-being of one thing in another must needs take away all their difference, and confound them each with other: which sure would much rather argue them distinct. For certainly it cannot, without great impropriety, be said that any thing is in it self: And is both the container and contained. How were these thoughts in his mind? and these very notions which he opposes to each other, so as not to be confounded with his mind, and consequently with one another? So that it's a great wonder he was not of both opinions at once. And how did he think his soul to be in his body, which, though substantially united with it (and that is somewhat more, as we will suppose he knew was commonly held, than to be intimately present) was not yet the same thing. However himself acknowledges the power and providence of God to be every where. And then at least every thing must it seems be the very power and providence of God. But he thought it may be only of confuting the words of Lucan, and ⟨p. 285⟩
2. No Idolatry can be committed if there be not the least point to be found, that is not wholly full of whole God. For whithersoever worship shall be directed, it shall be directed to God himself, who will be no less there than in heaven.
Answ. This proceeds upon the supposition that the former would be granted as soon as it should be heard, as a self-evident principle, that whatsoever is in another is that in which it is. And so his consequence were most undeniable. But though we acknowledge God to be in every thing, yet so to worship him in any thing, as if his essential presence were confined thereto, while it ought to be conceived of as immense, this is Idolatry. And therefore they who so conceive of it as confined (or tied in any respect, wherein he hath not so tied it himself) are concerned to beware of running upon this rock.
Answ. This proceeds upon the supposition that the former would be granted as soon as it should be heard, as a self-evident principle, that whatsoever is in another is that in which it is. And so his consequence were most undeniable. But though we acknowledge God to be in every thing, yet so to worship him in any thing, as if his essential presence were confined thereto, while it ought to be conceived of as immense, this is Idolatry. And therefore they who so conceive of it as confin'd (or ty'd in any respect, wherein he hath not so ty'd it himself) are concerned to beware of running upon this rock.
3. Nor can the opinion of Fanatics be solidly refuted, who call themselves spiritual, when ⟨p. 286⟩they determine God to be all in all. To do not only good but evil things; because he is to be accounted to be essentially in all the atoms of the world, in whole; and as a common soul by which all the parts of the universe do act.
3. Nor can the opinion of Fanaticks be solidly refuted, who call themselves spiritual, when ⟨p. 286⟩they determine God to be all in all. To do not only good but evil things; because he is to be accounted to be essentially in all the atoms of the world, in whole; and as a common soul by which all the parts of the universe do act.
Answ. We may in time make trial whether they can be refuted or no; or whether any solid ground will be left for it. At this time it will suffice to say, that though he be present every where as a necessary Being, yet he acts as a free cause. And according as his wisdom, his good pleasure, his holiness, and justice do guide his action.
4. So God will be equally present with the wicked and with the holy and godly, with the damned in Hell and Devils, as with the blessed in Heaven or Christ himself.
Answ. So he will in respect of his essential presence. How he is otherwise (distinguishingly enough) present in his Temple, we shall have occasion hereafter to show.
Answ. So he will in respect of his essential presence. How he is otherwise (distinguishingly enough) present in his Temple, we shall have occasion hereafter to shew.
5. That I say not how shameful it is to think that the most pure and holy God should be as much in the most nasty places as in heaven, &c. (I forbear to recite the rest of this uncleanly argument, which is strong in nothing but ill savour.) But for
Answ. How strange a notion was this of Holiness, by which it is set in opposition to corporal filthiness! As if an holy man should lose, or very much blemish his sanctity, by a casual fall into a puddle. Indeed if sense must give us measures of God, and every thing must be ⟨p. 287⟩reckoned an essence to him that is so to it; we shall soon frame to our selves a God altogether such a one as our selves. The Epicureans themselves would have been ashamed to reason or conceive thus of God, who tell us the Divine Being is as little capable of receiving a stroke as the Inane. And surely (in proportion) of any sensible offence, we might as well suppose him in danger, as Dr. More fitly expresseth it, to be 1hurt with a thorn, as offended with an ill smell.
- 1In his Dialogues.
We have then enough to assure us of Gods absolute immensity and omnipresence, and nothing of that value against it as ought to shake our belief herein. And surely the consideration of this, added to the other of his perfections (and which tends so directly to facilitate and strengthen our persuasion concerning the rest) may render us assuredly certain, that we shall find him a conversable Being. If we seriously apply our selves to converse with him, and will but allow him the liberty of that Temple within us, whereof we are hereafter (with his leave and help) to treat more distinctly and at large.
We have then enough to assure us of Gods absolute immensity and omnipresence, and nothing of that value against it as ought to shake our belief herein. And surely the consideration of this, added to the other of his perfections (and which tends so directly to facilitate and strengthen our perswasion concerning the rest) may render us assuredly certain, that we shall find him a conversable Being. If we seriously apply our selves to converse with him, and will but allow him the liberty of that Temple within us, whereof we are hereafter (with his leave and help) to treat more distinctly and at large.