OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.
pp. 1–360712 passagespart 5 of 18
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Concerning the matter or businesses wherein Lots may lawfully be used the rule of Caution in general is this that Lots are to be used in things indifferent only. Which Caution that it may be the better conceived, a word or two will do well for the explication of the word Indifferent used in it. The rather for that some there be that suppose that there is no Act at all Indifferent; and so according to their judgement, if Lots may be used in things indifferent only, they may not be used at all. True it is that in the Schools there are two received Axioms that may seem the one to cross the other, to wit, that lEvery action is indifferent; and that mNo action is indifferent: which seeming contradiction they yet salve with a distinction of nnaked and clothed, that every naked or bare action simply conceived is indifferent, but no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent. For example, say they, to strike is indifferent, but to strike an Innocent, or to strike without authority, or to strike in this or that case, this or that Person, is not so. But to come nearer home to that we have now in hand: The word indifferent may be taken two ways, either as it opposed to Good and Evil, and more specially to such actions of virtue and vice as deserve more special either praise or reproof; or as it is opposed to necessary good duties, such things as must needs be done, and so consequently also to Evils simply forbidden, which in that regard may in no wise be done. In the former sense is that said to be oindifferent, that is neither good nor bad, neither lawful nor unlawful. In this sense albeit
natural actions not proceeding from reason, and therefore coming not within compass of the Moral law, as for a man to talk or walk in his sleep and the like, are in that regard merely indifferent, no Law being given of them that may be observed or transgressed in them: As also howsoever
many actions in general are said to be indifferent, because they are not either so simply good, but that by some particular circumstances they may be so tainted and corrupted as they may become evil, nor yet so absolutely evil but that in some cases and with some circumstances qualified they may not only become good, but prove even necessary duties:
Concerning the matter or businesses wherein Lots may lawfully be vsed the rule of Caution in generall is this that Lots are to be vsed in things indifferent onely. Which Caution that it may be the better conceiued, a word or two will doe well for the explication of the word Indifferent vsed in it. The rather for that some there be that suppose that there is no Act at all Indifferent; and so according to their judgement, if Lots may be vsed in things indifferent onely, they may not be vsed at all. True it is that in the Schooles there are two receiued Axiomes that may seeme the one to crosse the other, to wit, that lEuery action is indifferent; and that mNo action is indifferent: which seeming contradiction they yet salue with a distinction of nnaked and clothed, that euery naked or bare action simply conceiued is indifferent, but no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent. For example, say they, to strike is indifferent, but to strike an Innocent, or to strike without authority, or to strike in this or that case, this or that Person, is not so. But to come neerer home to that wee haue now in hand: The word indifferent may be taken two waies, either as it opposed to Good and Euill, and more specially to such actions of virtue and vice as deserue more speciall either praise or reproofe; or as it is opposed to necessary good duties, such things as must needes be done, and so consequently also to Euills simply forbidden, which in that regard may in no wise be done. In the former sense is that said to be oindifferent, that is neither good nor bad, neither lawfull nor vnlawfull. In this sense albeit ⟨p. 95⟩many pnaturall actions not proceeding from reason, and therefore comming not within compasse of the Morall law, as for a man to talke or walke in his sleepe and the like, are in that regard meerely indifferent, no Law being giuen of them that may be obserued or transgressed in them: As also howsoeuer qmany actions in generall are said to be indifferent, because they are not either so simply good, but that by some particular circumstances they may be so tainted and corrupted as they may become euill, nor yet so absolutely euill but that in some cases and with some circumstances qualified they may not onely become good, but proue euen necessarie duties:
lOmnis actio est adiaphora.
mNulla actio est adiaphora. Vise Gerson. in regul. mor.
nOmnis nuda; nulla vestita.
oOmnia aut bona sunt, a•t mala, aut indifferentia: quod nec bonum nec malum est, sequitur ut medium sit. Senec. epist. 118. Indifferentia dico. quae Graeci [Greek or Hebrew] vocant, quae nec bona, nec mala sunt. Idem ep. 83. [Greek or Hebrew] indifferens sive medium, quod nec bonum nec malū est: quod nec in bonis ponitur, nec in contrarijs. Cic. de fin. lib. 3.Omnia aut bona sunt, a•t mala, aut indifferentia: quod nec bonum nec malum est, sequitur vt medium sit. Senec. epist. 118. Indifferentia dico. quae Graeci 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 vocant, quae nec bona, nec mala sunt. Idem ep. 83. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 indifferens siue medium, quod nec bonum nec malū est: quod nec in bonis ponitur, nec in contrarijs. Cic. de fin. lib. 3.
pIndifferentia sunt morbus, paupertas, &c. Senec. ep 83. Indifferens est actus omnis à ratione non procedens. Thom. sum. par. 2• 2ae, q. 18. a. 9. Id medium atque indifferens v•camus, quod tam malo contingere quàm bono potest. Senec. ep. 118.
q[Greek or Hebrew], quaeper sese ipsa neque honesta (malè vulgo, inhonesta) sunt neque turpia, sed perinde ut aguntur, ita aut probanda fiunt, aut reprehendenda. Gellius noct. Attic. l. 2. c. 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉, quaeper sese ipsa neque honesta (malè vulgo, inhonesta) sunt neque turpia, sed perinde vt aguntur, ita aut probanda fiunt, aut reprehendēda. Gellius noct. Attic. l. 2. c. 7.
Yet nevertheless most true it is, that rno particular moral action, or no action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word or disconformable thereunto. In common speech indeed the word Indifferent according to this acception is taken in some latitude of signification, when it is attributed to such actions as though good and warrantable, yea or necessary, yet sare not greatly praise-worthy, because there is no special matte• of goodness in them, as for a man to eat when he is hungry, to drink when he is athirst, tto provide carefully for his own Family, uto love those that love him, and the like, which yet in ⟨p. 96⟩strictness of truth according to this acception are not absolutely indifferent.
Yet neuerthelesse most true it is, that rno particular morall action, or no action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word or disconformable thereunto. In common speech indeede the word Indifferent according to this acception is taken in some latitude of signification, when it is attributed to such actions as though good and warrantable, yea or necessarie, yet sare not greatly praise-worthy, because there is no speciall matte• of goodnesse in them, as for a man to eate when he is hungrie, to drinke when he is athirst, tto prouide carefully for his owne Family, uto loue those that loue him, and the like, which yet in ⟨p. 96⟩strictnesse of truth according to this acception are not absolutely indifferent.
rVise Thom. par. 2a 2ae, q. 14. a. 9. & q. 21. a. 1.2. Quicquid facimus, aut malitiae, aut virt••tis gerimu• imperio. Senes. ep. 107.
sMediū est, quod nec in virtutibus est nec in vitijs. Cic. de fin. l. 3. Indifferens nihil gloriosum. Sen. ep. 83. Neglecta quaedam offensam contrabunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur; & damnant praevaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.Mediū est, quod nec in virtutibꝰ est nec in vitijs. Cic. de fin. l. 3. Indifferens nihil gloriosum. Sen. ep. 83. Neglecta quaedam offensam contrabunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur; & damnant praeuaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.
uMatth. 5.45.46. [Greek or Hebrew]; Quid magnifici est se amara, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. benef. l. 4. c. 14. Si quid amicum erga benefeci, aut consului fideliter; non videor meruisse laudem, culpa caruisse arbiter. Plant. trinum. act. 5. scen. 2.Matth. 5.45.46. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; Quid magnifici est se amara, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. benef. l. 4. c. 14. Si quid amicum erga benefeci, aut consului fideliter; non videor meruisse laudem, culpa caruisse arbitrer. Plant. trinum. act. 5. scen. 2.
In the latter sense that is said to be indifferent *that is good and lawful to be done, but is no necessary duty, that may either be committed or omitted, done or left undone without sin. And thus are many particular actions indifferent. The ground whereof is this; because the Law of God though it bind the Creature guided by reason xto do nothing but what is good, and to do good at all times, yet yit bindeth him not to do all good at once or at all times; so that many good things there are that may at sometime be done, whereof a man may make choice whether of them he will do, being not necessarily tied unto or enjoined any one of them: As for a student having divers books about him in his study it is indifferent to choose one this or that, refusing the rest, for present employment, there being no special occasion to urge the use of one more then of another: Or zfor a man that carieth a pair of knives about him, it is indifferent to draw and use either when occasion requireth. And of this nature in this Caution is the thing required to be, that is put to a Lot, to wit, such as a man may lawfully either choose or refuse ••ther do or leave undone.
In the latter sense that is said to be indifferent *that is good and lawfull to be done, but is no necessarie dutie, that may either be committed or omitted, done or left vndone without sinne. And thus are many particular actions indifferent. The ground whereof is this; because the Law of God though it binde the Creature guided by reason xto doe nothing but what is good, and to doe good at all times, yet yit bindeth him not to doe all good at once or at all times; so that many good things there are that may at sometime be done, whereof a man may make choise whether of them he will doe, being not necessarily tied vnto or enjoyned any one of them: As for a student hauing diuers bookes about him in his study it is indifferent to choose one this or that, refusing the rest, for present imployment, there being no speciall occasion to vrge the vse of one more then of another: Or zfor a man that carieth a paire of kniues about him, it is indifferent to draw and vse either when occasion requireth. And of this nature in this Caution is the thing required to be, that is put to a Lot, to wit, such as a man may lawfully either chuse or refuse ••ther doe or leaue vndone.
*Adiaphora collocat Gel. l. 2. c. 7. inter ea quae sua virecta & hon•sta sunt, & quae his contraria turpia & omninò iniqua sunt: illa fieri oportere, sive imperet pater, sive non i• peret; ista nec fi imperet: in medijs solummodò parendū. Id quod I•an. Sari•h. polyer. l. 6. c. 12. Quaedam ita necessaria sun•, ut mandatum nec exp• ctent; alia sic detestabilia, ut manda tum non admittant: media quae nec sunt necessaria bona, nec detestabilia •ala, consistunt in arbitrio praesidentis. Adiaphora quae nec praecepta sunt lege Dei, nec prohibita. M•lanch. loc. commun. •oc. 21. reg. 2. noc necessariò facienda, nec necessariò vitanda. Ibid. loc. 23. reg. 2. quae nunc usurpare, nunc omittere, indifferenter liceat. Calvin. institut. l. 3 c. 19. §. 7. Things indifferent, neither simply commanded, nor forbidden, but left free. Fenner of recreate. rule spec. § 4.Adiaphora collocat Gell. l. 2. c. 7. inter ea quae sua virecta & hon•sta sunt, & quae his contraria turpia & omninò iniqua sunt: illa fieri oportere, siue imperet pater, siue non i• peret; ista nec fi imperet: in medijs solummodò parendū. Id quod I•an. Sari•h. polyer. l. 6. c. 12. Quaedam ita necessaria sun•, vt mandatum nec exp• ctent; alia sic detestabilia, vt manda tum non admittāt: media quae nec sunt necessaria bona, nec detestabilia •ala, consistunt in arbitrio praesidentis. Adiaphora quae nec praecepta sunt lege Dei, nec prohibita. M•lanch. loc. commun. •oc. 21. reg. 2. noc necessariò facienda, nec necessariò vitanda. Ibid. loc. 23. reg. 2. quae nunc vsurpare, nunc omittere, indifferenter liceat. Caluin. institut. l. 3 c. 19. §. 7. Things indifferent, neither simply commanded, nor forbidden, but left free. Fenner of recreat. rule spec. § 4.
§ 5. Now this Caution divideth it self into two distinct branches according to the divers quality ⟨p. 97⟩of those things that oppose to, or swerve from this indifferency.
§ 5. Now this Caution diuideth it selfe into two distinct branches according to the diuers qualitie ⟨p. 97⟩of those things that oppose to, or swarne from this indifferencie.
The former is that Lots may not be used in ought evidently unlawful or in it self evil, either in the omission of some necessary good duty, or in the yielding to ought simply wicked, ungodly, or unjust, and so consequently where at the present it is evidently apparent upon other grounds what a man ought to choose or to refuse. For a Lot, as we have seen, is casual: and to put a necessary act to a casual event, cannot be without sin, since it maketh that casual and contingent which Gods law maketh necessary. *In such cases therefore a man is to follow the grounds and to be led by the rules of religion and reason; and not to put that to hazard whether he shall do it or no, for which he seeth and knoweth already good grounds why he should do it or not do it. What a man seeth evident grounds against, that he may not do: and look what he may not lawfully do, that he may not put to hazard whether he shall do or no. And on the other side what a man seeth necessary ground for, that he is necessarily bound to do: what he is necessarily bound unto, he may not refuse or forbear to do: and wha•••e may not refuse, he may not put to the hazard of refusing.
The former is that Lots may not bee vsed in ought euidently vnlawfull or in it selfe euill, either in the omission of some necessarie good dutie, or in the yeelding to ought simply wicked, vngodly, or vniust, and so consequently where at the present it is euidently apparent vpon other grounds what a man ought to chuse or to refuse. For a Lot, as we haue seene, is casuall: and to put a necessarie act to a casuall euent, cannot be without sinne, since it maketh that casual and contingent which Gods law maketh necessarie. *In such cases therefore a man is to follow the grounds and to be led by the rules of religion and reason; and not to put that to hazard whether he shall doe it or no, for which hee seeth and knoweth already good grounds why he should doe it or not doe it. What a man seeth euident grounds against, that he may not doe: and looke what hee may not lawfully doe, that hee may not put to hazard whether he shall doe or no. And on the other side what a man seeth necessarie ground for, that he is necessarily bound to doe: what he is necessarily bound vnto, he may not refuse or forbeare to doe: and wha•••e may not refuse, he may not put to the hazard of refusing.
To illustrate this by some instances. Where many stand for an office either in Church or Commonweal, whereof some are fit, some are altogether unfit for it, or some fitter, some less fit with very manifest difference, in this case for those persons in whose power it is to call and admit thereunto, ⟨p. 98⟩ato put it to Lot amongst them all, which of them shall have it, were utterly unlawful: For it were to hazard the binding of themselves to do that which they ought not to do, as it may fall out, to accept of one either wholly unfit, as it fell out when the High-priesthood was once so put to Lot, bthe Lot lighting on a silly rude Clown, that for simpleness scarce knew what the High-priesthood meant, and became therefore a scorn to all sorts; or not so fit as were fit where better choice may be had; as cin some offices at Rome it came sometime to pass: Since dthe Lot maketh no difference of good or bad; nor taketh any notice of the fitness or unfitness, *of the worth or unworthiness of those that be put together upon it. In which regard though emany worthily condemn such promiscuous Lotteries, and prefer for the most part, and that justly, other courses of election before that by Lot: ⟨p. 99⟩and fit is generally accounted a greater credit for a man to be elected then to be allotted to any place of employment: yet gwhere divers Competitors are judged alike fit, or are all fit in some good competency though with some small inequality, so that hhowsoever the Lot fall, it cannot light amiss, that as he said sometime, ithough a man should cast blindfold at them, he could not miss but hit a good man, there were it not unlawful to dispose a place or office, were it civill or sacred, by Lot among such; especially when there shall be much labouring and contending for divers by sundry persons on either side engaged, who may all by that means be quieted, and some one picked out and pitched upon without disgrace to any of his Competitors, or discontentment to their friends.
To illustrate this by some instances. Where many stand for an office either in Church or Commonweale, whereof some are fit, some are altogether vnfit for it, or some fitter, some lesse fit with very manifest difference, in this case for those persons in whose power it is to call and admit thereunto, ⟨p. 98⟩ato put it to Lot amongst thē al, which of them shal haue it, were vtterly vnlawfull: For it were to hazard the binding of themselues to doe that which they ought not to doe, as it may fall out, to accept of one either wholy vnfit, as it fell out when the High-preisthood was once so put to Lot, bthe Lot lighting on a sily rude Clowne, that for simplenesse scarce knew what the High-preisthood meant, and became therefore a scorne to all sorts; or not so fit as were fit where better choise may be had; as cin some offices at Rome it came sometime to passe: Since dthe Lot maketh no difference of good or bad; nor taketh any notice of the fitnesse or vnfitnesse, *of the worth or vnworthinesse of those that bee put together vpon it. In which regard though emany worthily condemne such promiscuous Loteries, and prefer for the most part, and that justly, other courses of election before that by Lot: ⟨p. 99⟩and fit is generally accounted a greater credit for a man to be elected then to be allotted to any place of imploiment: yet gwhere diuers Competitors are judged alike fit, or are all fit in some good competency though with some small inequalitie, so that hhowsoeuer the Lot fall, it cannot light amisse, that as he said sometime, ithough a man should cast blindfold at them, he could not misse but hit a good man, there were it not vnlawfull to dispose a place or office, were it ciuill or sacred, by Lot among such; especially when there shall be much labouring and contending for diuers by sundrie persons on either side engaged, who may all by that meanes be quieted, and some one picked out and pitched vpon without disgrace to any of his Competitors, or discontentment to their friends.
aPeccat, qui sortesiacit ad electionem beneficij Eccles. nullo prius habito id•neorum delectu. Martin. Navarre. manual. c. 11. §. 38. Iniqua est sortitio, ubi de officijs public•s digni cum indignis sortes mitterent: poss•t enim sors indigno favere, cum damno publico, & digniorum iniuria. Delrio. disquis. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.Peccat, qui sortesiacit ad electionem beneficij Eccles. nullo prius habito id•neorum delectu. Martin. Nauar. manual. c. 11. §. 38. Iniqua est sortitio, vbi de officijs public•s digni cum indignis sortes mitterent: poss•t enim sors indigno fauere, cum damno publico, & digniorum iniuria. Delrio. disquis. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.
b[Greek or Hebrew]. Joseph. captiu. l. 4 c. 12.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ioseph. captiu. l. 4 c. 12.
cSors ad parum idon•es deerrabat. Tacit annal. l. 13.
d[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist•t. Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 20. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo. de constit. princip. [Greek or Hebrew]. Ibid. [Greek or Hebrew]. Isocr. in Areop. [Greek or Hebrew]. Chrysost. ad Ephes. homil. 2. In sort• non est electio: ubi merita considerantur, electio est, non sors. August. in Psalm. 30. Sort & urna mores non discerni. Heluidius apud Ta•it. hist. lib. 4. In sorte eventus est, non judicium, & saepe irrationabili casu sort melioribus ultimus quisque prafertur. Ambros. hexam. lib. 5. cap. 21. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de constit. princip.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist•t. Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 20. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo. de constit. princip. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ibid. . Isocr. in Areop. . Chrysost. ad Ephes. homil. 2. In sort non est electio: vbi merita considerantur, electio est, non sors. August. in
And to this purpose in most estates, where offices were disposed by Lot, as there went kan election before the Lottery, that the Lottery might go only among such as were of some sufficiency, so again after the Lottery there was a public *trial of them, and an inquiry made into the courses and abilities of such as the Lot had ⟨p. 100⟩lighted on, that if they were found insufficient or faulty they might be rejected, and lothers taken in in their steed. Besides that those places that required some special kind of skill, military, musical or the like, either were mexempted wholly from Lottery, or the Lot went namong such only, as upon due trial were found to be expert in that particular. Neither was there great diligence used without just cause in this kind: for oif men would be loath by Lot to take a Physician when they are sick, or a Pilot when they are to go to sea, of whose skill they have not had some good trial before, or assurance otherwise: much less were it fit by Lot, without further enquiry, to commit the helm of the estate and the life of many hundreds into the hand of any one hand-over-head that the Lot might light upon. Again for private men in some danger and distress weary of their lives to cast Lots, as pthey sometime did, who shall slay either other, were unlawful: because a plain breach of Gods precept: or where two Malefactors are condemned to death, but the one is to be spared upon some special occasion, as qwith the Jews where some offender was given them to grace their feast, (I stand now to discuss the lawfulness of that course, but taking it to be granted that some one is upon good ground to be ⟨p. 101⟩spared) here rif the parties be unlike, the one a debauched Rogue that hath been before oft in the like villainies, the other but a Novice newly fallen to the trade, and the present his first known offence; or the one an obstinate and desperate wretch, the other penitent and not unlikely to prove an honest man afterward; for the public Magistrate it were unfit here to put it to hazard whether to spare or to punish:
And to this purpose in most estates, where offices were disposed by Lot, as there went kan election before the Lotery, that the Lotery might go onely among such as were of some sufficiencie, so againe after the Lotery there was a publike *triall of them, and an inquirie made into the courses and abilities of such as the Lot had ⟨p. 100⟩lighted on, that if they were found insufficient or faultie they might be reiected, and lothers taken in in their steed. Besides that those places that required some speciall kinde of skill, military, musicall or the like, either were mexempted wholy from Lotery, or the Lot went namong such onely, as vpon due triall were found to bee expert in that particular. Neither was there great diligence vsed without iust cause in this kinde: for oif men would be loath by Lot to take a Phisitian when they are sicke, or a Pilote when they are to go to sea, of whose skill they haue not had some good triall before, or assurance otherwise: much lesse were it fit by Lot, without further enquiry, to commit the helme of the estate and the life of many hundreds into the hand of any one hand-ouer-head that the Lot might light vpon. Againe for priuate men in some danger and distresse weary of their liues to cast Lots, as pthey sometime did, who shall slay either other, were vnlawfull: because a plaine breach of Gods precept: or where two Malefactors are condemned to death, but the one is to be spared vpon some speciall occasion, as qwith the Iewes where some offendor was giuen them to grace their feast, (I stand now to discusse the lawfulnesse of that course, but taking it to bee granted that some one is vpon good ground to be ⟨p. 101⟩spared) here r
k[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist pit. l. 4. c. 16. [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. 6. Jude [Greek or Hebrew] dicti qui a•sp•m sortis admitt••tur •ud. in comment. Hi•• D•mosth. in Eu•ulid [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist p•it. l. 4. c. 16. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. 6. Iude 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dicti qui a•sp•m sortis admitt••tur •ud. in com•ent. Hi•• D•mosth. in Eu•ulid 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
*[Greek or Hebrew]. Pla•o de leg l. 6. Et [Greek or Hebrew]. Ibid. [Greek or Hebrew]. Aeschin. in Cresiph. Hinc orationes [Greek or Hebrew]. Et D•m•sth. in Mid•am, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et de Thesmothetis Libanius in Androt. [Greek or Hebrew]. Sed & Senatū quisqu• ingressus, juramento adigebatur, [Greek or Hebrew], id indicare. Lysias in Philon.
whereas in war, as before, when a whole band hath offended, swhere the cutting off of all would be too great a maim to the whole, and again passing by all would be a matter of evil example, here time being not afforded to consider of particulars, who may best be spared, or who are worthiest to be punished, all alike deserving death, and being in the power of the General to put all to death, it is lawful for him to tithe them, as we said they did sometime, and by Lot to decide who shall be saved, who slain.
whereas in warre, as before, when a whole band hath offended, swhere the cutting off of all would be too great a maime to the whole, and againe passing by all would be a matter of euill example, here time being not afforded to consider of particulars, who may best be spared, or who are worthiest to be punished, all alike deseruing death, and being in the power of the Generall to put all to death, it is lawfull for him to tithe them, as wee said they did sometime, and by Lot to decide who shall be saued, who slaine.
sNe in bello propter hostium metum miles deficeret, amplier ei mortis & supplicij metus est à maioribus constitu•us: ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subivent, idcircò illa sortitio comparata est. Cic. ibid. Sic enim fieri posse, ut poena ad paucus, exemplum ad multos per•eniret. Donat. in Scipion.Ne in bello propter hostium metum miles deficeret, amplier ei mortis & supplicij metus est à maioribus constitu•us: ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subivent, idcircò illa sortitio comparata est. Cic. ibid. Sic enim fieri posse, vt poena ad paucus, exemplum ad multos per•eniret. Donat. in Scipion.
In matter of alms and liberality, for a man to make Beggars usually as he meeteth them, draw cuts for his money, were to play and make sport with his alms and his prodigality (for that term would best fit it,) as tthe mad Antiochus sometime did, and as uBernard saith the Pope doth with his; and so were but to abuse a Lot for the inconsiderate casting away of that, *that ought to be disposed of ⟨p. 100⟩[…] ⟨p. 101⟩[…] ⟨p. 102⟩by advice: Or again where two Persons in want crave that relief of a man which but one of them can have, it being apparent that the one hath far more need then the other, and is nearer to the party in whose power it is to dispose of, for him to make them draw cuts for it in this case were not warrantable, because he may evidently see here xwhether is rather to be relieved, and may not therefore hazard the defeating of him. But for those that be in office to avoid the clamour of many much alike poor suing for some pension, to cast Lots among them which shall have it for the present, and which expect it hereafter; or yfor a man that hath a tool of some trade which two poor men of that trade are Suitors to him for, there being no ground for him to pleasure the one rather then the other, here likewise by Lot to determine whether of the twain shall have the tool, were neither unlawful nor unfit.
In matter of almes and liberalitie, for a man to make Beggers vsually as he meeteth them, draw cuts for his money, were to play and make sport with his almes and his prodigality (for that tearme would best fit it,) as tthe madde Antiochus sometime did, and as uBernard saith the Pope doth with his; and so were but to abuse a Lot for the inconsiderate casting away of that, *that ought to be disposed of ⟨p. 100⟩〈…〉⟨p. 101⟩〈…〉⟨p. 102⟩by aduice: Or againe where two Persons in want craue that reliefe of a man which but one of them can haue, it being apparent that the one hath farre more neede then the other, and is neerer to the partie in whose power it is to dispose of, for him to make them draw cuts for it in this case were not warrantable, because hee may euidently see here xwhether is rather to bee relieued, and may not therefore hazard the defeating of him. But for those that be in office to auoide the clamour of many much alike poore suing for some pension, to cast Lots among them which shall haue it for the present, and which expect it hereafter; or yfor a man that hath a toole of some trade which two poore men of that trade are Suters to him for, there being no ground for him to pleasure the one rather then the other, here likewise by Lot to determine whether of the twaine shall haue the toole, were neither vnlawfull nor vnfit.
tSolitum A•tiochum Epiphan•m, vel Epimanem potius, effusis per viam publicam nunamis dicere, [Greek or Hebrew]. Ex Pt•lom. Everget. comment. l. 5. Athenae. l. 10.Solitum A•tiochum Epiphan•m, vel Epimanem potius, effusis per viam publicam nunamis dicere, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ex Pt•lom. Euerget. comment. l. 5. Athenae. l. 10.
uPauperum vita in plateis di•ilum seminatur. Argentum micat in luto: accurritur undique: tollit illud non pauperior, sed fortior, a•t quifor•ècilius praecucurrit. Scilice• sic factirabat Petius, sic Paulus ludeba•. Bern de consider. l. 4.Pauperum vita in plateis di•ilum seminatur. Argentum micat in luto: accurritur vndique: tollit illud non pauperior, sed fortior, a•t quifor•ècilius praecucurrit. Scilice• sic factirabat Petius, sic Paulus ludeba•. Bern de consider. l. 4.
*Nec avarum te Deus, nec profusum vult: collocare te vult quae babes, non pr•ijcere. Aug. de 10. chord c. 12. Beneficia nec in vulgus effundenda sunt; & nullius r••, mi •imè benefici•rum, bonesta largitio est: quibus si detra•cr• judicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliut quodlibe• jucidunt nomen. S••ec. benef l. 1. c. 2.Nec auarum te Deus, nec profusum vult: collocare te vult quae babes, non pr•ijcere. Aug. de 10. chord c. 12. Beneficia nec in vulgus effundenda sunt; & nullius r••, mi •imè benefici•rum, bonesta largitio est: quibus si detra•cr• iudicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliut quodlibe• iucidunt nomen. S••ec. benef l. 1. c. 2.
ySi cum tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oport•ret dari ei qui non haberet, nee duobus dari posset; occurrerent duo, quorum neuter vel indigentia, vel crga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nibiliustius fac•res, quàm ut sort eligeres, cui da•dū asset, quod dari utrique non posset. Aug. de doctrin• Christ. l. 1. c. 28.Si cum tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oport•ret dari ei qui non haberet, nee duobꝰ dari posset; occurrerent duo, quorum neuter vel indigentia, vel crga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nibiliustius fac•res, quàm vt sorte eligeres, cui da•dū asset, quod dari vtrique non posset. Aug. de doctrin• Christ. l. 1. c. 28.
§ 6. And thus was the former branch of this Caution that Lots are not to be used either in necessary duties or things in themselves evil, such as may evidently at the present appear to be such.
§ 6. And thus was the former branch of this Caution that Lots are not to be vsed either in necessarie duties or things in themselues euill, such as may euidently at the present appeare to be such.
The latter branch is that Lots may not be used in such things, though not otherwise in themselves evil, where by consequence the use of them may in likelihood prove Inconvenient or Inexpedient.
The latter branch is that Lots may not be vsed in such things, though not otherwise in themselues euill, where by consequence the vse of them may in likelihood proue Inconuenient or Inexpedient.
The reason is apparent; because zthings indifferent and such as are good and lawful in themselves, become unlawful unto us when they grow Inconvenient or Inexpedient in the use of them.
The reason is apparent; because zthings indifferent and such as are good and lawfull in themselues, become vnlawfull vnto vs when they grow Inconuenient or Inexpedient in the vse of them.
z1. Cor. 6.12. & 10.23. Est aliquid quod […] oporteat, etia•s• licet. Cic. pro Balb•. Quid decoat vos, non quantum liceat vobis, spectare debetis. Idem pro Rabir.1. Cor. 6.12. & 10.23. Est aliquid quod 〈…〉 oporteat, etia•s• licet. Cic. pro Balb•. Quid decoat vos, non quantum liceat vobis, spectare debetis. Idem pro Rabir.
In matters therefore of indifferency that of themselves ⟨p. 103⟩are not evil, yet are such as by some circumstance they may easily become evil, great regard ought to be had of the conveniency and expediency of them. Where under the head of inconveniency I comprehend all such things, as may tend to any outward evil: unto the head of Inexpediency I refer all such things as may bring a man within danger of some spiritual evil.
In matters therefore of indifferencie that of themselues ⟨p. 103⟩are not euill, yet are such as by some circumstance they may easily become euill, great regard ought to be had of the conueniencie and expediencie of them. Where vnder the head of inconueniencie I comprehend all such things, as may tend to any outward euill: vnto the head of Inexpediency I referre all such things as may bring a man within danger of some spirituall euill.
For the former point of Conveniency and Inconveniency the rule is, that because things in themselves otherwise lawful and warrantable may seem Convenient in some respects, and Inconvenient in others, that therefore where the Conveniences and the Inconveniences shall be laid in an even balance of equal and indifferent judgement, either against' other the action is to be deemed either Convenient or Inconvenient, as the one side shall appear to weigh down the other: that is to say, The Conveniences being more or weightier make the thing questioned Convenient, the Inconveniences being more and weightier make it justly deemed Inconvenient.
For the former point of Conueniencie and Inconueniencie the rule is, that because things in themselues otherwise lawfull and warrantable may seeme Conuenient in some respects, and Inconuenient in others, that therefore where the Conueniences and the Inconueniences shall be laid in an euen ballance of equall and indifferent iudgement, either against' other the action is to be deemed either Conuenient or Inconuenient, as the one side shall appeare to weigh downe the other: that is to say, The Conueniences being more or weightier make the thing questioned Conuenient, the Inconueniences being more and weightier make it iustly deemed Inconuenient.
To apply this to the present; In the Use of a Lot about a matter of it self otherwise not evil, if the Conveniences shall be so many and so weighty on the one side, that they may well weigh down whatsoever Inconveniences may be produced on the other side, there the action is Convenient, and a Lot therefore lawful: but contrariwise where the Inconveniences that shall necessarily or in good probability appear to accompany the thing questioned or ensue upon the doing of it shall be such and ⟨p. 104⟩so great, as the Conveniences that stand on the other side shall not be able to countervail, there the action is worthily disallowed as Inconvenient, and a Lot consequently unlawful.
To apply this to the present; In the Vse of a Lot about a matter of it selfe otherwise not euill, if the Conueniences shall be so many and so weighty on the one side, that they may wel weigh downe whatsoeuer Inconueniences may be produced on the other side, there the action is Conuenient, and a Lot therefore lawfull: but contrariwise where the Inconueniences that shall necessarily or in good probability appeare to accompanie the thing questioned or ensue vpon the doing of it shall be such and ⟨p. 104⟩so great, as the Conueniences that stand on the other side shall not be able to counteruaile, there the action is worthily disallowed as Inconuenient, and a Lot consequently vnlawfull.
Thus in public affairs for the giving of some few private men contentment to admit a Lot where the admission of it may in likelihood prove prejudicial to the public, were an unwise course and an unwarrantable, because the public weighing down the private maketh the action inconvenient. Where it is worth the observing that albeit among the Romans the ordinary employments of their Officers, and many other affairs were ordered oft-times by Lot, yet awhen any extraordinary accident fell out, or any business to be dispatched of more special weight, they either left wholly then their Lottery, or blimited the course of it (which yet cafter when things were quieted and settled they returned again unto) and though those in office themselves ddesired, ⟨p. 105⟩yea eurged it and instantly called for it, that they might not seem contemned, as being balked and rejected, and others in the State-service preferred before them; yet fthe regard of the common good prevailed so far with them that they would not hearken unto them to put that to the hazard of a Lot, where the event might prove much inconvenient, which otherwise ordinarily they did.
Thus in publike affaires for the giuing of some few priuate men contentment to admit a Lot where the admission of it may in likelihood proue preiudiciall to the publike, were an vnwise course and an vnwarrantable, because the publike weighing down the priuate maketh the action inconuenient. Where it is worth the obseruing that albeit among the Romanes the ordinary imployments of their Officers, and many other affaires were ordered oft-times by Lot, yet awhen any extraordinarie accident fell out, or any busines to be dispatched of more speciall weight, they either left wholy then their Lotery, or blimited the course of it (which yet cafter when things were quieted and setled they returned againe vnto) and though those in office themselues ddesired, ⟨p. 105⟩yea evrged it and instantly called for it, that they might not seeme contemned, as being balked and reiected, and others in the State-seruice preferred before them; yet fthe regard of the common good preuailed so farre with them that they would not hearken vnto them to put that to the hazard of a Lot, where the euent might proue much inconuenient, which otherwise ordinarily they did.
aSic cum Annibal ad portas, Bellum cum Annibale Coss. mandatum: Liu. l. 24. an. 541. Consulibus belium cum Annibale & binae legions decretae: Praetors provincias sortili sunt: Liu. l. 25. an. 542. Italia ambobus provincia decreta. Jaē l. 27. an. 545. & 547. & 548. Sic Ausonum bello, Omni ope annixi sunt, ut ma•imum ea tempestate Imperatorē haberent, & ne forte casu erraretur, petitum ab Coss. ut extra sortem Coruini ea pr• uincia esset. Linius l. 8. an. 420. Sic bellum Volseum Camillo extra ordinem decretum. Idem. l. 6. an. 374. & idem Manlijs sine sort. Ibid. an. 276 Sic Martio novi hosts devernuntur. Idem l. 9. an. 448. Sic Coss. ambobus quaestio de clandestinis coniurationibus decreta est. Idem l. 39. an. 568. Sic Augustus provincias validicres, & quas annuis magistratuum imperijs regi nec facilenec tutum erat, ipse suscepit, caeteras Procensulibus s•rtitò permisit. Suet. Aug. c. 47. In bello Macedonico Coss. provincias sortiri parantes, cùm bellum produci animadu•rterent, quod rebus vix dumb inc•oatis Imperatores au•carentur, cohibuerunt patribus adnitentibus Tribuni, & Quintio imperium prorogarunt: ut Liu. l. 32. ann. 557. Provinciae quae in bello decretae. Idem l. 41. an. 577.Sic cum Annibal ad portas, Bellum cum Annibale Coss. mandatum: Liu. l. 24. ann. 541. Consulibus belium cum Annibale & binae legiones decretae: Prae•ores prouincias sortili sunt: Liu. l. 25. ann. 542. Italia ambobus prouincia decreta. Iaē l. 27. ann. 545. & 547. & 548. Sic Ausonum bello, Omni ope annixi sunt, vt ma•imum ea tempestate Imperatorē haberent, & ne forte casu erraretur, petitum ab Coss. vt extra sortem Coruini ea pr• uincia esset. Linius l. 8. ann. 420. Sic bellum Volseum Camillo extra ordinem decretum. Idem. l. 6. ann. 374. & idem Manlijs sine sorte. Ibid. ann. 276 Sic Martio noui hostes deuernuntur. Idem l. 9. ann. 448. Sic Coss. ambobus quaestio de clandestinis coniurationibus decreta est. Idem l. 39. ann. 568. Sic Augustus prouincias validicres, & quas annuis magistratuum imperijs regi nec facilenec tutum erat, ipse suscepit, caeteras Procensulibus s•rtitò permisit. Suet. Aug. c. 47. In bello Macedonico Coss. prouincias sortiri parantes, cùm bellum produci animadu•rterent, quod rebus vix dum inc•oatis Imperatores au•carentur, cohibuerunt patribus adnitentibus Tribuni, & Quintio imperium prorogarunt: vt Liu. l. 32. ann. 557. Prouinciae quae in bello decretae. Idem l. 41. ann. 577.
bQuas provincias Praetoribus esse placeret, Consul ad Senatum retulit: decreverunt duas Romae, duas in Italia, duas extra Italiam; & extemplo sortiri jussi, Liu. l. 38. ann. 567. Nominatae jam antea Coss. provinciae erant: tum sortiri jussi. Idem l. 21. an. 536. Coss. Aetoliam & Asiam sortiri placuit. Idem l. 37. an. 565. Ligures & Galliam. Ibid. 38. an 566. Senatus decrevit ut Coss. duas Gallias sortireutur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. His ita in Senatu, ad id, qua cuius provincia foret, decretis, tum demum sortiri Coss. placuit. Liu. l. 36.Quas prouincias Praetoribus esse placeret, Consul ad Senatum retulit: decreuerunt duas Romae, duas in Italia, duas extra Italiam; & extemplo sortiri iussi, Liu. l. 38. ann. 567. Nominatae iam antea Coss. prouinciae erant: tum sortiri iussi. Idem l. 21. ann. 536. Coss. Aetoliam & Asiam sortiri placuit. Idem l. 37. ann. 565. Ligures & Galliam. Ibid. 38. ann 566. Senatus decreuit vt Coss. duas Gallias sortireutur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. His ita in Senatu, ad id, qua cuius prouincia foret, decretis, tum demum sortiri Coss. placuit. Liu. l. 36.
cCoss. cùm jam minus terroris à paeni• esset, sortiri jus•. Liu. l. 26. an. 543.Coss. cùm iam minus terroris à paeni• esset, sortiri ius•. Liu. l. 26. ann. 543.
dItaliam & Africam in sortem con•ci, ambo Africam cupientes volebant: populus rogatus quom vellet in Africam bellum gerere, Scipionem jussit. Liu. l. 30. Coss. ut Macedoniam cum Italia sortirentur petelant: ambobus Italia decreta. Ibid. 32.Italiam & Africam in sortem con•ci, ambo Africam cupientes volebant: populus rogatus quom vellet in Africam bellum gerere, Scipionem iussit. Liu. l. 30. Coss. vt Macedoniam cum Italia sortirentur petelant: ambobus Italia decreta. Ibid. 32.
eDecius iniuriam querebatur, irrita sieri fortunae arbitria: omnes ante se Cuss. previncias sortitos, nune extra so•tem Fabio Senatum dare provinciam: cui d•bium esse, ubibellum sit asperum & difficile, cum id alte• extra sortem mandetur, quin alter Consul pro superua•aneo a•que inutili habeatur? Liu. l. 10.Decius iniuriam querebatur, irrita sieri fortunae arbitria: omnes ante se C•ss. preuincias sortitos, nune extra so•tem Fabio Senatum dare prouinciam: cui d•bium esse, vbibellum sit asperum & difficile, cum id alte• extra sortem mandetur, quin alter Consul pro superua•aneo a•que inutili habeatur? Liu. l. 10.
fPopuli consensu Hetruria extra sortem Fabio decreta est. Ibid.
That is not true therefore that one of our Writers saith, that gRome directed the main course of her government by the Fortune of this mock-destiny. For neither were the Officers themselves ordinarily chosen by Lot, neither did they retain the use of it in matters of special weight or difficulty: the only constant use of it was in dividing the Provinces and Jurisdictions, as if the Judges with us should cast Lots for their Circuits; and the two in each Circuit whether should sit upon private suites, and whether upon public pleas. Which course also as they brake, where the employments were of more special importance; so, if in using the Lot, it fell not out so, as seemed behovefull for the State, hthey made bold, as they might well do, to control the Lottery, and to dispose of things otherwise.
That is not true therefore that one of our Writers saith, that gRome directed the maine course of her gouernment by the Fortune of this mocke-destinie. For neither were the Officers themselues ordinarily chosen by Lot, neither did they retaine the vse of it in matters of speciall weight or difficultie: the only constant vse of it was in diuiding the Prouinces and Iurisdictions, as if the Iudges with vs should cast Lots for their Circuits; and the two in each Circuit whether should sit vpon priuate suites, and whether vpon publike pleas. Which course also as they brake, where the imploiments were of more speciall importance; so, if in vsing the Lot, it fell not out so, as seemed behouefull for the State, hthey made bold, as they might well doe, to controle the Lotery, and to dispose of things otherwise.
gClem. Edmund on Caesars comment. l. 1. c. 20.
hMummio Praetori Sardinia e•enerat: sed ca propter belli magnitudinem consularia f•cta est. Liu. l. 41. an. 577. Baebio & At•ilio primum Senatus consulto, deinde plebis etiam scito permutala provinci• sunt. Idem l. 35. an. 562. Hostilio jurisdictio urbana e•enerat: addita & peregrina, ut tres in provincias exirent. Idem lib. 27. an. •47. Cùm de Consularibus m•asors prima exisset, una vice Senatus frequens retinendum i• urbe cemsuit; hoc idem post me P•mpris acidic […] ut nes duo quasi pignora reipublicae r•tineri videamur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. Fabiam Pictor•m Flamine•• Quirinalem cui Sardinia provincia •n•neras, M•tellus Pont. Max. ads••ra retinuit: religio vicit, & dicto audiens esse Flamen Pontifici jussus. Liu. l. 37. an. 565.Mummio Praetori Sardinia e•enerat: sed ca propter belli magnitudinem consularia f•cta est. Liu. l. 41. ann. 577. Baebio & At•ilio primum Senatus consulto, deinde plebis etiam scito permutala prouinci• sunt. Idem l. 35. ann. 562. Hostilio iurisdictio vrbana e•enerat: addita & peregrina, vt tres in prouincias exirent. Idem lib. 27. ann. •47. Cùm de Consularibus m•asors prima exisset, vna v•ce Senatus frequens retinendum i• vrbe cemsuit; hoc idem post me P•mpris accidi•〈…〉 vt nes duo quasi pignora reipublicae r•tineri videamur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. Fabiam Pictor•m Flamine•• Quirinalem cui Sardinia prouincia •n•neras, M•tellus Pont. Max. ads••ra retinuit: religio vicit, & dicto audiens esse Flamen Pontifici iussus. Liu. l. 37. ann. 565.
Thus again howsoever it were not unlawful simply, for many to join together in a Lottery (as ⟨p. 106⟩well as in a free contribution, which iJobs friends sometime did) for the raising again of an honest man by crosses and casualties fallen behind hand: yet for a State to give way to public courses in that kind kfor the raising and enriching of some one decayed Bankrupt' by the probable damage, yea and impoverishing of many others, that out of hope to gain great matters may wring and wrong both themselves and their whole families thereby, may well seem scarce warrantable, considering the hindrance of many therein procured for the helping of some one.
Thus againe howsoeuer it were not vnlawfull simply, for many to ioyne together in a Lotery (as ⟨p. 106⟩well as in a free contribution, which iIobs friends sometime did) for the raising againe of an honest man by crosses and casualties fallen behind hand: yet for a State to giue way to publike courses in that kinde kfor the raising and enriching of some one decaied Banckrupt' by the probable damage, yea and impouerishing of many others, that out of hope to gaine great matters may wring and wrong both themselues and their whole families thereby, may well seeme scarce warrantable, considering the hindrance of many therein procured for the helping of some one.
kDecoctores quidam in blanchis, ut aiunt, suis sortibus utuntur. Post el. de Magistr. Athen. c. 8. A notable abuse so used. Perkins of witchcraft.Decoctores quidam in blanchis, vt aiunt, suis sortibus vtuntur. Post el. de Magistr. Athen. c. 8. A notable abuse so vsed. Perkins of witchcraft.
Thus lastly how soever in goods bought in common, because lmen may be many times contentiously minded, and ready to take discontent even in the equallest courses; yea because men commonly in these cases mare wont to think that better, that goeth from them, though indeed it be not so; and that less that cometh to them, though it be the better part; when division hath been made with as much equality as may be, or with such inequality as they shall both agree upon, it is a course not lawful and convenient only, but even laudable and commendable, for mutual satisfaction, by Lot to assign each one his share: yea how soever in this, or in the like case; when a mans goods are so mixed with another's in whose hands they both are; it were not unlawful for a man to put his whole right to them to the hazard of a Lot, for the procuring and purchasing of his peace, which cannot otherwise be had, with one whom he would not by any means, if it lay in his power, be at odds with the thing it self ⟨p. 107⟩being no other then he may well forgo; yet for a man in such a case to put that to the hazard of a Lot, when he may otherwise recover it, which his estate will not bear, or may be otherwise more prejudicial both to him and his, were not lawful, because the damage that thereby might accrue, would be greater, then could free such an action from imputation of evident inconvenience.
Thus lastly how soeuer in goods bought in common, because lmen may be many times contentiously minded, and ready to take discontent euen in the equallest courses; yea because men commonly in these cases mare wont to thinke that better, that goeth from them, though indeed it be not so; and that lesse that commeth to them, though it be the better part; when diuision hath beene made with as much equalitie as may be, or with such inequalitie as they shall both agree vpon, it is a course not lawfull and conuenient onely, but euen laudable and commendable, for mutuall satisfaction, by Lot to assigne each one his share: yea how soeuer in this, or in the like case; when a mans goods are so mixed with anothers in whose hands they both are; it were not vnlawfull for a man to put his whole right to them to the hazard of a Lot, for the procuring and purchasing of his peace, which cannot otherwise be had, with one whom he would not by any meanes, if it lay in his power, be at ods with the thing it selfe ⟨p. 107⟩being no other then he may well forgo; yet for a man in such a case to put that to the hazard of a Lot, when he may otherwise recouer it, which his estate will not beare, or may be otherwise more preiudiciall both to him and his, were not lawfull, because the damage that thereby might accrue, would be greater, then could free such an action from imputation of euident inconuenience.
l[Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. l. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. l. 6.
mFertilior seges est alien•• semper in aruis; Vicinumque pecus grandius uber habet. Ovid. art•• l. 1. Aliena nobis, nostra plus alijs placent. P. Syrus.Fertilior seges est alien•• semper in aruis; Vicinumque pecus grandiꝰ vber habet. Ouid. art•• l. 1. Aliena nobis, nostra plus alijs placent. P. Syrus.
§ 7. For the latter point of Expediency and Inexpediency the general rule is, that that which is no necessary duty, but a thing indifferent only otherwise, may not be done, where there is strong presumption upon good ground, that it shall spiritually endanger a mans self, or others, by giving occasion of sin unto the one or the other.
§ 7. For the latter point of Expediency and Inexpediencie the generall rule is, that that which is no necessary dutie, but a thing indifferent onely otherwise, may not be done, where there is strong presumption vpon good ground, that it shall spiritually endanger a mans selfe, or others, by giuing occasion of sinne vnto the one or the other.
I except necessary duties; because such are not to be omitted, though they may be occasion of sin unto others, or though we our selves cannot do them without some sin. nNot for the sin of others; for there is no duty so holy but that many may and will take occasion of evil by: even othe ministry of the word turneth to the evil of not a few, which yet is pnot in that regard to be neglected or omitted, because mans corruption cannot free any from the employment that God enjoineth him.
I except necessarie duties; because such are not to be omitted, though they may be occasion of sinne vnto others, or though wee our selues cannot doe them without some sinne. nNot for the sinne of others; for there is no duty so holy but that many may and will take occasion of euill by: euen othe ministery of the word turneth to the euill of not a few, which yet is pnot in that regard to be neglected or omitted, because mans corruption cannot free any from the imployment that God enjoineth him.
Nay, nor for our selves and our own sins are such duties to be forborne. For then should no good work at all be done of us; because qwe can do none so, but that some sin will stick to us in the doing of it. rAs a diseased Person therefore ought not to forbear his food, and by fasting to ⟨p. 108⟩starve himself (as fPomponius Atticus tand Cornelius Rufus, absurdly sometime did,) because uin feeding his body he shall withal feed his disease; nor a melancholy man is to pine himself to death, because where he is, he can come by none but melancholic food, such as is not so convenient for a man of his constitution; but is to use such as he can get for the preserving of life where no other can be had: so in this case men are not to give over hearing the word, praying, participating in holy things and the like, because they cannot hear so attentively, pray so devoutly, receive so reverently, and religiously as they would and should; but *endeavour to do all such good duties as God requireth of them so well as they can, leaving the issue and event of the work to the good providence of God in regard of others, to his gracious acceptance in regard of themselves.
Nay, nor for our selues and our owne sinnes are such duties to be forborne. For then should no good worke at all be done of vs; because qwee can doe none so, but that some sinne will sticke to vs in the doing of it. rAs a diseased Person therefore ought not to forbeare his foode, and by fasting to ⟨p. 108⟩starue himselfe (as fPomponius Atticus tand Corelius Rufus, absurdly sometime did,) because uin feeding his body he shall withall feede his disease; nor a melancholy man is to pine himselfe to death, because where he is, he can come by none but melancholicke foode, such as is not so conuenient for a man of his constitution; but is to vse such as he can get for the preseruing of life where no other can be had: so in this case men are not to giue ouer hearing the word, praying, participating in holy things and the like, because they cannot heare so attentiuely, pray so deuoutly, receiue so reuerently, and religiously as they would and should; but *endeauour to doe all such good duties as God requireth of them so well as they can, leauing the issue and euent of the worke to the good prouidence of God in regard of others, to his gratious acceptance in regard of themselues.
But in things indifferent, and such as are no necessary duties, xfor a man to do that which in great likelihood may spiritually endanger an other, is to make himself guilty of soul-murder; yto do that which may spiritually endanger himself, is to make himself guilty of self-murder. And surely, if it be unlawful and za tempting of God for a man needlessly 1to plunge himself into danger of death in regard of his body; it is no less unlawful, yea a far greater sin rather, for a man to do the same in regard of his soul. Besides that Gods commandments not only forbid sin, but even 2whatsoever may be a means and an occasion of sin, though it be not sinful of it self.
But in things indifferent, and such as are no necessary duties, xfor a man to doe that which in great likelihood may spiritually endanger an other, is to make himselfe guilty of soule-murther; yto doe that which may spiritually endanger himselfe, is to make himselfe guiltie of selfe-murther. And surely, if it be vnlawfull and za tempting of God for a man needlesly 1to plunge himselfe into danger of death in regard of his body; it is no lesse vnlawfull, yea a farre greater sinne rather, for a man to doe the same in regard of his soule. Besides that Gods commandements not onely forbid sinne, but euen 2whatsoeuer may be a meanes and an occasion of sinne, though it be not sinnefull of it selfe.
yExponere see periculo pecca•i, est peccatum. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 17. Gerson. in regul. mor. Caietan. in sum.Exponere se periculo pecca•i, est peccatum. Bonauent. in 4. dist. 17. Gerson. in regul. mor. Caietan. in sum.
Needless therefore and unnecessary Lotteries though in things otherwise not unlawful, where they are likely to cause, or by experience are found to occasion much sin, are so far forth unwarrantable, because in that regard inexpedient. In respect whereof howsoever it were no unwarrantable course, in a matter of common or public benefit, as the reparation of a bridge, reedifying of an Hospital, erecting of a school or the like, for divers men of good ability to agree among themselves to put it to hazard what sums each of them shall disburse or dispend toward the discharge or support thereof, the sums being no greater then the estate of any of them may well bear, when they cannot readily agree upon a rate otherwise; as also for the better encouragement of either other in that kind, in common equally to contribute toward the price of a jewel, or some one of them to convert his part into some such commodity, to be conferred upon some one of them so contributing, whom by Lot it shall light to, their minds and states probably known either to other, I see here no reason why it should be unlawful. But for a man in this kind to put that to hazard which he knoweth or probably suspecteth that he shall be unable well, or unwilling on such terms to part with; the loss whereof in that regard may either disable him to the doing of other necessary duties, or distemper him and so make him guilty of sin in Gods sight; or to join with others needlessly in such an act, much more to draw them in and incite them thereunto, whom he knoweth not upon good presumptions ⟨p. 110⟩to be both able and willing; by means whereof they may be occasioned to sin in the same sort; especially in such an action as he cannot but see to be so carried that many abuses are committed in it, and occasion given by it of much evil; I cannot see how a man should be free from sin in so doing; neither can I conceive with what comfort of conscience a man can receive or retain what a Lot in such a case shall cast upon him, coming in all likelihood in part out of the purses of those, as either are altogether unable to part well with such sums, but have strained themselves thereunto out of a greedy desire and hope of lucre and gain; or being unwilling to loose and to part with what they put in, do in that regard wretchedly curse and blaspheme Gods name for the loss of it.
Needlesse therefore and vnnecessarie Loteries though in things otherwise not vnlawfull, where they are likely to cause, or by experience are found to occasion much sinne, are so farre forth vnwarrantable, because in that regard inexpedient. In respect whereof howsoeuer it were no vnwarrantable course, in a matter of common or publike benefit, as the reparation of a bridge, reedifying of an Hospitall, erecting of a schoole or the like, for diuers men of good ability to agree among themselues to put it to hazard what summes each of them shall disburse or dispend toward the discharge or support thereof, the summes being no greater then the estate of any of them may well beare, when they cannot readily agree vpon a rate otherwise; as also for the better encouragement of either other in that kinde, in common equally to contribute toward the price of a iewell, or some one of them to conuert his part into some such commodity, to bee conferred vpon some one of them so contributing, whom by Lot it shall light to, their mindes and states probably knowne either to other, I see here no reason why it should be vnlawfull. But for a man in this kinde to put that to hazard which he knoweth or probably suspecteth that he shall be vnable well, or vnwilling on such tearmes to part with; the losse whereof in that regard may either disable him to the doing of other necessarie duties, or distemper him and so make him guilty of sinne in Gods sight; or to ioyne with others needlesly in such an act, much more to draw them in and incite them thereunto, whom he knoweth not vpon good presumptions ⟨p. 110⟩to bee both able and willing; by meanes whereof they may be occasioned to sinne in the same sort; especially in such an action as he cannot but see to be so carried that many abuses are committed in it, and occasion giuen by it of much euill; I cannot see how a man should be free from sin in so doing; neither can I conceiue with what comfort of conscience a man can receiue or retaine what a Lot in such a case shall cast vpon him, comming in all likelihood in part out of the purses of those, as either are altogether vnable to part well with such summes, but haue strained themselues thereunto out of a greedy desire and hope of lucre and gaine; or being vnwilling to loose and to part with what they put in, doe in that regard wretchedly curse and blaspheame Gods name for the losse of it.
*Which occasions of evil being seen or foreseen, cannot but make such Lotteries unlawful to all those that partake in them, in regard of the inconveniency, and inexpediency that is in them. The more able therefore and willing a man may be to sustain such loss as by Lot may befall him, the lawfuller the Lot is. And the better known they are to be such whom a man dealeth with in matter of Lot, especially where the occasion is rather voluntary then necessary, the more warrantable is the Lot.
*Which occasions of euill being seene or foreseene, cannot but make such Loteries vnlawfull to all those that partake in them, in regard of the inconueniencie, and inexpediencie that is in them. The more able therefore and willing a man may be to sustaine such losse as by Lot may befall him, the lawfuller the Lot is. And the better knowne they are to be such whom a man dealeth with in matter of Lot, especially where the occasion is rather voluntary then necessary, the more warrantable is the Lot.
*Nonfaci•• adducor licitum consentire, quod tot parturit illicita. Bern. de consider. lib. 3.
To conclude briefly the grounds of this twofold caution: the event of Lot is casual: but the doing of Gods will in the avoiding of things evil either in them selves or by consequence is necessary: and therefore no sit matter to be put to the casual event of a Lot. Again the use of a Lot is to determine some question ⟨p. 111⟩or doubt: but no question ought to be made or doubt to be moved, of the committing of any moral evil, or the omitting of any necessary good duty, of the doing what God forbiddeth, or the not doing what he enjoineth: no Lot therefore may lawfully be used about such. Lastly what a man may not do though a Lot should determine it, that it is in vain to put to the determination of a Lot: but afor an oath, to observe it, a man may not do evil; much less for a Lot: such things therefore may not be put thereunto.
To conclude briefly the grounds of this twofold caution: the euent of Lot is casuall: but the doing of Gods wil in the auoiding of things euil either in thē selues or by consequence is necessarie: and therfore no sit matter to be put to the casuall euent of a Lot. Againe the vse of a Lot is to determine some question ⟨p. 111⟩or doubt: but no question ought to be made or doubt to be moued, of the committing of any morall euill, or the omitting of any necessary good duty, of the doing what God forbiddeth, or the not doing what he enioyneth: no Lot therefore may lawfully be vsed about such. Lastly what a man may not doe though a Lot should determine it, that it is in vaine to put to the determination of a Lot: but afor an oath, to obserue it, a man may not doe euill; much lesse for a Lot: such things therefore may not be put thereunto.
aNihil inhomestū promit•as: quin siquid promiseris, tolerabilius est promissum non facere, quem facere quod turpe sit. Ambr. offic. l. 3. c. 12. Tolerabilius talisacramento periuriū. Ibid. Juravit David temerè, sed non implevit inrationē major peitate. 1 Sam. 25.32. Aug. de divers. Serm. 11.Nihil inhomestū promit•as: quin siquid promiseris, tolerabilius est promissum non facere, quem facere quod turpe sit. Ambr. offic. l. 3. c. 12. Tolerabilius talisacramento periuriū. Ibid. Iurauit Dauid temerè, sed non impleuit inrationē maiore peitate. 1 Sam. 25.32. Aug. de diuers. Serm. 11.
Whereas therefore all moral actions are of three kinds in relation to Gods law, bsome simply enjoined, as are all necessary duties, some simply inhibited as are all moral evils, some freely permitted and left to our choice, as are all actions indifferent: the rule here is that a Lot hath his lawful use cin indifferent things only, such as may without either offence or inconvenience be done or left undone. In regard whereof the greater the indifferency is in the event of it which way soever it fall out, the more lawful the Lot is: and so (contrary to that which is commonly delivered and almost generally received,) the less weighty the matter is wherein a Lot is used, the lawfuller the Lot is.
Whereas therefore all morall actions are of three kindes in relation to Gods law, bsome simply enioyned, as are all necessarie duties, some simply inhibited as are all morall euills, some freely permitted and left to our choise, as are all actions indifferent: the rule here is that a Lot hath his lawfull vse cin indifferent things onely, such as may without either offence or inconuenience be done or left vndone. In regard whereof the greater the indifferencie is in the euent of it which way soeuer it fall out, the more lawfull the Lot is: and so (contrary to that which is commonly deliuered and almost generally receiued,) the lesse weighty the matter is wherein a Lot is vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is.
bPraecepta, prohibita, permissa.
c[Greek or Hebrew]. Chrysipp. offic. l. 6. apud Plut. de Stoic. contrar. Sors enim est. res incertissima, qua res graves quaelibet […] possunt definiri. Baro. in Jon. c. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Chrysipp. offic. l. 6. apud Plut. de Stoic. contrar. Sors enim est. res incertissima, qua res graues quaelibet 〈…〉 possunt definiri. Baro. in Ion. c. 1.
§ 8. Now these Cautions were concerning the matter wherein Lots are used: there follow two other concerning the manner how they are to be used in such matters.
§ 8. Now these Cautions were concerning the matter wherein Lots are vsed: there follow two other concerning the manner how they are to be vsed in such matters.
Where the former Caveat or Caution is that a man be willing to forgo and part with what he putteth to the hazard of a Lot: as before for the matter ⟨p. 112⟩it self, that it be such as he may be willing to part withal: (for that a man may be willing sometime to part with, what he may not lawfully part with) so now for the disposition of the party in such an action, that he be willing', if it shall so fall out, to sustain some loss, and so much loss, as may befall him by the Lot. The reason is evident: because otherwise a man doth that unadvisedly that may afterward discontent him, and be an occasion of sin to him. Again that which is put to the hazard of a Lot is in a manner forgone, so far forth, as it is put thereunto. A man ought therefore to be willing to forgo that, if the Lot shall put it from him, which he is content to cast upon the Lot, which may put it from him.
Where the former Caueat or Caution is that a man be willing to forgo and part with what he putteth to the hazard of a Lot: as before for the matter ⟨p. 112⟩it selfe, that it be such as he may be willing to part withall: (for that a man may be willing sometime to part with, what he may not lawfully part with) so now for the disposition of the partie in such an action, that he be willing', if it shall so fall out, to sustaine some losse, and so much losse, as may befall him by the Lot. The reason is euident: because otherwise a man doth that vnaduisedly that may afterward discontent him, and be an occasion of sin to him. Againe that which is put to the hazard of a Lot is in a manner forgone, so farre forth, as it is put thereunto. A man ought therefore to be willing to forgo that, if the Lot shall put it from him, which he is content to cast vpon the Lot, which may put it from him.
But here may some say, Is a man then bound to be willing to depart with his known right, because he may in some cases commit it to such hazard? or may he not in such case lawfully desire to obtain it?
But here may some say, Is a man then bound to be willing to depart with his knowne right, because he may in some cases commit it to such hazard? or may hee not in such case lawfully desire to obtaine it?
I answer: As ca man is bound not absolutely but conditionally to depart with his right, when a greater evil may ensue upon the recovery of it by such means as he hath only to recover the same by, though he may lawfully otherwise desire to obtain it: so in this case where a man is willing rather to loose it, then to seek it by other courses, and as willing to put it to the hazard of a Lot as to loose it, (for else were it a folly for him to put it thereunto) he ought to be no less willing, having yielded so far, to part with it, when it shall be so past; howsoever he might otherwise not unlawfully desire, ⟨p. 113⟩what he might lawfully retain, if with conveniency it might be had.
I answere: As ca man is bound not absolutely but conditionally to depart with his right, when a greater euill may ensue vpon the recouery of it by such meanes as he hath onely to recouer the same by, though he may lawfully otherwise desire to obtaine it: so in this case where a man is willing rather to loose it, then to seeke it by other courses, and as willing to put it to the hazard of a Lot as to loose it, (for else were it a folly for him to put it thereunto) he ought to be no lesse willing, hauing yeelded so farre, to part with it, when it shall be so past; howsoeuer he might otherwise not vnlawfully desire, ⟨p. 113⟩what he might lawfully retaine, if with conueniencie it might be had.
§ 9. The last Caution is that no dspecial or immediate decision, no extraordinary work be expected from God for the directing of the Lots in a certain course: nor ought concluded to that purpose out of the event of them. For dto expect any such thing is to presume of more then God hath promised: seeing that ehe hath no where promised any special providence in such cases, to do men right by such means, to justify their quarrels, to direct the Lot as the equity of the cause shall require, or to interpose himself and his providence in such courses otherwise then in any other of our actions, be they casual, contingent or necessary. And therefore to put ought to hazard with expectation of such an act of Gods providence is to presume of that which God hath not promised: (that wherein many of the Heathens Lotteries were not free from some fault) to make trial of it is to tempt God; I mean, to put ought to the hazard of a Lot to this end, thereby to try whether God will in such special manner interpose himself for our benefit, the recovery of our right, or the clearing of our cause; that is in effect, whether he will extraordinarily work for us at our will. Which therefore as to presume or expect before hand without good ground is hardly religious; so to conclude ought to that purpose afterward from the issue and event ⟨p. 114⟩of it, is undoubtedly superstitious.
§ 9. The last Caution is that no dspeciall or immediate decision, no extraordinarie worke bee expected from God for the directing of the Lots in a certaine course: nor ought concluded to that purpose out of the euent of them. For dto expect any such thing is to presume of more then God hath promised: seeing that ehe hath no where promised any speciall prouidence in such cases, to doe men right by such meanes, to iustifie their quarrels, to direct the Lot as the equitie of the cause shall require, or to interpose himselfe and his prouidence in such courses otherwise then in any other of our actions, be they casuall, contingent or necessarie. And therefore to put ought to hazard with expectation of such an act of Gods prouidence is to presume of that which God hath not promised: (that wherein many of the Heathens Loteries were not free from some fault) to make triall of it is to tempt God; I meane, to put ought to the hazard of a Lot to this end, thereby to trie whether God will in such speciall manner interpose himselfe for our benefit, the recouery of our right, or the clearing of our cause; that is in effect, whether he will extraordinarily worke for vs at our will. Which therefore as to presume or expect before hand without good ground is hardly religious; so to conclude ought to that purpose afterward from the issue and euent ⟨p. 114⟩of it, is vndoubtedly superstitious.
dIntentio non sit inquirere voluntat•m Dei modo extraordinario; quia talum dus •mni• è est incertus. Delrio disq. mag. tom. 3. l 4. c. 4. q. 1.
dPeccatum est tē tationis Dei exp•tere a•que exp•ctare à Deo ut ipse sortes dirigat, quando ipse id se facturam non promisit. Bellarm. decler. l. 1. c. 5Peccatum est tē tationis Dei exp•tere a•que exp•ctare à Deo vt ipse sortes dirigat, quando ipse id se facturam non promisit. Bellarm. decler. l. 1. c. 5
eSortibus affu•urum see minimié repromisit. Delrio. mag tom. 3. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.Sortibus affu•urum se minimié repromisit. Delrio. mag tom. 3. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.
In Lots therefore of this nature, ethe thing hazarded must be put wholly to fthe casual or uncertain event of the Lot in regard of the act of the Creature, though gnot excluding the providence of God from the action, no more then from other civill affairs managed by counsel and advice; (which he may also, if the thing be weighty, be entreated by prayer to interpose, but so far forth only as he shall see fit) yet hnot expecting any extraordinary or immediate hand of God for the carriage of it so as in right it ought to go, or as is best that it should go: because neither do we know how far forth God seeth it fit to interpose his providence therein, neither hath he left us any promise in his word general or special, that he will immediately at any time or upon any occasion interpose it in that manner. In division therefore of Lands made as equal as may be with conveniency, yet so as there is still some apparent inequality, in regard that the things cannot well otherwise be parted, for a man because in equity he hath right to the best part, as the eldest in an inheritance that goeth equally among all, to expect an extraordinary hand of God for the disposing of it according to the right as in equity it ought to go, is unwarrantable.
In Lots therefore of this nature, ethe thing hazarded must be put wholy to fthe casuall or vncertaine euent of the Lot in regard of the act of the Creature, though gnot excluding the prouidence of God from the action, no more then from other ciuill affaires managed by counsell and aduice; (which he may also, if the thing be weightie, be intreated by praier to interpose, but so farre forth onely as hee shall see fit) yet hnot expecting any extraordinarie or immediate hand of God for the cariage of it so as in right it ought to go, or as is best that it should go: because neither doe we know how farre forth God seeth it fit to interpose his prouidence therein, neither hath he left vs any promise in his word generall or speciall, that he wil immediatly at any time or vpon any occasion enterpose it in that manner. In diuision therefore of Lands made as equall as may be with conueniencie, yet so as there is still some apparent inequalitie, in regard that the things cannot well otherwise be parted, for a man because in equitie he hath right to the best part, as the eldest in an inheritance that goeth equally among all, to expect an extraordinarie hand of God for the disposing of it according to the right as in equitie it ought to go, is vnwarrantable.
eContingit aliquē divisoria sorte uti, non quasi requirat divinum judicium, sed quasi committat fortunae. Thom. desort. c. 5. & Lyra in Prou. c. 16.Contingit aliquē diuisoria sorte vti, non quasi requirat diuinum iudicium, sed quasi committat fortunae. Thom. desort. c. 5. & Lyra in Prou. c. 16.
fJudice fortuna cadat alea. Petron. satir. Fortuna sit optionis judex. Cod. Just. l. 2. tit. 20. & lib. 6. c. 43. leg. 3.Iudice fortuna cadat alea. Petron. satir. Fortuna sit optionis iudex. Cod. Iust. l. 2. tit. 20. & lib. 6. c. 43. leg. 3.
gVisatur Malder. de superstit. c. 7. dub. 9.
hMinus ergo solidum quod Plato de leg l. 6. [Greek or Hebrew]. Sed & quod Aug. Epist. 180. Qui maneant, qui fugiant sorte legenda, &c. quia Deus melius in huiusmodi ambagibus, quám homines judicat. Sed & quae Delrio l. 4. c. 2 q. 3. § 1. contra suam ipsius alibi sententians. & Peuc•r. de divinat. c. de s•rt. & Tolet. in sum. cas. consc. l. 4. c. 15. & Piscat. ad I•n. c. 1.Minus ergo solidum quod Plato de leg l. 6. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Sed & quod Aug. Epist. 180. Qui maneāt, qui fugiant sorte legenda, &c. quia Deus melius in huiusmodi ambagibꝰ, quám homines iudicat. Sed & quae Delrio l. 4. c. 2 q. 3. § 1. contra suam ipsius alibi sententians. & Peuc•r. de diuinat. c. de s•rt. & Tolet. in sum. cas. consc. l. 4. c. 15. & Piscat. ad I•n. c. 1.
As also to conclude, when two stand for a place, that the one is fitter and more sufficient for it then the other, because the question between them being put to Lot, the Lot lighted on him, as if God by that event had given sentence on his side, is no less unwarrantable.
As also to conclude, when two stand for a place, that the one is fitter and more sufficient for it then the other, because the question betweene them being put to Lot, the Lot lighted on him, as if God by that euent had giuen sentence on his side, is no lesse vnwarrantable.
§ 10. The rules then here are first, that Lots determine no right: and that iLots consequently are to be used in these cases not for matter of right, but for matter of fact only, and that not of fact past, but of fact future alone; not kto decide who hath best right to the better part, or who is fittest for the place, but to determine which of them shall have it and enjoy it, or shall go away with it. Else we make it not an ordinary but an extraordinary, not a mere divisory but a divinatory Lot, a Lot for divination, not a Lot only for division, which, as we shall show afterward, is utterly unlawful.
§ 10. The rules then here are first, that Lots determine no right: and that iLots consequently are to be vsed in these cases not for matter of right, but for matter of fact onely, and that not of fact past, but of fact future alone; not kto decide who hath best right to the better part, or who is fittest for the place, but to determine which of them shall haue it and enioy it, or shall go away with it. Else we make it not an ordinarie but an extraordinarie, not a meere diuisory but a diuinatory Lot, a Lot for diuination, not a Lot onely for diuision, which, as we shall shew afterward, is vtterly vnlawfull.
iNon ut per cam decernatur quid in rerū division magis expediat • sed ut quod ratione diffiniri non potest, saltem fortunae relinquatur. Thom. de sort. c. 4.Non vt per cam decernatur quid in rerū diuisione magis expediat • sed vt quod ratione diffiniri non potest, saltem fortunae relinquatur. Thom. de sort. c. 4.
kIn causis judicialibus aut criminalibus uti non licet. Baro in Jen. cap. 1. Nam quod hus traehunt Chytr. in Jud. c. 1. & Lavat. in Prou. c. 16. Judices ita missis in urnam calculis far solitos sententiam, ut albis absoluerent, atris damnarent, &c. nihil quicquam ad sortem pertinet: immit•ebant enim suum quisque calculum qualem ipsi visum, non casu fortuito catrahebant.In causis iudicialibus aut criminalibus vti non licet. Baro in Ien. cap. 1. Nam quod hus traehunt Chytr. in Iud. c. 1. & Lauat. in Prou. c. 16. Iudices ita missis in vrnam calculis ferre solitos sententiam, vt albis absoluerent, atris damnarent, &c. nihil quicquam ad sortem pertinet: immit•ebant enim suum quisque calculum qualem ipsi visum, non casu fortuito catrahebant.
And whereas in terms the civill Lawyers seem to say the contrary, where they say that lLots are to be used not in question of Fact, but in question of Right: yet in sense they accord with that which we here say, the Lawyers meaning being this alone, that Lots are not to be used in question of mFact past, where the question is whether a thing be done or not done; for that is no ordinary Lot able to decide; but where some question is who hath right to a thing, in which case notwithstanding the Lot is not used to determine who in truth hath right to it, but who for peace and quietness sake shall enjoy it, where the right cannot be determined, or who shall have possession of it, till the right be determined.
And whereas in tearmes the ciuill Lawiers seeme to say the contrarie, where they say that lLots are to be vsed not in question of Fact, but in question of Right: yet in sense they accord with that which we here say, the Lawyers meaning being this alone, that Lots are not to be vsed in question of mFact past, where the question is whether a thing be done or not done; for that is no ordinarie Lot able to decide; but where some question is who hath right to a thing, in which case notwithstanding the Lot is not vsed to determine who in truth hath right to it, but who for peace and quietnesse sake shall enioy it, where the right cannot be determined, or who shall haue possession of it, till the right be determined.
lInte•lige quando est questio •uris: secus si facti: quiae tunc non committitur sorti. Gloss. ad Digest. lib. 5. tit. 1. leg. 14. Imol. & Jas apud Gomez ad Taur leg. 38.Inte•lige quando est questio •uris: secus si facti: quiae tunc non committitur sorti. Gloss. ad Digest. lib. 5. tit. 1. leg. 14. Imol. & Ias apud Gomez ad Taur leg. 38.
mSi factum incertum est, dicenti incumbit probatio. Panorm. ad 5. decretal. de sortileg. In facti incertitudine, satius est • prounciare, non liquere, quàm sorti rem commit: ere. Greg. Tholoss. de appell. l. 2. c. 19.
Secondly, that no censure of right or wrong be grounded upon Lots: as that no extraordinary power or providence be expected, so nothing to that purpose upon the event of it be concluded, as ⟨p. 116⟩if it ought to have been or gone so, or it was Gods approving will that it should be so, because so it hath fallen out.
Secondly, that no censure of right or wrong bee grounded vpon Lots: as that no extraordinarie power or prouidence be expected, so nothing to that purpose vpon the euent of it be concluded, as ⟨p. 116⟩if it ought to haue beene or gone so, or it was Gods approuing will that it should be so, because so it hath falne out.
But doth not the work it self, may some say, manifest Gods will? I answer; there is a twofold will of God, a disposing will, and a directing will; a will informing and a will over-ruling: a will prescribing what should be, and a will preordaining what shall be. *When ought therefore is fallen out be it good or bad, it is apparent indeed that it was Gods will either to perform it or to permit it. For nnothing can possibly come to pass either without or against his will. But that it ought in right to have been so, cannot thence be concluded. Else might we conclude that the Jews ought to have crucified Christ, because God suffered them so to do, yea ohe preordained the doing of it. In this case therefore where the matter is put to a Lot by those in whose power it is so to dispose of it, it may be truly said, that it was Gods will, to wit, his disposing will, that the Lot should go as it hath gone: But it is no consequent therefore, that according to Gods directing or informing will, it ought in regard of right so to have gone as it hath.
But doth not the worke it selfe, may some say, manifest Gods will? I answere; there is a twofold will of God, a disposing will, and a directing will; a will enforming and a will ouer-ruling: a will prescribing what should be, and a will preordaining what shall be. *When ought therefore is falne out be it good or bad, it is apparent indeed that it was Gods will either to performe it or to permit it. For nnothing can possibly come to passe either without or against his will. But that it ought in right to haue beene so, cannot thence be concluded. Else might we conclude that the Iewes ought to haue crucified Christ, because God suffred them so to doe, yea ohe preordained the doing of it. In this case therefore where the matter is put to a Lot by those in whose power it is so to dispose of it, it may be truely said, that it was Gods will, to wit, his disposing will, that the Lot should go as it hath gone: But it is no consequent therefore, that according to Gods directing or enforming will, it ought in regard of right so to haue gone as it hath.
*Non fit aliquid, nisi omniposens fieri velit, vel sinendo, vel ipse faciendo. Aug. enchir. c. 95.
yPraecepta affirmativa ligant semper, sed non ad semper. Thom. par. 1a 2ae q. 71. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 10. & q. 88. a. 1 & par. 2a 2ae q. 3. a. 2. & Gerson. in regul. moral.Praecepta affirmatiua ligant semper, sed non ad semper. Thom. par. 1a 2ae q. 71. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 10. & q. 88. a. 1 & par. 2a 2ae q. 3. a. 2. & Gerson. in regul. moral.
z[Greek or Hebrew]. Plut. de Stoic. contradict.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plut. de Stoic. contradict.
. Sorte & vrna mores non discerni. Heluidius apud Ta•it. hist. lib. 4. In sorte euentus est, non iudicium, & saepe irrationabili casu sorte melioribus vltimus quisque prafertur. Ambros. hexam. lib. 5. cap. 21. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de constit. princip.
*Sicut aleae, sic & curiae casus delectu carens, digni• & indigni• aequè respondet. Gyraeld. Itinera•. Cambr. praesat. 1. Fortuna dignum atque indignum nequit internoscere. Pacu•. apud Cornif. ad Heren. lib. 2. §. 41.
eEt Isocrat. in Areopag. laudat [Greek or Hebrew]. Et de apibus Ambros. he•am. lib. 5. cap. 21. Rex non sorte ducitur.Et Isocrat. in Areopag. laudat 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et de apibus Ambros. he•am. lib. 5. cap. 21. Rex non sorte ducitur.
f[Greek or Hebrew]. Demost in Midia. ad quem lo•um Ulpia. [Greek or Hebrew]. Et Ulyss•s apud Ovid. met. 13. Est a•iquid de tot Graiarum millibus unum A Diomede legi. ••c me sors ire jubebat. Et Plin. Ep. 24. lib 8. Ne sort, quem judicio missus videaris.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Demost in Midia. ad quem lo•um Vlpia. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et Vlyss•s apud Ouid. met. 13. Est a•iquid de tot Graiarum millibus vnum A Diomede legi. ••c me sors ire iubebat. Et Plin. Ep. 24. lib 8. Ne sorte, quem iudicio missus videaris.
g[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist polit. l. 6. c. 3. Sortes licitae sunt quibus functiones certae viris idoneis tribu••tur. Lavat. in Prou. c. 16.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist polit. l. 6. c. 3. Sortes licitae sunt quibus functiones certae viris idoneis tribu••tur. Lauat. in Prou. c. 16.
hUbi impossibile esset ut sors aberraret. Bulling. in Act. 1. quia nu• um tunc est periculum, quacunque sirs exe•t. Bellarm. de cler. l. 1. c. 5.Vbi impossibile esset vt sors aberraret. Bulling. in Act. 1. quia nu• um tunc est periculum, quacunque s•rs exe•t. Bellarm. de cler. l. 1. c. 5.
i[Greek or Hebrew]. Cyrus apud Xenoph. Paed. l. 8.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Cyrus apud Xenoph. Paed. l. 8.
if the parties be vnlike, the one a debauched Roge that hath beene before oft in the like vilanies, the other but a Nouice newly fallen to the trade, and the present his first knowne offence; or the one an obstinate and desperate wretch, the other penitent and not vnlikely to proue an honest man afterward; for the publike Magistrate it were vnfit here to put it to hazard whether to spare or to punish:
〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Pla•o de leg l. 6. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ibid. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aeschin. in Cresiph. Hinc orationes 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et D•m•sth. in Mid•am, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et de Thesmothetis Libanius in Androt. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Sed & Senatū quisqu• ingressus, iuramento adigebatur, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, id indicare. Lysia• in Philon.
l[Greek or Hebrew] inde dicti: de quo priu• cap. 4. §. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 inde dicti: de quo priu• cap. 4. §. 6.
m[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot. polit. l. 6. c. 2. Sic [Greek or Hebrew], & militares reliqui [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. l. 6. Sic & Athenians. [Greek or Hebrew], &c. Pollux l 8. c. 8. § 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot. polit. l. 6. c. 2. Sic 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, & militares reliqui 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. l. 6. Sic & Atheniens. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, &c. Pollux l 8. c. 8. § 7.
n[Greek or Hebrew]. Plot. leg. l. 6. Hinc Lysias in Alcibiadem [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plat. leg. l. 6. Hinc Lysias in Alcibiadem 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
o[Greek or Hebrew]. Socrates apud Xenoph. [Greek or Hebrew]. 1. Cui geminum illud Philonis de constit. princip. [Greek or Hebrew]; &c.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Socrates apud Xenoph. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. 1. Cui geminum illud Philonis de constit. princip. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; &c.
pJoseph. captiu. l. 3. c. 26. & l. 7. c. 35.Ioseph. captiu. l. 3. c. 26. & l. 7. c. 35.
rOportet ut par sit sortientium reatus. Delri•. disq. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1. Alioqui, Sortiri ad poenam, atque hominum delictum fortunae judicio committere, minimè censorium est. Cic. pro Cluent.Oportet vt par sit sortientium reatus. Delri•. disq. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1. Alioqui, Sortiri ad poenam, atque hominum delictum fortunae iudicio committere, minimè censorium est. Cic. pro Cluent.