AN ANSWER TO THE FORMER CHALLENGE.AN ANSVVER TO THE FORMER CHALLENGE.
pp. 1–527550 passagespart 13 of 14
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The four books, which by his authority were published against that Nicene Synod, and the adoration of Images defended therein, are yet to be seen: as the Resolution also of the Doctors of France assembled at Paris by the command of his son Ludovicus Pius, in the year 824. and the book of Agobardus Bishop of Lions concerning Pictures and Images, written about the same time; the argument whereof is thus delivered by Papirius Massonus the setter out of it. gDetecting most manifestly the errors of the Grecians touching images and pictures, he denieth that they ought to be worshipped: which opinion all we Catholics do allow; and follow the testimony of Gregory the great concerning them. This passage, together with the larger view of hthe contents of this Treatise following afterwards, the Spanish Inquisitors in their Index Expurgatorius command to be blotted out: which we find to be accordingly performed by the Divines of Cullen, in their late corrupt edition of the igreat Bibliothecke of the ancient Fathers. Gretser professeth, that he kextremely wondereth, that this judgement of the book of Agobardus should proceed from a Catholic ⟨p. 463⟩man. For Agobardus (saith he) in that w•ole book doth nothing else, but endeavour to demonstrate (although with a vain labour) that images are not to be worshipped. lAnd who be these Grecians, whose errors touching images Agobardus doth refel, as this Publisher saith? Surely these Grecians are the Fathers of the Nicene Council, who decreed that Images should be adored and worshipped. Against whom whosoever disputeth, doth mainly dissent from right believers. To which blind censure of the Jesuit we may oppose, not only the general judgement of the ancient mAlmains his own countrymen, who within these four or five hundred years did flatly disclaim this Image-worship (as by Nicetas Choniates is witnessed:) but also the testimony of the Divines and Historians of England, France, and Germany touching the Nicene Council in particular; rejecting it as a
that Images should be worshipped: which thing (say our Chroniclers) the Church of God doth utterly detest. And yet for all that, we have news lately brought us from Rome:
The foure bookes, which by his authoritie were published against that Nicene Synod, and the adoration of Images defended therein, are yet to be seene: as the Resolution also of the Doctors of France assembled at Paris by the command of his sonne Ludovicus Pius, in the yeare 824. and the booke of Agobardus Bishop of Lions concerning Pictures and Images, written about the same time; the argument whereof is thus delivered by Papirius Massonus the setter out of it. gDetecting most manifestly the errors of the Grecians touching images and pictures, he denieth that they ought to be worshipped: which opinion all wee Catholickes doe allowe; and follow the testimonie of Gregory the great concerning them. This passage, together with the larger view of hthe contents of this Treatise following afterwards, the Spanish Inquisitors in their Index Expurgatorius commande to be blotted out: which wee finde to be accordingly performed by the Divines of Cullen, in their late corrupt edition of the igreat Bibliothecke of the ancient Fathers. Gretser professeth, that he kextreamely vvondereth, that this judgement of the booke of Agobardus should proceed from a Catholicke ⟨p. 463⟩man. For Agobardus (saith he) in that w•ole booke doth nothing else, but endevour to demonstrate (although with a vaine labour) that images are not to be worshipped. lAnd who be these Grecians, whose errors touching images Agobardus doth refell, as this Publisher saith? Surely these Grecians are the Fathers of the Nicene Councell, who decreed that Images should be adored and worshipped. Against whom whosoever disputeth, doth mainely dissent from right beleevers. To which blinde censure of the Iesuite we may oppose, not onely the generall judgement of the ancient mAlmaines his owne countriemen, who within these foure or five hundred yeares did flatly disclayme this Image-worship (as by Nicetas Choniates is witnessed:) but also the testimonie of the Divines and Historians of England, France, and Germanie touching the Nicene Councell in particular; rejecting it as a nPseudo-synode, because it concluded othat Images should be worshipped: which thing (say our Chroniclers) the Church of God doth utterly detest. And yet for all that, we have newes lately brought us from Rome:
gGraecorum errores de imaginibus & picturis manifestissimé detegens, negat eas adorari debere: quam sententiam omnes Catholici probamus, Gregorijque Magni testimoniū de illis sequimur. Papir. Mason. Praefat. in Agobardi Opera, edit. Paris. an. 1605.Graecorum errores de imaginibus & picturis manifestissimé detegens, negat eas adorari debere: quam sententiam omnes Catholici probamus, Gregorijque Magni testimoniū de illis sequimur. Papir. Masson. Praefat. in Agobardi Opera, edit. Paris. an. 1605.
hExpungantur omnia, quae sub hoe titulo (De Imaginibu• ) continentur. Jndex librorum expurgatorum. Bernardi de Sandoval & Roxas Card. de consilio senatus generalis Inquisit. Hispan. excus. Madriti, an. 1612.
kVehementer profectò hoc judicium de libro. Agobardi ab homine Catholico profectū. miratus sum. nam Agobardus toto libello, nihil aliud facit, quàm quòd demonstrare nititur (quamvis casso conatu) imagines non esse adorandas. Jac. Gretser. lib. 1. de Cruc•. •ap. 58.Vehementer profectò hoc judicium de libro. Agobardi ab homine Catholico profectū. miratus sum. nam Agobardus toto libello, nihil aliud facit, quàm quòd demonstrare nititur (quamvis casso conatu) imagines non esse adorandas. Jac. Gretser. lib. 1. de Cruc•. •ap. 58.
lEt quinam sunt Graeci, quorū de imaginibus er•ore Agobardus refellit, ut Editor ait? Nimirum Graeci isti sunt Petres Nicaeni Concilij; qui sanxerunt, imagines adorandas & colenda• esse. Contra quos qui disputat, is ab orthodoxis toto coelo discordat. Ibid.Et quinam sunt Graeci, quorū de imaginibus er•ore Agobardus refellit, ut Editor ait? Nimirum Graeci isti sunt Petres Nicaeni Concilij; qui sanxerunt, imagines adorandas & colenda• esse. Contra quos qui disputat, is ab orthodoxis toto coelo discordat. Ibid.
that pit is most certain, and most assured, that the Christian Church, even the most Ancient, the Whole, and the Universal Church, did with wonderful consent, without any opposition or contradiction, worship statues and images. Which if the cauterized conscience of a wretched Apostate would give him leave to utter: yet the extreme shamelessness of the assertion might have withheld their wisdoms whom he sought to please thereby, from giving him leave to publish it.
that pit is most certaine, and most assured, that the Christian Church, even the most Ancient, the Whole, and the Vniversall Church, did with wonderfull consent, without any opposition or contradiction, worship statues and images. Which if the cauterized conscience of a wretched Apostata would give him leave to utter: yet the extreame shamelessenesse of the assertion might have withhelde their wisedomes whom he sought to please thereby, from giving him leave to publish it.
pEcclesiam porrò Christianam, etiam Antiquissimam, Totam, ac Universalem, summo consensu, absque ullâ opposition, aut contradiction, Statuas ac imagines veneratam esse, est certissimum ac probatissimum. M. Anton. de Dominis, De consilio sui reditus, sect. 23.Ecclesiam porrò Christianam, etiam Antiquissimam, Totam, ac Vniversalem, summo consensu, absque ullâ oppositione, aut contradictione, Statuas ac imagines veneratam esse, est certissimum ac probatissimum. M. Anton. de Dominis, De consilio sui reditus, sect. 23.
But it may be I seek for shamefastness, in a place where it is not be found: and therefore leaving them to their Images, like to like, (for qthey that make them are like unto them; and so is every one that trusteth in them) I proceed from this point unto that which followeth.
But it may be I seeke for shamefastnesse, in a place where it is not be founde: and therefore leaving them to their Images, like to like, (for qthey that make them are like unto them; and so is every one that trusteth in them) I proceede from this point unto that which followeth.
That man hath Free-will, is not by us gainsaid: though we dare not give him so large a freedom as the Jesuits presume to do. Freedom of will we know doth as essentially belong unto a man, as reason it self: and he that spoileth him of that power, doth in effect make him a very beast. For this is the difference betwixt reasonable and unreasonable creatures: as Damascene rightly noteth. 1The unreasonable are rather led by nature, then themselves leaders of it: and therefore do they never contradict their natural appetite, but as soon as they affect any thing, they rush to the prosecution of it. But man, being endued with reason, doth rather lead nature, then is led by it: and therefore being moved with appetite, if he will, he hath power to restrain his appetite, or to follow it. Hereby he is enabled to do the things which he doth, neither by a brute instinct of nature not ye• by any compulsion, but by advise and deliberation: the Mind first taking into consideration the grounds and circumstances of each action, & freely debating on either side what in this case were best to be done or not done; and then the Will inclining it self to put in execution the last and conclusive judgement of the practical Understanding. This liberty we acknowledge a man may exercise in all actions ⟨p. 465⟩that are within his power to do: whether they be lawful, unlawful, or indifferent; whether done by the strength of nature or of grace. for even in doing the works of grace, our free-will suspendeth not her action, but being moved and guided by grace, doeth that which is fit for her to do: grace not taking away the liberty, which cometh by Gods creation, but the pravity of the Will, which ariseth from Mans corruption. In a word, as we condemn bAgapius and the rest of that mad sect of the Manichees, for bringing in such a kind of necessity of sinning, whereby men were made to offend against their wills: so likewise with Polychronius and other men of understanding we defend, that cvirtue is a voluntary thing, and free from all necessity; and with the author of the books De vocatione Gentium (attributed unto Prosper) dwe both believe and feel by experience that Grace is so powerful, that yet we conceive it no way to be violent.
THat man hath Free-will, is not by us gainesayd: though wee dare not give him so large a freedome as the Iesuites presume to doe. Freedome of will wee knowe doth as essentially belong unto a man, as reason it selfe: and he that spoyleth him of that power, doth in effect make him a verie beast. For this is the difference betwixt reasonable and unreasonable creatures: as Damascen rightly noteth. 1The unreasonable are rather ledd by nature, then themselves leaders of it: and therefore doe they never contradict their naturall appetite, but as soone as they affect any thing, they rush to the prosecution of it. But man, being indued with reason, doth rather lead nature, then is ledd by it: and therefore being moved with appetite, if he will, he hath power to restraine his appetite, or to follow it. Hereby he is inabled to doe the things which he doth, neither by a brute instinct of nature not ye• by any compulsion, but by advise and deliberation: the Minde first taking into consideration the grounds and circumstances of each action, & freely debating on eyther side what in this case were best to be done or not done; and then the Will inclining it selfe to put in execution the last and conclusive judgement of the practicall Vnderstanding. This libertie we acknowledge a man may exercise in all actions ⟨p. 465⟩that are within his power to doe: whether they be lawfull, unlawfull, or indifferent; whether done by the strength of nature or of grace. for even in doing the workes of grace, our free-will suspendeth not her action, but being moved and guided by grace, doeth that which is fit for her to doe: grace not taking away the libertie, which commeth by Gods creation, but the pravitie of the Will, which ariseth from Mans corruption. In a word, as we condemne bAgapius and the rest of that mad sect of the Manichees, for bringing in such a kinde of necessitie of sinning, whereby men were made to offend against their wils: so likewise with Polychronius and other men of understanding we defend, that cvertue is a voluntarie thing, and free from all necessitie; and with the author of the bookes De vocatione Gentium (attributed unto Prosper) dwe both beleeve and feele by experience that Grace is so powerfull, that yet we conceive it no way to be violent.
c[Greek or Hebrew]. Polychron. in Cantic. pag. 93. edit. Meursij.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Polychron. in Cantic. pag. 93. edit. Meursij.
dHanc quippe abundantiorem gratiam ita credimu• atque experimur potentem, ut nullo modo arbitremur esse violentam. Prosp. de vocat. Gent. li. 2. cap 26
But it is one thing to inquire of the nature, another to dispute of the strength and ability of Free-will. We say with Adamantius (in the Dialogues collected out of Maximus against the Marcionites) that eGod made Angels and Men [Greek or Hebrew], but not [Greek or Hebrew]: he endued them with freedom of Will, but not with ability to do all things. And now since the fall of Adam we say further, that freedom of Will remaineth still among men; but the ability which once it had, to perform spiritual duties and things pertaining to salvation, is quite lost and extinguished. For fwho is ⟨p. 466⟩there of us (saith S. Augustine) which would say, that by the sin of the first Man Free-will is utterly perished from mankind? Freedom indeed is perished by sin: but that freedom which was in Paradise, of having full righteousness with immortality. for which cause Mans nature standeth in need of Gods grace, according to the saying of our Lord; If the Son shall free you, then ye shall be free indeed: namely free to live well and righteously. For free-will is so far from having perished in the sinner; that by it they sin, all they especially who sin with delight, and for the love of sin, that pleaseth them which liketh them. When we deny therefore that a natural man hath any free-will unto good: by a natural man, we understand one that is without Christ, and destitute of his renewing grace; by free-will, that which the Philosophers call [Greek or Hebrew], a thing that is in our own power to do; and by good, a Theological not a Philosophical good, bonū veré spiritual & salutare, a spiritual good and tending to salvation. This then is the difference which Gods word teacheth us to put, betwixt a regenerate & an unregenerate man. The one is galive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord; and so enabled to hyield himself unto God, as one that is alive from the dead, and his members as instruments of righteousness unto God: ihaving his fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. The other is a mere kstranger from the life of God, ldead in trespasses and sins; and so no more able to lead a holy life acceptable unto God, then a dead man is to perform the actions of him which is alive.
But it is one thing to inquire of the nature, another to dispute of the strength and abilitie of Free-will. We say with Adamantius (in the Dialogues collected out of Maximus against the Marcionites) that eGod made Angels and Men 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, but not 〈non-Latin alphabet〉: hee indued them with freedome of Will, but not with abilitie to doe all things. And now since the fall of Adam wee say further, that freedome of Will remayneth still among men; but the abilitie which once it had, to performe spirituall duties and things pertayning to salvation, is quite lost and extinguished. For fvvho is ⟨p. 466⟩there of us (saith S. Augustine) which would say, that by the sinne of the first Man Free-will is utterly perished from mankinde? Freedome indeed is perished by sinne: but that freedome which was in Paradise, of having full righteousnesse with immortalitie. for vvhich cause Mans nature standeth in neede of Gods grace, according to the saying of our Lord; If the Sonne shall free you, then yee shall be free indeed: namely free to live well and righteously. For free-will is so farre from having perished in the sinner; that by it they sinne, all they especially who sinne with delight, and for the love of sinne, that pleaseth them which liketh them. When we denie therefore that a naturall man hath any free-will unto good: by a naturall man, wee understand one that is without Christ, and destitute of his renewing grace; by free-will, that which the Philosophers call 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, a thing that is in our owne power to doe; and by good, a Theologicall not a Philosophicall good, bonū veré spirituale & salutare, a spirituall good and tending to salvation. This then is the difference which Gods word teacheth us to put, betwixt a regenerate & an unregenerate man. The one is galive unto God, through Iesus Christ our Lord; and so inabled to hyeelde himselfe unto God, as one that is alive from the dead, and his members as instruments of righteousnesse unto God: ihaving his fruite unto holinesse, and the end everlasting life. The other is a meere
fQuis autem nostrûm dicat, quòd primi hominis peccato perierit liberū arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidē perijt per peccatū; sed illa quae in Paradiso fuit, habendi plenā con immortalitate justitiam: propter quod natura humana divinâ indiget gratiâ, dicente Domino; Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc veré liberi critis; utique liberi ad bene justeque vivendū Nam liberū a•b•triū usque adeò in peccatore non perijt; ut per illud peccent, maximé omnes qui cum delectatione peccant, & amore peccati, hoc eis placet quod eis libet. Aug. contr, duas exist. Pelagian. li. 1. cap. •.Quis autem nostrûm dicat, quòd primi hominis peccato perierit liberū arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidē perijt per peccatū; sed illa quae in Paradiso fuit, habēdi plenā cū immortalitate justitiam: propter quod natura humana divinâ indiget gratiâ, dicente Domino; Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc veré liberi critis; utique liberi ad bene justeque vivendū Nam liberū a•b•triū usque adeò in peccatore non perijt; ut per illud peccēt, maximé omnes qui cum delectatione peccāt, & amore peccati, hoc eis placet quod eis libet. Aug. contr, duas e•ist. Pelagian. li. 1. cap. •.
He may live indeed the life of a natural and a moral man, and so exercise the freedom of his Will, not only in natural and civill, but also in moral actions, ⟨p. 467⟩so far as concerneth external conformity unto those notions of good and evil that remain in his mind: (in respect whereof the very mGentiles themselves which have not the Law, are said to do by nature the things contained in the Law:) he may have such fruit, as not only common honesty and civility, but common gifts of Gods spirit likewise will yield, and in regard thereof he may obtain of God temporal rewards appertaining to this transitory life, and a lesser measure of punishment in the world to come: yet until he be quickened with the life of grace, & nmarried to him who is raised from the dead, he cannot bring forth fruit unto God, nor be accepted for one of his servants. This is the doctrine of our Saviour himself, John. 15.4, 5. As the branch cannot bear fruit of it self, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me: I am the Vine, ye are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do NOTHING, that is, nothing truly good and acceptable unto God. This is the lesson that S. Paul doth every where inculcate. oI know, that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. pThe natural man perceiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. qWithout faith it is impossible to please God. rUnto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure: but even their mind & conscience is defiled. Now seeing sthe end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned; seeing the first beginning, from whence every good action should proceed, is a sanctified heart, the last end the seeking of Gods glory, and faith working by love ⟨p. 468⟩must intercurre betwixt both: the moral works of the unregenerate failing so foully both in the beginning, middle and end, are to be accounted breaches rather of the Commandment then observances, depravations of good works rather then performances. For howsoever these actions be in their own kind good and commanded of God, yet are they marred in the carriage, that which is bonum being not done been:
He may live indeed the life of a naturall and a morall man, and so exercise the freedome of his Will, not onely in naturall and civill, but also in morall actions, ⟨p. 467⟩so farre as concerneth externall conformitie unto those notions of good and evill that remaine in his minde: (in respect whereof the verie mGentiles themselves which have not the Law, are said to doe by nature the things contayned in the Law:) he may have such fruite, as not onely common honestie and civilitie, but common giftes of Gods spirit likewise will yeelde, and in regard thereof hee may obtaine of God temporall rewards appertayning to this transitorie life, and a lesser measure of punishment in the world to come: yet untill he be quickened with the life of grace, & nmarried to him who is raysed from the dead, he cannot bring forth fruite unto God, nor be accepted for one of his servants. This is the doctrine of our Saviour himselfe, Iohn. 15.4, 5. As the branch cannot beare fruite of it selfe, except it abide in the vine; no more can yee, except yee abide in me: I am the Vine, yee are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruite: for without me yee can doe NOTHING, that is, nothing truely good and acceptable unto God. This is the lesson that S. Paul doth everie where inculcate. oI know, that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. pThe naturall man perceiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishnesse unto him: neyther can he understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. qWithout faith it is impossible to please God. rVnto them that are defiled and unbeleeving is nothing pure: but even their minde & conscience is defiled. Now seeing sthe end of the commandement is charitie, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfained; seeing the first beginning, from whence every good action should proceed, is a sanctified heart, the last end the seeking of Gods glorie, and faith working by love
The Pelagian heretics were wont here to object unto our forefathers (as the Romanists do now a days unto us) both the examples of the Heathen, twho being strangers from the faith, did notwithstanding (as they said) abound with virtues: and S. Pauls testimony also concerning them, Rom. 2.14, 15. by which they laboured to prove, uthat even such as were strangers from the faith of Christ, might yet have true righteousness; because that these, as the Apostle witnessed, naturally did the things of the Law. But will you hear how S. Augustine took up Julian the Pelagian, for making this objection? xHerein hast thou expressed more evidently that doctrine of yours, wherein you are enemies unto the grace of God which is given by Jesus Christ our Lord, who taketh away the sin of the world: bringing in a kind of men, which may please God without the faith of Christ, by the law of nature. This is it, for which the Christian Church doth most of all detest you: & again. yBe ⟨p. 469⟩it far from us to think, that true virtue should be in any one, unless he were righteous. And as far, that one should be truly righteous, unless he did live by faith: for the just doth live by faith. Now which of them, that would have themselves accounted Christians, but the Pelagians alone, or even among them, perhaps thou thy self alone, would say that an infidel were righteous, would say that an ungodly man were righteous, would say that a man mancipated to the Devil were righteous? although he were Fabricius, although he were Fabius, although he were Scipio, although he were Regulus. And whereas Julian had further demanded: zIf a Heathen man do clothe the naked, because it is not of faith, is it therefore sin? Saint Augustine answereth absolutely, in as much as it is not of faith, it is sin: not because the fact considered in it self, which is to clothe the naked, is a sin; but of such a work not to glory in the Lord, none but an impious man will deny to be a sin. For howsoever, ain it self, this natural compassion be a good work; yet he useth this good work amiss, that useth it unbelievingly, and doth this good work amiss, that doth it unbelievingly: but who so doth any thing amiss, sinneth surely. From whence it is to be gathered, that even those good works which unbelievers do, are not theirs, but his who maketh good use of evil men:
The Pelagian heretickes were wont here to object unto our forefathers (as the Romanistes doe now a daies unto us) both the examples of the Heathen, tvvho being strangers from the faith, did notwithstanding (as they said) abound with vertues: and S. Pauls testimonie also concerning them, Rom. 2.14, 15. by which they laboured to prove, uthat even such as were strangers from the faith of Christ, might yet have true righteousnesse; because that these, as the Apostle witnessed, naturally did the things of the Law. But will you heare how S. Augustine tooke up Iulian the Pelagian, for making this ob•ection? xHerein hast thou expressed more evidently that doctrine of yours, wherein you are enemies unto the grace of God which is given by Iesus Christ our Lord, who taketh away the sinne of the world: bringing in a kinde of men, which may please God without the faith of Christ, by the law of nature. This is it, for which the Christiā Church doth most of all detest you: & again. yBe ⟨p. 469⟩it farre from us to thinke, that true vertue should be in any one, unlesse he were righteous. And as farre, that one should be truly righteous, unlesse he did live by faith: for the just doth live by faith. Now which of them, that would have themselves accounted Christians, but the Pelagians alone, or even among them, perhaps thou thy selfe alone, would say that an infidell were righteous, would say that an ungodly man were righteous, would say that a man mancipated to the Devill were righteous? although he were Fabricius, although hee were Fabius, although hee were Scipio, although he were Regulus. And whereas Iulian had further demanded: zIf a Heathen man doe cloath the naked, because it is not of faith, is it therefore sinne? Saint Augustine answereth absolutely, in as much as it is not of faith, it is sinne: not because the fact considered in it selfe, which is to cloath the naked, is a sinne; but of such a worke not to glory in the Lord, none but an impious man will deny to be a sinne. For howsoever, ain it selfe, this naturall compassion be a good worke; yet hee useth this good worke amisse, that useth it unbeleevingly, and doth this good work amisse, that doth it unbeleevingly: but who so doth any thing amisse, sinneth surely. From whence it is to be gathered, that even those good workes which unbeleevers doe, are not theirs, but his who maketh good use of evill men:
tSed acerbissimi gratiae hujus inimici, exempla nobis opponitis impiorum, quos dicitis alienos á fide abundare virtutibus. Aug. contr. Julian. lib. 4. cap. 3.Sed acerbissimi gratiae hujus inimici, exempla nobis opponitis impiorum, quos dicitis alienos á fide abundare virtutibus. Aug. contr. Iulian. lib. 4. cap. 3.
uPer hos enim probare conatus es, etiam alienos á fide Christi, veram posse habere justitiam; eo quòd isti, teste Apostolo, naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt. Ibid.
xUbi quidem dogma vestrū quo estis inimici gratiae Dei, quae datur per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrū, qui tollit peccatum mundi, evidentiùs expressisti; intro ducens hominum genus, quod Deo placere possit sine Christi fide, lege naturae. Hoc est unde vos maximé Christiana detestatur Ecclesia. Ibid.Vbi quidem dogma vestrū quo estis inimici gratiae Dei, quae datur per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrū, qui tollit peccatum mundi, evidentiùs expressisti; intro ducens hominum genus, quod Deo placere possit sine Christi fide, lege naturae. Hoc est unde vos maximé Christiana detestatur Ecclesia. Ibid.
ySed absit, ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit justus. Absit autē ut sit justus veré, nisi vivat ex fide: Justus enim ex fide vivit. Quis porrò eorū, qui se Christianos habe•i volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiā fortè tu solus, justū dixerit infidelē justū dixerit impiū, justū dixerit Diabolo mancipatū? sit licèt ille Fabricius, sit licèt Fabius, sit licèt Scipio, sit licèt Regulus. I•id.Sed absit, ut sit in aliquo vera virtus, nisi fuerit justus. Absit autē ut sit justus veré, nisi vivat ex fide: Iustus enim ex fide vivit. Quis porrò eorū, qui se Christianos habe•i volunt, nisi soli Pelagiani, aut in ipsis etiā fortè tu solus, justū dixerit infidelē justū dixerit impiū, justū dixerit Diabolo mancipatū? sit licèt ille Fabricius, sit licèt Fabius, sit licèt Scipio, sit licèt Regulus. I•id.
zSi gently (inquis) nudum operuerit, nunquid quia non est ex fide, peccatum est? Prorsus in quantum non est ex fide peccatum est: non quia per seipsum factum, quod est nudum operire, peccatum est; sed de tali opere non in •omino gloriari, solus impius negat esse peccatum. Ibid.
but that the sins are theirs, whereby they do good things amiss; because they do them not with a faithful, but with an unfaithful, that is, with a foolish and naughty will. Which kind of will no Christian doubteth to be an evil ⟨p. 470⟩tree, which cannot bring forth but evil fruits, that is to say, sins only. For all that is not of faith, whether thou wilt or no, is sin. This and much more to the same purpose, doth Saint Augustine urge against the Heretic Julian: prosecuting at large that conclusion which he layeth down in his book of the Acts of the Palestine Council against Pelagius. bHow much soever the works of unbelievers be magnified, we know the sentence of the Apostle to be true and invincible; Whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Which maketh him also in his Retractations to correct himself, for saying in one place, cThat the Philosophers shined with the light of virtue, who were not endued with true piety.
but that the sinnes are theirs, whereby they doe good things amisse; because they doe them not with a faithfull, but with an unfaithfull, that is, with a foolish and naughtie will. Which kinde of will no Christian doubteth to be an evill ⟨p. 470⟩tree, which cannot bring forth but evill fruits, that is to say, sinnes only. For all that is not of faith, whether thou wilt or no, is sinne. This and much more to the same purpose, doth Saint Augustine urge against the Heretike Iulian: prosecuting at large that conclusion which hee layeth downe in his booke of the Acts of the Palestine Councell against Pelagius. bHow much soever the works of unbeleevers be magnified, we know the sentence of the Apostle to be true and invincible; Whatsoever is not of faith is sinne. Which maketh him also in his Retractations to correct himselfe, for saying in one place, cThat the Philosophers shined with the light of vertue, who were not endued with true pietie.
bQuantumlibet opera infidelium praedicentur: Apostoli sententiam veram novimus & invictam; Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Id. de gestis c•ntra Pelag•um, cap. 14.
The like sentence doth Saint Hierome pronounce against those, dwho not believing in Christ, did yet think themselves to be valiant and wise, temperate or just: that they might know that no man doth live without Christ, without whom all virtue is accounted vice. And Prosper against Cassianus, a Patron of the free-will of the Semipelagians: eIt appeareth (saith he) most manifestly, that there dwelleth no virtue in the minds of the ungodly, but that all their works be unclean and polluted; who have wisdom not spiritual, but animal, not heavenly but earthly, not Christian, but Diabolical, not from the Father of light, but from the Prince of darkness; while by those very things which they should not have had but by Gods giving, they are made subject to him, who did first fall from ⟨p. 471⟩God. fNeither ought we therefore to imagine, that the beginnings of virtues be in the treasures of nature, because many commendable things are found in the minds of ungodly men, which do proceed indeed from nature; but because they have departed from him that made nature, can not be accounted virtues. For that which is illuminated with the true light, is light; and that which wanteth that light, is night: because the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. And so that is vice, which is thought to be virtue: as that is foolishness, which is thought to be wisdom. Hitherto also pertaineth that sentence, produced by him out of S. Augustine's works: gThe whole life of unbelievers is sin; and there is nothing good without the chiefest good. For where there is wanting the acknowledgement of the eternal and unchangeable truth, there is false virtue even in the best manners. Which he elegantly expresseth in verse, as well in his 81. Epigram, as in his Poem against the Pelagians, wherein of natural wisdom he writeth thus:
hEt licèt eximias studeat pollere per arts,
Ingeniumque bonum generosis moribus ornet:
Coeca tamen finem ad mortis per devia currit,
Nec vitae aeternae veros acquirere fructus
De falsâ virtute potest; unamque decoris
Occidui speciem mortali perdit in aevo.
Omne etenim probitatis opus, nisi semine verae
Exoritur fidei, peccatum est, inque reatum
Vertitur, & sterilis cumulat sibi gloria poenam.
The like sentence doth Saint Hierome pronounce against those, dwho not beleeving in Christ, did yet thinke themselves to be valiant and wise, temperate or just: that they might know that no man doth live without Christ, without whom all vertue is accounted vice. And Prosper against Cassianus, a Patron of the free-will of the Semipelagians: eIt appeareth (saith he) most manifestly, that there dwelleth no vertue in the minds of the ungodly, but that all their workes be uncleane and polluted; who have wisdome not spirituall, but animall, not heavenly but earthly, not Christian, but Diabolicall, not from the Father of light, but from the Prince of darknesse; while by those very things which they should not have had but by Gods giving, they are made subject to him, who did first fall from ⟨p. 471⟩God. fNeither ought we therefore to imagine, that the beginnings of vertues be in the treasures of nature, because many commendable things are found in the mindes of ungodly men, which doe proceed indeed from nature; but because they haue departed from him that made nature, can not be accounted vertues. For that which is illuminated with the true light, is light; and that which wanteth that light, is night: because the wisdome of this world is foolishnesse with God. And so that is vice, which is thought to be vertue: as that is foolishnesse, which is thought to be wisdome. Hitherto also pertaineth that sentence, produced by him out of S. Augustines workes: gThe whole life of unbeleevers is sinne; and there is nothing good without the chiefest good. For where there is wanting the acknowledgement of the eternall and unchangeable truth, there is false vertue even in the best manners. Which he elegantly expresseth in verse, as well in his 81. Epigramme, as in his Poëme against the Pelagians, wherein of naturall wisdome he writeth thus:
hEt licèt eximias studeat pollere per artes,
Ingeniumque bonum generosis moribus ornet:
Coeca tamen finem ad mortis per deuia currit,
Nec vitae aeternae veros acquirere fructus
De falsâ virtute potest; unamque decoris
Occidui speciem mortali perdit in aevo.
Omne etenim probitatis opus, nisi semine verae
Exoritur fidei, peccatum est, inque reatum
Vertitur, & sterilis cumulat sibi gloria poenam.
dSententiam proferamus adversus eos, qui in Christū non credentes, fortes & sapientes, temperantes se putant esse & justos: ut sciant nullum absque Christo vivere, sine quo omnis virtus in vitio est. Hieronym. in Galat. cap. 3.Sententiam proferamus adversus eos, qui in Christū non credentes, fortes & sapientes, temperantes se putant esse & justos: ut sciant nullum absque Christo vivere, sine quo omnis virtus in vitio est. Hieronym. in Galat. cap. 3.
eManifestissimè patet, in impiorum animis nullam habitare virtutem: sed omnia opera eorum immunda esse atque polluta; habentium sapientiam non spiritualem sed animalem, non coelestem sed terrenam, non Christianam sed Diabolicam, non à Patre luminum, sed à Principe tenebrarum; dumb per ea ipsa quae non haberent nisi dante Deo, subduntur ei qu• primus recessit à Deo. Prosper. contra Collator. cap. 13.Manifestissimè patet, in impiorum animis nullam habitare virtutem: sed omnia opera eorum immunda esse atque polluta; habentium sapientiam non spiritualem sed animalem, non coelestem sed terrenam, non Christianam sed Diabolicam, non à Patre luminum, sed à Principe tenebrarum; dum per ea ipsa quae non haberent nisi dante Deo, subduntur ei qu• primus recessit à Deo. Prosper. contra Collator. cap. 13.
fNec ideo existima•e debemus, in naturalibus thesauris principia esse virtutum, quia multa laudanda reperiuntur etiam in ingenijs impiorum: quae ex naturâ quidem prodeunt; sed quoniam ab eo qui naturam condidit recesserunt, virtutes esse non possunt. Quod enim vero illuminatum est lumine, lumē est; & quod eodem lumine caret, nox est: Quia sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Ac sic vitium est quod putatur esse virtus: quandoquidem stultitia est, quod putatur esse sapientia. Ibid.Nec ideo existima•e debemus, in naturalibus thesauris principia esse virtutum, quia multa laudanda reperiuntur etiam in ingenijs impiorum: quae ex naturâ quidem prodeunt; sed quoniam ab eo qui naturam condidit recesserunt, virtutes esse non possunt. Quod enim vero illuminatum est lumine, lumē est; & quod eodem lumine caret, nox est: Quia sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Ac sic vitium est quod putatur esse virtus: quandoquidem stultitia est, quod putatur esse sapientia. Ibid.
The Author of the book De Vocatione Gentium (by some wrongly attributed to S. Ambrose, to Prosper by others) delivereth the same doctrine in these words:
The Author of the booke De Vocatione Gentium (by some wrongly attributed to S. Ambrose, to Prosper by others) delivereth the same doctrine in these words:
iAlthough there have been some who by their natural understanding have endeavoured to resist vices; yet have they only barrenly adorned this temporal life, but not profited at all unto true virtues and everlasting bliss. For without the worship of the true God, even that which seemeth to be virtue is sin: neither can any man please God, without God. And he that doth not please God, whom doth he please but himself and the Devil? By whom when man was spoiled, he was deprived not of his will, but of the sanity of his will. kTherefore if God do not work in us, we can be partakers of no virtue. For without this good, there is nothing good; without this light, there is nothing lightsome; without this wisdom, there is nothing sound; without this righteousness, there is nothing right. So Fulgentius, in his book of the Incarnation and Grace of Christ. lIf unto some who did know God, and yet did not glorify him as God, that knowledge did profit nothing unto salvation: how could they be just with God, which do so keep some goodness in their manners and works, that yet they refer it not unto the end of Christian faith and charity? In whom there may be indeed some good things that appertain to the equity of humane society: but because they are not done by the love of God, profit they cannot. And Maxentius in the Confession of his Faith: mWe believe ⟨p. 473⟩that natural Free-will hath ability to nothing else, but to discern and desire carnal or secular things only; which not with God, but with m•n peradventure may seem glorious: but for the things that pertain to everlasting life, that it can neither think, nor will, nor desire, nor effect, but by the infusion and inward operation of the Holy Ghost. and Cassiodorus, in his exposition of the Psalms. nOn the evil part indeed there is an execrable freedom of the will, that the sinner may forsake his Creator, and convert himself to wicked vices: but on the good part, by Adams sinning, we have lost free-will, unto which otherwise than by the grace of Christ we cannot return: according to the saying of the Apostle; It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure. (Philip. 2.13.)
iAlthough there have beene some who by their naturall understanding have endevoured to resist vices; yet have they only barrenly adorned this temporall life, but not profited at all unto true vertues and everlasting blisse. For without the worship of the true God, even that which seemeth to be vertue is sinne: neither can any man please God, without God. And he that doth not please God, whom doth hee please but himselfe and the Devill? By whom when man was spoiled, he was deprived not of his will, but of the sanitie of his will. kTherefore if God doe not worke in us, we can be partakers of no vertue. For without this good, there is nothing good; without this light, there is nothing lightsome; without this wisdome, there is nothing sound; without this righteousnesse, there is nothing right. So Fulgentius, in his booke of the Incarnation and Grace of Christ. lIf unto some who did know God, and yet did not glorifie him as God, that knowledge did profit nothing unto salvation: how could they be just with God, which doe so keepe some goodnesse in their manners and workes, that yet they referre it not unto the end of Christian faith and charitie? In whom there may be indeed some good things that appertaine to the equitie of humane societie: but because they are not done by the love of God, profit they cannot. And Maxentius in the Confessio• of his Faith: mWe beleeve ⟨p. 473⟩that naturall Free-will hath abilitie to nothing else, but to discerne and desire carnall or secular things only; which not with God, but with m•n peradventure may seeme glorious: but for the things that pertaine to everlasting life, that it can neither thinke, nor will, nor desire, nor effect, but by the infusion and inward operation of the Holy Ghost. and Cassiodorus, in his exposition of the Psalmes. nOn the evill part indeed there is an execrable freedome of the will, that the sinner may forsake his Creator, and convert himselfe to wicked vices: but on the good part, by Adams sinning, we have lost free-will, unto which otherwise than by the grace of Christ we cannot returne: according to the saying of the Apostle; It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to doe, of his good pleasure. (
iEtsi fuit qui naturali intellectu conatus sit vitijs reluctari; hujus tantùm temporis vitam steriliter ornavit, ad veras autem virtutes aeternā que beatitudinem non profecit. Sine cultu enim veri Dei, etiā quod virtus videtur esse, peccatū est: nec placere ullus Deo sine Deo potest. Qui verò Deo non placet, cui nisi sibi & Diabolo placet? A quo cùm homo spoliaretur; nō voluntate, sed voluntatis sanitate privatus est. Prosp. de Vocatione Gent. lib. 1. cap. 7.Etsi fuit qui naturali intellectu conatus sit vitijs reluctari; hujus tantùm temporis vitam steriliter ornavit, ad veras autem virtutes aeternā que beatitudinem non profecit. Sine cultu enim veri Dei, etiā quod virtus videtur esse, peccatū est: nec placere ullus Deo sine Deo potest. Qui verò Deo non placet, cui nisi sibi & Diabolo placet? A quo cùm homo spoliaretur; nō voluntate, sed voluntatis sanitate privatus est. Prosp. de Vocatione Gent. lib. 1. cap. 7.
kQui si non operatur in nobis, nullius possumus esse participes virtutis. Si• noe quippe bono, nihil est bonum: sine hâc luce, nihil est lucidum: sine hâc sapientiâ, nihil sanum; fine hac justitiâ, nihil rectum. Ibid. cap. 8.
lQuòd si quibusdam cognoscentibus Deum, nec tamen sicut Deum glorificantibus, cognitio illa nihil profuit ad salutem: quomodo hi potuerunt justi esse apud Deum, qui sic in suis moribus atque operibus bonitatis aliquid servant, ut hoc ad finem Christianae fidei charitatisque non referant? Quibus aliqua quidem bona, quae ad societatis humanae pertinent aequitatem, inesse possunt: sed quia non charitate Dei fiunt, prodesse non possunt. Fulg. de Incarn. & Grat. Christi, c. 26.
mLiberum naturale arbitrium ad nihil aliud valere credimus, nisi ad discernenda tantùm & desideranda carnalia sive secularia; quae non apud Deum, sed apud homines possunt fortassis videri gloriosa. Ad ea verò quae ad vitam aeternam pertinent, nec cogitare, nec velle, nec defiderare, nec perficere posse, nisi per infusionem & inoperationem intrinsecus Spiritus Sancti. Jo. Maxent. in Confessione suae fidei.Liberum naturale arbitrium ad nihil aliud valere credimus, nisi ad discernenda tantùm & desideranda carnalia sive secularia; quae non apud Deum, sed apud homines possunt fortassis videri gloriosa. Ad ea verò quae ad vitam aeternam pertinent, nec cogitare, nec velle, nec defiderare, nec perficere posse, nisi per infusionem & inoperationem intrinsecus Spiritus Sancti. Io. Maxent. in Confessione suae fidei.
The first presumptuous advancer of free-will, contrary to the doctrine anciently received in the Church, is by Vicentius Lirinensis noted to be Pelagius the heretic. For owho ever (saith he) before that profane Pelagius, presumed the virtue of free-will to be so great; that he did not think the grace of God to be necessary for the helping of it in good things at every act? For maintaining of which ungodly opinion, both he and his disciple Celestius were condemned by the censure of the CCXLIII. Bishops assembled in the great Council of Carthage (anno Dom. 418.) puntil they should acknowledge by a most open confession, that by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, we are holpen not only to ⟨p. 474⟩know but also to do righteousness at every act: so that without it we can have, think, say, do, nothing that belongeth to true and holy piety. Wherewith Pelagius being pressed, stuck not to make this profession: qAnathema to him, who either thinketh or saith, that the grace of God, whereby Christ came into this world to save sinners, is not necessary, not only at every hour or every moment, but also at every act of ours: and they who go about to take away this, are worthy to suffer everlasting punishment. Four books also did he publish in defence of Freewill; to which he thus referreth his adversaries, for further satisfaction in this matter: rLet them read the late work, which we were forced to set out the other day for Free-will; and they shall perceive how unjustly they go about to defame us with the denial of Grace, who throughout the whole context almost of that work do perfectly and entirely confess both Free-will and Grace. Yet for all this he did but equivocate in the name of Grace: sunder an ambiguous generality hiding what he thought, but by the term of Grace breaking the envy, and declining the offence which might be taken at his doctrine, as S. Augustine well observeth. For, by Grace, he did not understand, as the Church did in this question, the infusion of a new quality of holiness into the soul, whereby it was regenerated, and the will of evil made good: but first, tthe possibility of nature, that is to say, the natural freedom of will which every one hath received from God by virtue of the first creation. Against which S. Augustine thus opposeth himself: ⟨p. 475⟩uWhy is there so much presumed of the possibility of nature?
The first presumptuous advancer of free-will, contrary to the doctrine anciently received in the Church, is by Vicentius Lirinensis noted to be Pelagius the hereticke. For owho ever (saith he) before that profane Pelagius, presumed the vertue of free-will to be so great; that he did not thinke the grace of God to be necessarie for the helping of it in good things at every act? For maintaining of which ungodly opinion, both he and his disciple Celestius were condemned by the censure of the CCXLIII. Bishops assembled in the great Councell of Carthage (anno Dom. 418.) puntill they should acknowledge by a most open confession, that by the grace of God through Iesus Christ our Lord, we are holpen not onely to ⟨p. 474⟩know but also to doe righteousnesse at every act: so that without it we can have, thinke, say, doe, nothing that belongeth to true and holy piety. Wherewith Pelagius being pressed, stucke not to make this profession: qAnathema to him, who either thinketh or saith, that the grace of God, whereby Christ came into this world to save sinners, is not necessarie, not onely at every houre or every moment, but also at every act of ours: and they who goe about to take away this, are worthy to suffer everlasting punishment. Foure bookes also did he publish in defence of Freewill; to which he thus referreth his adversaries, for further satisfaction in this matter: rLet them reade the late worke, which we were forced to set out the other day for Free-will; and they shall perceive how uniustly they goe about to defame us with the deniall of Grace, who thorowout the whole context almost of that worke doe perfectly and entirely confesse both Free-will and Grace. Yet for all this he did but equivocate in the name of Grace: sunder an ambiguous generalitie hiding what he thought, but by the tearme of Grace breaking the envie, and declining the offence which might be taken at his doctrine, as S. Augustine well observeth. For, by Grace, he did not understand, as the Church did in this question, the infusion of a new qualitie of holinesse into the soule, whereby it was regenerated, and the will of evill made good: but first, tthe possibilitie of nature, that is to say, the naturall freedome of will which every one hath received from God by vertue of the first creation. Against which S. Augustine thus opposeth himselfe:
oQuis unquā ante profanum illum Pelagium tantam virtutē liberi praesumpsit arbitrij; ut ad hoc in bonis rebus per actus singulos adjuvandum, necessariam Dei gratiam non putaret? Vincent. Lirinens. Commonitor. 1. advers. haeres. cap. 34.Quis unquā ante profanum illum Pelagium tantam virtutē liberi praesumpsit arbitrij; ut ad hoc in bonis rebus per actus singulos adjuvandum, necessariam Dei gratiam non putaret? Vincent. Lirinens. Commonitor. 1. advers. haeres. cap. 34.
pDonec apertissimâ confessione fateantur, Gratiâ Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non solùm ad cognoscendam verumetiam ad faciendam justitiam, nos per actus singulos adjuvari; ita ut sine eâ nihil verae sanctaeque pietatis habere, cogitare, dicere, agere valeamus. Synod. African. Epist. ad Zosimum Pap. apud Prosperum contra Collator. cap. 5. & Respons. ad object. 8. Gallorum: ubi addit hanc constitutionem contra inimicos gratiae Dei totum mundum amplexum esse.Donec apertissimâ confessione fateantur, Gratiâ Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non solùm ad cognoscendam verumetiam ad faciendam justitiam, nos per actus singulos adjuvari; ita ut sine eâ nihil verae sanctaeque pietatis habere, cogitare, dicere, agere valeamus. Synod. African. Epist. ad Zosimum Pap. apud Prosperum contra Collator. cap. 5. & Respons. ad object. 8. Gallorum: ubi addit hanc constitutionem contra inimicos gratiae Dei totum mundum amplexum esse.
qAnathema qui vel sentit vel dicit, gratiam Dei, quâ Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores s•lvos facere, non solùm per singulas horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam: & qui hanc conantur auferre, poenas so•tiuntur aeternas. Pelag. apud Augustin. lib. 1. de gratiâ Christi, con•r. Pelag. & Cellest. cap. 2.Anathema qui vel sentit vel dicit, gratiam Dei, quâ Christus venit in hunc mundum peccatores s•lvos facere, non solùm per singulas horas aut per singula momenta, sed etiam per singulos actus nostros non esse necessariam: & qui hanc conantur auferre, poenas so•tiuntur aeternas. Pelag. apud Augustin. lib. 1. de gratiâ Christi, con•r. Pelag. & Celest. cap. 2.
rLegant etiam recens meum opusculū, quod pro libero nuper arbitrio edere compulsi sumus; & agnoscent quàminiquè nos negatione gratiae infamare gestierint; qui per tutom penè ipsius textum operis perfectè atque integrè & liberum arbitrium confitemur & gratiam. Id. ibid. cap. 41.
It is wounded, it is maimed, it is vexed, it is lost. It hath need of a true confession, not of a false defence. And Prosper, speaking of the state of mans free-will after Adams fall;
— xhinc arbitrium per devia lapsum
Claudicat, & caecis conatibus inque ligatis
Motus inest, non error abest. manet ergo voluntas
Semper amans aliquid quò see ferat; & labyrintho
Fallitur, ambages dubiarum ingressa viarum.
Vana cupit, vanis tumet & timet: omnimodaque
Mobilitate ruens, in vulnera vulnere surgit.
It is wounded, it is maimed, it is vexed, it is lost. It hath need of a true confession, not of a false defence. And Prosper, speaking of the state of mans free-will after Adams fall;
— xhinc arbitrium per devia lapsum
Claudicat, & caecis conatibus inque ligatis
Motus inest, non error abest. manet ergo voluntas
Semper amans aliquid quò se ferat; & labyrintho
Fallitur, ambages dubiarum ingressa viarum.
Vana cupit, vanis tumet & timet: omnimodaque
Mobilitate ruens, in vulnera vulnere surgit.
Secondly, by grace he understood the grace of doctrine and instruction, whereby the mind was informed in the truth out of the word of God. Which by Prosper is thus objected to his followers:
— yaliud non est vobiscum gratia, quàm lex,
Quamque Propheta monens, & quàm doctrina ministri.
Unto whom S. Augustine therefore saith well: zLet them read and understand, let them behold and confess, that not by the law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an inward and hidden, by a wonderful and unspeakable power, God doth work in the hearts of men, not only true revelations, but good wills also. And thereupon the African Fathers in the Council of Carthage, enacted this Canon. aWhosoever shall say, that the grace of God by Jesus Christ our Lord, doth for this cause only help us not to sin, because by it the understanding of the commandments ⟨p. 476⟩is revealed and opened unto us, that we may know what we ought to affect, what to shun; & that by it there is not wrought in us, that we may also love and be enabled to do that, which we know should be done; let him be anathema. Thirdly, under this grace he comprehended not only the external revelation by the word, but also the binternal by the illumination of Gods Spirit. Whereupon he thus riseth up against his adversary. cWe confess that this grace is, not (as thou thinkest) in the Law only, but in the help of God also. For God doth help us by his doctrine and revelation, whilst he openeth the eyes of our hearts; whilst he showeth us things to come, that we be not holden with things present; whilst he discovereth the snares of the Devil; whilst he enlighteneth us with the manifold and unspeakable gift of his heavenly grace. He that saith these things, doth he seem unto thee to deny grace? or doth he confess, both the free-will of man, and the grace of God too? And yet in all this (as S. Augustine rightly noteth) dhe doth but confess that grace, whereby God doth show and reveal what we ought to do; not that, whereby he doth grant and help that we may do. And therefore, ein other places of his writings he plainly affirmeth, that our very prayers are to be used for nothing but this, that the doctrine may be opened unto us by divine revelation; not that the mind of man may be holpen, that he may also accomplish by love and action that which he hath learned should be done.
Secondly, by grace he understood the grace of doctrine and instruction, whereby the minde was informed in the truth out of the word of God. Which by Prosper is thus objected to his followers:
— yaliud non est vobiscum gratia, quàm lex,
Quamque Propheta monens, & quàm doctrina ministri.
Unto whom S. Augustine therefore saith well: zLet them reade and understand, let them behold and confesse, that not by the law and doctrine sounding outwardly, but by an inward and hidden, by a wonderfull and unspeakable power, God doth worke in the hearts of men, not only true revelations, but good wills also. And thereupon the African Fathers in the Councell of Carthage, enacted this Canon. aWhosoever shall say, that the grace of God by Iesus Christ our Lord, doth for this cause only helpe us not to sinne, because by it the understanding of the commandements ⟨p. 476⟩is revealed and opened unto us, that we may know what we ought to affect, what to shunne; & that by it there is not wrought in us, that we may also love and be inabled to doe that, which we know should be done; let him be anathema. Thirdly, under this grace he comprehended not only the externall revelation by the word, but also the binternall by the illumination of Gods Spirit. Whereupon he thus riseth up against his adversarie. cWe confesse that this grace is, not (as thou thinkest) in the Law only, but in the helpe of God also. For God doth helpe us by his doctrine and revelation, whilest he openeth the eyes of our hearts; whilest he sheweth us things to come, that we be not holden with things present; whilest he discovereth the snares of the Devill; whilest he enlightneth us with the manifold and unspeakable gift of his heavenly grace. He that saith these things, doth he seeme unto thee to denie grace? or doth he confesse, both the free-will of man, and the grace of God too? And yet in all this (as S. Augustine rightly noteth) dhe doth but confesse that grace, whereby God doth shew and reveale what we ought to doe; not that, whereby he doth grant and helpe that we may doe. And therefore, e
yId. ibid. cap. 20. Vid. eund. in epist. ad Ruffinum, non procul ab initio: & Augustin. de haeres. cap. 88. & lib. 1. de gratiâ Christi contra Pelag. cap. 8, 9, 10.
zLegant ergo & intelligant, intueantur atque fateantur, non lege atque doctrinâ insonante forinsecùs, sed internâ atque occultâ, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum, non solùm veras revelationes, sed etiam bonas voluntates. Augustin. ibid. cap. 24.
aQuisquis dixerit gratiam Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, propter hoc tantum nos adjuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis revelatur & aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus; non autem per illam nobis praestari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus: anathema sit. African. Patr. in Synod. Carthagin. can. 4.Quisquis dixerit gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, propter hoc tantum nos adjuvare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsam nobis revelatur & aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus quid appetere, quid vitare debeamus; non autem per illam nobis praestari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus: anathema sit. African. Patr. in Synod. Carthagin. can. 4.
cQuam (gratiam) nos non, ut tu putas, in lege tantummodo, sed & in Dei esse adjutorio confitemur. Adjuvat enim nos Deus per doctrinam & revelationē suam, dumb cordis nostri oculos aperit; dum nobis, ne praesentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat; dumb Diaboli pandit insidias; dumb nos multiformi & ineffabili dono gratiae coelestis· illuminat. Qui haec dicit, gratiam tibi videtur neg•re? An & liberum hominis arbitrium, & Dei gratiam confitetur? Pelag. ibid. cap. 7.Quam (gratiam) nos non, ut tu putas, in lege tantummodo, sed & in Dei esse adjutorio confitemur. Adjuvat enim nos Deus per doctrinam & revelationē suam, dum cordis nostri oculos aperit; dum nobis, ne praesentibus occupemur, futura demonstrat; dum Diaboli pandit insidias; dum nos multiformi & ineffabili dono gratiae coelestis· illuminat. Qui haec dicit, gratiam tibi videtur neg•re? An & liberum hominis arbitrium, & Dei gratiam confitetur? Pelag. ibid. cap. 7.
dHinc itaque apparet, hanc eum gratiam confiteri, quâ demonstrat & revelat Deus quid agere debeamus; non quâ donat atque adjuvat ut agamus; cùm ad hoc potiùs valeat legis agnitio, si gratiae desit opitulatio, ut fiat mandati praevaricatio. Augustin. ibid. cap. 8.
Fourthly, ⟨p. 477⟩to these he further added the grace of remission of sins. For the Pelagians said, fthat mans nature which was made with free-will, might be sufficient to enable us, that we might not sin, and that we might fulfil righteousness: and that this is the grace of God, that we were so made that we might do this by our will, and that he hath given us the help of his law and commandments, and that he doth pardon the sins past to those that are converted unto him: that in these things only the grace of God was to be acknowledged, and not in the help given unto all our singular actions. And so they gsaid, that that grace of God which is given by the faith of Jesus Christ, which is neither law nor nature, is effectual only to his, that sins past may be remitted, not that sins to come may be avoided, or when they make resistance may be vanquished. Whereupon S. Augustine thus encountereth Julian the Pelagian heretic. hThou (according to your custom, which descendeth from your error) dost not acknowledge grace, but in the remission of sins; that now from henceforth a man himself by his free-will may make himself righteous. But so saith not the Church, which all crieth that which it hath learned from a good master: Lead us not into temptation.
Fourthly, ⟨p. 477⟩to these he further added the grace of remission of sins. For the Pelagians said, fthat mans nature which was made with free-will, might be sufficient to enable us, that we might not sinne, and that we might fulfill righteousnesse: and that this is the grace of God, that we were so made that we might doe this by our will, and that he hath given us the helpe of his law and commandements, and that he doth pardon the sinnes past to those that are converted unto him: that in these things only the grace of God was to be acknowledged, and not in the helpe given unto all our singular actions. And so they gsaid, that that grace of God which is given by the faith of Iesus Christ, which is neither law nor nature, is effectuall only to his, that sinnes past may be remitted, not that sinnes to come may be avoided, or when they make resistance may be vanquished. Whereupon S. Augustine thus encountreth Iulian the Pelagian hereticke. hThou (according to your custome, which descendeth from your error) dost not acknowledge grace, but in the remission of sinnes; that now from henceforth a man himselfe by his free-will may make himselfe righteous. But so saith not the Church, which all cryeth that which it hath learned from a good master: Lead us not into temptation.
fUt non pec•emus, impleamusque justitiam, posse sufficere naturam humanam quae condita est cum libero arbitrio: eamque esse Dei gratiam, quia sic conditi sumus, ut hoc voluntate possimus; & quòd adjutorium Legis mandatorumque suorum dedit; & quòd ad se conversis peccata praeterita ignoscit: in his solis esse Dei gratiam deputandam, non in adjutorio nostrorū actuum singulorum. Id. de gestis contra Pelagium, cap. 35.Ut non pec•emus, impleamusque justitiam, posse sufficere naturam humanam quae condita est cum libero arbitrio: eamque esse Dei gratiam, quia sic conditi sumus, ut hoc voluntate possimus; & quòd adjutorium Legis mandatorumque suorum dedit; & quòd ad se conversis peccata praeterita ignoscit: in his solis esse Dei gratiam deputandam, non in adjutorio nostrorū actuum singulorum. Id. de gestis contra Pelagium, cap. 35.
gDicunt gratiam Dei quae data est per fidem Jesu Christi, quae neque lex est neque natura, ad hoc tantùm valere, ut peccata praeterita dimittantur, non ut futura vitentur, vel repugnantia superentur. Id. de gratiâ & libero arbitrio, cap. 13. Vid. eiusd. lib. 1. de grat. Christi contr. Pelag. cap. 2.Dicunt gratiam Dei quae data est per fidem Iesu Christi, quae neque lex est neque natura, ad hoc tantùm valere, ut peccata praeterita dimittantur, non ut futura vitentur, vel repugnantia superentur. Id. de gratiâ & libero arbitrio, cap. 13. Vid. eiusd. lib. 1. de grat. Christi contr. Pelag. cap. 2.
hTu vest•o more, qui de vestro descendit errore, non agnoscis gratiam, nisi in dimissione peccatorum; ut jam de caetero per liberum arbitrium ipse homo se ipsum fabricet justum. Sed non hoc dicit Ecclesia, quae clamat •ota, quod didicit à Magistro bono: Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Id. lib. 2. postremi operis contra Julianum; à Claud. Menardo edit. non procul à fine.Tu vest•o more, qui de vestro descendit errore, non agnoscis gratiam, nisi in dimissione peccatorum; ut jam de caetero per liberum arbitrium ipse homo se ipsum fabricet justum. Sed non hoc dicit Ecclesia, quae clamat •ota, quod didicit à Magistro bono: Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Id. lib. 2. postremi operis contra Iulianum; à Claud. Menardo edit. non procul à fine.
Lastly, this was the common doctrine of the iPelagians, and accounted to be one of the principal kblasphemies of that sect: that they held the grace of ⟨p. 478⟩God to be given according to mens merits. Which was lso abhorring from the Catholic doctrine, and opposite to the grace of Christ, that when it was objected to Pelagius in the Diospolitan Synod, held in Palaestina by the Bishops of the East, he durst not avow it; but was forced to accurse it, lest otherwise he should have been accursed himself. But that he deceitfully cursed it, the books written by him afterwards do show; wherein he defendeth nothing else, but that the grace of God is given according to our merits. which Prosper treading in S. Augustine's steps, doth thus expresse:
mObjectum est aliud; ipsum dixisse magistrum
Quòd meritis hominum tribuatur gratia Christi,
Quantum quisque Dei donis se fecerit aptum.
Sed nimis adversum hoc fidei, nimiumque repugnans
Esse videns, dixit se non ita credere, & illos
Damnari dignos quorum mens ista teneret.
Quo cernis, cum Judicibus damnantibus ista
Consensisse reum: nec quenquam haec posse tueri.
Quae tamen ipse suis rursum excoluisse libellis
Detegitur, reprobum in sensum fallendo reversus.
And in this also did the Pelagians betake themselves unto their old coverts of the grace of nature, the grace of mercy in forgiving of sins, the grace of instruction and revelation, and such other shifts. For nwhen it is demanded of them (saith S. Augustine) what grace Pelagius did think was given without any precedent merits: when he anathematized those, who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits: they answer, that the grace which is without any precedent merits, is the humane nature it self wherein we are created. ⟨p. 479⟩forasmuch as before we were, we could not deserve any thing, that we might be. Then afterward perceiving what an idle thing it was to confound grace and nature thus together; othey said, that the only grace which was not according to our merits, was that whereby a man had his sins forgiven him. for they did not think, that a sinner could rightly be said to merit any thing save Gods displeasure.
Lastly, this was the common doctrine of the iPelagians, and accounted to be one of the principall kblasphemies of that sect: that they held the grace of ⟨p. 478⟩God to be given according to mens merits. Which was lso abhorring from the Catholicke doctrine, and opposite to the grace of Christ, that when it was objected to Pelagius in the Diospolitan Synod, held in Palaestina by the Bishops of the East, he durst not avow it; but was forced to accurse it, lest otherwise he should have beene accursed himselfe. But that he deceitfully cursed it, the books wri•ten by him afterwards doe shew; wherein he defendeth nothing else, but that the grace of God is given according to our merits. which Prosper treading in S. Augustines steps, doth thus expresse:
mObjectum est aliud; ipsum dixisse magistrum
Quòd meritis hominum tribuatur gratia Christi,
Quantum quisque Dei donis se fecerit aptum.
Sed nimis adversum hoc fidei, nimiumque repugnans
Esse videns, dixit se non ita credere, & illos
Damnari dignos quorum mens ista teneret.
Quo cernis, cum Iudicibus damnantibus ista
Consensisse reum: nec quenquam haec posse tueri.
Quae tamen ipse suis rursum excoluisse libellis
Detegitur, reprobum in sensum fallendo reversus.
And in this also did the Pelagians betake themselves unto their old coverts of the grace of nature, the grace of mercy in forgiving of sinnes, the grace of instruction and revelation, and such other shifts. For nwhen it is demanded of them (saith S. Augustine) what grace Pelagius did thinke was given without any precedent merits: when he anathematized those, who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits: they answer, that the grace which is without any precedent merits, is the humane nature it selfe wherein we are created. ⟨p. 479⟩forasmuch as before we were, we could not deserve any thing, that we might be. Then afterward perceiving what an idle thing it was to confound grace and nature thus together; othey said, that the only grace which was not according to our merits, was that whereby a man had his sinnes forgiven him. for they did not thinke, that a sinner could rightly be said to merit any thing save Gods displeasure.
iId. De dono Perseverant. cap. 2. & 20 De gratiâ & lib. arbitr. cap. 5. De haeresib. cap. 88. &c.
kEx his una est blasphemia, nequissimum & subtilissimum germen aliarum, quâ dicunt, Gratiam Dei secundùm merita hominum dari. Prosper. in epist. de grat. & lib. arbitr. ad Ruffinum.
lQuod sic alienū est á Catholicâ doctrinâ, & inimicum gratiae Christi; ut nisi hoc objectū sibi anathematizâsset, ipse inde anathematizatus exîsset. Sed fallaciter eum anathematizâsse posteriors ejus indicant libri; in quibus omnino nihil aliud defendit, quàm gratiam Dei secundùm merita nostra dari. Augustin. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 5.Quod sic alienū est á Catholicâ doctrinâ, & inimicum gratiae Christi; ut nisi hoc objectū sibi anathematizâsset, ipse inde anathematizatus exîsset. Sed fallaciter eum anathematizâsse posteriores ejus indicant libri; in quibus omnino nihil aliud defendit, quàm gratiam Dei secundùm merita nostra dari. Augustin. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 5.
mProsp. de Ingratis, cap. 9.
nCùm ab istis quaeritur, quā gratiam Pelagius cogitaret sine ullis praecedentibus meritis dari, quando anathematizabat eos, qui dicunt gratiam Dei secundùm merita nostra dari: respondent, sine ullis praecedentibus meritis gratiam, ipsam humanam esse naturam, in quâ conditi sumus. Neque enim antequàm essemus, mereri aliquid poteramus, ut essemus. Augustin. epist. 105. ad Sixtum.Cùm ab istis quaeritur, quā gratiam Pelagius cogitaret sine ullis praecedentibus meritis dari, quando anathematizabat eos, qui dicunt gratiam Dei secundùm merita nostra dari: respondent, sine ullis praecedentibus meritis gratiam, ipsam humanam esse naturam, in quâ conditi sumus. Neque enim antequàm essemus, mereri aliquid poteramus, ut essemus. Augustin. epist. 105. ad Sixtum.
oDicunt Pelagiani, hanc esse solam non secundùm merita nostra gratiam, quâ homini peccata dimittuntur. Id. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 6.
But that at which they all aimed in general was this, pthat Grace was only a kind of Mistress to Free-will; and that by exhortations, by the law, by doctrine, by the creatures, by contemplation, by miracles, and by terrors outwardly, it showed it self to the judgement thereof: whereby every man according to the motion of his will, if he did seek, might find; if he did ask, might receive; if he did knock, might enter in. And thus (saith Pelagius) doth God qwork in us to will that which is good, to will that which is holy; whilst finding us given to earthly lusts, and like brute beasts affecting only present things, he inflameth us with the greatness of the glory to come, and with promise of rewards; whilst by the revelation of his wisdom he raiseth up our stupefied will to the desire of God; whilst he persuadeth us to all that good is. To this instructing and persuading grace doth Pelagius attribute the exciting of the Will: but the converting of it unto God (which followeth afterward) he ascribeth wholly to the freedom of the will it self. ⟨p. 480⟩rHe that runneth unto God, (saith he) and desireth to be ruled by God, hanging his will upon Gods will; he who by adhering unto him continually, is made, according to the Apostle, one spirit with him: doth not this but out of the freedom of his will. Which freedom who so useth aright, doth so commit himself wholly to God, and mortifieth all his own will, that he may say with the Apostle; I live now, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and doth put his heart into Gods hand, that God may incline it whither it shall please him. Here have you the full platform laid down of Pelagius his doctrine touching the conversion of a sinner. First, he supposeth a possibility in nature; whereby a man may will and do good. secondly, a corruption in act; whereby a man doth will and do the contrary. thirdly, an exciting grace from God; whereby the mind is enlightened, and the will persuaded (upon consideration of the promises and threats propounded) to forsake that lewd course of life, and to will and do the things that are good and holy. fourthly, an act of the free-will, thus prepared by Gods exciting grace: whereby a man (without any further help from God) doth voluntarily yield unto these good motions;
But that at which they all aymed in generall was this, pthat Grace was only a kinde of Mistresse to Free-will; and that by exhortations, by the law, by doctrine, by the creatures, by contemplation, by miracles, and by terrors outwardly, it shewed it selfe to the judgement thereof: whereby every man according to the motion of his will, if he did seeke, might finde; if he did aske, might receive; if he did knocke, might enter in. And thus (saith Pelagius) doth God qworke in us to will that which is good, to will that which is holy; whilest finding us given to earthly lusts, and like bruit beasts affecting only present things, he inflameth us with the greatnesse of the glory to come, and with promise of rewards; whilest by the revelation of his wisdome he raiseth up our stupified will to the desire of God; whilest he perswadeth us to all that good is. To this instructing and perswading grace doth Pelagius attribute the exciting of the Will: but the converting of it unto God (which followeth afterward) hee ascribeth wholly to the freedome of the will it selfe. ⟨p. 480⟩rHe that runneth unto God, (saith he) and desireth to be ruled by God, hanging his will upon Gods wil; he who by adhering unto him continually, is made, according to the Apostle, one spirit with him: doth not this but out of the freedome of his will. Which freedome who so useth aright, doth so commit himselfe wholly to God, and mortifieth all his owne will, that he may say with the Apostle; I live now, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and doth put his heart into Gods hand, that God may incline it whither it shall please him. Here have you the full platforme laid downe of Pelagius his doctrine touching the conversion of a sinner. First, he supposeth a possibilitie in nature; whereby a man may will and doe good. secondly, a corruption in act; whereby a man doth will and doe the contrary. thirdly, an exciting grace from God; whereby the minde is inlightned, and the will perswaded (upon consideration of the promises and threats propounded) to forsake that lewd course of life, and to will and doe the things that are good and holy. fourthly, an act of the free-will, thus prepared by Gods exciting grace: whereby a man (without any further helpe from God) doth voluntarily yeeld unto these good motions;
pIntellectum est enim, saluberriméque perspectum, hoc tantùm eos de gratiâ confiteri, quòd quaedam libero arbitrio sit magistra; seque per cohor•ationes, per legem, per doctrinam, per creaturam, per contemplationem, per miracula, perque terrors extrinsecùs judicio ejus ostendat: quo unusquisque secundum voluntatis suae motum, si quaesierit, inveniat; si petierit, recipiat; si pulsaverit, introcat. Prosper. in epist. ad Ruffin. de grat. & lib. arbitr.Intellectum est enim, saluberriméque perspectum, hoc tantùm eos de gratiâ cōfiteri, quòd quaedam libero arbitrio sit magistra; seque per cohor•ationes, per legem, per doctrinam, per creaturam, per contemplationem, per miracula, perque terrores extrinsecùs judicio ejus ostendat: quo unusquisque secundum voluntatis suae motum, si quaesierit, inveniat; si petierit, recipiat; si pulsaverit, introcat. Prosper. in epist. ad Ruffin. de grat. & lib. arbitr.
qOperatur in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est; dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos, & mutorum more animalium tantummudò praesentia diligentes, futurae gloriae magnitudine & praemiorum pollicitatione succendit; dumb revelation sapientiae in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem; dum nobis suadet omne, quod bonum est. Pelag. apud Augustin. lib. 1. de grat. Christi contra Pelag. cap. 10.Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est; dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos, & mutorum more animalium tantummudò praesentia diligentes, futurae gloriae magnitudine & praemiorum pollicitatione succendit; dum revelatione sapientiae in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem; dum nobis suadet omne, quod bonum est. Pelag. apud Augustin. lib. 1. de grat. Christi contra Pelag. cap. 10.
rQui currit ad Deum, & á Deo se regi cupit, id est, voluntatem suam ex ejus voluntate suspendit; qui ei adhaerendo jugiter, unus, secundùm Apostolum, cum eo fit spiritus; non hoc nisi de arbitrij efficit libertate. Q•â qui bene utitur, ita se totum tradit Deo, omnemque suam mortificat voluntatem, ut cum Apostolo possit dicere; Vivo autem jam non ego, vivit autem in me Christus: ponitque cor suum in manu Dei, ut illud quò voluerit Deus ipse declinet. Pelagius, apud Augustin. de gratia Christi, lib. 1. cap. 22, 23.
and so runneth unto God, desireth to be ruled by him, hangeth his will upon Gods will, and by adhering unto him is made one spirit with him. fifthly, an assisting grace; whereby God guideth the will thus converted, and inclineth the heart whither it pleaseth him.
We see three kinds of Grace here commended unto us by Pelagius. the first, a natural grace (as he fondly termed it) bringing with it a bare possibility only to will and do good: which he said was not given according to merits, because he held it to be given at the very ⟨p. 481⟩beginning of mans being, before which he could not possibly merit any thing. the second, an ex•iting or persuading grace, imparted unto such as were given to earthly lusts, and like brute beasts affected only present things; who being in that case, were far from meriting any good thing at Gods hands: and in that regard he affirmed, that this grace likewise was given without any respect to precedent merits. the third, an assisting grace, by which God doth guide and incline the heart of the converted sinner, to the doing of all good: and this he maintained to be given as a reward to that act of the free-will, whereby it yielded to the persuasions of the former exciting grace, and so did actually convert it self to God. Now this is sthe presumption which S. Augustine condemneth so much in these men; that they durst say: We work to merit that God may work with us. that they twould first give to God, that it might be recompensed to them again: namely, they first give somewhat out of their free-will, that grace might be rendered to them again for a reward. that they were of opinion; uthat our merit consisted in this, that we were with God, and that his grace was given according to this merit, that he should also be with us: that our merit should be in this, that we do seek him; and according to this merit his grace was given that we should find him. For they that followed Pelagius, (refining herein a little the doctrine of their Master, and delivering it in somewhat a more plausible manner) declared that xthe merits which they held to go before grace and to procure ⟨p. 482⟩grace, were, asking, seeking, and knocking: and that ygrace was given, not according to the merit of our good works, (which they did acknowledge to be an effect, and not a cause of this grace) but of our good will only. because (said they) the good will of man praying went before, and the will of man believing went before that: that according to these merits the grace of God hearing might follow after. And all this they did under colour of maintaining free-will against the Manichees:
We see three kindes of Grace here commended unto us by Pelagius. the first, a naturall grace (as he fondly tearmed it) bringing with it a bare possibilitie only to will and doe good: which he said was not given according to merits, because he held it to be given at the very ⟨p. 481⟩beginning of mans being, before which he could not possibly merit any thing. the second, an ex•iting or perswading grace, imparted unto such as were given to earthly lusts, and like bruit beasts affected only present things; who being in that case, were far from meriting any good thing at Gods hands: and in that regard he affirmed, that this grace likewise was given without any respect to precedent merits. the third, an assisting grace, by which God doth guide and incline the heart of the converted sinner, to the doing of all good: and this he maintained to be given as a reward to that act of the free-will, whereby it yeelded to the perswasions of the former exciting grace, and so did actually convert it selfe to God. Now this is sthe presumption which S. Augustine condemneth so much in these men; that they durst say: We worke to merit that God may worke with us. that they twould first give to God, that it might be recompensed to them againe: namely, they first give somewhat out of their free-will, that grace might be rendred to them againe for a reward. that they were of opinion; uthat our merit consisted in this, that we were with God, and that his grace was given according to this merit, that he should also be with us: that our merit should be in this, that we doe seeke him; and according to this merit his grace was given that we should finde him. For they that followed Pelagius, (refining herein a little the doctrine of their Master, and delivering it in somewhat a more plausible manner) declared that xthe merits which they held to goe before grace and to procure ⟨p. 482⟩grace, were, asking, seeking, and knocking: and that ygrace was given, not according to the merit of our good workes, (which they did acknowledge to be an effect, and not a cause of this grace) but of our good will only. because (said they) the good will of man praying went before, and the will of man beleeving went before that: that according to these merits the grace of God hearing might follow after. And all this they did under colour of maintaining free-will against the Manichees:
sN•hil sic evertit hominum praesumptionem dicentium; Nos facimus, ut mereamur cum quibus faciat Deus. Augustin. c•ntra duas epist. Pel•gian. lib. 4. cap. 6.
tPriors volunt dare Deo, ut retribuatur eis: priors utique dare quodlibet ex libero arbitrio, ut sit gratia retrib•enda pro praemio. Ibid.Priores volunt dare Deo, ut retribuatur eis: priores utique dare quodlibet ex libero arbitrio, ut sit gratia retrib•enda pro praemio. Ibid.
uMeritum nostrum in eo esse, quòd sumus cum Deo: ejus autem gratiam secundùm hoc meritum da•i, ut sit & ipse nobiscum. Item meritum nostrum in eo esse, quòd quaerimus: & secundùm hoc meritum dari ejus gratiam, ut inveniamus eum. Id. de grat. & libero arbitr. cap. 5.
xIbi enim vos ut video, ponere jam coepistis merita gratiam praecedentia, quod est petere, quaerere, pulsare; ut his meritis debita illa reddatur, ac sic gratia inaniter nuncupetur. Id. contra Julian. Pelagian. lib. 4. cap. 8.Ibi enim vos ut video, ponere jam coepistis merita gratiam praecedentia, quod est petere, quaerere, pulsare; ut his meritis debita illa reddatur, ac sic gratia inaniter nuncupetur. Id. contra Iulian. Pelagian. lib. 4. cap. 8.
yDicunt enim, etsi non datur gratia secundùm me•ita bonorum ope•um, quia per ipsam bene operamur, tamen secundùm meritum bonae voluntatis datur. quia bona voluntas (inquiunt) praecedit orantis, quam praecessit voluntas credentis; ut secundùm haec merita gratia sequatur exaudientis Dei. Id. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 14.
for which they urged much that testimony of the Prophet, Esa. 1.19, 20. If ye be willing and hearken unto me, ye shall eat the good things of the land: but if ye refuse and will not hearken unto me, the sword shall consume them. But zwhat doth this profit them? (saith S. Augustine) seeing they do not so much defend free-will against the Manichees, as extol it against the Catholics. For so would they have that understood which is said; If ye be willing and hearken unto me: as if in that very precedent will there should be the meriting of the subsequent grace; and so grace should be now no grace, which is no gratuity, when it is rendered as due. But if they would so understand that which is said, If ye be willing; that they would also confess that he doth prepare that good will, of whom it is written, The will is prepared by the Lord: they should use this testimony like Catholics; and not only vanquish the old heresy of the Manichees, but also crush the new of the Pelagians.
for which they urged much that testimony of the Prophet, Esa. 1.19, 20. If yee be willing and hearken unto me, yee shall eat the good things of the land: but if yee refuse and will not hearken unto me, the sword shall consume them. But zwhat doth this profit them? (saith S. Augustine) seeing they doe not so much defend free-will against the Manichees, as extoll it against the Catholickes. For so would they have that understood which is said; If yee be willing and hearken unto me: as if in that very precedent will there should be the meriting of the subsequent grace; and so grace should be now no grace, which is no gratuitie, when it is rendred as due. But if they would so understand that which is said, If yee be willing; that they would also confesse that he doth prepare that good will, of whom it is written, The will is prepared by the Lord: they should use this testimonie like Catholickes; and not only vanquish the old heresie of the Manichees, but also crush the new of the Pelagians.
zQuid eis hoc prodest? quando quidem non tam contra Manichaeos defendunt, quàm contra Catholicos extollunt liberum arbitrium. Sic enim volunt intelligi quod dictum est; Si volueritis & audiveritis me: tanquam in ipsâ precedent voluntate sit consequentis meritum gratiae; ac si gratia jam non sit gratia, quae non est gratuita, cùm redditur debita. Si autem sic intelligerent quod dictum est, Si volueritis; ut etiam ipsam bonam voluntatem illum praeparare confiterentur, de quo scriptum est, Praeparatur voluntas á Domino: tanquam Catholici ute•entur hoc testimonio; & non solùm haeresim veterem Manichaeorum vincerent, sed novam Pelagianorum contererent. Id. contr. duas epist. Pelagian. lib. 4. cap. 6.Quid eis hoc prodest? quando quidem non tam contra Manichaeos defendunt, quàm contra Catholicos extollunt liberum arbitrium. Sic enim volunt intelligi quod dictum est; Si volueritis & audiveritis me: tanquam in ipsâ praecedente voluntate sit consequentis meritum gratiae; ac si gratia jam non sit gratia, quae non est gratuita, cùm redditur debita. Si autem sic intelligerent quod dictum est, Si volueritis; ut etiam ipsam bonam voluntatem illum praeparare confiterentur, de quo scriptum est, Praeparatur voluntas á Domino: tanquam Catholici ute•entur hoc testimonio; & non solùm haeresim veterem Manichaeorum vincerent, sed novam Pelagianorum contererent. Id. contr. duas epist. Pelagian. lib. 4. cap. 6.
Beside the professed Pelagians, who directly did deny Original sin; there arose others in the Church in S. Augustine's days, that were tainted not a little ⟨p. 483⟩with their errors in this point of Grace and Free-will; as namely one Vitalis in Carthage, and the Semi-pelagians (as they are commonly called) in France. For the first held, that aGod did work in us to will by his Scriptures either read or heard by us: but that to consent unto them or not consent is so in our power, that if we will it may be done, if we will not, we may make the operation of God to be of no force in us. For God doth work (said he) as much as in him is that we may will, when his word is made known unto us: but if we will not yield unto it, we make that his operation shall have no profit in us. Against him S. Augustine disputeth largely in his 107. Epistle; where he maketh •his to be the state of the question betwixt them; bWhether Grace doth go before or follow after the Will of man, that is to say, (as he further explaineth it) Whether it be therefore given us, because we will; or by it God doth work even this also, that we do will. The worthy Doctor maintaineth that Grace goeth before, and worketh the will unto good: which he strongly proveth, both by the word of God and by the continual practise of the Church, in her prayers and thanksgivings for the conversion of unbelievers. cFor if thou dost confess (saith he) that we are to pray for them, surely thou dost pray that they may consent to the doctrine of God, with their will freed from the power of darkness. And thus it will come to pass, that ⟨p. 484⟩neither men shall be made to be believers but by their free-will; and yet shall be made believers by his grace, who hath freed their will from the power of darkness. Thus both Gods grace is not denied, but is showed to be true without any humane merits going before it: and free-will is so defended, that it is made solid with humility, and not thrown down headlong by being lifted up; that he that rejoiceth, may not rejoice in man, either any other or yet himself, but in the Lord. and again: dHow doth God expect the wills of men that they should prevent him, to whom he might give grace:
Beside the professed Pelagians, who directly did denie Originall sinne; there arose others in the Church in S. Augustines daies, that were tainted not a little ⟨p. 483⟩with their errors in this point of Grace and Free-will; as namely one Vitalis in Carthage, and the Semi-pelagians (as they are commonly called) in France. For the first held, that aGod did worke in us to will by his Scriptures either read or heard by us: but that to consent unto them or not consent is so in our power, that if we will it may be done, if we will not, we may make the operation of God to be of no force in us. For God doth worke (said he) as much as in him is that we may will, when his word is made knowne unto us: but if we will not yeeld unto it, we make that his operation shall have no profit in us. Against him S. Augustine disputeth largely in his 107. Epistle; where he maketh •his to be the state of the question betwixt them; bWhether Grace doth goe before or follow after the Will of man, that is to say, (as he further explaineth it) Whether it be therefore given us, because we will; or by it God doth worke even this also, that we doe will. The worthy Doctor maintaineth that Grace goeth before, and worketh the will unto good: which he strongly proveth, both by the word of God and by the continuall practise of the Church, in her prayers and thanksgivings for the conversion of unbeleevers. cFor if thou dost confesse (saith he) that we are to pray for them, surely thou dost pray that they may consent to the doctrine of God, with their will freed from the power of darknesse. And thus it will come to passe, that ⟨p. 484⟩neither men shall be made to be beleevers but by their free-will; and yet shall be made beleevers by his grace, who hath freed their will from the power of darknesse. Thus both Gods grace is not denied, but is shewed to be true without any humane merits going before it: and free-will is so defended, that it is made solide with humilitie, and not throwne downe headlong by being lifted up; that he that rejoyceth, may not rejoyce in man, either any other or yet himselfe, but in the Lord. and againe: dHow doth God expect the wills of men that they should prevent him, to whom he might give grace:
aPer legem suam, per Scripturas suas Deum operari ut velimus quas vel legimus vel audimus: sed eis consentire vel non consentire ita nostrum est, ut si velimus fiat; si •utem noli•us, nihil in nobis operationem Dei valere facia•u•. Operatur quippe ille, dicis, quantum in ipso est ut velimus, cùm nobis nota siunt ejus eloquia: sed si eis acquiescere nolumus, nos ut operatio ejus nihil in nobis prosit efficimus. Id. epist. 107. ad Vital•m.
bUtrum praecedat haec gratia an subsequatur hominis voluntatem, hoc est, (ut planiùs id eloquar) utrum ideò nobis detur, quia volumus, an per ipsam Deus etiam hoc efficiat ut velimus. Ibid.
cSi fateris pro eis orandum, id utique orandum fateris, ut doctrinae divinae arbitrio liberato á tenebrarum potestate consentiant. Ita fit ut neque fideles fiant nisi libero arbitrio; & tamen illius gratiâ fideles fiant, qui eorum á potestate tenebrarum liberavit arbitrium. Sic & Dei gratia non negatur, sed sine ullis humanis praecedentibus meritis vera monstratur: & liberum ita defenditur, ut humilitate solidetur, non elatione praecipitetur arbitrium; & qui gloriatur, non in homine, vel quolibet alio vel seipso, sed in Domino glorietur. Ibid.
dQuomodo Deus expectat voluntates hominum, ut praeveniant eum, quibusdet gratiam: cùm gratias ei non immeritò agamus de ijs quibus non ei credentibus, & ejus doctrinam voluntate impiâ persequentibus misericordiam praerogavit; eosque ad seipsum omnipotentissimâ facilitate convertit, ac volentes ex nolentibus fecit? ut quid ei inde gratias agimus, si hoc ipse non fecit? Ibid.
when we do give him thanks not undeservedly in the behalf of them, whom not believing, and persecuting his doctrine with an ungodly will, he hath prevented with his mercy, and with a most omnipotent facility converted them unto himself, and made them willing of unwilling? Why do we give him thanks for this, if he himself did not this? eQuestionless we do not pray to God, but feign that we do pray, if we believe that not he, but our selves be the doers of that which we pray for. Questionless we do not give thanks to God, but feign that we give thanks; if we do not think that he doth the thing, for which we give him thanks. If deceitful lips be found in any other speeches of men, at leastwise let them not be found in prayers. Far be it from us, that what we do beseech God to do with our mouths and voices, ⟨p. 485⟩we should deny that he doth it in our hearts: and, which is more grievous, to the deceiving of others also, not conceal the same in our disputations; and whilst we will needs defend free-will before men, we should leese the help of prayer with God, and not have true giving of thanks, whilst we do not acknowledge true grace. If we will truly defend free-will, let us not oppugn that by which it is made free. For who so oppugneth grace, whereby our will is made free to decline from evil and to do good; he will have his will to be still captive. Thus doth S. Augustine deal with Vitalis: to whom he saith, fI do not believe indeed that thou art a Pelagian heretic; but so I would have thee to be, that no part of that error may pass unto thee, or be left in thee.
when we doe give him thanks not undeservedly in the behalfe of them, whom not beleeving, and persecuting his doctrine with an ungodly will, he hath prevented with his mercy, and with a most omnipotent facilitie converted them unto himselfe, and made them willing of unwilling? Why doe we give him thanks for this, if he himselfe did not this? eQuestionlesse we doe not pray to God, but faine that we doe pray, if we beleeve that not he, but our selves be the doers of that which we pray for. Questionlesse we doe not give thanks to God, but faine that we give thanks; if we doe not thinke that he doth the thing, for which we give him thanks. If deceitfull lips be found in any other speeches of men, at leastwise let them not be found in prayers. Farre be it from us, that what we doe beseech God to doe with our mouthes and voices, ⟨p. 485⟩we should denie that he doth it in our hearts: and, which is more grievous, to the deceiving of others also, not conceale the same in our disputations; and whilest we will needs defend free-will before men, we should leese the helpe of prayer with God, and not have true giving of thanks, whilest we doe not acknowledge true grace. If we will truly defende free-will, let us not oppugne that by which it is made free. For who so oppugneth grace, whereby our will is made free to decline from evill and to doe good; he will have his will to be still captive. Thus doth S. Augustine deale with Vitalis: to whom he saith, fI doe not beleeve indeed that thou art a Pelagian hereticke; but so I would have thee to be, that no part of that error may passe unto thee, or be left in thee.
eProrsus non oramus Deum, sed orare nos fingimus; si nos ipsos non illum credimus facere quod oramus. Prorsus non gratias Deo agimus, sed nos agere fingimus; si unde illi gratia• agimus, ipsum facere non putamus. Labia dolosa si in hominum quibus•unque sermonibus sunt, saltem in orationibus non sint. Absit, ut quod facere Deum rogamus oribus & vocibus nostris, eum facere negemus cordibus nostris: &, quod est gravius ad alios decipiendos, hoc non taceamu• disputationibus nostris: & dum volumus apud homines defendere liberum arbitrium, apud Deum perdamus orationis auxilium, & gratiarum actionem non habeamus veram, dum veram non agnoscimus gratiam. Si veré volumus defendere liberum arbitri•m; non oppugnemus unde fit liberum. Nam qui oppugnat gratiam, quâ nostrum ad declinandum á malo, & faciendum bonum liberatur arbitrium, ipse arbit•ium suum adhuc vult esse captivum. Ibid.
fEgo haereticum quidem Pelagianum te esse non credo: sed ita esse volo, ut nihil illius ad te transeat, vel in te relinquatur erroris. Ibid.
The doctrine of the Semi-pelagians in France is related by Prosper Aquitanicus and Hilarius Arelatensis, in their several epistles written to S. Augustine of this argument. gThey do agree (saith Hilarius) that all men were lost in Adam, and that from thence no man by his proper will can be freed: but this they say is agreeable to the truth, or answerable to the preaching of the word; that when the means of obtaining salvation is declared to such as are cast down and would never rise again by their own strength, they by that merit, whereby they do will and believe that they can be healed from their disease, may obtain both the increase of that faith, and the effecting of their whole health. And hthat grace is not denied, when such a will as this is said to go before it, which seeketh ⟨p. 486⟩only a Physician, but is not of it self otherwise able to do any thing. For as touching that place, As he hath distributed to every one the measure of faith; and other like testimonies: they would have them make for this, that he should be holpen that hath begun to will; but not that this also should be given unto him, that he might will. Prosper in his Poems doth thus deliver it.
iGratia quâ Christi populus sumus, hoc cohibetur
Limite vobiscum, & formam hanc asseribitis illi:
Ut cunctos vocet illa quidem, invitetque nec ullum
Praeteriens, studeat communem adferre salutem
Omnibus, & totum peccato absolvere mundum.
Sed proprio quemque arbitrio parere vocanti,
Judicioque suo, motâ see extendere mente
Ad lucem oblatam; quae se non subtrahat ulli,
Sed cupidos recti juvet, illustretque volentes.
Hinc adjutoris Domini bonitate magistrâ
Crescere virtutum studia; ut quod quisque petendum
Mandatis didicit, jugi sectetur amore.
Esse autem edoctis istam communiter aequam
Libertatem animis, ut cursum explere beatum
Persistendo queant: finem effectumque petitum
Dante Deo, ingenijs qui nunquam desit honestis.
Sed quia non idem est cunctis vigor, & variarum
Illecebris rerum trahitur dispersa voluntas:
Sponte aliquos vitijs succumbere, qui potuissent
A lapsu re vocare pedem, stabilesque manere.
The doctrine of the Semi-pelagians in France is related by Prosper Aquitanicus and Hilarius Arelatensis, in their severall epistles written to S. Augustine of this argument. gThey doe agree (saith Hilarius) that all men were lost in Adam, and that from thence no man by his proper will can be freed: but this they say is agreeable to the truth, or answerable to the preaching of the word; that when the meanes of obtaining salvation is declared to such as are cast downe and would never rise againe by their owne strength, they by that merit, whereby they doe will and beleeve that they can be healed from their disease, may obtaine both the increase of that faith, and the effecting of their whole health. And hthat grace is not denied, when such a will as this is said to goe before it, which seeketh ⟨p. 486⟩only a Physitian, but is not of it selfe otherwise able to doe any thing. For as touching that place, As he hath distributed to every one the measure of faith; and other like testimonies: they would have them make for this, that he should be holpen that hath begun to will; but not that this also should be given unto him, that he might will. Prosper in his Pöems doth thus deliver it.
iGratia quâ Christi populus sumus, hoc cohibetur
Limite vobiscum, & formam hanc asseribitis illi:
Ut cunctos vocet illa quidem, invitetque nec ullum
Praeteriens, studeat communem adferre salutem
Omnibus, & totum peccato absolvere mundum.
Sed proprio quemque arbitrio parere vocanti,
Iudicioque suo, motâ se extendere mente
Ad lucem oblatam; quae se non subtrahat ulli,
Sed cupidos recti iuvet, illustretque volentes.
Hinc adjutoris Domini bonitate magistrâ
Crescere virtutum studia; ut quod quisque petendum
Mandatis didicit, jugi sectetur amore.
Esse autem edoctis istam communiter aequam
Libertatem animis, ut cursum explere beatum
Persistendo queant: finem effectumque petitum
Dante Deo, ingenijs qui nunquam desit honestis.
Sed quia non idem est cunctis vigor, & variarum
Illecebris rerum trahitur dispersa voluntas:
Sponte aliquos vitijs succumbere, qui potuissent
A lapsu re vocare pedem, stabilesque manere.
gConsentiunt omnem hominem in Adam periisse, nec inde quenquam posse proprio arbitrio liberari: sed id conveniens asserunt veritati, vel congruum praedicationi, ut cùm prostratis & nunquam suis viribus surrecturis annunciatur obtinendae salutis occasio; eo merito, quo voluerint & crediderint á suo morbo see posse sanari, & ipsius fidei augmentum, & totius sanitatis suae consequantur effectum. Hilar. epist. ad Augustin.Consentiunt omnem hominem in Adam periisse, nec inde quenquam posse proprio arbitrio liberari: sed id conveniens asserunt veritati, vel congruum praedicationi, ut cùm prostratis & nunquam suis viribus surrecturis annunciatur obtinendae salutis occasio; eo merito, quo voluerint & crediderint á suo morbo se posse sanari, & ipsius fidei augmentum, & totius sanitatis suae consequantur effectum. Hilar. epist. ad Augustin.
hNec negari gratiam, si praecedere dicatur talis voluntas, quae tantùm medicum quaerat; non autem quicquam ipsa jam valeat. Nam illa testimonia, ut est illud, Sicut unicuique partitus est mensuram fidei, & similia, ad id volunt valere, ut adjuvetur qui coeperit velle; non ut etiam donetur, ut velit. Ibid.
Against these opinions, S. Augustine wrote his two books, of the Predestination of the Saints, and of the gift of Perseverance: in the former whereof he hath this memorable passage among divers others. ⟨p. 487⟩kMany hear the word of truth; but some do believe, others do contradict. Therefore these have a will to believe, the others have not. Who is ignorant of this? who would deny it? But seeing the will is to some prepared by the Lord, to others not, we are to discern what doth proceed from his mercy, and what from his judgement. That which Israel did seek (saith the Apostle) he obtained not: but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, (Rom. 11.7.) Behold mercy and judgement; mercy in the election which hath obtained the righteousness of God, but judgement upon the rest that were blinded: and yet the one because they would, did believe; the others because they would not, did not believe. Mercy therefore and judgement were executed even upon the wills themselves. Against the same opinions divers treatises were published by Prosper also; who chargeth these men with lnourishing the poison of the Pelagian pravity, by their positions: inasmuch as 1. the beginning of salvation is naughtily placed in man by them. 2. the will of man is impiously preferred before the will of God: as if therefore one should be holpen because he did will, and did not therefore will because he was holpen. 3. a man originally evil is naughtily believed to begin his receiving of good, not from the highest good, but from himself. 4. it is thought that God may otherwise be pleased, than out of that which he himself hath bestowed. But he maintaineth constantly, that both the beginning and ending of a ⟨p. 488⟩mans conversion is wholly to be ascribed unto grace: and that God effecteth this grace in us, not by way of counsel and persuasion only, but by an inward change and reformation of the mind; making up a new vessel of a broken one, by a creating vertue.
mNon hoc consilio tantùm hortatuque benigno
Suadens atque docens, quasi normam legis haberet
Gratia: sed mutans intus mentem, atque reformans,
Vasque novum ex fracto fingens, virtute creandi.
Against these opinions, S. Augustine wrote his two bookes, of the Predestination of the Saints, and of the gift of Perseverance: in the former whereof he hath this memorable passage among divers others. ⟨p. 487⟩kMany heare the word of truth; but some doe beleeve, others doe contradict. Therefore these have a will to beleeve, the others have not. Who is ignorant of this? who would denie it? But seeing the will is to some prepared by the Lord, to others not, we are to discerne what doth proceed from his mercy, and what from his iudgement. That which Israël did seeke (saith the Apostle) he obtained not: but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, (Rom. 11.7.) Behold mercy and judgement; mercy in the election which hath obtained the righteousnesse of God, but judgement upon the rest that were blinded: and yet the one because they would, did beleeve; the others because they would not, did not beleeve. Mercy therefore and judgement were executed even upon the wills themselves. Against the same opinions divers treatises were published by Prosper also; who chargeth these men with lnourishing the poyson of the Pelagian pravitie, by their positions: inasmuch as 1. the beginning of salvation is naughtily placed in man by them. 2. the will of man is impiously preferred before the will of God: as if therefore one should be holpen because he did will, and did not therefore will because he was holpen. 3. a man originally evill is naughtily beleeved to begin his receiving of good, not from the highest good, but from himselfe. 4. it is thought that God may otherwise be pleased, than out of that which he himselfe hath bestowed. But he maintaineth constantly, that both the beginning and ending of a ⟨p. 488⟩mans conversion is wholly to be ascribed unto grace: and that God effecteth this grace in us, not by way of counsell and perswasion only, but by an inward change and reformation of the minde; making up a new vessell of a broken one, by a creating vertue.
mNon hoc consilio tantùm hortatuque benigno
Suadens atque docens, quasi normam legis haberet
Gratia: sed mutans intus mentem, atque reformans,
Vasque novum ex fracto fingens, virtute creandi.
kMulti audiunt verbum veritatis; sed alij credunt, alij contradicunt. Volunt ergo isti credere, nolunt autem illi. Quis hoc ignoret? quis hoc neget? Sed cùm alijs praeparetur, alijs non praeparetur voluntas á Domino: discernendum est utique quid veniat de mise•icordiâ ejus, quid de judicio. Quod quaerebat Israel, ait Apostostolus, hoc non est consecutu•: electio autem consecuta est, caeteri veró excoecati sunt, &c. Ecce misericordia & judicium; misericordia in electione quae consecuta est justitiam Dei, judicium veró in caeteros qui excoecati sunt: & tamen illi quia voluerunt, crediderunt; illi quia noluerunt, non crediderunt. Misericordia igitur & judicium in ipsis voluntatibus facta sunt. Augustin. d• Praedestinat. Sanctor. cap. 6.
lIn istis Pelagianae pravitatis reliquijs non mediocris virulentiae fibra nutritur, si principium salutis malé in homine collocatur; si divinae voluntati impié voluntas humana praefe•tur, ut ideò quis adjuvetur quia voluit, non ideò quia adjuvatur velit; si originaliter malus receptionem boni non á summo bono, sed á semetipso inchoare male-creditur; si aliunde Deo placetur, nisi ex eo quod ipse donaverit. Prosp. in epist. ad Augustin.
The Writers of principal esteem on the other side, were nJohannes Cassianus, and Faustus Regiensis or Reiensis: the former of which was encountered by Prosper (in his book Contra Collatorem) the latter by Fulgentius, Joh. Maxentius, Facundus, Caesarius, Johannes Antiochenus: as also by Gelasius and his Roman Synod of LXX. Bishops, the writings of them both were rejected amongst the books Apocryphal. And lastly by the joint authority both of the See of Rome, and of the French Bishops assembled in the second Council of Orange, in the year of our Lord DXXIX. sentence was given against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in general, that their opinions touching Grace and Free-will, were not agreeable to the rule of the Catholic faith: and these conclusions following, among sundry others, determined in particular.
The Writers of principal esteeme on the other side, were nIohannes Cassianus, and Faustus Regiensis or Reiensis: the former of which was encountred by Prosper (in his booke Contra Collatorem) the latter by Fulgentius, Ioh. Maxentius, Facundus, Caesarius, Iohannes Antiochenus: as also by Gelasius and his Romane Synod of LXX. Bishops, the writings of them both were rejected amongst the bookes Apocryphall. And lastly by the joint authoritie both of the See of Rome, and of the French Bishops assembled in the second Councell of Orange, in the yeare of our Lord DXXIX. sentence was giuen against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in generall, that their opinions touching Grace and Free-will, were not agreeable to the rule of the Catholike faith: and these conclusions following, among sundrie others, determined in particular.
oIf any doth say, that by mans prayer the grace of God may be conferred; and that it is not grace it self which maketh, that God is prayed unto by us: he contradicteth the Prophet Isaiah, or the Apostle saying the same thing; I was found of them that sought me not, and have been made manifest to them that asked not after me, (Isaiah. 65.1. Rom. 10.20.)
oIf any doth say, that by mans prayer the grace of God may be conferred; and that it is not grace it selfe which maketh, that God is prayed unto by us: he contradicteth the Prophet Esay, or the Apostle saying the same thing; I was found of them that sought me not, and have beene made manifest to them that asked not after me, (Esai. 65.1. Rom. 10.20.)
oSi quis invocatione humanâ gratiam Dei dicit posse conferri; non autem ipsam gratiam facere, ut invocetur á nobis: contradicit Esaiae Prophetae, vel Apostolo idem dicenti; Inventus sum a non quaerentibus me, palám apparui ijs qui me non interrogabant. Concil. A•ausican. 11. Can. 3.
pIf any man defend, that God doth expect our will, that we may be purged from sin; and doth not confess, that this will of ours to be purged, is wrought in us by the infusion and operation of the holy Ghost: he resisteth the holy Ghost, saying by Solomon; The will is prepared by the Lord, (Prov. 8.35. according to the LXX.) and the Apostle preaching wholesomely; It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure: (Phil. 2.13.)
pIf any man defend, that God doth expect our will, that we may be purged from sinne; and doth not confesse, that this will of ours to be purged, is wrought in us by the infusion and operation of the holy Ghost: he resisteth the holy Ghost, saying by Salomon; The will is prepared by the Lord, (Prov. 8.35. according to the LXX.) and the Apostle preaching wholesomely; It is God which worketh in you, both to will and to doe, of his good pleasure: (Phil. 2.13.)
pSi quis, ut á peccato purgemur, voluntatem nostram Deum expectare contendit; non autem ut etiam purgari velimus per sancti Spiritus infusionem & operationem in nobis fieri confitetur: resistit ipsi Spiritui sancto, per Salomonem dicenti; Praeparatur voluntas á Domino. et Apostolo salubriter praedicanti; Deus est qui operatur in nobis & velle & perficere pro bonâ voluntate. Ibid. can. 4.
qIf any man say, that to us, without grace, believing, willing, desiring, endeavouring, labouring, watching, studying, asking, seeking, knocking, mercy is conferred by God; and doth not confess, that it is wrought in us by the infusion and inspiration of the holy Ghost, that we may believe, will, or do all these things as we ought; and doth make the help of grace to follow after mans either humility or obedience, neither doth yield that it is the gift of grace it self, that we are obedient and humble: he resisteth the Apostle, saying; What hast thou, that thou hast not received? (1 Cor. 4.7.) and, By the grace of God I am that I am, (1 Cor. 15.10.)
qIf any man say, that to us, without grace, beleeving, willing, desiring, endevouring, labouring, watching, studying, asking, seeking, knocking, mercie is conferred by God; and doth not confesse, that it is wrought in us by the infusion and inspiration of the holy Ghost, that we may beleeve, will, or doe all these things as we ought; and doth make the helpe of grace to follow after mans either humilitie or obedience, neither doth yeeld that it is the gift of grace it selfe, that we are obedient and humble: he resisteth the Apostle, saying; What hast thou, that thou hast not received? (1 Cor. 4.7.) and, By the grace of God I am that I am, (1 Cor. 15.10.)
qSi quis sine gratiâ Dei, credentibus, volē tibus, desiderā tibus, conantibus, laborantibus, vigilantibus, studentibus, petentibus, quaerentibus, pulsantibus nobis misericordiam dicit conferri divinitùs; non autē ut credamus, velimus, vel haec omnia sicut oportet agere valeamus, per infusionē & inspirationem sancti Spiritus in nobis fieri confitetur; & aut humilitati aut obedientiae humanae subjungit gratiae adjutorium, nec ut obedientes & humiles simus ipsius gratiae donum esse consentit: resistit Apostolo dicenti; Quid habes, quod non accepisti? et, Gratiâ Dei sum id quod sum. Can. 6.Si quis sine gratiâ Dei, credentibus, volē tibus, desiderā tibus, conantibus, laborantibus, vigilantibus, studētibus, petētibus, quaerentibus, pulsantibus nobis misericordiam dicit cōferri divinitùs; non autē ut credamus, velimus, vel haec omnia sicut oportet agere valeamus, per infusionē & inspirationem sancti Spiritus in nobis fieri confitetur; & aut humilitati aut obedientiae humanae subjungit gratiae adjutorium, nec ut obedientes & humiles simus ipsius gratiae donum esse consentit: resistit Apostolo dicenti; Quid habes, quod non accepisti? et, Gratiâ Dei sum id quod sum. Can. 6.
rIt is of Gods gift, both when we do think aright, and when we hold our feet from falsehood and unrighteousness. For as oft as we do good things, God worketh in us, and with us, that we may work.
rIt is of Gods gift, both when we doe thinke aright, and when we hold our feet from falshood and unrighteousnesse. For as oft as we doe good things, God worketh in us, and with us, that we may worke.
rDivini est muneris, cùm & recté cogitamus, & pedes nostros á falsitate & injustitiâ tenemus, Quoties enim bona agimus, Deus in nobis atque nobiscum, ut operemur, operatur, Can. 9.
tThis also do we wholesomely profess and believe, that in every good work we do not begin, and are holpen afterwards by the mercy of God; but he first of all, no good merits of ours going before, inspireth into us both faith and the love of him: that we may both faithfully seek the Sacrament of Baptism, and after Baptism with his help, we way fulfil the things that are pleasing unto him.
tThis also doe we wholesomely professe and beleeve, that in every good worke we doe not beginne, and are holpen afterwards by the mercie of God; but hee first of all, no good merits of ours going before, inspireth into us both faith and the love of him: that we may both faithfully seeke the Sacrament of Baptisme, and after Baptisme with his helpe, we way fulfill the things that are pleasing unto him.
tHoc etiam salubriter profitemur & credimus, quòd in omni opere bono non nos incipimus, & postea per Dei misericordiam adjuvamur; sed ipse nobis, nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis, & fidem & amorem sui priùs inspirat, ut & baptismi sacramenta fideliter •equiramus, & post baptismum •um ipsius adjutorio ea quae sibi sunt placita implere possimus. Can. ult.
Touching which last Canon we may note: First for the reading, that in the Tomes of the Councils set out by Binius, it is most notoriously corrupted. For where the Council hath, Nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis, No good merits going before; there we read, uMultis praecedentibus bonis meritis, Many good merits going before. Secondly, for the meaning, that xthe Fathers understand grace to be given according to merits; when any thing is done by our own strength, in respect whereof grace is given, although it be no merit of condignitie: as both Bellarmine him self doth acknowledge in the explication of the determination of the Palaestine Synod against Pelagius; and in the case of the Semi-Pelagians, as it is delivered by Cassianus, is most evident. For ythe grace of God (saith he) doth always so cooperate to the good part with our Free-will, and in all things help, protect and defend it, that sometime it either requireth, or expecteth from it some endeavours of a good will; that it may not seem to ⟨p. 491⟩confer its gifts upon one that is altogether sleeping, and given to sluggish idleness: seeking occasions after a sort, whereby the dullness of humane slothfulness being shaken off, the bargenesse of its bounty may not seem to be unreasonable, while it imparteth the same under the colour of a kind of desire and labour. Yet so notwithstanding that grace may always continue to be gracious and free; while to such kind of small and little endeavours, with an inestimable largess it giveth so great glory of immortality, so great gifts of everlasting bliss. zLet humane frailty therefore endeavour as much as it will, it cannot be equal to the retribution that is to come; neither by the labours thereof doth it so diminish Gods grace, that it doth not always continue to be given freely.
Touching which last Canon we may note: First for the reading, that in the Tomes of the Councels set out by Binius, it is most notoriously corrupted. For where the Councell hath, Nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis, No good merits going before; there wee reade, uMultis praecedentibus bonis meritis, Many good merits going before. Secondly, for the meaning, that xthe Fathers understand grace to be given according to merits; when any thing is done by our owne strength, in respect whereof grace is given, although it be no merit of condignitie: as both Bellarmine him selfe doth acknowledge in the explication of the determination of the Palaestine Synod against Pelagius; and in the case of the Semi-Pelagians, as it is delivered by Cassianus, is most evident. For ythe grace of God (saith he) doth alwaies so cooperate to the good part with our Free-will, and in all things helpe, protect and defend it, that sometime it either requireth, or expecteth from it some endevours of a good will; that it may not seeme to ⟨p. 491⟩conferre its gifts upon one that is altogether sleeping, and given to sluggish idlenesse: seeking occasions after a sort, whereby the dulnesse of humane slothfulnesse being shaken off, the bargenesse of its bountie may not seeme to be unreasonable, while it imparteth the same under the colour of a kinde of desire and labour. Yet so notwithstanding that grace may alwaies continue to be gratious and free; while to such kinde of small and little endevours, with an inestimable largesse it giveth so great glory of immortalitie, so great gifts of everlasting blisse. zLet humane frailtie therefore endevour as much as it will, it cannot be equall to the retribution that is to come; neither by the labours thereof doth it so diminish Gods grace, that it doth not alwaies continue to be given freely.
xGratiam secundùm merita nostra dari intelligunt Patres, cùm aliquid fit proprijs viribus, ratione cujus datur gratia, etiamsi non sit illud meritum de condigno. Bellarm. de Grat. & l•b. Arbitr. lib. 6. cap. 5.
yIta semper gratia Dei nostro in bonam partem cooperatur arbitrio, atque in omnibus illud adjuvat, protegit ac defendit, ut nonnunquam etiam ab eo quosdam conatus bonae voluntatis vel exigat, vel expectet; ne penitùs dormienti aut inerti otio dissoluto, sua dona confer videatur: occasions quodammodo quaerens, quibus humanae segnitiei torpore discusso, non irrationabilis munificentiae suae largitas videatur, dumb eam sub colour cujusdam desiderij ac laboris impartit. & nihilominus gratia Dei semper gratuita perseveret; dumb exiguis quibusdam parvisque conatibus tantam immortalitatis gloriam, tanta perennis beatitudinis dona, inaestimabili tribuit largitate. Jo. Cassian. Collat. 13. cap. 13.Ita semper gratia Dei nostro in bonam partem cooperatur arbitrio, atque in omnibus illud adjuvat, protegit ac defendit, ut nonnunquam etiam ab eo quosdam conatus bonae voluntatis vel exigat, vel expectet; ne penitùs dormienti aut inerti otio dissoluto, sua dona cōferre videatur: occasiones quodammodo quaerens, quibus humanae segnitiei torpore discusso, non irrationabilis munificentiae suae largitas videatur, dum eam sub colore cujusdam desiderij ac laboris impartit. & nihilominus gratia Dei semper gratuita perseveret; dum exiguis quibusdam parvisque conatibus tantam immortalitatis gloriam, tanta perennis beatitudinis dona, inaestimabili tribuit largitate. Io. Cassian. Collat. 13. cap. 13.
zQuantumlibet ergo enisa fuerit humana fragilitas, futurae retributioni par esse non poterit; nec ita laboribus suis divinam imminuit gratiam, ut non semper gratuita perseveret. Ibid.
Where you may observe, from what fountain the School-men did derive their doctrine of works preparatory, meriting grace by way of congruity, though not of condignitie. For Cassianus (whom aProsper chargeth, notwithstanding all this qualifying of the matter, to be a maintainer in very deed of that damned point of Pelagianism; that the grace of God was given according to our merits) Cassianus, I say, was a man that bare great sway in our Monasteries, where his writings were accounted as the Monks general Rules: and until the other day, Faustus him self (who of all others most cunningly opposed the doctrine of S. Augustine touching grace and free-will) was accepted in the Popish Schools for a reverend Doctor and a Catholic Bishop. Yea the works of Pelagius himself were had in such account, that some of them (as his Epistle ad Demetriadem for example, and his Exposition upon S. Pauls Epistles, which are fraught with his heretical opinion•) have passed from hand to hand, as if they had ⟨p. 492⟩been written by S. Hierome; and as such, have been alleged against us by some of our Adversaries in this very question of Free-will. The less is it to be wondered, that three hundred years ago in the mid-night of Popery, the profound Doctor Thomas Bradwardin (then Chancellor of London, and afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury) should begin his Disputations, Of the cause of God against Pelagius with this lamentable complaint. bBehold, (I speak it, with grief of heart touched inwardly) as in old time against one Prophet of God, there were found eight hundred and fifty Prophets of Baal; unto whom an innumerable company of people did adhere: s• at this day, in this cause, how many (O Lord) do now fight with Pelagius for Free-will against thy free grace, and against Paul, the spiritual Champion of grace? cFor the whole world almost is gone after Pelagius into error. Arise therefore, O Lord, judge thine own cause; and him that defendeth thee, defend, protect, strengthen, comfort. To whose judgement I also now leave these dVain defenders, or (as S. Augustine rightly censureth them) deceivers, and puffers up, and presumptuous extollers of Free-will.
Where you may observe, from what fountaine the Schoole-men did derive their doctrine of workes preparatorie, meriting grace by way of congruitie, though not of condignitie. For Cassianus (whom aProsper chargeth, notwithst•nding all this qualifying of the matter, to be a maintainer in very deed of that damned point of Pelagianisme; that the grace of God was given according to our merits) Cassianus, I say, was a man that bare great sway in our Monasteries, where his writings were accounted as the Monkes generall Rules: and untill the other day, Faustus him selfe (who of all others most cunningly opposed the doctrine of S. Augustine touching grace and free-will) was accepted in the Popish Schooles for a reverend Doctor and a Catholike Bishop. Yea the workes of Pelagius himselfe were had in such account, that some of them (as his Epistle ad Demetriadem for example, and his Exposition upon S. Pauls Epistles, which are fraught with his hereticall opinion•) haue passed from hand to hand, as if they had ⟨p. 492⟩beene written by S. Hierome; and as such, have beene alledged against us by some of our Adversaries in this very question of Free-will. The lesse is it to be wondered, that three hundred yeares agoe in the mid-night of Popery, the profound Doctor Thomas Bradwardin (then Chancellor of London, and afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury) should beginne his Disputations, Of the cause of God against Pelagius with this lamentable complaint. bBehold, (I speake it, with griefe of heart touched inwardly) as in old time against one Prophet of God, there were found eight hundred and fiftie Prophets of Baal; unto whom an innumerable company of people did adhere: s• at this day, in this cause, how many (O Lord) doe now fight with Pelagius for Free-will against thy free grace, and against Paul, the spirituall Champion of grace? cFor the whole world almost is gone after Pelagius into error. Arise therefore, O Lord, judge thine owne cause; and him that defendeth thee, defend, protect, strengthen, comfort. To whose judgement I also now leave these dVaine defenders, or (as S. Augustine rightly censureth them) deceivers, and puffers up, and presumptuous extollers of Free-will.
bEcce enim (quod non nisi tactus dolore cordis intrinsecus refero) sicut olim contra unicum Dei Prophetam octingenti & quinquaginta Prophetae Baal, & similes sunt reperti, quibus & innumerabilis populus adhaerebat: ita & hodiè in hâc caussâ; quot, Domine, hodie cum Pelagio pro libero Arbitrio contra gratuitam Gratiam tuam pugnant, & contra Paulum pugilem gratiae spiritualem? Tho. Bradwardin Praefat. in libros de Caussâ Dei contra Pelag.
cTotus etenim penè mundus post Pelagium abijt in errorem. Exurge igitur Domine, judica caussam tuam; & sustinentem te sustine, protege, robora, consolare. Ibid.
dLiberi arbitrij defensores, imó deceptores quia inflatores, & inflatores quia praesumptores. August•n. Epist. 105. ad Sixtum. Vani, non defensores, sed inflatores liberi arbitrij. Id. in opere postremo c•ntra Julian. Pelagian. lib. 2. Non defensores, sed inflatores & praecipitatores liberi arbitrij. Id. de Grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 14.Liberi arbitrij defensores, imó deceptores quia inflatores, & inflatores quia praesumptores. August•n. Epist. 105. ad Sixtum. Vani, non defensores, sed inflatores liberi arbitrij. Id. in opere postremo c•ntra Iulian. Pelagian. lib. 2. Non defensores, sed inflatores & praecipitatores liberi arbitrij. Id. de Grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 14.
IN the last place we are told, that the Fathers of the unspotted Church of Rome did •each, Tha• man for ⟨p. 493⟩his meritorious works receiveth, through the assistance of Gods grace, the bliss of everlasting happiness. But our Challenger, I suppose, will hardly find one Father either of the spotted or unspotted Church of Rome, that ever spake so babishly herein, as he maketh them all to do. That man, by the assistance of Gods grace, may do meritorious works, we have read in divers Authors, and in divers meanings. But after these works done, that a man should receive through the assistance of Gods grace the bliss of everlasting happiness, is such a piece of gibberish, as I do not remember that before now I have ever met withal even in Babel it self. For with them that understand what they speak, assistance hath reference to the doing of the work, not to the receiving of the reward: and simply to say, that a man for his meritorious works (taking merit here as the Romanists in this question would have it taken) receiveth through Gods grace the bliss of everlasting happiness; is to speak flat contrarieties, and to conjoin those things, that cannot possibly be coupled together. For that conclusion of Bernard is most certain: aThere is no place for grace to enter, where merit hath taken possession. because it is grounded upon the Apostles determination, Rom. 11.6. If it be of grace, it is no more of works: or else were grace no more grace.
IN the last place we are told, that the Fathers of the unspotted Church of Rome did •each, Tha• man for ⟨p. 493⟩his meritorious workes receiveth, through the assistance of Gods grace, the blisse of everlasting happinesse. But our Challenger, I suppose, will hardly finde one Father either of the spotted or unspotted Church of Rome, that ever spake so babishly herein, as he maketh them all to doe. That man, by the assistance of Gods grace, may doe meritorious workes, we have read in divers Authors, and in divers meanings. But after these workes done, that a man should receive through the assistance of Gods grace the blisse of everlasting happinesse, is such a peece of gibbrish, as I doe not remember that before now I have ever met withall even in Babel it selfe. For with them that understand what they speake, assistance hath reference to the doing of the worke, not to the receiving of the reward: and simply to say, that a man for his meritorious workes (taking merit here as the Romanists in this question would have it taken) receiveth through Gods grace the blisse of everlasting happinesse; is to speake flat contrarieties, and to conjoine those things, that cannot possibly be coupled together. For that conclusion of Bernard is most certaine: aThere is no place for grace to enter, where merit hath taken possession. because it is grounded upon the Apostles determination, Rom. 11.6. If it be of grace, it is no more of workes: or else were grace no more grace.
aNon est in quo gratia intret, ubi jam meritum occupavit. Bernard. in Cantic. Ser. 67.
Neither do we therefore take away the reward, because we deny the merit of good works. We know, that in the keeping of Gods Commandments there is great reward; Psal. 19.11. and that unto him who soweth righteousness, there shall be a sure reward; Prov. 11.18. But the question is, whence he that soweth in this manner, must expect to reap so great and so sure a harvest? Whether from Gods justice; which he must do ⟨p. 494⟩if he stand as the Jesuits would have him do upon merit: or from his mercy; as a recompense freely bestowed out of Gods gracious bounty, and not in justice due for the worth of the work performed. Which question, we think, the Prophet Hosea hath sufficiently resolved; when he biddeth us sow to our selves in righteousness, and reap in MERCY, Hose. 10.12. Neither do we hereby any whit detract from the truth of that axiom, That God will give every man according to his works: for still the question remaineth the very same; whether God may not judge a man according to his works, when he sitteth upon the throne of grace, as well as when he sitteth upon the throne of justice? and we think here, that the Prophet David hath fully cleared the case, in that one sentence, Psal. 62.12. With thee, O Lord, is MERCY: for thou rewardest every one according to his work.
Neither doe we therefore take away the reward, because we deny the merit of good workes. Wee know, that in the keeping of Gods Commandements there is great reward; Psal. 19.11. and that unto him who soweth righteousnesse, there shall be a sure reward; Prov. 11.18. But the question is, whence he that soweth in this manner, must expect to reape so great and so sure a harvest? Whether from Gods justice; which he must doe ⟨p. 494⟩if hee stand as the Iesuites would have him doe upon merit: or from his mercie; as a recompence freely bestowed out of Gods gracious bountie, and not in justice due for the worth of the worke performed. Which question, we thinke, the Prophet Hosea hath sufficiently resolved; when he biddeth us sow to our selves in righteousnesse, and reape in MERCIE, Hose. 10.12. Neither doe we hereby any whit detract from the truth of that axiome, That God will give every man acccording to his works: for still the question remaineth the very same; whether God may not judge a man according to his workes, when he sitteth upon the throne of grace, as well as when he sitteth upon the throne of justice? and wee thinke here, that the Prophet David hath fully cleared the case, in that one sentence, Psal. 62.12. With thee, O Lord, is MERCY: for thou rewardest every one according to his worke.
Originally therefore, and in it self, we hold that this reward proceedeth merely from Gods free bounty and mercy: but accidentally, in regard that God hath tied himself by his word and promise to confer such a reward, we grant that it now proveth in a sort to be an act of justice. even as in forgiving of our sins (which in it self all men know to be an act of mercy) he is said to be faithful and just, 1 Joh. 1.9. namely, in regard of the faithful performance of his promise. For promise, we see, amongst honest men is counted a due debt. but the thing promised being free, and on our part altogether undeserved, if the promiser did not perform, and proved not to be so good as his word; he could not properly be said to do me wrong, but rather to wrong himself, by impairing his own credit. And therefore Aquinas himself confesseth, bthat God is not hereby simply ⟨p. 495⟩made a debtor to us, but to himself; in as much as it is requisite that his own ordinance should be fulfilled. Thus was Moses careful to put the children of Israel in mind touching the Land of Canaan (which was a type of our eternal habitation in Heaven) that it was a Land of promise, and not of merit: which God did give them to possess, not for their righteousness, or for their upright beart, but that he might perform the word which he sware unto their Fathers, Abraham, Izhak, and Jacob, (Deut. 9.5.) Whereupon the Levites say, in their prayer unto God, Nehem. 9.8. Thou madest a covenant with Abraham, to give unto his seed the Land of the Canaanites; and hast performed thy word, because thou art JUST. Now because the Lord had made a like promise of the Crown of life to them that love him: (Jam. 1.12.) therefore S. Paul doth not stick in like manner to attribute this also to Gods justice. Henceforth (saith he, 2 Tim. 4.8.) is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day: and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing. Upon which place, Bernard, in his book of Grace and Free-will, saith most sweetly. cThat therefore which Paul expecteth, is a crown of righteousness, but of Gods righteousness, not his own. For it is just that he should give what he oweth, and he oweth what he hath promised: and this is the righteousness of God, of which the Apostle presumeth, the promise of God.
Originally therefore, and in it selfe, we hold that this reward proceedeth meerely from Gods free bountie and mercie: but accidentally, in regard that God hath tied himselfe by his word and promise to conferre such a reward, we grant that it now proveth in a sort to be an act of justice. even as in forgiving of our sins (which in it selfe all men know to be an act of mercie) he is said to be faithfull and just, 1 Ioh. 1.9. namely, in regard of the faithfull performance of his promise. For promise, we see, amongst honest men is counted a due debt. but the thing promised being free, and on our part altogether undeserved, if the promiser did not performe, and proved not to be so good as his word; he could not properly be said to doe me wrong, but rather to wrong himself, by impairing his own credit. And therfore Aquinas himselfe confesseth, bthat God is not hereby simply ⟨p. 495⟩made a debter to us, but to himselfe; in as much as it is requisite that his owne ordinance should be fulfilled. Thus was Moses carefull to put the children of Israel in minde touching the Land of Canaan (which was a type of our eternall habitation in Heaven) that it was a Land of promise, and not of merit: which God did give them to possesse, not for their righteousnesse, or for their upright beart, but that he might performe the word which he sware unto their Fathers, Abraham, Izhak, and Iacob, (Deut. 9.5.) Whereupon the Levites say, in their praier unto God, Nehem. 9.8. Thou madest a covenant with Abraham, to give unto his seed the Land of the Canaanites; and hast performed thy word, because thou art IUST. Now because the Lord had made a like promise of the Crowne of life to them that love him: (Iam. 1.12.) therefore S. Paul doth not sticke in like manner to attribute this also to Gods justice. Henceforth (saith he, 2 Tim. 4.8.) is laid up for me the crowne of righteousnesse, which the Lord, the righteous Iudge, shall give me at that day: and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing. Upon which place, Bernard, in his booke of Grace and Free-will, saith most sweetly. cThat therefore which Paul expecteth, is a crowne of righteousnesse, but of Gods righteousnesse, not his owne. For it is just that he should give what he oweth, and he oweth what he hath promised: and this is the rightusnesse of God, of which the Apostle presumeth, the promise of God.
bNon sequitur, quòd Deus efficiatur simplicitèr debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi; in quantum debitum est, ut sua ordinatio impleatur. Thom. 1.2. Quaest. 14. art. 1. ad 3.
cEst ergo quā Paulus expectat, corona justitiae, sed justitiae Dei, non suae. Justum quippe est ut reddat quod debet; debet autem quod pollicitus est. Et haec est justitia Dei, de quâ praesumit Apostolus, promissio Dei. Bern. li. de Gratia, & libero arbitrio.Est ergo quā Paulus expectat, corona justitiae, sed justitiae Dei, non suae. Iustum quippe est ut reddat quod debet; debet autem quod pollicitus est. Et haec est justitia Dei, de quâ praesumit Apostolus, promissio Dei. Bern. li. de Gratia, & libero arbitrio.
But this will not content our Jesuits, unless we yield unto them; dthat we do as properly and truly merit rewards, when with the grace of God we do well, as we do merit punishments, when without grace we do evil. So saith Maldonat. that is to say, unless we maintain, ethat the good works of just persons do merit eternal ⟨p. 496⟩life condignly, not only by reason of Gods covenant and acceptation, but also by reason of the work it self: so that in a good work proceeding from grace, there may be a certain proportion and equality unto the reward of eternal life. So saith Cardinal Bellarmine. For the further opening whereof, Vasquez taketh upon him to prove in order these three distinct Propositions. First, fthat the good works of just persons are of themselves, without any covenant and acceptation, worthy of the reward of eternal life; and have an equal value of condignitie to the obtaining of eternal glory. Secondly, gThat no accession of dignity doth come to the works of the just by the merits or person of Christ; which the same should not have otherwise, if they had been done by the same grace bestowed liberally by God alone without Christ. Thirdly, hThat Gods promise is annexed indeed to the works of just men, yet it belongeth no way to the reason of the merit; but cometh rather to the works, which are already not worthy only, but also meritorious. Unto all which he addeth afterwards this Corollary. iSeeing the works of a just man do condignly merit eternal life, as an equal recompense and reward: ⟨p. 497⟩there is no need that any other condigne merit, such as is the merit of Christ, should come between, that eternal life might be rendered unto them. Yea the merit of every just man hath somewhat peculiar in respect of the just man himself, which the merit of Christ hath not: namely, to make the man himself just, and worthy of eternal life, that he may worthily obtain the same. But the merit of Christ, although it be most worthy to obtain glory of God for us, yet it hath not this efficacy and virtue, to make us formally just, and worthy of eternal life: but men by virtue derived from him, attain this effect in themselves. And so we never request of God by the merits of Christ, that the reward of eternal life may be given to our worthy and meritorious works:
But this will not content our Iesuites, unlesse wee yeeld unto them; dthat wee doe as properly and truly merit rewards, when with the grace of God we doe well, as we doe merit punishments, when without grace we do evill. So saith Maldonat. that is to say, unlesse we maintaine, ethat the good workes of just persons doe merit eternall ⟨p. 496⟩life condignely, not only by reason of Gods covenant and acceptation, but also by reason of the worke it selfe: so that in a good worke proceeding from grace, there may be a certaine proportion and equalitie unto the reward of eternall life. So saith Cardinall Bellarmine. For the further opening whereof, Vasquez taketh upon him to prove in order these three distinct Propositions. First, fthat the good workes of just persons are of themselves, without any covenant and acceptation, worthy of the reward of eternall life; and have an equall value of condignitie to the obtaining of eternall glorie. Secondly, gThat no accession of dignitie doth come to the workes of the just by the merits or person of Christ; which the same should not have otherwise, if they had beene done by the same grace bestowed liberally by God alone without Christ. Thirdly, hThat Gods promise is annexed indeed to the workes of just men, yet it belongeth no way to the reason of the merit; but commeth rather to the workes, which are alreadie not worthy only, but also meritorious. Unto all which hee addeth afterwards this Corollary. iSeeing the works of a just man doe condignely merit eternall life, as an equall recompence and reward: ⟨p. 497⟩there is no need that any other condigne merit, such as is the merit of Christ, should come betweene, that eternall life might be rendred unto them. Yea the merit of every just man hath somewhat peculiar in respect of the just man himselfe, which the merit of Christ hath not: namely, to make the man himselfe just, and worthie of eternall life, that hee may worthily obtaine the same. But the merit of Christ, although it be most worthie to obtaine glory of God for us, yet it hath not this efficacy and vertue, to make us formally just, and worthy of eternall life: but men by vertue derived from him, attaine this effect in themselves. And so we never request of God by the merits of Christ, that the reward of eternall life may be given to our worthy and meritorious workes:
dNos tam proprié ac veré cum gratiâ Dei bene agentes praemia mereri, quàm sine illâ malé agents supplicia meremur. Jo. Maldonat. in Ezech. 18.20.Nos tam proprié ac veré cum gratiâ Dei bene agentes praemia mereri, quàm sine illâ malé agentes supplicia meremur. Io. Maldonat. in Ezech. 18.20.
eOpera bona justorum meritoria esse vitae aeternae ex condigno, non solùm ratione pacti & acceptationis, sed etiam ratione operis; ita ut in opere bono ex gratiâ procedente, sit quaedam proportio & aequalitas ad praemium vitae aeternae. Bellar. de Justis. l. 5. c. 17.Opera bona justorum meritoria esse vitae aeternae ex condigno, non solùm ratione pacti & acceptationis, sed etiam ratione operis; ita ut in opere bono ex gratiâ procedente, sit quaedam proportio & aequalitas ad praemium vitae aeternae. Bellar. de Iustis. l. 5. c. 17.
fOpera bona justo•um ex seipsis, absque ullo pacto & acceptatione, digna esse remuneratione vitae aeternae; & aequalem valorem condignitatis habere ad consequendam aeternam gloriam. Gabr. Vasquez. Commentar. in 1am. 2 ae. qu. 114 disp. 214 ca. 5. •nit.
gOperibus justorum nullum dignitatis accrementum provenire ex meritis aut personâ Christi, quod aliâs eadem non haberent, si fierent ex eâdem gratiâ á solo Deo liberaliter sine Christo collatâ. Ibid. init. cap. 7.
hOperibus justorum accessisse quidem divinam promissionem: eam tamen nullo modo pertinere ad rationem meriti; sed potiùs advenire operibus, non tantùm jam dignis, sed etiam jam meritorijs. Ibid. init. cap. 8.
iCùm opera justi condigné mereantur vitam aeternam, tanquam aequalem mercedem, & praemium: non opus est interventu alterius meriti condigni, quale est meritum Christi, ut eis reddatur vita aeterna. quinimo aliquid habet peculiar meritum cujuscunque justi respectu ipsius hominis justi, quod non habet meritum Christi: nempe reddere ipsum hominem justum, & dignum aeternâ vitâ, ut eam digné consequatur. meritum autem Christi licè• dignissimum sit, quod obtine at á Deo gloriam pro nobis; tamen non habet hanc efficaciam & virtutem, ut reddat nos formaliter justos, & dignos aeternâ vitâ: sed per virtutem ab ipso derivatam hunc consequuntur effectum homines in seipsis. Et ita nunquam petimus á Deo per merita Christi, ut nostris dignis operibus & meritorijs reddatur merces aeternae vitae: sed ut per Christum detur nobis gratia, quâ possimus digné hanc mercedem promereri. Id. ibid. disput. 222. cap. 3. num. 30.31.
dead in trespasses and sinnes; and so no more able to lead a holy life acceptable unto God, then a dead man is to performe the actions of him which is alive.
⟨p. 468⟩
must intercurre betwixt both: the morall workes of the unregenerate fayling so fowly both in the beginning, middle and end, are to be accounted breaches rather of the Commandement then observances, depravations of good workes rather then performances. For howsoever these actions be in their owne kinde good and commanded of God, yet are they marred in the carriage, that which is bonum being not done bene:
Si gentili• (inquis) nudum operuerit, nunquid quia non est ex fide, peccatum est? Prorsus in quantum non est ex fide peccatum est: non quia per seipsum factum, quod est nudum operire, peccatum est; sed de tali opere non in •omino gloriari, solus impius negat esse peccatum. Ibid.
aQuod si & ipsa (misericordia) per seipsam naturali compassione opus est bonum; etiam isto bono malé utitur qui infideliter utitur, & hoc bonum malé facit qui infideliter facit: qui autem malé facit aliquid, profectò peccat. Ex quo colligitur, etiam ipsa bona opera quae faciunt infideles, non ipsorum esse, sed illius qui bene utitur malis. Ipso•um autem esse peccata, quibus & bona malé faciunt; quia ea non fideli, sed infideli, hoc est, stultâ & noxiâ faciunt voluntate. qualis voluntas, nullo Christiano dubitante, arbor est mala, quae facere non potest nisi fructus malos, id est, sola peccata. Omne enim, velis nolis, quod non est ex fide, peccatum est. Ibid.
gOmnis infideliū vita peccatum est: & nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio aeternae & incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Id. ex Augustino Sentent. 106. & Epigram. 81.Omnis infideliū vita peccatum est: & nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Vbi enim deest agnitio aeternae & incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Id. ex Augustino Sentent. 106. & Epigram. 81.
hId. de Ingratis, cap. 16.
Philip. 2.13
.)
Est quidem in malâ part• execrabilis libertas arbitrij, ut praevaricator creatorem deserat, & ad vitia se nefanda convertat: in bonâ verò part arbitrium liberū, Adā peccante, perdidimus; ad quod nisi per Christi gratiam redire non possumus: dicente Apòstolo; Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis, & velle, & perficere, pro bonâ voluntate. Cassiodor. in Psalm. 117.
Est quidem in malâ part• execrabilis libertas arbitrij, ut praevaricator creatorem deserat, & ad vitia se nefanda convertat: in bonâ verò parte arbitrium liberū, Adā peccante, perdidimus; ad quod nisi per Christi gratiam redire non possumus: dicente Apòstolo; Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis, & velle, & perficere, pro bonâ voluntate. Cassiodor. in Psalm. 117.
Why is there so much presumed of the possibilitie of nature?
Legant etiam recens meum opusculū, quod pro libero nuper arbitrio edere compulsi sumus; & agnoscent quàminiquè nos negatione gratiae infamare gestierint; qui per tutom penè ipsius textum operis perfectè atque integrè & liberum arbitrium confitemur & gratiam. Id. ibid. cap. 41.
sSub ambiguâ generalitate quid sentiret abscondens; gratiae tamen vocabulo frangens invidiam, offensionemque declinans. Augustin. ibid. cap. 37.
tPelag. apud Augustin. de gostis contra Pelag. cap. 10. & in epist. 95. Vid. eund. Augustin. de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. 13. & serm. 11. de verbis Apostoli.
uQuid tantum de naturae possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, sauciata, vexata, perdita est. Verâ confessione, non falsâ defensione opus habet. Augustin. de natur. & grat. cap. 53.
in other places of his writings he plainly affirmeth, that our very prayers are to be used for nothing but this, that the doctrine may be opened unto us by divine revelation; not that the minde of man may be holpen, that he may also accomplish by love and action that which he hath learned should be done.
eIpsas quoque orationes (ut in scriptis suis apertissimè affirmat) ad nihil aliud adhibendas opinatur, nisi ut nobis doctrina etiam divinâ revelatione aperiatur; non ut adjuvetur mens hominis, ut id, quod faciendum esse didicerit, etiam dilectione & actione perficiat. Id. ibid. cap. 41.
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Cùm opera justi condigné mereantur vitam aeternam, tanquam aequalem mercedem, & praemium: non opus est interventu alterius meriti condigni, quale est meritum Christi, ut eis reddatur vita aeterna. quinimo aliquid habet peculiare meritum cujuscunque justi respectu ipsius hominis justi, quod non habet meritum Christi: nempe reddere ipsum hominem justum, & dignum aeternâ vitâ, ut eam digné consequatur. meritum autem Christi licè• dignissimum sit, quod obtine at á Deo gloriam pro nobis; tamen non habet hanc efficaciam & virtutem, ut reddat nos formaliter justos, & dignos aeternâ vitâ: sed per virtutem ab ipso derivatam hunc consequuntur effectum homines in seipsis. Et ita nunquam petimus á Deo per merita Christi, ut nostris dignis operibus & meritorijs reddatur merces aeternae vitae: sed ut per Christum detur nobis gratia, quâ possimus digné hanc mercedem promereri. Id. ibid. disput. 222. cap. 3. num. 30.31.