Chapter 3
pp. 44–134134 passagespart 4 of 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
And in another way than that of generation, how will any go about to make a soul? Let experience and the making of trial convince the undertakers. By what power, or by what art will they make a reasonable soul spring up out of nothing?
It might be hoped that thus, without disputing the possibility of an eternal successive production of souls, this shift may appear vain. But if any will persist and say that how or in what way soever they are produced; 'Tis strange if they need any nobler cause than themselves; for may not any living thing well enough be thought capable of producing another of the same kind? or no more than equal perfection with it self? To this we say, besides that no one living thing is the only cause of another such. Yet if that were admitted possible what will it avail? For hath every soul that hath ever existed or been in being been produced in this way by another? This it were ridiculous to say; for if every one were so produced, there was then some one before every one. Inasmuch as that which produces must surely have been before that which is produced by it. But how can every one have one before it? A manifest contradiction in the very terms! For then there will be one ⟨p. 129⟩without the compass of every one, And how is it then said to be every one? There is then it seems one, besides or more than all. And so all is not all. And if this be thought a sophism, let the matter be soberly considered thus. The soul of man is either a thing of that nature universally (and consequently every individual soul) as that it doth exist of it self necessarily and independently, or not? If it be. Then we have however a wise intelligent being necessarily existing. The thing we have been proving all this while. Yet this concession we will not accept, for though it is most certain there is such a being, we have also proved the humane soul is not it. Whence it is evidently a dependent being in its own nature that could never have been of it self, had it not been put into being by somewhat else. And being so in its own nature, it must be thus with every one that partakes of this nature. And consequently it must be somewhat of another nature that did put the souls of men into being. Otherwise the whole stock and lineage of humane souls is said to have been dependent on a productive cause, and yet had nothing whereon to depend, And so is both caused by another, and not caused. And therefore since it is hereby evident it was somewhat else, and of another nature, than an humane soul by which all humane souls were produced into being.
It might be hoped that thus, without disputing the possibility of an eternal successive production of souls, this shift may appear vain. But if any will persist and say that how or in what way soever they are produc'd; 'Tis strange if they need any nobler cause than themselves; for may not any living thing well enough be thought capable of producing another of the same kind? or no more than equal perfection with it self? To this we say, besides that no one living thing is the only cause of another such. Yet if that were admitted possible what will it avail? For hath every soul that hath ever existed or been in being been produced in this way by another? This it were ridiculous to say; for if every one were so produced, there was then some one before every one. Inasmuch as that which produces must surely have been before that which is produced by it. But how can every one have one before it? A manifest contradiction in the very terms! For then there will be one
We again say, that distinct Being either was a dependent caused Being, or not. If not, it being proved that the soul of man cannot but have had an intelligent ⟨p. 130⟩or wise cause, we have now what we seek. An independent necessary intelligent Being. If it do depend, or any will be so idle to say so. That however will infallibly and very speedily lead us to the same mark. For though some have been pleased to dream of an infinite succession of individuals of this or that kind; I suppose we have no dream as yet ready formed to come under confutation of infinite kinds or orders of beings gradually superior, one above another; the inferior still depending on the superior, and all upon nothing.
We again say, that distinct Being either was a dependent caused Being, or not. If not, it being proved that the soul of man cannot but have had an intelligent ⟨p. 130⟩or wise cause, we have now what we seek. An independent necessary intelligent Being. If it do depend, or any will be so idle to say so. That however will infallibly and very speedily lead us to the same mark. For though some have been pleased to dream of an infinite succession of individuals of this or that kind; I suppose we have no dream as yet ready formed to come under confutation of infinite kinds or orders of beings gradually superiour, one above another; the inferiour still depending on the superiour, and all upon nothing.
And therefore I conceive we may fairly take leave of this argument from the humane soul, as having gained from it sufficient evidence of the existence of a necessary Being that is intelligent and designingly active, being guided by wisdom and counsel in what it doth.
We might also, if it were needful further argue the same thing from a power or ability manifestly superior to, and that exceeds the utmost perfection of humane nature, viz. that of Prophecy, or the prediction of future contingencies; yea, and from another that exceeds the whole sphere of all created nature, and which crosses and countermands the known and stated laws thereof, viz. that of working miracles; both of them exercised with manifest design; as might evidently be made appear, by manifold instances, to as many, as can believe any thing to be true; more than what they have seen with their own eyes. And that do not take present sense (yea and their own ⟨p. 131⟩only) to be the alone measure of all reality. But it is not necessary we insist upon every thing that may be said; so that enough be said to serve our present purpose.
We might also, if it were needful further argue the same thing from a power or ability manifestly superiour to, and that exceeds the utmost perfection of humane nature, viz. that of Prophesie, or the prediction of future contingencies; yea, and from another that exceeds the whole sphere of all created nature, and which crosses and countermands the known and stated laws thereof, viz. that of working miracles; both of them exercised with manifest design; as might evidently be made appear, by manifold instances, to as many, as can believe any thing to be true; more than what they have seen with their own eyes. And that do not take present sense (yea and their own ⟨p. 131⟩only) to be the alone measure of all reality. But it is not necessary we insist upon every thing that may be said; so that enough be said to serve our present purpose.
And that our purpose may yet be more fully served; and such a Being evidenced to exist as 1we may with satisfaction esteem to merit a Temple with us, and the Religion of it; it is necessary that we add somewhat concerning
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9. The Divine Goodness; for unto that eternal Being, whose existence we have hitherto asserted, Goodness also cannot but appertain together with those his other Attributes we have spoken of.
It is not needful here to be curious about the usual scholastical notions of Goodness, or what it imports, as it is wont to be attributed to Being in the general, what, as it belongs, in a peculiar sense, to intellectual Beings, or what more special import it may have in reference to this.
That which we at present chiefly intend by it is a propension to do good with delight; or most freely without other inducement, than the agreeableness of it to his nature who doth it; and a certain delectation and complacency, which, hence, is taken in so doing. The name of Goodness (though thus it more peculiarly signify the particular virtue of liberality) is of a significancy large enough, even in the moral acceptation, to comprehend all other perfections or virtues, that belong to, or may any way commend the will of a free Agent. These ⟨p. 132⟩therefore we exclude not; and particularly whatsoever is wont to be signified (as attributable unto God) by the names of Holiness [as a steady inclination unto what is intellectually pure, and comely, with an aversion to the contrary] Justice as that signifies [an inclination to deal equally] which is included in the former, yet as more expressly denoting what is more proper to a Governor over others, viz. [a resolution not to let the transgression of laws made for the preservation of common order, pass without due animadversion and punishment:] Truth, whose signification also may be wholly contained under those former more general terms, but more directly contains [sincerity, unaptness to deceive, and constancy to ones word.] For these may properly be styled good things in a moral sense. As many other things might in another notion of goodness, which it belongs not to our present design to make mention of. But these are mentioned as more directly tending to represent to us an amiable object of Religion. And are referred hither, as they fitly enough may, out of an unwillingness to multiply without necessity, particular heads or subjects of discourse.
That which we at present chiefly intend by it is a propension to do good with delight; or most freely without other inducement, than the agreeableness of it to his nature who doth it; and a certain delectation and complacency, which, hence, is taken in so doing. The name of Goodness (though thus it more peculiarly signifie the particular virtue of liberality) is of a significancy large enough, even in the moral acceptation, to comprehend all other perfections or vertues, that belong to, or may any way commend the will of a free Agent. These ⟨p. 132⟩therefore we exclude not; and particularly whatsoever is wont to be signified (as attributable unto God) by the names of Holiness [as a steady inclination unto what is intellectually pure, and comely, with an aversion to the contrary] Justice as that signifies [an inclination to deal equally] which is included in the former, yet as more expresly denoting what is more proper to a Governour over others, viz. [a resolution not to let the transgression of laws made for the preservation of common order, pass without due animadversion and punishment:] Truth, whose signification also may be wholly contained under those former more general terms, but more directly contains [sincerity, unaptness to deceive, and constancy to ones word.] For these may properly be stiled good things in a moral sense. As many other things might in another notion of goodness, which it belongs not to our present design to make mention of. But these are mentioned as more directly tending to represent to us an amiable object of Religion. And are referr'd hither, as they fitly enough may, out of an unwillingness to multiply without necessity, particular heads or subjects of discourse.
In the mean time, as was said, what we principally intend, is, That the Being whose existence we have been endeavouring to evince is good, as that imports a ready inclination of will to communicate unto others what may be good to them; creating first its own object, and then issuing forth to it in acts of free beneficence, ⟨p. 133⟩suitable to the nature of every thing created by it. Which though it be the primary or first thing carried in the notion of this goodness. Yet because that inclination is not otherwise good, than as it consists with holiness, justice and Truth; These therefore may be esteemed secondarily, at least, to belong to it, as inseparable qualifications thereof.
In the mean time, as was said, what we principally intend, is, That the Being whose existence we have been endeavouring to evince is good, as that imports a ready inclination of will to communicate unto others what may be good to them; creating first its own object, and then issuing forth to it in acts of free beneficence, ⟨p. 133⟩sutable to the nature of every thing created by it. Which though it be the primary or first thing carried in the notion of this goodness. Yet because that inclination is not otherwise good, than as it consists with holiness, justice and Truth; These therefore may be esteemed secondarily, at least, to belong to it, as inseparable qualifications thereof.
Wherefore it is not a merely natural, and necessary emanation we here intend, that prevents any act or exercise of counsel or design; which would no way consist with the liberty of the Divine will: And would make the Deity as well a necessary Agent, as a necessary Being; Yea, and would therefore make all the creatures merely natural and necessary emanations; and so destroy the distinction of necessary and contingent Beings. And, by consequence, bid fair to the making all things God. It would infer not only the eternity of the world, but would seem to infer either the absolute infinity of it, or the perfection of it, and of every creature in it, to that degree, as that nothing could be more perfect in its own kind than it is; or would infer the finiteness of the Divine Being. For it would make what he hath done the adequate measure of what he can do. And would make all his administrations necessary, yea, and all the actions of men, and consequently take away all Law and Government out of the world, and all measures of right and wrong, and make all punitive justice barbarous cruelty. And consequently give us a notion of goodness ⟨p. 134⟩at length plainly inconsistent with it self.
Wherefore it is not a meerly natural, and necessary emanation we here intend, that prevents any act or exercise of counsel or design; which would no way consist with the liberty of the Divine will: And would make the Deity as well a necessary Agent, as a necessary Being; Yea, and would therefore make all the creatures meerly natural and necessary emanations; and so destroy the distinction of necessary and contingent Beings. And, by consequence, bid fair to the making all things God. It would infer not only the eternity of the world, but would seem to infer either the absolute infinity of it, or the perfection of it, and of every creature in it, to that degree, as that nothing could be more perfect in its own kind than it is; or would infer the finiteness of the Divine Being. For it would make what he hath done the adequate measure of what he can do. And would make all his administrations necessary, yea, and all the actions of men, and consequently take away all Law and Government out of the world, and all measures of right and wrong, and make all punitive justice barbarous cruelty. And consequently give us a notion of goodness ⟨p. 134⟩at length plainly inconsistent with it self.
All this is provided against by our having first asserted the Wisdom of that Being, whereunto we also attribute goodness. Which guides all the issues of it according to those measures or rules which the essential rectitude of the Divine will gives, or rather is, unto it. Whereby also a foundation is laid of answering such cavils against the Divine Goodness, as they are apt to raise to themselves, who are wont to magnify this attribute to the suppression of others. Which is indeed, in the end, to magnify it to nothing.
All this is provided against by our having first asserted the Wisdom of that Being, whereunto we also attribute goodness. Which guides all the issues of it according to those measures or rules which the essential rectitude of the Divine will gives, or rather is, unto it. Whereby also a foundation is laid of answering such cavils against the Divine Goodness, as they are apt to raise to themselves, who are wont to magnifie this attribute to the suppression of others. Which is indeed, in the end, to magnifie it to nothing.
And such goodness needs no other demonstration than the visible instances and effects we have of it, in the creation and conservation of this world; and particularly, in his large munificent bounty and kindness towards man, whereof his designing him for his Temple, and residence, will be a full and manifest proof.
And of all this, his own self-sufficient fullness leaves it impossible to us to imagine another reason, than the delight he takes in dispensing his own free and large communications. Besides, that when we see some semblances and imitations of this goodness▪ in the natures of some men, which we are sure are not nothing, they must needs proceed from something, and have some fountain and original, which can be no other than the common cause and Author of all things. In whom, therefore, this goodness doth firstly and most perfectly reside.
And of all this, his own self-sufficient fulness leaves it impossible to us to imagine another reason, than the delight he takes in dispensing his own free and large communications. Besides, that when we see some semblances and imitations of this goodness▪ in the natures of some men, which we are sure are not nothing, they must needs proceed from something, and have some fountain and original, which can be no other than the common cause and Author of all things. In whom, therefore, this goodness doth firstly and most perfectly reside.