Chapter 5
pp. 180–22677 passagespart 2 of 2
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And if we will yet descend to a more particular enquiry into this matter, which way will we fully be ascertained that this supposed man is truly and really what he seems to be. This we know not how to go about without recollecting, what is the differencing notion we have of a man that he is (viz.) a reasonable living creature, or a reasonable soul inhabiting, and united with a body. And how do we think to descry that, here, which may answer this common notion we have of a man? Have we any way, besides that discovery, which the acts and effects of reason do make of a rational or intelligent Being? We will look more narrowly, i. e. unto somewhat else than his external appearance: and observe the actions that proceed from a more distinguishing principle in him; that he reason's, discourse's, doth business, pursues designs; in short he talks and acts as a reasonable creature. And hence we conclude him to be one, or to have a reasonable soul in him.
And if we will yet descend to a more particular enquiry into this matter, which way will we fully be ascertain'd that this supposed man is truly and really what he seems to be. This we know not how to go about without recollecting, what is the differencing notion we have of a man that he is (viz.) a reasonable living creature, or a reasonable soul inhabiting, and united with a body. And how do we think to descry that, here, which may answer this common notion we have of a man? Have we any way, besides that discovery, which the acts and effects of reason do make of a rational or intelligent Being? We will look more narrowly, i. e. unto somewhat else than his external appearance: and observe the actions that proceed from a more distinguishing principle in him; that he reason's, discourse's, doth business, pursues designs; in short he talks and acts as a reasonable creature. And hence we conclude him to be one, or to have a reasonable soul in him.
And have we not the same way of procedure in the other case. Our first view, or taking notice of a world, full of life and motion, assures us of an eternal active Being, besides it; which we take to be God, having now before our eyes a darker shadow of him; only, as the external bulk of the humane body is only the shadow of a man. Which, when we behold it stirring and moving, assures us there is somewhat ⟨p. 206⟩besides that grosser bulk (that of it self could not so move) which we take to be the soul of a man. Yet as a principle that can move the body makes not up the entire notion of this soul; so an eternal active Being, that moves the matter of the universe, makes not up the full notion of God. We are thus far sure in both cases, i. e. of some mover distinct from what is moved. But we are not yet sure (by what we hitherto see) what the one or the other is. But as, when we have, upon the first sight, thought it was a reasonable soul that was acting in the former: or a man (if we will speak according to their sense, who make the soul the man) in order to being sure (as sure as the case can admit) we have no other way, but to consider what belongs, more distinguishingly, to the notion of a man, or of a reasonable soul; and observe how actions and effects, which we have opportunity to take notice of, do answer thereto, or serve to discover that. So when we would be sure, what that eternal active Being is (which that it is we are already sure, and) which we have taken to be God, That I say we may be sure of that also, we have the same thing to do.
That is to consider what more peculiarly belongs to the entire notion of God (and would even in the judgment of opposers be acknowledged to belong to it) and see whether his works more narrowly inspected do not bear as manifest correspondency to that notion of God, as the works and actions of a man do to the ⟨p. 207⟩notion we have of him. And certainly, we cannot but find they do correspond as much. And that upon a serious and considerate view of the works and appearances of God in the world, having diligently observed, and pondered the vastness and beauty of this universe, the variety, the multitude, the order, the exquisite shapes, the numerous parts, the admirable and useful composure of particular creatures; and, especially, the constitution and powers of the reasonable soul of man it self, we cannot, surely, if we be not under the possession of a very voluntary and obstinate blindness, and the power of a most vicious prejudice, but acknowledge the making sustaining and governing such a world is as God-like, as worthy of God, and as much becoming him, according to the notion that hath been assigned of him, as at least, the common actions of ordinary men are of a man; or evidence the doer of them to be an humane creature. Yea, and with this advantageous difference, that the actions of a man do evidence an humane creature more uncertainly, and so as it is possible the matter may be otherwise: But these works of God do with so plain and demonstrative evidence discover him the Author of them, that its altogether impossible they could ever otherwise have been done.
Now, therefore, if we have as clear evidence of a Deity as we can have in a way not unsuitable to the nature and present state of man, and we can have in a suitable way that which is sufficient.
Now, therefore, if we have as clear evidence of a Deity as we can have in a way not unsutable to the nature and present state of man, and we can have in a sutable way that which is sufficient.
If we have clear and more certain evidence of Gods government over the world, than most men have or can have of the existence of their Secular Rulers; yea, more sure than that there are men on earth, and that thence (as far as the existence of God will make towards it) there is a less disputable ground for Religious than for Civil Conversation, we may reckon our selves competently well ascertained, and have no longer reason to delay the Dedication of a Temple to him upon any pretence of doubt, whether we have an object of worship existing yea or no.
If we have clear and more certain evidence of Gods government over the world, than most men have or can have of the existence of their Secular Rulers; yea, more sure than that there are men on earth, and that thence (as far as the existence of God will make towards it) there is a less disputable ground for Religious than for Civil Conversation, we may reckon our selves competently well ascertain'd, and have no longer reason to delay the Dedication of a Temple to him upon any pretence of doubt, whether we have an object of worship existing yea or no.
Wherefore we may also by the way take notice how impudent a thing is Atheism, that by the same fulsome and poisonous breath, whereby it would blast Religion, would despoil man of his reason and apprehensive power, even in reference to the most apprehensive thing, would blow away the rights of Princes and all foundations of Policy and Government, and destroy all civil Commerce and Conversation out of the world, and yet blushes not at the attempt of so foul things.
Wherefore we may also by the way take notice how impudent a thing is Atheism, that by the same fulsom and poisonous breath, whereby it would blast Religion, would despoil man of his reason and apprehensive power, even in reference to the most apprehensive thing, would blow away the rights of Princes and all foundations of Policy and Government, and destroy all civil Commerce and Conversation out of the world, and yet blushes not at the attempt of so foul things.
And here it may perhaps prove worth our 1while (though it can be no pleasant contemplation) to pause a little, and make some short reflections upon the Atheistical Temper and Genius, so as therein to remark some few more obvious characters of Atheism it self.
- 1VIII.
And first such, as have not been themselves seized by the infatuation, cannot but judge it a most unreasonable thing, a perverse and cross-grained ⟨p. 209⟩humour, that so oddly writhes and warps the mind of a man, as that it never makes any effort, or offer at any thing against the Deity, but it therein doth (by a certain sort of serpentine involution and retortion) seem to design a quarrel with it self: That is, with (what one would think should be most intimate and natural to the mind of man) his very reasoning power, and the operations thereof. So near indeed was the ancient alliance between God and man (his own Son, his likeness, and living image) and consequently between Reason and Religion; that no man can ever be engaged in an opposition to God and his interest, but he must be equally so to himself and his own. And any one that takes notice how the business is carried by an Atheist, must think in order to his becoming one, his first plot was upon himself. To assassin his own intellectual faculty by a sturdy resolution, and violent imposing on himself not to consider, or use his thoughts, at least with any indifferency, but with a treacherous pre-determination to the part resolved on beforehand. Otherwise it is hard to be imagined, how it should ever have been possible, that so plain and evident proofs of a Deity, as every where offer themselves unto observation; even such as have been here proposed (that do even lie open for the most part to common apprehension, and needed little search to find them out; so that it was harder to determine what not to say than what to say) could be over-looked.
And first such, as have not been themselves seized by the infatuation, cannot but judge it a most unreasonable thing, a perverse and crossgrain'd ⟨p. 209⟩humour, that so odly writhes and warps the mind of a man, as that it never makes any effort, or offer at any thing against the Deity, but it therein doth (by a certain sort of serpentine involution and retortion) seem to design a quarrel with it self: That is, with (what one would think should be most intimate and natural to the mind of man) his very reasoning power, and the operations thereof. So near indeeed was the ancient alliance between God and man (his own Son, his likeness, and living image) and consequently between Reason and Religion; that no man can ever be engaged in an opposition to God and his interest, but he must be equally so to himself and his own. And any one that takes notice how the business is carried by an Atheist, must think in order to his becoming one, his first plot was upon himself. To assassine his own intellectual faculty by a sturdy resolution, and violent imposing on himself not to consider, or use his thoughts, at least with any indifferency, but with a treacherous pre-determination to the part resolved on beforehand. Otherwise it is hard to be imagined, how it should ever have been possible, that so plain and evident proofs of a Deity, as every where offer themselves unto observation; even such as have been here proposed (that do even lie open for the most part to common apprehension, and needed little search to find them out; so that it was harder to determine what not to say than what to say) could be over-look'd.
For what could be more easy and obvious, than, taking notice, that there is somewhat in Being, to conclude that somewhat must be of it self, from whence, whatever is not so, must have sprung. That since there is somewhat effected or made (as is plain, in that some things are alterable, and daily altered which nothing can be that is of it self, and therefore a necessary Being.) Those effects have then had an active being for their cause. That since these effects are, partly, such as bear the manifest characters of wisdom and design upon them; and are partly, themselves, wise and designing; therefore they must have had a wisely active and designing cause. So much would plainly conclude the sum of what we have been pleading for; and what can be plainer or doth require a shorter turn of thoughts? At this easy expense might any one that had a disposition to use his understanding to such a purpose, save himself from being an Atheist. And where is the flaw? what Joint is not firm and strong in this little frame of discourse? which, yet, arrogates nothing to the contriver; for there is nothing in it worthy to be called contrivance: But things do themselves lie thus. And what hath been further said concerning the Perfection and Oneness of this Cause of all things (though somewhat more remote from common apprehension) is what is likely would appear plain and natural to such as would allow themselves the leisure to look more narrowly into such things.
For what could be more easie and obvious, than, taking notice, that there is somewhat in Being, to conclude that somewhat must be of it self, from whence, whatever is not so, must have sprung. That since there is somewhat effected or made (as is plain, in that some things are alterable, and daily altered which nothing can be that is of it self, and therefore a necessary Being.) Those effects have then had an active being for their cause. That since these effects are, partly, such as bear the manifest characters of wisdom and design upon them; and are partly, themselves, wise and designing; therefore they must have had a wisely active and designing cause. So much would plainly conclude the sum of what we have been pleading for; and what can be plainer or doth require a shorter turn of thoughts? At this easie expence might any one that had a disposition to use his understanding to such a purpose, save himself from being an Atheist. And where is the flaw? what Joynt is not firm and strong in this little frame of discourse? which, yet, arrogates nothing to the contriver; for there is nothing in it worthy to be called contrivance: But things do themselves lie thus. And what hath been further said concerning the Perfection and Oneness of this Cause of all things (though somewhat more remote from common apprehension) is what is likely would appear plain and natural to such as would allow themselves the leasure to look more narrowly into such things.
Atheism, therefore, seems to import a direct and open hostility, against the most native genuine and facile dictates of common Reason.
And being so manifest an enemy to it, we cannot suppose it should be at all befriended by it. For that will be always true and constant to it self. Whatsoever false shows of it a bad cause doth sometimes put on. That having yet somewhat a more creditable name, and being of a little more reputation in the world, than plain downright madness and folly. And it will appear how little it is befriended, by any thing that can justly, bear that name; if we consider the pitiful shifts the Atheist makes for his forlorn cause: And what infirm tottering supports, the whole frame of Atheism rests upon. For what is there to be said for their hypothesis, or against the existence of God, and the duness of Religion?
And being so manifest an enemy to it, we cannot suppose it should be at all befriended by it. For that will be always true and constant to it self. Whatsoever false shews of it a bad cause doth sometimes put on. That having yet somewhat a more creditable name, and being of a little more reputation in the world, than plain downright madness and folly. And it will appear how little it is befriended, by any thing that can justly, bear that name; if we consider the pittiful shifts the Atheist makes for his forlorn cause: And what infirm tottering supports, the whole frame of Atheism rests upon. For what is there to be said for their hypothesis, or against the existence of God, and the duness of Religion?
For there's directly nothing at all. Only a possibility is alleged, things might be as they are, though God did not exist. And if this were barely possible, how little doth that signify? where Reason is not injuriously dealt with, it is permitted the liberty of balancing things equally, and of considering which scale hath most weight. And is he not perfectly blind, that sees not what violence is done to free reason in this matter? Are there not thousands of things, not altogether impossible, which yet he would be concluded altogether out of his wits that should profess to be of the opinion they are or were actually so? And as to the ⟨p. 212⟩present case, how facile and unexceptionable, how plain and intelligible is the account that is given of the original of this world, and the things contained in it, by resolving all into a Deity, the Author and maker of them? when as the wild, extravagant suppositions of Atheists, if they were admitted possible, are the most unlikely that could be devised. So that, if there had been any to have laid wagers, when things were taking their beginning; there is no body that would not have ventured thousands to one that no such frame of things (no not so much as one single Mouse or Flea) would ever have hit. And how desperate hazards the Atheist runs upon this mere supposed possibility, it will be more in our way to take notice by and by.
For there's directly nothing at all. Only a possibility is alledged, things might be as they are, though God did not exist. And if this were barely possible, how little doth that signifie? where Reason is not injuriously dealt with, it is permitted the liberty of ballancing things equally, and of considering which scale hath most weight. And is he not perfectly blind, that sees not what violence is done to free reason in this matter? Are there not thousands of things, not altogether impossible, which yet he would be concluded altogether out of his wits that should profess to be of the opinion they are or were actually so? And as to the ⟨p. 212⟩present case, how facile and unexceptionable, how plain and intelligible is the account that is given of the original of this world, and the things contained in it, by resolving all into a Deity, the Author and maker of them? when as the wild, extravagant suppositions of Atheists, if they were admitted possible, are the most unlikely that could be devised. So that, if there had been any to have laid wagers, when things were taking their beginning; there is no body that would not have ventured thousands to one that no such frame of things (no not so much as one single Mouse or Flea) would ever have hit. And how desperate hazards the Atheist runs upon this meer supposed possibility, it will be more in our way to take notice by and by.
But besides; That pretended possibility plainly appears none at all. It is impossible any thing should spring up of it self out of nothing. That any thing that is alterable should have been necessarily of it self, such as it now is. That what is of it self unactive should be the maker of other things. That the Author of all the Wisdom in the world should be himself unwise. These cannot but be judged most absolute impossibilities to such as do not violence to their own minds; or with whom Reason can be allowed any the least exercise. Wherefore the Atheistical spirit is most grossly unreasonable in withholding assent, where the most ungainsayable Reason plainly exacts it.
But besides; That pretended possibility plainly appears none at all. It is impossible any thing should spring up of it self out of nothing. That any thing that is alterable should have been necessarily of it self, such as it now is. That what is of it self unactive should be the maker of other things. That the Author of all the Wisdom in the world should be himself unwise. These cannot but be judged most absolute impossibilities to such as do not violence to their own minds; or with whom Reason can be allow'd any the least exercise. Wherefore the Atheistical spirit is most grosly unreasonable in withholding assent, where the most ungainsayable Reason plainly exacts it.
And are not the Atheists Cavils as despicably silly against the Deity, and (consequently) Religion? Whosoever shall consider their exceptions against some things in the notion of God, eternity, infinity, &c. which themselves in the mean time are forced to place elsewhere, will he not see they talk idly? And as for such other impeachments of his Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness, as they take their ground for from the state of affairs, in some respects, in this present world (many of which may be seen in Lucretius, and answered by Dr. More in his Dialogues.) How inconsiderable will they be, to any one that bethinks himself with how perfect and generous a liberty this world was made, by one that needed it not; who had no design, nor could have inclination, to a fond self-indulgent glorying, and vaunting of his own work; who did it with the greatest facility, and by an easy unexpensive vouchsafement of his good pleasure; not with an operous curiosity, studious to approve it self to the peevish eye of every froward Momus, or to the nauseous squeamish gust of every sensual Epicure. And to such as shall not confine their mean thoughts to that very clod or ball of earth on which they live. Which, as it is a very small part, may, for ought we know, but be the worst or most abject part of Gods Creation, which yet is full of his Goodness, and hath most manifest prints of his other excellencies besides; as hath been observed. Or, that shall not look upon the present state of things ⟨p. 214⟩as the eternal state, but upon this world only as an antechamber to another, which shall abide in most unexceptionable perfection for ever.
And are not the Atheists Cavils as despicably silly against the Deity, and (consequently) Religion? Whosoever shall consider their exceptions against some things in the notion of God, eternity, infinity, &c. which themselves in the mean time are forced to place elsewhere, will he not see they talk idly? And as for such other impeachments of his Wisdom, Justice, and Goodness, as they take their ground for from the state of affairs, in some respects, in this present world (many of which may be seen in Lucretius, and answered by Dr. More in his Dialogues.) How inconsiderable will they be, to any one that bethinks himself with how perfect and generous a liberty this world was made, by one that needed it not; who had no design, nor could have inclination, to a fond self-indulgent glorying, and vaunting of his own work; who did it with the greatest facility, and by an easie unexpensive vouchsafement of his good pleasure; not with an operous curiosity, studious to approve it self to the peevish eye of every froward Momus, or to the nauseous squeamish gust of every sensual Epicure. And to such as shall not confine their mean thoughts to that very clod or ball of earth on which they live. Which, as it is a very small part, may, for ought we know, but be the worst or most abject part of Gods Creation, which yet is full of his Goodness, and hath most manifest prints of his other excellencies besides; as hath been observed. Or, that shall not look upon the present state of things
How fond and idle, I say, will all such cavils appear to one that shall but thus use his thoughts, and not think himself bound to measure his conceptions of God, by the uncertain rash dictates of men born in the dark, and that talk at random: Nor shall affix any thing to him which plain Reason doth not dictate, or which he doth not manifestly assume or challenge to himself. But that because a straw lies in my way, I would attempt to overturn heaven and earth, what raging frenzy is this?
How fond and idle, I say, will all such cavils appear to one that shall but thus use his thoughts, and not think himself bound to measure his conceptions of God, by the uncertain rash dictates of men born in the dark, and that talk at random: Nor shall affix any thing to him which plain Reason doth not dictate, or which he doth not manifestly assume or challenge to himself. But that because a straw lies in my way, I would attempt to overturn heaven and earth, what raging phrensie is this?
Again it is a base abject temper, speaks a mind sunk and lost in carnality, and that having dethroned and abjured Reason, hath abandoned it self to the hurry of vile appetite, and sold its liberty, and sovereignty, for the insipid gustless pleasures of sense: An unmanly thing. A degrading of ones self. For if there be no God, what am I? A piece of moving thinking clay, whose ill compacted parts will shortly fly asunder, and leave no other remains of me, than what shall become the prey and the triumph of worms!
Again it is a base abject temper, speaks a mind sunk and lost in carnality, and that having dethron'd and abjur'd Reason, hath abandon'd it self to the hurry of vile appetite, and sold its liberty, and sovereignty, for the insipid gustless pleasures of sense: An unmanly thing. A degrading of ones self. For if there be no God, what am I? A piece of moving thinking clay, whose ill compacted parts will shortly fly asunder, and leave no other remains of me, than what shall become the prey and the triumph of worms!
'Tis a sad, mopish, disconsolate Temper, Cuts off, and quite banishes all manly rational joy. All that might spring from the contemplation of the Divine Excellencies and Glory, shining in the works of his hands. Atheism clothes the world in black, draws a ⟨p. 215⟩dark and duskish cloud over all things. Doth more to damp and stifle all relishes of intellectual pleasure, than it would of sensible, to extinguish the Sun. What is this world (if we should suppose it still to subsist) without God? How grateful an entertainment is it to a pious mind to behold his glory stamped on every creature sparkling in every providence; and by a firm and rational Faith to believe (when we cannot see) how all events are conspiring to bring about the most happy and blissful state of things! The Atheist may make the most of this world; he knows no pleasure, but what can be drawn out of its dry breasts, or found in its cold embraces: Which yields as little satisfaction, as he finds whose arms aiming to enclose a dear friend do only clasp a stiff and clammy carcass. How uncomfortable a thing is it to him, that having neither power nor wit to order things to his own advantage or content, but finds himself liable to continual disappointments, and the rencounter of many an unsuspected cross accident, hath none to repose on that is wiser and mightier than himself? But when he finds he cannot command his own affairs, to have the settled apprehension of an Almighty Ruler that can with the greatest certainty do it for us, the best way; and will, if we trust him: How satisfying and peaceful a repose doth this yield! And how much the rather, inasmuch as that filial unsuspicious confidence and trust, which naturally tends to and begets that calm and quiet rest, ⟨p. 216⟩is the very condition required on my part; and that the chief thing I have to do, to have my affairs brought to a good pass, is to commit them to his management. And my only care to be careful in nothing. The Atheist hath nothing to mitigate the greatness of this loss, but that he knows not what he loses, which is an allay that will serve but a little while. And when the most unsupportable pressing miseries befall him, he must in bitter agonies groan out his wretched soul, without hope; and sooner die under his burden, than say, Where is God my Maker?
'Tis a sad, mopish, disconsolate Temper, Cuts off, and quite banishes all manly rational joy. All that might spring from the contemplation of the Divine Excellencies and Glory, shining in the works of his hands. Atheism clothes the world in black, draws a
At the best, he exchanges all the pleasure, and composure of mind, which certainly accompanies a dutiful son-like trust, submission and resignation of our selves, and all our concernments, to the disposal of fatherly wisdom and love, for a sour and sullen succumbency to an irresistible fate, or hard necessity, against which he sees it's vain to contend. So that at the best he only not rages, but tastes nothing of consolation; whereof his spirit is as uncapable, as his desperate affairs are of redress. And if he have arrived to that measure of fortitude, as not to be much discomposed with the lighter crosses which he meets with in this short time of life, what a dreadful cross is it that he must die! How dismal a thing is a certain never to be avoided death! Against which as Atheism hath not, surely, the advantage of Religion in giving protection: So it hath greatly the disadvantage, in affording no relief. What would the ⟨p. 217⟩joy be worth in that hour, that arises from the hope of the glory to be revealed? And is the want of that the total sum of the Atheists misery at this hour? What heart can conceive the horror of that one thought if darted in upon him at that time (as 'tis strange, and more sad, if it be not) what becomes now of me, if there prove to be a God! where are my mighty demonstrations upon which one may venture? and which may cut off all fear and danger of future calamity in this dark unknown state I am going into? shall I be the next hour nothing or miserable? Or, if I had opportunity, shall I not have sufficient cause to proclaim (as *once one of the same fraternity did, by way of warning, to a surviving companion)—A Great and a Terrible God! a Great and a Terrible God! A Great and a Terrible God!
At the best, he exchanges all the pleasure, and composure of mind, which certainly accompanies a dutiful son-like trust, submission and resignation of our selves, and all our concernments, to the disposal of fatherly wisdom and love, for a sour and sullen succumbency to an irresistable fate, or hard necessity, against which he sees it's vain to contend. So that at the best he only not rages, but tastes nothing of consolation; whereof his spirit is as uncapable, as his desperate affairs are of redress. And if he have arrived to that measure of fortitude, as not to be much discomposed with the lighter crosses which he meets with in this short time of life, what a dreadful cross is it that he must die! How dismal a thing is a certain never to be avoided death! Against which as Atheism hath not, surely, the advantage of Religion in giving protection: So it hath greatly the disadvantage, in affording no relief. What would the
I only add, 'Tis a most strangely mysterious and unaccountable Temper. Such as is hardly reducible to its proper causes. So that it would puzzle any mans enquiry to find out, or even give but probable conjectures how so odd and preternatural a disaffection as Atheism should ever come to have place in an humane mind.
It must be concluded a very complicated disease, and yet when our thoughts have fastened upon several things that have an aspect that way as none of them alone could infer it, so it is hard to imagine, how all of them, together, should ever come to deprave reasonable nature to such a degree.
It must be concluded a very complicated disease, and yet when our thoughts have fastned upon several things that have an aspect that way as none of them alone could infer it, so it is hard to imagine, how all of them, together, should ever come to deprave reasonable nature to such a degree.
'Tis, first, most astonishingly marvellous (though it's apparent this distemper hath its rise from an ill will) that any man should so much as will, that which the Atheist hath obtained of himself to believe, or affect to be what he is.
The commonness of this vile disposition of will, doth but sorrily shift off the wonder, and only with those slight and trifling minds that have resigned the office of judging things to their (more active) senses, and have learned the easy way of waving all enquiries about common things, or resolving the account into this only, that they are to be seen every day. But if we allowed our selves to consider this matter soberly, we would soon find that howsoever it most plainly appear a very common plague upon the spirits of men (and universal till a cure be wrought) to say by way of wish, No God, or I would there were none: Yet by the good leave of them who would thus easily excuse the thing, the commonness of this horrid evil doth so little diminish, that it increases the wonder. Things are more strange as their causes are more hardly assignable. What should the reason be, that a Being of so incomparable ⟨p. 219⟩excellency, so amiable and alluring glory, purity, love, and goodness is become undesirable and hateful to his own creatures! That such creatures, his more immediate peculiar off-spring, stamped with his likeness, the so vivid resemblances of his own spiritual immortal nature, are become so wickedly unnatural towards their common and most indulgent Parent! what to wish him dead! to envy life and being, to him from whom they have received their own! 'Tis strange as it is without a cause. But they have offended him, are in a revolt, and sharply conscious of fearful demerits. And who would not wish to live? and to escape so unsupportable revenge? 'Tis still strange we would ever offend such a one! Wherein were his Laws unequal? his Government grievous? But since we have; this only is pertinent to be said by them that have no hope of forgiveness, that are left to despair of reconciliation, why do we sort our selves with Devils? We profess not to be such.
The commonness of this vile disposition of will, doth but sorrily shift off the wonder, and only with those slight and trifling minds that have resigned the office of judging things to their (more active) senses, and have learned the easie way of waving all enquiries about common things, or resolving the account into this only, that they are to be seen every day. But if we allow'd our selves to consider this matter soberly, we would soon find that howsoever it most plainly appear a very common plague upon the spirits of men (and universal till a cure be wrought) to say by way of wish, No God, or I would there were none: Yet by the good leave of them who would thus easily excuse the thing, the commonness of this horrid evil doth so little diminish, that it increases the wonder. Things are more strange as their causes are more hardly assignable. What should the reason be, that a Being of so incomparable
Yea, but we have no hope to be forgiven the sin we do not leave, nor power to leave the sin which now we love. This, instead of lessening, makes the wonder a miracle! O wretched forlorn creature! wouldst thou have God out of being for this? (I speak to thee who dost not yet profess to believe there is no God, but dost only wish it.) The sustainer of the world! The common Basis of all Being! dost thou know what thou sayest? Art thou not wishing thy self and all things into nothing? This, rather ⟨p. 220⟩than humble thy self, and beg forgiveness? This! rather than become, again, an holy, pure, obedient creature, and again, blessed in him who first made thee so!
Yea, but we have no hope to be forgiven the sin we do not leave, nor power to leave the sin which now we love. This, instead of lessening, makes the wonder a miracle! O wretched forlorn creature! wouldst thou have God out of being for this? (I speak to thee who dost not yet profess to believe there is no God, but dost only wish it.) The sustainer of the world! The common Basis of all Being! dost thou know what thou sayest? Art thou not wishing thy self and all things into nothing? This, rather ⟨p. 220⟩than humble thy self, and beg forgiveness? This! rather than become, again, an holy, pure, obdeient creature, and again, blessed in him who first made thee so!
It can never cease, I say, to be a wonder, we never ought to cease wondering that ever this befell the nature of man, to be prone to wish such a thing that there were no God!
It can never cease, I say, to be a wonder, we never ought to cease wondering that ever this befel the nature of man, to be prone to wish such a thing that there were no God!
But this is, 'tis true, the too common case; and if we will only have what is more a rarity go for a wonder; How amazing then is it, that if any man would even never so fain; he ever can make himself believe there is no God! and shape his horrid course according to that most horrid misbelief! By what fatal train of causes is this ever brought to pass! Into what can we devise to resolve it?
Why such as have arrived to this pitch are much addicted to the pleasing of their senses; and this they make their business; so as that, for a long time they have given themselves no leisure to mind objects of another nature; especially that should any way tend to disturb them in their easy course: Till they are (gradually) fallen into a forgetful sleep, and the images of things are worn out with them; that had only more slightly touched their minds before. And being much used to go by the suggestions of sense, they believe not what they neither see nor feel.
Why such as have arrived to this pitch are much addicted to the pleasing of their senses; and this they make their business; so as that, for a long time they have given themselves no leasure to mind objects of another nature; especially that should any way tend to disturb them in their easie course: Till they are (gradually) fallen into a forgetful sleep, and the images of things are worn out with them; that had only more slightly touch'd their minds before. And being much used to go by the suggestions of sense, they believe not what they neither see nor feel.
This is somewhat, but does not reach the mark; for there are many very great sensualists (as great as they at least) who never arrive ⟨p. 221⟩hither, but firmly avow it that they believe a Deity, whatsoever mistaken notion they have of him; whereupon they imagine to themselves impunity in their vicious course.
But these, it may be said, have so disaccustomed themselves to the exercise of their reason, that they have no disposition to use their thoughts about any thing above the sphere of sense; and have contracted so dull and sluggish a temper, that they are no fitter to mind or employ themselves in any speculations that tend to beget in them the knowledge of God, than any man is for discourse or business when he is fast asleep.
So indeed in reason one would expect to find it, but the case is so much otherwise, when we consider particular instances, that we are the more perplexed and entangled in this enquiry, by considering how agreeable it is that the matter should be thus, and observing that it proves oft-times not to be so: Insomuch that reason and experience seem herein, not to agree, and hence we are put again upon new conjectures what the immediate cause of this strange malady should be.
So indeed in reason one would expect to find it, but the case is so much otherwise, when we consider particular instances, that we are the more perplex'd and intangled in this enquiry, by considering how agreeable it is that the matter should be thus, and observing that it proves oft-times not to be so: Insomuch that reason and experience seem herein, not to agree, and hence we are put again upon new conjectures what the immediate cause of this strange malady should be.
For did it proceed purely from a sluggish temper of mind, unapt to reasoning and discourse; the more any were so, the more disposed they should be to Atheism; Whereas, every one knows that, multitudes of persons of dull and slow minds to any thing of ratiocination would rather you should burn their houses, than tell them they did not believe in God; and would presently tell you, it were ⟨p. 222⟩pity he should live, that should but intimate a doubt whether there were a God or no. Yea, and many, somewhat more intelligent, yet in this matter, are shy of using their Reason, and think it unsafe, if not profane, to go about to prove, that there is a God, lest they should move a doubt, or seem hereby to make a question of it. And, in the mean time, while they offer not at reasoning, they, more meanly, supply that want, after a sorry fashion, from their education, the tradition of their fore-fathers common example, and the universal profession and practice of some Religion, round about them; and it may be only take the matter for granted, because they never heard such a thing was ever doubted of, or called in question in all their lives.
For did it proceed purely from a sluggish temper of mind, unapt to reasoning and discourse; the more any were so, the more dispos'd they should be to Atheism; Whereas, every one knows that, multitudes of persons of dull and slow minds to any thing of ratiocination would rather you should burn their houses, than tell them they did not believe in God; and would presently tell you, it were ⟨p. 222⟩pitty he should live, that should but intimate a doubt whether there were a God or no. Yea, and many, somewhat more intelligent, yet in this matter, are shie of using their Reason, and think it unsafe, if not profane, to go about to prove, that there is a God, lest they should move a doubt, or seem hereby to make a question of it. And, in the mean time, while they offer not at reasoning, they, more meanly, supply that want, after a sorry fashion, from their education, the tradition of their fore-fathers common example, and the universal profession and practice of some Religion, round about them; and it may be only take the matter for granted, because they never heard such a thing was ever doubted of, or called in question in all their lives.
Whereas, on the other hand, they who incline to Atheism are, perhaps, some of them the greatest pretenders to Reason. They rely little upon authority of former times and ages, upon vulgar principles and maxims, but are vogued great masters of Reason, diligent searchers into the mysteries of nature, and can philosophize (as sufficiently appears) beyond all imagination. But 'tis hoped it may be truly said for the vindication of Philosophy, and them that profess it, that modern Atheists have little of that to glory in, and that their chief endowments are only their skill to please their senses, and a faculty with a pitiful sort of drollery to tincture their cups, and add a grace to their (otherwise) dull and flat conversation.
Whereas, on the other hand, they who incline to Atheism are, perhaps, some of them the greatest pretenders to Reason. They rely little upon authority of former times and ages, upon vulgar principles and maxims, but are vogued great masters of Reason, diligent searchers into the mysteries of nature, and can philosophize (as sufficiently appears) beyond all imagination. But 'tis hoped it may be truly said for the vindication of Philosophy, and them that profess it, that modern Atheists have little of that to glory in, and that their chief endowments are only their skill to please their senses, and a faculty with a pittiful sort of drollery to tincture their cups, and add a grace to their (otherwise) dull and flat conversation.
Yet all this howsoever being considered, there is here but little advance made to the finding out whence Atheism should proceed: For, that want of reason should be thought the cause, what hath been already said seems to forbid. That many ignorant persons seem possest with a great awe of a Deity from which divers more knowing have delivered themselves. And yet neither doth the former signify any thing (in just interpretation) to the disrepute of Religion. For truth is not the less true, for that some hold it they know not how or why. Nor doth the latter make to the reputation of Atheism, inasmuch as men otherwise rational may sometimes learnedly dote. But it confirms us that Atheism is a strange thing, when its extraction and pedigree are so hardly found out, and it seems to be directly of the lineage, neither of knowledge nor ignorance, neither sound Reason nor perfect Dotage.
Yet all this howsoever being considered, there is here but little advance made to the finding out whence Atheism should proceed: For, that want of reason should be thought the cause, what hath been already said seems to forbid. That many ignorant persons seem possest with a great awe of a Deity from which divers more knowing have delivered themselves. And yet neither doth the former signifie any thing (in just interpretation) to the disrepute of Religion. For truth is not the less true, for that some hold it they know not how or why. Nor doth the latter make to the reputation of Atheism, inasmuch as men otherwise rational maysometimes learnedly dote. But it confirms us that Atheism is a strange thing, when its extraction and pedigree are so hardly found out, and it seems to be directly of the lineage, neither of knowledge nor ignorance, neither sound Reason nor perfect Dotage.
Nor doth it at all urge to say, and why may we not as well stand wondering whence the apprehension of a God, and an addictedness to Religion should come, when we find them peculiar, neither to the more knowing, nor the more ignorant. For they are apparently and congruously enough to be derived from somewhat common to them both. The impression of a Deity universally put upon the minds of all men (which Atheists have made a shift to raze out or obliterate to that degree as to render it illegible) and that cultivated by the exercise of Reason, in some, and in others, less capable ⟨p. 224⟩of that help, somewhat confirmed by education and the other accessories mentioned above.
Nor doth it at all urge to say, and why may we not as well stand wondering whence the apprehension of a God, and an addictedness to Religion should come, when we find them peculiar, neither to the more knowing, nor the more ignorant. For they are apparently and congruously enough to be derived from somewhat common to them both. The impression of a Deity universally put upon the minds of all men (which Atheists have made a shift to raze out or obliterate to that degree as to render it illegible) and that cultivated by the exercise of Reason, in some, and in others, less capable ⟨p. 224⟩of that help, somewhat confirmed by education and the other accessaries mentioned above.
Therefore is this matter still most mysteriously intricate that there should be one temper and persuasion agreeing to two so vastly different sorts of persons, while yet we are to seek for a cause (except what is most tremendous to think of) from whence it should proceed, that is common to them both. And here is in short the sum of the wonder, that any, not appearing very grossly unreasonable in other matters, (which cannot be denied even of some of the more sensual and lewder sort of Atheists) should, in so plain and important a case, be so, beyond all expression, absurd. That they, without scruple, are pleased to think like other men, in matters that concern and relate to common practice, and wherein they might more colourably and with less hazard, go out of the common road. And are here only, so dangerously and madly extravagant. Theirs is therefore a particular madness, the Dementia quoad hoc. So much the stranger thing, because they whom it possesses, do only in this one case put off themselves, and are like themselves, and other men in all things else. If they reckoned it a glory to be singular they might (as hath been plainly shown) more plausibly profess it as a principle, that they are not bound to believe the existence of any secular Ruler (and consequently not be subject to any) longer than they see him, and so subvert all Policy and ⟨p. 225⟩Government; or pretend an exemption from all obligation to any act of justice, or to forbear the most injurious violence towards any man, because they are not infallibly certain any one they see is an humane wight, and so abjure all morality as they already have so great a part; than offer with so fearful hazard to assault the Deity (of whose existence if they would but think a while, they might be most infallibly assured, or go about to subvert the foundations of Religion. Or, if they would get themselves glory by great adventures, or show themselves brave men, by expressing a fearless contempt of Divine Power, and Justice. This fortitude is not humane. These are without the compass of its object. As Inundations, 1Earthquakes, &c. are said to be, unto which, that any one should fearlessly expose himself, can bring no profit to others, nor therefore glory to him.
Therefore is this matter still most mysteriously intricate that there should be one temper and perswasion agreeing to two so vastly different sorts of persons, while yet we are to seek for a cause (except what is most tremendous to think of) from whence it should proceed, that is common to them both. And here is in short the sum of the wonder, that any, not appearing very grosly unreasonable in other matters, (which cannot be deny'd even of some of the more sensual and lewder sort of Atheists) should, in so plain and important a case, be so, beyond all expression, absurd. That they, without scruple, are pleased to think like other men, in matters that concern and relate to common practice, and wherein they might more colourably and with less hazard, go out of the common road. And are here only, so dangerously and madly extravagant. Theirs is therefore a particular madness, the Dementia quoad hoc. So much the stranger thing, because they whom it possesses, do only in this one case put off themselves, and are like themselves, and other men in all things else. If they reckon'd it a glory to be singular they might (as hath been plainly shewn) more plausibly profess it as a principle, that they are not bound to believe the existence of any secular Ruler (and consequently not be subject to any) longer than they see him, and so subvert all Policy and
In all this harangue of discourse the design hath not been to fix upon any true cause of Atheism, but to represent it a strange thing; And an Atheist a Prodigy, a Monster amongst mankind. A dreadful spectacle, forsaken of the common aids afforded to other men, hung up in chains, to warn others; and let them see what an horrid creature, man may make himself by voluntary aversion from God that made him.
In the mean time they upon whom this dreadful plague is not fallen, may plainly see before them, the object of that worship which ⟨p. 226⟩is imported by a Temple, An existing Deity, a God to be worshipped.
Unto whom we shall yet see further reason to design, and consecrate a Temple for that end (and even our selves to become such) when we have considered (what comes next to be spoken of) his Conversableness with men.