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750 passagespart 15 of 19
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To this you answer, that rather on the contrary Universalia are priora singularibus, non tam natura generante, quam intendente. For Homo prius intenditur quam Socrates: Non enim species est propter Individuum, sed Individuum propter speciem. Or, if this be not true in universalibus physicis, yet is it in politicis sive aggregatis, which have a more resemblance to our present matter.
To this I answer, 1. The comparison we speak of between a decree indefinite and definite, is not the same with a comparison between the species and the singular; but only as between singulars and singulars; singulars indefinitely proposed as aliqui, and singulars proposed definitely, as Hic & ille, Peter and Paul. Now though individuum be propter speciem, as that which nature intends principally; and individua for the maintenance of the species: yet is it not so congruous to say, that particulars definite are for particulars indefinite, &c. The instance I gave in reducing it to a comparison between generalia and specialia, was to bring it, as near as I could, to such a State wherein the evidence of truth might plead for it self. As indeed it is manifest, that generalia are only priora specialibus quoad naturam generantem, specialia priora generalibus quoad naturam intendentem; which I delivered out of the remembrance of my old Philosophy, as a thing which I conceived to be without question. Zabarell de methodis lib. 1. cap. 6. Ordo naturae non unus est, sed multiplex, vel saltem duplex: Non solum ⟨p. 176⟩enim simplicia sunt naturae priora compositis, sed etiam composita simplicibus, ut ex Aristotele colligimus, in cap. 1. lib. 2. de partibus animalium: si namque ordinem naturae intelligamus habita ratione generationis naturae, elementa sunt priora misto, mistum animali, animal homine; quod si per ordinem naturae intelligamus ordinem perfectionis seu ordinem scopi & intentionis naturae, homo est natura prior animali, animal misto, & mistum elementis. But I confess the case is different between a species and the particulars thereof, whether we consider nature particular, or nature universal: For, as for nature particular, though it intends and works only for a particular like it self; yet, whereas particulars may be infinite, and it is found to have no power to produce one particular rather then another; this consideration hath puzzled many in enquiring how it comes to pass that this particular agent brings forth this particular effect at such a time; whereas he was indifferent to have brought forth any one particular of many thousands in that kind. And, after Suarez in his Metaphysics hath tried many ways hereabouts, at length resolves upon Ariminensis his invention, who reduceth it to the determination of Gods will: