The Answer to the Additions.
pp. 6–170533 passagespart 10 of 14
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
At length he comes to conclude that, if to deal justly, to exercise charity &c. with their contraries be absolutely & antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawless in these as in the other, by these he means acts of the soul rational; by the other, he means acts of the soul vegetative, or sensitive. Now we utterly deny that any of these are absolutely necessary; Nay we deny that any thing is of absolute necessity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internal emanations thereof which constitute the distinction of persons in the Trinity. For albeit some ⟨p. 118⟩Agents created are Agents necessary, working necessarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of absolute necessity, because they may be hindered in their operations; either by Angels as some of them; or at least by the power of God, all of them. And as there are necessary Agents working necessarily; so there are free Agents working contingently and freely; as Angels and men. And albeit a question may be made as touching acts supernatural, whether the creature hath any free power to perform them freely; such as are the acts of the three Theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we do not deny, but grant upon the infusion of a supernatural principle into our souls, which we count formally the life of grace; the cause whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deserves to be no question, but that as touching all actions of moral virtues, and of the contrary vicious actions, that there is a free power in man to perform them naturally; until such time as by a vicious disposition, procured by a custom in vicious courses a man is habitually inclined unto evil; whereby he is made a slave to vice, and thereby hath deprived himself of a moral liberty unto actions virtuous. For like as a man holding a stone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as soon as he hath thrown him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whether he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vicious habit contracted, man hath freedom moral unto actions virtuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of Aristotle, and thus he illustrates it.
At length he comes to conclude that, if to deale justly, to exercise charitie &c. with their contraries be absolutely & antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawlesse in these as in the other, by these he meanes acts of the soule rationall; by the other, he meanes acts of the soule vegetative, or sensitive. Now we utterly deny that any of these are absolutely necessary; Nay we deny that any thing is of absolute necessity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internall emanations thereof which constitute the distinction of persons in the Trinity. For albeit some