Nay, your self have acknowledged out of Austin, the ends of God in this, when you alleged out of lib. de corrept. & gratia, cap. 10. this passage; credimus Deum sic ordinasse Angelorum & hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet quid p•ssct eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Apply this to man, first he showed what his free will could do; wherein? but in his fall; Secondly, quid posset gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium: how was this showed, but in the raising of some, and derelinquishing others? As for the circumstances wherewith you charm this strange saying, they serve you in no stead: man is in doubt what end to resolve on, upon the event or non-event of something, because he knows not whether it will fall out or no: so if God were to seek, whether upon his permission of Adam to sin, he would sin or no; he might be uncertain what to intend. But you suppose, that before God decreed to permit him to sin, he knew he would sin if he were permitted. And as for the distinction of particular and general, it cannot be accommodated to ends; for ends intended are only particulars, for they are intended to be produced, and such things are only singulars: like as by singular means they are produced, and actions versantur only circa singularia. Again, it is untrue, that Gods decree was negative: For, as Austin saith, Enchirid. cap. 100. Non utique nelens sinit sed volens: And actus volendi is positive in God. And again, Cap. 95. Non ergo fit aliquid, nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel ⟨p. 188⟩sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Your self, ere you are aware, draw near to the truth, which breaks forth as loath to be suppressed; As when you say, a man suffers an house to fall, because he can dispose of it many ways being fallen, to his own behoof. Apply this to God concerning the fall of Adam, permitted by him. So saith Austin, Nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo facere posset been. Here is the generall, de malo facere posse been. What are the specials in the passage by your self alleged, they are two, ut ostenderet gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Now consider I pray, posse de malo facere been is not causa adaequata, why God should permit fieri male. But onely velle de malo facere been.
Nay, your selfe have acknowledged out of Austin, the ends of God in this, when you alledged out of lib. de corrept. & gratia, cap. 10. this passage; credimus Deum sic ordinasse Angelorum & hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet quid p•ssct eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Apply this to man, first he shewed what his free will could do; wherein? but in his fall; Secondly, quid posset gratiae beneficium justitiaeque judicium: how was this shewed, but in the raysing of some, and derelinquishing others? As for the circumstances wherewith you charm this strange saying, they serve you in no stead: man is in doubt what end to resolve on, upon the event or non-event of something, because he knowes not whether it will fall out or no: so if God were to seek, whether upon his permission of Adam to sinne, he would sinne or no; he might be uncertain what to intend. But you suppose, that before God decreed to permit him to sinne, he knew he would sinne if he were permitted. And as for the distinction of particular and generall, it cannot be accommodated to ends; for ends intended are onely particulars, for they are intended to be produced, and such things are onely singulars: like as by singular means they are produced, and actiones versantur onely circa singularia. Again, it is untrue, that Gods decree was negative: For, as Austin saith, Enchirid. cap. 100. Non utique nelens sinit sed volens: And actus volendi is positive in God. And again, Cap. 95. Non ergo fit aliquid, nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel ⟨p. 188⟩sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Your selfe, ere you are aware, draw neer to the truth, which breakes forth as loath to be suppressed; As when you say, a man suffers an house to fall, because he can dispose of it many waies being fallen, to his own behoofe. Apply this to God concerning the fall of Adam, permitted by him. So saith Austin, Nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo facere posset bene. Here is the generall, de malo facere posse bene. What are the specials in the passage by your selfe alledged, they are two, ut ostenderet gratiae beneficium, justitiaeque judicium. Now consider I pray, posse de malo facere bene is not causa adaequata, why God should permit fieri male. But onely velle de malo facere bene.