An Answer to a Letter of D. H. concerning Gods Decrees definite or indefinite; By Dr. TWICE.An Answer to a Letter of D. H. concerning Gods Decrees definite or indefinite; By Dr. TWISSE.
pp. 175–188102 passagespart 2 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1. Your proposition is most sound.
2. As for your assumption, which you suppose to be true, they suppose to be utterly untrue; as directly contrary to the most general rules touching the order of things in intention, and execution: And Alphonsus Mendoza takes upon him to prove at large, that the supernaturals of Peter and Paul were intended before their naturals.
2. As for your assumption, which you suppose to be true, they suppose to be utterly untrue; as directly contrary to the most generall rules touching the order of things in intention, and execution: And Alphonsus Mendoza takes upon him to prove at large, that the supernaturals of Peter and Paul were intended before their naturals.
2. The only reason (saving the plausibility of the proposition it self) to justify it, seems to be this, God cannot work upon a subject, unless the subject first be, and that occasion also whereupon he works; therefore God cannot intend to work upon a subject unless first he intend to produce that subject, and permit (at least) the occasion whereupon he intends to work. As much as to say, because I cannot ride to London without a horse, therefore I cannot intend to ride to London, unless first I intend to get me a horse. Whence it manifestly followeth, that in execution I must first ride to London, and afterward get me an horse to that purpose. And the confounding of the order of execution with the order of intention, seems to be the cause why this proposition of yours seems to be so plausible.
2. The onely reason (saving the plausibility of the proposition it selfe) to justifie it, seems to be this, God cannot worke upon a subject, unlesse the subject first be, and that occasion also whereupon he works; therefore God cannot intend to work upon a subject unlesse first he intend to produce that subject, and permit (at least) the occasion whereupon he intends to work. As much as to say, because I cannot ride to London without a horse, therefore I cannot intend to ride to London, unlesse first I intend to get me a horse. Whence it manifestly followeth, that in execution I must first ride to London, and afterward get me an horse to that purpose. And the confounding of the order of execution with the order of intention, seems to be the cause why this proposition of yours seems to be so plausible.