pp. 1896 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1Hereby we gather that the right of prescription is no new thing, but a thing grafted of God himself in the hearts of men.
1HEreby we gather that the right of prescription is no newe thing, but a thing grafted of God hymselfe in the hartes of men.
But why it was found out, I will in few words declare. It may be, that a man may possess an other mans thing unwittingly. As for example: There is an heir which succeedeth him that is dead, and among his goods he findeth somethings that were usurped by the former, while he lived, or received for a pledge, which he being ignorant of, possesseth all those things with a good mind. And so being ignorant and unwitting, possesseth an other mans thing as his own. What then? shall the heir never seek for the just possession thereof? If the true owner do never require his thing, ought the ignorant to defraud the heir for ever, that he should never possess again that thing as his own? For if the owner never demand his own thing again, that is to be ascribed unto his own sloth and sluggish negligence. Wherefore in detestation of such sluggishness, and in commendation of an upright faith, and lastly for public peace sake, the law of prescription was found out. Jephthah now useth this law against the Ammonites.
But why it was founde out, I wyll in fewe woordes declare. It may be, that a man may possesse an other mans thing vnwittinglye. As for example: There is an heyre whiche succeedeth him that is deade, and among hys goodes he findeth somethinges that were vsurped by the former, while he lyued, or receaued for a pledge, which he being ignoraunt of, possesseth all those things with a good mynde. And so being ignoraunt and vnwitting, possesseth an other mans thing as his owne. What then? shal the heyre neuer seeke for the iust possession thereof? If the true owner doo neuer require his thing, ought the ignoraunt to defraude the heyre for euer, that he shoulde neuer possesse againe that thing as hys owne? For if the owner neuer demaunde hys owne thing againe, that is to be ascribed vnto his owne slothe and slouggishe negligence. Wherefore in detestacion of suche slouggishnes, and in commendacion of an vprighte fayth, and lastly for publike peace sake, the lawe of prescription was found out. Iiphtah nowe vseth thys lawe agaynst the Ammonites.
We saith he, have possessed this land this three hundred years. Why then doest thou make this garboil and tumult against us? Except some certain time were appointed, within the space whereof, and not beyond, things might be demanded again, the possession of all things should be uncertain: but from that humane things doth wonderfully abhor. Wherefore this evil is remedied by the right of prescription.1 And it is defined in the Digestes de usucapionibus, law .iii. that it is an addiction or claim of dominion by continuation of possession, by the time appointed by the law. The definition is plain and manifest. But in these days they make a difference between prescription and usucapione, when yet in the Digests, and among the old Lawyers they were not separated.
We saith he, haue possessed thys land this three hundred yeares. Why then doest thou make this garboyle and tumult agaynst vs? Except some certayne time were appointed, within the space whereof, and not beyonde, thinges myght be demaunded agayne, the possession of all thinges should be vncertaine: but from that humane thinges doth wonderfullye abhorre. Wherefore this euyll is remedyed by the right of prescription.1 And it is defined in the Digestes de vsucapionibus, law .iii. that it is an addiction or claime of dominion by continuacion of possession, by the time appointed by the lawe. The difinition is plaine and manifest. But in these daies they make a difference betwene prescription and vsucapione, when yet in the Digestes, and among the olde Lawyers they wer not seperated.
In the time of Antonius Pius (as I remember) these began first to be separated, so that usucapio taketh place in things moveable,1 and prescription in things unmoveable. But thus much by the way. But in our history this is to be marked, that Jephthah doth wisely divide his arguments: for he doth not first place the law of prescription, but before all things he objecteth the right of war, afterward the gift of the true God: and his cause being so confirmed, at the last he useth the law of prescription. And that he doth therefore, because a possession continued, doth not by it self and alone prescribe:2 but it hath need of a good title, and an upright faith. A good title is, that the thing be gotten by right order and lawful manner. For he that hath gotten any thing by theft or rapine, although he have long possessed it, yet it prescribeth not. But if both the title be good, and his faith upright, and continuance of time be added, the prescription is firm and good. If we have gotten any thing, either by buying, or by gift, or by inheritance, or such like ways, the title is good: but farther we have need of an upright faith, whereby we are assured in our selves, that no mans right is injured, and that we know that there is nothing which may by just means let us. Wherefore Jephthah hath a good title, the right of war, and the gift of God. He possesseth also with an upright faith, because he meaneth neither fraud nor rapine. Wherefore he very well useth the law of prescription.
In the tyme of Antonius Pius (as I remember) these beganne fyrst to bee seperated, so that vsucapio taketh place in thinges moueable,1 and prescription in thinges vnmoueable. But thus much by the way. But in our historye this is to be marked, that Iiphtah doth wisely deuide his argumentes: for he doth not first place the lawe of prescription, but before all thinges hee obiecteth the right of warre, afterward the gift of the true God: and his cause beyng so confirmed, at the last he vseth the lawe of prescription. And that hee doth therefore, bicause a possession continued, doth not by it selfe and alone prescribe:2 but it hath neede of a good title, and an vpright faith. A good title is, that the thing bee gotten by right order and lawfull manner. For he that hath gotten anye thing by theft or rapine, although he haue long possessed it, yet it prescribeth not. But if both the title be good, and his faith vpright, and continuance of tyme bee added, the prescription is firme and good. If we haue gotten any thing, eyther by bying, or by gift, or by inheritaunce, or suche lyke wayes, the tytle is good: but farther wee haue neede of an vpright fayth, whereby we are assured in our selues, that no mans right is iniured, and that we know that there is nothing which maye by iust meanes let vs. Wherefore Iiphtah hath a good tytle, the ryght of warre, and the gyft of God. He possesseth also with an vpryght fayth, bycause hee meaneth neyther fraude nor rapine. Wherefore he very well vseth the lawe of prescription.
But the time of prescription in things moveable,1 is as touching our civill laws three years: but in things unmoveable, ten or twenty years, if ignorance happen not. For if the owner know that it is his own thing which is possessed of an other, and he hold his peace so long, he cannot afterward demand it again. And the law seemeth justly to punish such negligence. But if the owner be ignorant, the time is farther prorogued, namely to thirty or forty years. And this is done when ignorance happeneth, and that he possesseth it for himself, and not for an other: otherwise it is no prescription. Howbeit this we must know by the way, that the Ecclesiastical Canons, as touching prescription, do differ from the civill laws. For they, as we have said, do appoint thirty years, though the possessor be of an evil faith. For they determine that evil faith cannot let prescription. But as it is had in the .vi. De regulis juris, chapter Possessor. A possessor of an evil faith, prescribeth by longness of time. For we should have a respect unto the word of God, and with what conscience a man may possess any thing. These things have I alleged, that we might understand, how Jephthah useth the law of prescription.
But the tyme of prescription in thinges moueable,1 is as touching our ciuill lawes three yeares: but in thinges vnmoueable, tenne or twentye yeares, if ignoraunce happen not. For if the owner knowe that it is his owne thyng which is possessed of an other, and he hold his peace so long, hee cannot afterwarde demaunde it againe. And the lawe seemeth iustlye to punishe suche negligence. But if the owner be ignoraunt, the tyme is farther proroged, namely to thirtye or fortye yeares. And this is done when ignoraunce happeneth, and that he possesseth it for himselfe, and not for an other: otherwyse it is no prescription. Howbeit thys we must knowe by the waye, that the Ecclesiasticall Canons, as touching prescription, doo differ from the ciuill lawes. For they, as we haue sayde, doo appoynt thirtye yeares, though the possessor be of an euyll fayth. For they determine that euyll faythe cannot let prescription. But as it is had in the .vi. De regulis iuris, chapter Possessor. A possessor of an euil faith, prescribeth by longnes of tyme. For we should haue a respect vnto the woorde of God, and wyth what conscience a man may possesse any thing. These thinges haue I alledged, that we might vnderstand, how Iiphtah vseth the law of prescription.