pp. 1899 passages
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Now because allthings are certain and manifest, I might return unto the history. But yet I think it good somewhat to speak, although briefly, of Custom, because it hath great affinity with prescription, and because our adversaries do stir up great tumults, because of it, and would utterly oppress ⟨image 196⟩us with Customs.
NOw bicause althinges are certaine and manifest, I might returne vnto the history. But yet I thinke it good somwhat to speake, although briefelye, of Custome, bicause it hath great affinitye with prescription, and bicause our aduersaries doo styrre vp great tumultes, bicause of it, and woulde vtterlye oppresse ⟨image 196⟩vs with Customes.
1Custom (as it is had Extra. de Consuet. chapter the last) ought to be agreeable unto reason, and lawfully prescribed. The civil laws assign unto custom ten or twenty years, the Canons, thirty or forty years. But most firm is that custom,2 the memory of whose beginning is not extant among men. And this ought to be firm, that those things which are against the word of God, do by no means prescribe. Wherefore that which the Papists affirm, namely that the Communion hath been given but under one kind this four hundred or five hundred years: because it is manifestly against the word of God, they cannot prove that it is prescribed by custom. For such a thing is not (as you would say) prescriptable. By which self same means they can not bring the custom of the sole life of Ministers, as prescript: for it was at the beginning extort by violence,3 and it is against the word of God: although Hostiensis saith, that the power of Custom is so great, that it compelleth Priests to sole life,4 in the distinction .xxiii. chapter Placuit. But, as the civill laws determine, that Custom is vicious, which either is against nature, or else against the common law. But that which I have affirmed, hath his foundation in the holy Scriptures. For when Christ said unto the Pharisees: Hypocrites, why violate ye the commandment of God, because of your own tradition? For God saith: Honour thy father, and thy mother. But you say: whosoever saith to father or mother: The gift. &c. they might have prescribed unto him custom, but it was not lawful, because it was manifestly against the word of God.
1Custome (as it is had Extra. de Consuet. chapter the last) ought to be agreable vnto reason, and lawfully prescribed. The ciuil lawes assigne vnto custome ten or twenty yeares, the Canons, thirty or forty yeares. But most firme is that custome,2 the memorye of whose beginning is not extant amonge men. And this ought to be firme, that those thinges which are against the woord of God, do by no meanes prescribe. Wherfore that which the Papistes affirme, namelye that the Communion hath bene geuen but vnder one kinde thys foure hundreth or fyue hundreth yeares: bicause it is manifestlye against the woorde of God, they cannot proue that it is prescribed by custome. For suche a thyng is not (as you would say) prescriptable. By whiche selfe same meanes they can not bring the custome of the sole lyfe of Ministers, as prescript: for it was at the begynning extort by violence,3 and it is against the woorde of God: althoughe Hostiensis saith, that the power of Custome is so great, that it compelleth Priestes to sole lyfe,4 in the distinction .xxiii. chapter Placuit. But, as the ciuill lawes determine, that Custome is vicious, which eyther is against nature, or els agaynst the common lawe. But that which I haue affirmed, hath hys foundacion in the holye Scriptures. For when Christ sayd vnto the Phariseis: Hipocrites, why violate ye the commaundement of God, bicause of your own tradicion? For God saith: Honour thy father, and thy mother. But you say: whosoeuer sayth to father or mother: The gyft. &c. they might haue prescribed vnto hym custome, but it was not lawful, bicause it was manifestly against the woord of God.
In the country of Taurus there was a custom, to kill strangers and guests. The Persians had a custom, never to deliberate of weighty matters, but in feasts, and when they were drunk. Among the Sauromates there was a custom, that when they were drinking, they sold their daughters. These prescribe not, when as they are manifestly vicious and evil. But that custom prescribeth, which is neither against the word of God, nor the law of nature, nor the common law. For the right of custom cometh of the approbation, and secrete assent of the people. Otherwise, why are we bound unto laws? but because they were made,1 the people consenting and agreeing unto them? For this is the difference between a custom and a law, because in the one is a secrete assent, but in the other an open assent. Wherefore such customs cannot be revoked without danger. Aristotle in Politicis admonisheth, that men which have learned to do sinister things, ought not to be compelled to do things dextere. Wherefore in things indifferent, and of no great value, custom is to be retained. It is an old Proverb, [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Law and Country. For every region hath certain customs of their own, which cannot easily be changed. But as it is said, when they are against the word of God, or against nature, or the common law, they do not prescribe. For then are they not customs, but beastly cruelties.
In the country of Taurus there was a custome, to kyll straungers and gests. The Persians had a custome, neuer to deliberate of waighty matters, but in feastes, and when they were dronke. Among the Sauromates there was a custome, that when they were drinking, they solde their daughters. These prescribe not, when as they are manifestly vicious and euyll. But that custome prescribeth, which is neither against the woord of God, nor the law of nature, nor the common law. For the right of custome commeth of the approbation, and secrete assent of the people. Otherwise, why are we bound vnto lawes? but bicause they were made,1 the people consenting and agreing vnto them? For this is the difference betwene a custome and a lawe, bicause in the one is a secrete assent, but in the other an open assent. Wherfore such customes cannot be reuoked wythout daunger. Aristotle in Politicis admonisheth, that men which haue learned to doo sinister thinges, ought not to be compelled to do thinges dextere. Wherefore in thinges indifferent, and of no great value, custome is to be retayned. It is an old Prouerbe, , that is, Law and Country. For euery region hath certaine customes of their owne, which cannot easelye be chaunged. But as it is sayde, when they are againste the woorde of God, or againste nature, or the common lawe, they do not prescribe. For then are they not customes, but beastly cruelties.
It is very well read in the Digestes, De legibus & Senatusconsultis, in the law de quibus: 1Custome without reason, hath no force. And in the decrees, distinction the .viii. chapter Veritate, Augustine saith: The truth being found out, let custom give place: let no man presume to prefer custom before truth and reason. And in the next Canon, Christ said: I am the way, the truth and the life, he said not,2 I am the custom. Cyprian against the * Aquarii. Let all custom, though it be never so ancient, give place unto the truth, otherwise Peter when he was reprehended of Paul to the Galatians, might have claimed custom, but he assented rather, that custom should give place unto the truth. Cyprian in the same Epistle against the Aquarii: Custom (saith he) without truth, is the ancientness of error: and the more it obtaineth, the more grievous it is. Let the Papists therefore cease to brag of their customs, which are altogether full both of error and also of ungodliness.
It is very wel read in the Digestes, De legibus & Senatusconsultis, in the law de quibus: 1Custome without reason, hath no force. And in the decrees, distinction the .viii. chapter Veritate, Augustine sayth: The truth being founde out, let custome geue place: let no mā presume to preferre custome before truth and reason. And in the next Canon, Christ sayd: I am the way, the truth and the life, he said not,2 I am the custome. Ciprian against ye * Aquarii. Let al custome, thoughe it be neuer so auncient, geue place vnto the truth, otherwise Peter when he was reprehended of Paul to the Galathians, myght haue claymed custome, but he assēted rather, that custome should geue place vnto the truth. Ciprian in the same Epistle agaynst the Aquarii: Custome (sayth he) without truth, is the auncientnes of error: and the more it obteyneth, the more grieuous it is. Let the Papistes therfore cease to bragge of their customes, which are altogether ful both of error and also of vngodlines.
Moreover to establish a custom it is not sufficient, that some men do a thing, or that a thing be often done, unless it be so done, that it be received into a use,1 & an institution to be observed. For many things are done either rashly or of necessity, which yet we will not have drawn into a custom. In the digestes de Itinere, & actu privato, in the law .1. and last. Grant that I go thorough the field once, and again, and the third time, because peradventure the high way is so foul, that a man can not pass thorough it. Whither, because I sometimes go and return thorough thy field, do I therefore get unto my self in it the right of dominion & servitude? No: for I intended not with that mind to go thorough thy field, but because I was of necessity compelled thereunto. In the decrees distinction the .1. chap. Consuetudo: Custom is said to be a certain right, instituted by manners, which is taken for a law, when a law faileth.2 When in the first times of the Church, when tyrants persecuted Christian religion, godly men thorough fear were compelled to assemble together in houses and caves by night, and in the dark, this assembly was by a certain right & manner then instituted, counted lawful. But if we would, now that the Church is constituted, worship God after the same manner, we should both be derided & laughed at, & also it were not to be suffered. For they used not that manner, to the end they would have it drawn into a custom, or that it should be an institution which other men should follow. Ambrose being Catechumenus, that is, newly converted to the Christian faith, and not baptised, was chosen Bishop of Milan, and Nectarius of Constantinople and peradventure other. Yet is it not lawful for us now to follow the same custom, and to elect a Bishop, which neither hath seen sacred services, nor hath ben washed with the water of Baptism. But they did so. They did so in deed, but compelled by necessity: because they had no other, which were both learned & endowed with authority, whom they might oppose against the Arians.
Moreouer to establish a custome it is not sufficient, that some men do a thyng, or that a thing be often done, vnles it be so done, that it be receaued into a vse,1 & an institucion to be obserued. For many thinges are done either rashely or of necessity, which yet we wil not haue drawen into a custome. In the digestes de Itinere, & actu priuato, in the law .1. and last. Graunt that I go thorough the fielde once, and agayne, and the thyrd tyme, bycause peraduenture the hyghe way is so foule, that a man can not passe thoroughe it. Whither, bycause I sometymes go and returne thorough thy field, do I therefore get vnto my selfe in it the right of dominion & seruitude? No: for I entended not with that mynde to go thoroughe thy field, but bycause I was of necessity compelled thereunto. In the decrees distinction the .1. chap. Consuetudo: Custome is said to be a certain right, instituted by manners, whiche is taken for a law, when a lawe fayleth.
So is that easily confuted,1 which they are wont to bring out of the History of Eusebius, for the communicating under one kind, that Serapion sent a child, and commanded the bread to be dipped in the wine. I could in deed expound that place otherwise: but at this time it shall be sufficient to say, that that was not therefore so done then, thereby to bring in a custom which should be imitated of others. Wherefore custom is not made by examples, but by the assent, approbation, and institution of the people. Otherwise there are in many places drunkenness and night robbynges. But these things, because they are not allowed of the people, as institutions to be observed, have not the power of a custom.
So is that easely confuted,1 whiche they are wont to bryng out of the Hystory of Eusebius, for the communicatyng vnder one kinde, that Serapion sent a child, and commaunded the bread to be dipped in the wyne. I could in deede expounde that place otherwise: but at this tyme it shalbe sufficiēt to say, that that was not therfore so done then, thereby to bring in a custome which should be imitated of others. Wherfore custome is not made by examples, but by the assent, approbation, and institution of the people. Otherwise ther are in many places dronkēnes and night robbynges. But these things, bicause they are not allowed of the people, as institutions to be obserued, haue not the power of a custome.
And that the thing may the better be understand,1 I will bring a definition of custom, which I found in Hostiensis, in the title de Consuetudine. It is an use (saith he) agreeing with reason, allowed by the common institution of them that use it, whose beginning is time out of mind, or which is by a just time prescribed and confirmed, so that it is by no contrary act interrupted, but allowed with contradictory judgement. This is (as he thinketh) a full definition. But in that he saith: That that use ought to be agreeing with reason, it is not sufficient, but first it is to be said, that it ought to agree with the word of God, for that is to be counted for the chiefest reason. Afterward, it must be allowed by the institution of the people: for as much as it is not sufficient, that it be done ether rashly, or of necessity, or for some other cause, but it ought also to be allowed by the assent and institution of the people, and of whose beginning there is no mention, or that it is prescribed by a just time, and appointed by the laws, neither is interrupted by any contrary action. For if the judge or prince shall give judgement against it, the custom is broken, as it also happeneth in prescription, when a man is cast out of his possession, or the matter is called into law, & the matter is in plead, the prescription is broken. Also the allowing of the contradictory judgement ought to be had, that is, that when one part allegeth the custom, and an other part denieth it, if it be pronounced on the custom side, that doth confirm it. But ⟨image 197⟩all these things, as I have before said must be revoked unto the rule of the word of God.
And that the thing may the better be vnderstand,1 I wil bring a definition of custome, which I foūd in Hostiensis, in the title de Consuetudine. It is an vse (saith he) agreing with reason, allowed by the cōmon institution of them that vse it, whose begynnyng is tyme out of mynde, or whiche is by a iust tyme prescribed and confirmed, so that it is by no contrary acte interrupted, but allowed with contradictory iudgement. This is (as he thinketh) a full definition. But in that he saith: That that vse ought to be agreeing with reason, it is not sufficient, but first it is to be sayd, that it ought to agree with the worde of God, for that is to be counted for the chiefest reason. Afterward, it must be allowed by the institution of the people: for as much as it is not sufficient, that it be done ether rashly, or of necessity, or for some other cause, but it ought also to be allowed by the assent and institution of the people, and of whose beginnyng there is no mention, or that it is prescribed by a iust tyme, and appoynted by the lawes, neither is interrupted by any contrary action. For if the iudge or prince shal geue iudgement agaynst it, the custome is broken, as it also happeneth in prescriptiō, when a mā is cast out of his possessiō, or ye matter is called into law, & the matter is in plead, the prescription is broken. Also the allowyng of the contradictory iudgement ought to be had, that is, that when one part alledgeth the custome, and an other part denyeth it, if it be pronoūced on the custome side, that doth confirme it. But
1Now this only is to be added, which is had, Extra de Consuet. chap. 1. that a custom can not be suffered, if it be burdenous to the Church. Augustine also complained, that in his time were so many new ceremonies & rites brought in, that the Church was grievously burdened, and the state of Christians, at the time was nothing at all more tolerable then in the old time the state of the Jews was. That also we lay against our adversaries: that the Church should not be burdened. This is their own law. Why do they not acknowledge their own words? These things have I therefore mentioned that we might understand how firm an argument Jephthah used of Prescription, namely that the Israelites possessed that land .300. years: which is much more firm and of greater force, then if they had possessed it but .30. or .40. years. Now let us go to the other part of the chap. wherein Jephthah's victory against the Ammonites is described.
1Now this onely is to be added, whiche is had, Extra de Consuet. chap. 1. that a custome can not be suffred, if it be burdenous to ye Church. Augustine also cōplayned, that in his tyme were so many new ceremonyes & rites brought in, that the Church was greuously burdened, and the state of Christians, at ye tyme was nothing at all more tollerable then in the old tyme the state of ye Iewes was. That also we laye agaynst our aduersaryes: that the Churche should not be burdened. This is their owne lawe. Why do they not acknowledge their owne wordes? These things haue I therfore mencioned that we might vnderstand how firme an argument Iiphtah vsed of Prescription, namely that the Israelites possessed that land .300. yeares: whiche is much more firme and of greater force, then if they had possessed it but .30. or .40. yeares. Now let vs go to the other part of the chap. wherin Iyphtahs victory agaynst the Ammonites is described.