A14350:1122
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
31 Now must we search out, whether the liberty of the will be taken quite away, 1by means of those things which we have rehearsed. But because Paul affirmeth, that A natural man can not know those things which be of God: 2it seemeth a while to be against free will. For if we be not able, through our natural power to comprehend spiritual things; how can it come to pass, that we express them in our actions: seeing we see by experience, that there is much more business and labour in doing, than in understanding? And not only this, 3but also the predestination, or prescience, seemeth to be a hinderance to it. For it seemeth that this may be inferred; If God hath known all things, before they be brought to pass, and can not be deceived, the liberty of our will is quite gone, and all things happen of necessity. Also, 4the power of GOD, wherewith all things be wrought, causeth no small difficulty of this matter: for of such efficacy is the will of God, as Paul to the Romans said; Who is able to resist his will?
31 Now must we search out, whether the libertie of the will be taken quite awaie, 1by meanes of those things which we haue rehersed. But bicause Paule affirmeth, that A naturall man can not knowe those things which be of God: 2it séemeth a while to be against frée will. For if we be not able, through our naturall power to comprehend spirituall things; how can it come to passe, that we expresse them in our actions: séeing we sée by experience, that there is much more busines and labour in dooing, than in vnderstanding? And not onelie this, 3but also the predestination, or prescience, séemeth to be a hinderance to it. For it séemeth that this may be inferred; If God hath knowen all things, before they be brought to passe, and can not be deceiued, the libertie of our will is quite gone, and all things happen of necessitie. Also, 4the power of GOD, wherewith all things be wrought, causeth no small difficulty of this matter: for of such efficacie is the will of God, as Paule to the Romans said; Who is able to resist his will?
Moreover, the scriptures affirm sin to be of so great force, 1as by the same all things in a manner are corrupted and despoiled in us: wherefore the strength which is left unto will, is very feeble, the which is not able to do as reason hath appointed. Again, 2so much is attributed to the grace of Christ by divine oracles, as without the same it is said, that we are able to do nothing, which either may be acceptable or grateful unto God. And seeing the same is not equally given unto all men, it is thought that their liberty is destroyed; for so much as they have not this grace in their own power. 3The Mathematicians also extol the powers celestial, and in a manner persuade, that of them do depend ⟨p. 276⟩those things which happen; so as there might not seem to be left unto us the perfect liberty of such things as are to come. 4Finally, there have been such also, who would affirm, that there be definite causes of things to be done; 5the which being joined one with an other, and tied with a sure knot, there is brought to them a certain necessity and destiny, which cannot be withstood.
Moreouer, the scriptures affirme sinne to be of so great force, 1as by the same all things in a maner are corrupted and despoiled in vs: wherfore the strength which is left vnto will, is verie féeble, the which is not able to doo as reason hath appointed. Againe, 2
32 But we need not stand much upon that argument, 1which was taken from the force of knowledge; because it expressly appeareth by those things, which we have already spoken, that this liberty is not judged to be in men not yet regenerate, as concerning works, which be in very deed good, and do please God: wherefore that kind of reasoning is not to be weakened, seeing it surely confirmeth the doctrine of the apostle. 2In the next reason there is a more difficulty and trouble: for there be few, which can perceive how the providence of God, 3or (as they term it) his prescience can suffer any free choice to remain in our will. And the place is so difficult and dangerous to be dealt in, as many of the old writers, in reasoning about this matter, were brought to such a pass, as they judged altogether, that of those things, which be done, there ariseth a necessity: yea, and they supposed, that God himself is held with this necessity. Whereof came a proverb, 4that God also might not withstand necessity, so as he durst not attempt any thing against the same.
32 But we néed not stand much vpon that argument, 1which was taken frō the force of knowledge; bicause it expresselie appéereth by those things, which we haue alreadie spoken, that this libertie is not iudged to be in men not yet regenerate, as concerning works, which be in verie déed good, and doo please God: wherfore that kind of reasoning is not to be weakened, séeing it surelie confirmeth the doctrine of the apostle. 2In the next reason there is a more difficultie and trouble: for there be few, which can perceiue how the prouidence of God, 3or (as they terme it) his prescience can suffer anie frée choise to remaine in our will. And the place is so difficult and dangerous to be dealt in, as manie of the old writers, in reasoning about this matter, were brought to such a passe, as they iudged altogither, that of those things, which be doone, there ariseth a necessitie: yea, and they supposed, that God himselfe is held with this necessitie. Wherof came a prouerbe,
1Through this liberty of theirs, the poets went further, and said, that many things be done, even whether the gods will or no. And Homer brought in Jupiter to be sad, and to lament the necessity, or destiny, by the force whereof he was let from removing death, which approached unto his sweet son Sarpedones. And he maketh Neptunus to take very greevouslie• the chance of his son Cyclops; of whom he being stirred up with a lust to revenge, would have driven Ulysses altogether from home, and complaineth, that this was not granted to him by destiny. And in Virgil, Juno doth no less outrageously bewail; because she had kept wars so long together with one nation, and yet could not remove (as she desired) from the coast of Italy the Trojan navy. But we Christians do not in such sort speak of God: for we have most certainly learned out of the holy scriptures, that there is nothing unpossible to God; and we are taught by Christ himself, that allthings are possible unto God. And our faith, after the example of Abraham, 2doth chiefly cleave to this persuasion; that God can do whatsoever he hath promised. Neither must we conceive in our mind, 3that Christ was either condemned unto the death, or forced to the cross against his will, or his father not willing. GOD would these things to be done, not being led thereto by an inevitable necessity; but by a superabundant & exceeding charity towards men. So the scripture teacheth us, which saith; 4So God loveth the world, as he gave his only son, &c. And unto the Romans it is written; 5Which spared not his own son, but gave him for us all. Christ himself by the same love, was moved to die for us; and he taught us, 6that A greater love than this can none have, that one putteth his life for his friends. And thereby he showed himself to have exceeded the measure of mans love; because he would suffer death for his enemies. And that he willingly, and of his own accord took death upon him, he sufficiently declared; when in the last banquet (which, according to the Paschal custom, he kept with his apostles) he said;
33 By these places we perceive, that the Lords death was throughly foreknown, and understood, and did in no respect infringe the liberty, either of Christ, or of the father. Therefore Cicero, otherwise a very learned man, is greatly to be wondered at: 1against whom Augustine, in his fift book De civitate Dei, especiallie in the ninth & tenth chapters, earnestly disputeth concerning this question. The controversy dependeth upon this, that in the latter book De divinatione, all things are refelled, which were brought by Quintus, Ciceros brother, in the former book. And Cicero endeavoureth by all means, to overthrow all predictions of things to come, and of the prescience of God. Therefore Augustine affirmeth, that the Astrologians had reasons, which were better to be borne withal, than his: because, though they attribute overmuch unto the stars, yet they take not away all divination and prescience. 2And a certain Physician (as the same Augustine declareth in his book of confessions) being a grave man, and one that detested Astrology; when he was demanded, how it came to pass that Mathematicians did prophesy so many truths, he durst not (contrary unto all histories and experience) deny every divination; but he answered, that a certain destiny was spread over things: and he affirmed, that it was not incredible, but that reasonable souls did after a sort feel it. Surely there is nothing to be found more repugnant, 3than of the one side to affirm God to be; and on the other side to take from him the prescience of things to come. The prophet Isaiah would these things to be so firmly knit together, as he said; Show us what things shall come to pass, 4and we will declare you to be gods. But that Cicero had small knowledge, and no good judgement of God; it appeareth by his book, which he intituled ⟨p. 277⟩De natura deorum: wherein, disputing under the person of Cotta, he striveth utterly to take away the nature of God.
33 By these places we perceiue, that the Lords death was throughlie foreknowne, and vnderstood, and did in no respect infringe the libertie, either of Christ, or of the father. Therefore Cicero, otherwise a verie learned man, is greatlie to be woondered at:
And surely, it is to be lamented, that so notable a man is to be charged with that, which the psalm of David ascribeth unto fools: for there it is written; 1that The foolish man hath said in his hart, There is no God. Upon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialog unto Cotta, which was a bishop; I do not well understand: unless perhaps he considered, that none in a manner are to be found, which both more freely speak, and worse do esteem of God, than they do, to whose trust are committed ceremonies and holy things. And because it was not hidden to Tullius Cicero, that it is a very odious thing to profess an opinion, whereby God should be denied: therefore, when he had disputed as much as he thought good; in the end of his book he showed his opinion, yet in the behalf of Lucius Balbus; and so, as he saith to Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta is to be allowed. Cicero was a man very studious, as well of all kind of learning, as specially of the civill law. And whereas he thought, 2that the state of mans doings should be overthrown, if free will were denied: and he not knowing by what means this liberty might be retained, with a prescience of things to come; he rather yielded, that Gods wisdom should be taken from him, than that we should be deprived of the freedom of our will.
And surelie, it is to be lamented, that so notable a man is to be charged with that, which the psalme of Dauid ascribeth vnto fooles: for there it is written; 1that The foolish man hath said in his hart, There is no God. Vpon what occasion he appointed those parts in the dialog vnto Cotta, which was a bishop; I doo not well vnderstand: vnlesse perhaps he considered, that none in a maner are to be found, which both more fréelie speake, and woorse doo estéeme of God, than they doo, to whose trust are committed ceremonies and holie things. And bicause it was not hidden to Tullius Cicero, that it is a verie odious thing to professe an opinion, whereby God should be denied: therefore, when he had disputed as much as he thought good; in the end of his booke he shewed his opinion, yet in the behalfe of Lucius Balbus; and so, as he saith to Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta is to be allowed. Cicero was a man verie studious, as well of all kind of learning, as speciallie of the ciuill lawe. And whereas he thought,
Whereupon it may be gathered, into what darkness and obscurity of things the sin of the first man hath driven mankind: for what a madness is it to go about to throw GOD, the creator of all things, out of the fortress of his wisdom, 1that thou mayest preserve man? This is that over self-love, which every-where in the scriptures is condemned: we would that all things should perish, rather than our selves. This doth not godliness require. Wherefore we, which be taught by the spirit of God, declare that both must be confessed; namely, that both God doth foreknow all things, and also that the freedom of our mind (as we have showed before) must be retained. So do the holy scriptures instruct us, wherein we read; 2Whom he foreknew, them hath he predestinate to be made conformable to the image of his son: and that We were chosen by God before the foundations of the world were laid. 3In them do we learn, that The hairs of our head every one are numbered: 4that The little sparrows light not without the will of our heavenly father. And seeing we judge, that God doth all things rightly and justly; we cannot think that he dealeth without reason and understanding.
Wherevpon it may be gathered, into what darknesse and obscuritie of things the sinne of the first man hath driuen mankind: for what a madnes is it to go about to throwe GOD, the creator of all things, out of the fortresse of his wisedome, 1that thou maist preserue man? This is that ouer selfe-loue, which euerie-where in the scriptures is condemned: we would that all things should perish, rather than our selues. This dooth not godlinesse require. Wherfore we, which be taught by the spirit of God, declare that both must be confessed; namelie, that both God dooth foreknow all things, and also that the fréedome of our mind (as we haue shewed before) must be reteined. So doo the holie scriptures instruct vs, wherein we read; 2Whom he foreknew, them hath he predestinate to be made conformable to the image of his sonne: and that We were chosen by God before the foundations of the world were laid.
34 But go to, let us more nearly consider the manner of Ciceros reasoning. 1If (saith he) things to come are certainly known before, things among themselves shall have some certain order: and forsomuch as nothing is done without a cause, of necessity also it shall be granted, that there is an order and knitting together of causes. Whereby will come to pass, that all things, which be done, be done of necessity; by which means just and wholesome laws shall perish: and no admonitions or rebukings will be left, neither can there be any place for religion or prayers. Wherefore thou must choose, whether of these two evils thou wilt: either that there is divination, and prescience of God; or else to maintain the free power of mans will. Both together cannot be had, they be repugnant one with another, as he thinketh. Wherefore unto him it seemeth altogether necessary, that one of these be maintained and defended; and that the other be refused, as false and unprofitable. Which deliberation being taken, 2as Augustine no less wittily, than godly said; Cicero, otherwise a very prudent man, while he coveteth to make us free, maketh us impious and wicked persons, who should rob God of the knowledge, which he hath of things to come.
34 But go to, let vs more néerelie consider the maner of Ciceros reasoning. 1If (saith he) things to come are certeinlie knowne before, things among themselues shall haue some certeine order: and forsomuch as nothing is doone without a cause, of necessitie also it shall be granted, that there is an order and knitting togither of causes. Whereby will come to passe, that all things, which be doone, be doone of necessitie; by which meanes iust and wholsome lawes shall perish: and no admonitions or rebukings will be left, neither can there be anie place for religion or praiers. Wherefore thou must choose, whether of these two euils thou wilt: either that there is diuination, and prescience of God; or else to maintaine the frée power of mans will. Both togither cannot be had, they be repugnant one with another, as he thinketh. Wherefore vnto him it séemeth altogither necessarie, that one of these be mainteined and defended; and that the other be refused, as false and vnprofitable. Which deliberation being taken,
And we must diligently mark, that his arguments make no less against the foretellings of our prophets; than they impugn the divinations of the Ethnics, whereof he at that time disputed. Wherefore thus I think best to answer his curious reasons. Let us grant him what he would; to wit, that for the establishing of Gods prescience, we agree that there is a certain and determinate order before GOD, 1as well of things, as of causes. But that which he bringeth in at last; namely, that all things will therefore come to pass of necessity; that will we deny. For though there be an order of causes appointed, yet doth it not follow thereof, that there cannot be some causes found among them, which may keep their liberty, or (as they call it) their contingence. And in this point Cicero seemeth to err more than the Stoics: for he, 2to save the liberty of man, would that all order of causes, and foreshowing of things to come, should be utterly taken away; which things take so sure hold of the nature of God, that the same being spoiled of them, it cannot seem to consist. But the Stoics, because they would take nothing from the nature of GOD, 3do bring in their destiny: and that our entire and perfect will may have a place, they altogether remove the same from the order of causes joined together.
And we must diligentlie marke, that his arguments make no lesse against the foretellings of our prophets; than they impugne the diuinations of the Ethniks, whereof he at that time disputed. Wherefore thus I thinke best to answer his curious reasons. Let vs grant him what he would; to wit, that for the establishing of Gods prescience, we agrée that there is a certeine and determinate order before GOD, 1as well of things, as of causes. But that which he bringeth in at last; namelie, that all things will therefore come to passe of necessitie; that will we denie. For though there be an order of causes appointed, yet dooth it not followe therof, that there cannot be som causes found among them, which may kéepe their libertie, or (as they call it) their contingence. And in this point Cicero séemeth to erre more than the Stoiks: for he, 2
35 But here let us join issue with him, that we may steadfastly deny, that the knowledge of GOD doth nothing at all hinder our will; although it comprehend the things which ⟨p. 278⟩are to come: for never shall the will of man bring any thing to effect, unless GOD have both foreknown it, and wild it to be brought to effect. When he shall know before hand, that to morrow I will either run or read; indeed I shall run and read, yet not driven thereto of any necessity, but (as they speak) contingently: for as far as belongeth to my self, I might do neither one nor other. But if thou urge further, and say; Yet nevertheless thou shalt do it, in such sort as God knew that thou shouldst do it. I grant: but thereof it followeth not, that I could not otherwise do; because we do not always that which we can do: nay rather, many things might be done, which in no wise be done. 1And in that I shall read or run, it proceedeth altogether of my own choice: for of all things it is most in our power, to will, or not to will. Wherefore when they say; Because God knew before, that thou wouldest read or run; Therefore of necessity thou shalt read: we must demand of them again, whether under the name of necessity, they mean a compelled and a repugnant will.
35 But here let vs ioine issue with him, that we may stedfastlie denie, that the knowledge of GOD dooth nothing at all hinder our will; although it comprehend the things which ⟨p. 278⟩are to come: for neuer shall the will of man bring anie thing to effect, vnlesse GOD haue both foreknowne it, and wild it to be brought to effect. When he shall knowe before hand, that to morrowe I will either runne or read; indéed I shall runne and read, yet not driuen thereto of anie necessitie, but (as they speake) contingentlie: for as farre as belongeth to my selfe, I might doo neither one nor other. But if thou vrge further, and saie; Yet neuerthelesse thou shalt doo it, in such sort as God knew that thou shouldst doo it. I grant: but thereof it followeth not, that I could not otherwise doo; bicause we doo not alwaies that which we can doo: nay rather, manie things might be doone, which in no wise be doone. 1
1For if this be their mind, that we utterly deny: because it may be, that God foreknew that I would do some thing, and that neither unwillingly, nor with a constrained mind; but that I would do it willingly. But if by necessity, they mean that this should in any wise be done of me, we will not deny it: for so much as the controversy now is, not of the thing which is done, or is not done; but the disputation between us is only of the manner and form of doing. 2Neither (as he thought) are admonitions, laws, rebukings, or religious prayers taken away: these things doubtless will be of force, and that more frequentedlie than he could persuade himself; because God not only hath mans safety in his foreknowledge, but also he comprehendeth in his understanding, the ways and means, whereby he will help them. Wherefore if we shall perceive our brother to have need of the remedies, which we have here mentioned, we must boldly use them: for they have so far forth appeared, as God before hand knew, and would, that they should be profitable. Neither must we desist from our duty, although it may be, that all mortal men would affirm that we labour in vain. For we must follow the law prescribed unto us, and not the secret prescience of God, whereof we have no surety what he hath decreed of things to come.
1For if this be their mind, that we vtterlie denie: bicause it may be, that God foreknew that I would doo some thing, and that neither vnwillinglie, nor with a constrained mind; but that I would doo it willinglie. But if by necessitie, they meane that this should in anie wise be doone of me, we will not denie it: for so much as the controuersie now is, not of the thing which is doone, or is not doone; but the disputation betwéene vs is onelie of the maner and forme of dooing. 2Neither (as he thought) are admonitions, lawes, rebukings, or religious praiers taken awaie: these things doubtles will be of force, and that more frequentedlie than he could persuade himselfe; bicause God not onelie hath mans safetie in his foreknowledge, but also he comprehendeth in his vnderstanding, the waies and meanes, whereby he will helpe them. Wherefore if we shall perceiue our brother to haue néed of the remedies, which we haue héere mentioned, we must boldlie vse them: for they haue so farre foorth appéered, as God before hand knew, and would, that they should be profitable. Neither must we desist from our dutie, although it may be, that all mortall men would affirme that we labour in vaine. For we must followe the lawe prescribed vnto vs, and not the secret prescience of God, whereof we haue no suertie what he hath decréed of things to come.
And seeing the prescience of God is not the nature, or (as they term it) the essence or being of our mind; we must give judgement of the actions which proceed from the same, according as they ought to be esteemed by the nature of the mind and will; and not by that which is placed out of the same. Wherefore, seeing the nature of will is, that it is moved, neither unwillingly nor by constraint; it cannot be excluded from it by any outward means. 1It may sooner be abolished not to be at all, than that the violent action can be taken there from: even as thou mayest easilier rid any of us from being men, than when we be men to make us that we shall not be furnished with a reasonable soul; for it followeth immediately, that the soul being abandoned of reason, he cannot any longer be a man.
And séeing the prescience of God is not the nature, or (as they terme it) the essence or being of our mind; we must giue iudgement of the actions which procéed from the same, according as they ought to be estéemed by the nature of the mind and will; and not by that which is placed out of the same. Wherefore, séeing the nature of will is, that it is mooued, neither vnwillinglie nor by constraint; it cannot be excluded from it by anie outward means. 1It may sooner be abolished not to be at all, than that the violent action can be taken there from: euen as thou maist easilier ridde anie of vs from being men, than when we be men to make vs that we shall not be furnished with a reasonable soule; for it followeth immediatlie, that the soule being abandoned of reason, he cannot anie longer be a man.
36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessity, that I shall read to morrow; seeing God hath this foreknown: 1we answer, that upon condition, or supposition, some necessity may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessity, which we grant, the choice of free will may very well agree. Moreover, Aristotle in his Ethics, disputeth, and that learnedly (as he doth all other things) whether the casting forth, which is done in the sea, when shipwreck is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntary. And although he there confesseth a certain action, that is mixed with willingness and unwillingness: yet nevertheless he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong unto the voluntary sense; seeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogether make choice of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingness in this kind of action, whereas men by a certain force are tried to constrain themselves, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not been) they would never have done; then how much rather shall not we take willingness from our usual and common actions, when we perceive our selves, of our own accord, and with a mind most willing, to do and endeavour those things, which we think good; although we doubt not, but God did long before understand of the same?
36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessitie, that I shall read to morrowe; séeing God hath this foreknowen: 1we answer, that vpon condition, or supposition, some necessitie may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessitie, which we grant, the choise of frée will may verie well agrée. Moreouer, Aristotle in his Ethiks, disputeth, and that learnedlie (as he dooth all other things) whether the casting foorth, which is doone in the sea, when shipwracke is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntarie. And although he there confesseth a certeine action, that is mixed with willingnesse and vnwillingnesse: yet neuerthelesse he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong vnto the voluntarie sense; séeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogither make choise of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingnesse in this kind of action, wheras men by a certeine force are tried to constraine themselues, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not béene) they would neuer haue doone; then how much rather shall not we take willingnesse from our vsuall and common actions, when we perceiue our selues, of our owne accord, and with a mind most willing, to doo and indeuour those things, which we thinke good; although we doubt not, but God did long before vnderstand of the same?
And that the necessity of this kind which we have taught to be by supposition, doth not overthrow the free power of our will; 1Chrysostom doth plainly show, while he writing upon the first epistle to the Corinthians, & interpreting these words; It behooveth that heresies be, that they which be tried among us, 2may be made manifest, saith: Not unlike this form of speech Christ used, when he said; 3It is necessary that offences do come, but woe be unto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooved Christ to have suffered, and so to enter into his glory. 4All these things in holy matters are so to be expounded, as when they be called things of necessity; yet ⟨p. 279⟩nothing must be taken away from the nature of mans will. 5And this among the School-men is wont to be called, A necessity not of the consequent, but of consequence.
And that the necessitie of this kind which we haue taught to be by supposition, doth not ouerthrowe the frée power of our will; 1Chrysostome doth plainlie shew, while he writing vpon the first epistle to the Corinthians, & interpreting these words; It behooueth that heresies be, that they which be tried among vs, 2may be made manifest, saith: Not vnlike this forme of spéech Christ vsed, when he said; 3It is necessarie that offenses doo come, but wo be vnto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooued Christ to haue suffered, and so to enter into his glorie. 4
1Through this libertie of theirs, the poets went further, and said, that manie things be doone, euen whether the gods will or no. And Homer brought in Iupiter to be sad, and to lament the necessitie, or destinie, by the force whereof he was let from remoouing death, which approched vnto his swéet sonne Sarpedones. And he maketh Neptunus to take verie gréeuouslie• the chance of his sonne Cyclops; of whom he being stirred vp with a lust to reuenge, would haue driuen Vlysses altogither from home, and complaineth, that this was not granted to him by destinie. And in Virgil, Iuno dooth no lesse outragiouslie bewaile; bicause she had kept wars so long togither with one nation, and yet could not remooue (as she desired) from the coast of Italie the Troian nauie. But we Christians doo not in such sort speake of God: for we haue most certeinlie learned out of the holie scriptures, that there is nothing vnpossible to God; and we are taught by Christ himselfe, that althings are possible vnto God. And our faith, after the example of Abraham, 2dooth chéeflie cleaue to this persuasion; that God can doo whatsoeuer he hath promised. Neither must we conceiue in our mind, 3that Christ was either condemned vnto the death, or forced to the crosse against his will, or his father not willing. GOD would these things to be doone, not being led thereto by an ineuitable necessitie; but by a superabundant & excéeding charitie towards men. So the scripture teacheth vs, which saith; 4So God loueth the world, as he gaue his onelie sonne, &c. And vnto the Romans it is written; 5Which spared not his owne sonne, but gaue him for vs all. Christ himselfe by the same loue, was mooued to die for vs; and he taught vs, 6that A greater loue than this can none haue, that one putteth his life for his friends. And thereby he shewed himselfe to haue excéeded the measure of mans loue; bicause he would suffer death for his enimies. And that he willinglie, and of his owne accord tooke death vpon him, he sufficientlie declared; when in the last banket (which, according to the Paschall custome, he kept with his apostles) he said; 7I haue earnestlie desired to eate this passeouer with you.