A14350:1136
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessity, that I shall read to morrow; seeing God hath this foreknown: 1we answer, that upon condition, or supposition, some necessity may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessity, which we grant, the choice of free will may very well agree. Moreover, Aristotle in his Ethics, disputeth, and that learnedly (as he doth all other things) whether the casting forth, which is done in the sea, when shipwreck is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntary. And although he there confesseth a certain action, that is mixed with willingness and unwillingness: yet nevertheless he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong unto the voluntary sense; seeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogether make choice of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingness in this kind of action, whereas men by a certain force are tried to constrain themselves, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not been) they would never have done; then how much rather shall not we take willingness from our usual and common actions, when we perceive our selves, of our own accord, and with a mind most willing, to do and endeavour those things, which we think good; although we doubt not, but God did long before understand of the same?
36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of necessitie, that I shall read to morrowe; séeing God hath this foreknowen: 1we answer, that vpon condition, or supposition, some necessitie may be granted; but not perfect and absolute. Wherefore with that necessitie, which we grant, the choise of frée will may verie well agrée. Moreouer, Aristotle in his Ethiks, disputeth, and that learnedlie (as he dooth all other things) whether the casting foorth, which is doone in the sea, when shipwracke is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntarie. And although he there confesseth a certeine action, that is mixed with willingnesse and vnwillingnesse: yet neuerthelesse he concludeth, that those kind of actions belong vnto the voluntarie sense; séeing for that time, wherein the shipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogither make choise of them. And if so be that notable Philosopher doubted not to place willingnesse in this kind of action, wheras men by a certeine force are tried to constraine themselues, to choose that thing, which otherwise (if that chance had not béene) they would neuer haue doone; then how much rather shall not we take willingnesse from our vsuall and common actions, when we perceiue our selues, of our owne accord, and with a mind most willing, to doo and indeuour those things, which we thinke good; although we doubt not, but God did long before vnderstand of the same?
And that the necessity of this kind which we have taught to be by supposition, doth not overthrow the free power of our will; 1Chrysostom doth plainly show, while he writing upon the first epistle to the Corinthians, & interpreting these words; It behooveth that heresies be, that they which be tried among us, 2may be made manifest, saith: Not unlike this form of speech Christ used, when he said; 3It is necessary that offences do come, but woe be unto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooved Christ to have suffered, and so to enter into his glory. 4All these things in holy matters are so to be expounded, as when they be called things of necessity; yet ⟨p. 279⟩nothing must be taken away from the nature of mans will. 5And this among the School-men is wont to be called, A necessity not of the consequent, but of consequence.
And that the necessitie of this kind which we haue taught to be by supposition, doth not ouerthrowe the frée power of our will; 1Chrysostome doth plainlie shew, while he writing vpon the first epistle to the Corinthians, & interpreting these words; It behooueth that heresies be, that they which be tried among vs, 2may be made manifest, saith: Not vnlike this forme of spéech Christ vsed, when he said; 3It is necessarie that offenses doo come, but wo be vnto that man by whom they shall happen. Also he said to his apostles, that It behooued Christ to haue suffered, and so to enter into his glorie. 4
37 There be some which commonly say, that doubtless these distinctions help us nothing at all; if God have known before hand of things, those shall in any wise come to pass. Yes verily, they are profitable unto us, and that not meanly: for because thereby we understand, that mans will is not compelled; but that willingly and without compulsion it desireth whatsoever it will. For otherwise I will ask thee again, whether thou wouldest be saved against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldest be saved according to his will, he of necessity is not ignorant of thy salvation: for so it is ordained, that none willeth that which he is ignorant of. 1It happeneth unto us very often, that we together behold players; yet dare we not say, that the sight and knowledge which we have, bringeth any necessity to them which play: and yet, while we see them in play, it is of necessity, that they do play. Wherefore, as that necessity infringeth not the nature of their will; even so the excellency of God compelleth not the will of man.
37 There be some which commonlie saie, that doubtles these distinctions helpe vs nothing at all; if God haue knowen before hand of things, those shall in anie wise come to passe. Yes verelie, they are profitable vnto vs, and that not meanlie: for bicause thereby we vnderstand, that mans will is not compelled; but that willinglie and without compulsion it desireth whatsoeuer it will. For otherwise I will aske thée againe, whether thou wouldest be saued against the will and consent of God? I suppose not. But if thou wouldest be saued according to his will, he of necessitie is not ignorant of thy saluation: for so it is ordeined, that none willeth that which he is ignorant of. 1It happeneth vnto vs verie often, that we togither behold plaiers; yet dare we not saie, that the sight and knowledge which we haue, bringeth anie necessitie to them which plaie: and yet, while we sée them in plaie, it is of necessitie, that they doo plaie. Wherefore, as that necessitie infringeth not the nature of their will; euen so the excellencie of God compelleth not the will of man.
Some brawl at us, and say, that this similitude is far from the question proposed; because none at any time do behold players, which be not, and play not indeed. Whereas it is ascribed to God, that he hath had a knowledge before hand, of all our doings even from the beginning: when as yet, neither we, nor any of our actions appeared to be. To these men I might answer, that unto God all things are no otherwise present, than they which do play are conversant in the fight of them which behold. 1Let every one therefore take heed to himself, that he cast not the causes of his sins upon God; and when such a kind of cogitation entereth into his mind, let him have respect unto lust, voluptuousness, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountains let him seek for the causes of his sins. 2Neither must there be much credit given unto the Peripatetics in this matter, which deny, that God hath understanding of particular affairs; least they should seem to think, that the mind of God were abject & vile, if he should draw his knowledge from frail and transitory things. This thing is not agreeable unto our documents: for we do believe, that God of himself hath a perfect knowledge of all things; neither that he hath any need to challenge knowledge else-where to himself.
Some brall at vs, and saie, that this similitude is farre from the question proposed; bicause none at anie time doo behold plaiers, which be not, and plaie not indéed. Whereas it is ascribed to God, that he hath had a knowledge before hand, of all our doings euen from the beginning: when as yet, neither we, nor anie of our actions appéered to be. To these men I might answer, that vnto God all things are no otherwise present, than they which doo plaie are conuersant in the fight of them which behold. 1Let euerie one therefore take héed to himselfe, that he cast not the causes of his sinnes vpon God; and when such a kind of cogitation entreth into his mind, let him haue respect vnto lust, voluptuousnesse, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is sore diseased; and out of these fountaines let him séeke for the causes of his sinnes.
138 And whereas touching the third point, it was judged, that the power of God is a hinderance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong. For, although that God by his infinite power, wherewith he is endued, 2doth what his pleasure is; yet doth he suffer the state and nature of things to stand whole: neither doth he violate them, or wrest them any other way, than the condition of them doth bear. Wherefore it is said in the book of Wisdom; that God doth mightily reach even from one end to another, and doth pleasantly dispose all things: or (as the Greek text saith) [Greek or Hebrew], that is, Profitably. Which might not be said, if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The sum is, that God doth here moderate his power in ruling of the world, that he may fitly apply his action unto all manner of things. In the fourth place sin seemed to be a hinderance to the liberty of the will; 3as if it so weakened the powers of man, that after a sort they might be able to do nothing any more. But there needeth not now many words about this matter; because there hath been plenty enough spoken in those things which we have declared, how much our liberty hath been diminished by reason of sin; and that specially as touching very perfect and good actions, which might be acceptable and well pleasing unto God. Besides, it hath been declared, that our liberty is not by this means utterly taken away; but rather, that there is as yet a great deal of it remaining.
138 And whereas touching the third point, it was iudged, that the power of God is a hinderance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor strong. For, although that God by his infinit power, wherewith he is indued, 2doth what his pleasure is; yet doth he suffer the state and nature of things to stand whole: neither doth he violate them, or wrest them anie other waie, than the condition of them doth beare. Wherfore it is said in the booke of Wisdome; that God doth mightilie reach euen from one end to another, and doth pleasantlie dispose all things: or (as the Gréeke text saith) 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, Profitablie. Which might not be said, if by the high power of God the natures of things were disturbed. The summe is, that God doth here moderate his power in ruling of the world, that he may fitlie applie his action vnto all maner of things. In the fourth place sinne séemed to be a hinderance to the libertie of the will;
39 Moreover, concerning the powers celestial, there shall be no great need to entreat; 1seeing the Astronomers do glory in their own books, that The wise shall bear rule among the stars. But and if so be that these things, which they pronounce, might not be escaped, all their gains would fall away: for no man would bestow cost upon the skill of those things, which he thought he should not be able, neither to avoid, nor change, either by endeavour or study. Which thing without controversy would ensue, if so be they should ascribe a mere necessity unto their foreshowings. By this means all prayers, piety, and worshipping of God would be taken away: for who would pray to God for obtaining of any thing, if he were already persuaded, that the same should not be granted unto him? Wherefore Augustine said; 2They which thus think, do great wrong unto heaven: for there they believe is a court appointed, 3wherein are notable acts decreed, which cannot be avoided: the which if it were in the earth, it should needs be taken away. How much less must we think, that the same is done by God in the celestial parts? I beseech you what judgement would be left, if so be we did all things upon constraint?
39 Moreouer, concerning the powers celestiall, there shalbe no great néed to intreate; 1séeing the Astronomers doo glorie in their owne bookes, that The wise shall beare rule among the starres. But and if so be that these things, which they pronounce, might not be escaped, all their gaines would fall awaie: for no man would bestowe cost vpon the skill of those things, which he thought he should not be able, neither to auoid, nor change, either by indeuour or studie. Which thing without controuersie would ensue, if so be they should ascribe a méere necessitie vnto their foreshewings. By this meanes all praiers, pietie, and worshipping of God would be taken awaie: for who would praie to God for obteining of anie thing, if he were alreadie persuaded, that the same should not be granted vnto him? Wherefore Augustine said; 2
This matter some excuse, saying, that from heaven is only signified what shall come to pass: ⟨p. 280⟩yet that we be not thereby driven by any necessity. And they bring forth a place out of the book of Genesis, 1wherein it seemeth to be spoken; that The stars be put as signs. But that place is to be understood concerning seasons, winds, 2rains, tempests, and such like sort. But how can they affirm, that in heaven they see certain signs of things to come? They shall hardly prove it, especially touching mans affairs. 3For what answer can they make of twins, which being conceived at one time, and have all one aspect of the heavens; yet (as experience teacheth) the chance and success of them is altogether differing?
This matter some excuse, saieng, that frō heauen is onelie signified what shall come to passe: ⟨p. 280⟩yet that we be not thereby driuen by anie necessitie. And they bring foorth a place out of the booke of Genesis, 1wherein it séemeth to be spoken; that The starres be put as signes. But that place is to be vnderstood concerning seasons, winds, 2raines, tempests, and such like sort. But how can they affirme, that in heauen they sée certeine signes of things to come? They shall hardlie prooue it, especiallie touching mans affaires. 3For what answer can they make of twins, which being conceiued at one time, and haue all one aspect of the heauens; yet (as experience teacheth) the chance and successe of them is altogither differing?
1Augustine, in his fift book De civitate Dei, and second chapter, is worth the reading; where he writeth, 2that sometime there happened two brothers to be like affectioned, that when one sickened, the other also was diseased: and when the one recovered, the other was also eased. Concerning which thing Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, 3made answer, that he thought them to be twins; and that therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their body all of one nature. 4But Possidonius the Mathematician did ascribe the whole cause unto the stars; because in their nativity they occupied all one aspect of the heavens. But what (saith Augustine) will these men say of twins, and innumerable living creatures, which are borne in hours and moments alike; and yet attain to such diversity of fortunes? 5And Augustine witnesseth, that this example was taken out of Cicero; the which nevertheless we read not in his books at this day extant, unless perhaps he found the same in his book De fato, which remaineth amongst us all torn, mangled, and diminished.
1Augustine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, and second chapter, is woorth the reading; where he writeth, 2that sometime there happened two brothers to be like affectioned, that when one sickened, the other also was diseased: and when the one recouered, the other was also eased. Concerning which thing Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, 3made answer, that he thoght them to be twins; and that therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their bodie all of one nature. 4But Possidonius the Mathematician did ascribe the whole cause vnto the starres; bicause in their natiuitie they occupied all one aspect of the heauens. But what (saith Augustine) will these men saie of twins, and innumerable liuing creatures, which are borne in houres and moments alike; and yet atteine to such diuersitie of fortunes?
140 Moreover, destiny, which the Stoics appoint to have mere necessity, hindereth not our matter; forsomuch as we admit not the same to be. They severed it from the wills of men, because they thought that all things would go to naught, if together with other causes they comprehended will under destiny. Howbeit, it seemed not good to them, 2utterly to sever mans will from destiny; saving in respect of the first choice, which they would have to be wholly in our will. But whiles we shall choose any cause that might be under destiny, they would have it follow of necessity; that what things soever they were, they should be joined unto it. Even as Euripides said unto Laius, that It was free for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessity he should suffer even those things, which Apollo prophesied to be contained under destiny.
140 Moreouer, destinie, which the Stoiks appoint to haue méere necessitie, hindereth not our matter; forsomuch as we admit not the same to be. They seuered it from the wils of men, bicause they thought that all things would go to naught, if togither with other causes they comprehended will vnder destinie. Howbeit, it séemed not good to them, 2vtterlie to seuer mans will from destinie; sauing in respect of the first choise, which they would haue to be wholie in our will. But whiles we shall choose anie cause that might be vnder destinie, they would haue it followe of necessitie; that what things soeuer they were, they should be ioined vnto it. Euen as Euripides said vnto Laius, that It was frée for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of necessitie he should suffer euen those things, which Apollo prophesied to be conteined vnder destinie.
1But we, as we declared at the first, deny not, but that things are knit together, as God ordained, and knew before hand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remaineth whole and sound. For unto whom soever a thing contingent (as the School-divines speak) is due, they have the same: and to whom soever necessity belongeth, with necessity they be constrained. But in very deed, grace, which finally seemeth to resist free will, doth not take the same away; 2but rather helpeth and restoreth it. But now we will cease from these matters, least we dispute more curiously of them than beseemeth christians. Let every one follow their own vocation; and let us leave inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let us follow that doctrine of God, which is plainly laid out before us in the holy scriptures.
1But we, as we declared at the first, denie not, but that things are knit togither, as God ordeined, and knew before hand; yet so, as the nature and condition of them remaineth whole and sound. For vnto whom soeuer a thing contingent (as the Schoole-diuines speake) is due, they haue the same: and to whom soeuer necessitie belongeth, with necessitie they be constreined. But in verie déed, grace, which finallie séemeth to resist frée will, dooth not take the same awaie; 2but rather helpeth and restoreth it. But now we will cease from these matters, least we dispute more curiouslie of them than beséemeth christians. Let euerie one followe their owne vocation; and let vs leaue inquiring, more than is requisite, about the secret and hidden will of God, touching prescience and predestination: and let vs followe that doctrine of God, which is plainlie laid out before vs in the holy scriptures.
¶ Look another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this book. Now we think it convenient to join unto this disputation certain other discourses; namely, of Voluntary and Not voluntary, and also of mans choice, and such like.
¶ Looke another place of the same argument in the addition at the end of this booke. Now we thinke it conuenient to ioine vnto this disputation certeine other discourses; namelie, of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, and also of mans choise, and such like.
41 Aristotle in his first book of Ethics treateth at large of that which is voluntary, 1and of that which is not voluntary: the reason whereof is, because praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercy be voluntary. The argument is taken from the consequents. Praises and dispraises serve unto moral knowledge; for as commendable manners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blame-worthy are to be avoided. Howbeit, such praises and dispraises cannot be judged of, unless we know whether they be done with a willing or unwilling mind. Further, he added another cause; to wit, that this doctrine is a part of the civill faculty, whereto belongeth the making of laws. And laws set forth rewards and punishments to the observers and transgressors of them: it is needful therefore that they know which be voluntary things, and which be not voluntary. 2For men that be unwilling, do not obtain rewards; and they which sin by compulsion, should not suffer punishments. Some wrest this reason of law-makers hereunto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things, which of necessity must be done, nor those things, which are unpossible to be done; but only those, which be in our own power: and that therefore it behooveth them to know what is the nature of voluntary and not voluntary. I know in very deed, 3that this is the definition of law; that It is a reason commanding honest things, and calling back from things that be dishonest. But that which these men avouch, to ⟨p. 281⟩wit, that it commandeth things which be possible, I would only grant it as touching civill laws, but not of divine laws: for those require things that be unpossible, especially in respect of the state of nature, corrupt & defiled. Howbeit, Aristotle used not this reason; he only touched these things which I have mentioned of punishments & rewards. 4But why did he speak of the affects, since those be not voluntary, but are naturally planted in our minds? The Greek scholia answer; that, albeit as touching substance and root they be of nature, yet may they some kind of way be called voluntary, insomuch as by use & exercise they may be enlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer, that Aristotle made mention of both, of affects I mean and of actions; but voluntary must only be referred to the actions.
The which thing being done, it will also belong unto the virtues, which are conversant in the affections: for those also are gotten by actions, which when they be right and commendable, must be accounted voluntary. Moreover, why doth Aristotle say, that sometime pardon, sometime mercy must be showed? Because we do not always take mercy on them whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself, killed him which set upon him; he did it not willingly, he is forgiven, but we take not pity on him.
The which thing being doone, it will also belong vnto the vertues, which are conuersant in the affections: for those also are gotten by actions, which when they be right and commendable, must be accounted voluntarie. Morouer, whie dooth Aristotle saie, that somtime pardon, somtime mercie must be shewed? Bicause we doo not alwaies take mercie on them whom we pardon; for a man in defending himself, killed him which set vpō him; he did it not willinglie, he is forgiuen, but we take not pitie on him.
142 But how the knowledge of that which is Voluntary and Not voluntary, may help to moderate the punishments which laws appoint, it may many ways be showed. They which have committed any thing against their wills, or of compulsion, are not punished: And in the civill laws there be very many titles, which provide remedy in the case of ignorance or compulsion: even as they do likewise concerning those things which be done for fear, and by crafty collusion, and touching them which be under 25. years of age, &c. Also he that is taken with madness or frenzy is forgiven; yea and a mad man, although he kill his father; shall not be punished. The laws of God quit the hewer of wood, 2which by chance and not willingly shall kill an other, because perhaps the axe might fly out of the helve, and certain cities were appointed for refuge. Also Plato in his ninth book of laws, showeth that many things are to be forgiven, where the will did not consent. So as it greatly availeth law-makers and judges of the law, because of giving punishments and rewards, to know what is done voluntary, and what is not done voluntary. We will speak first of Not voluntary: for in this matter the privation seemeth to be better known, than the thing it self. By darkness is the light better known, and sickness doth make the goodness of health the more manifest. 3This definition of Not voluntary appeareth by the reckoning up of the parts thereof, so that it is rather a division than a definition; albeit that just and full divisions have sometime the place of a definition. And we then chiefly use them, when that which is common to the parts, can not be expressed by any one certain point thereof. Howbeit we must understand, that it is called Not voluntary, of these two forms or kinds, which be of one signification: for even that which is done violently and unwittingly, is not voluntary. And we prove, that the division of these two parts is rightly made: for Voluntary, which is contrary to Not voluntary, standeth of two things; of knowledge, and desire. First we must know that which we must desire, then are we stirred up thereunto by a motion of the desire. But either of these two may be hindered: ignorance taketh away knowledge, and violence letteth the desire. For good cause therefore be these two put contrary to that which is voluntary.
Violence is defined what it is after this manner; It is a vehement enforcing, which either not at all, or very difficultly can be abidden. But some man will marvel, how two things may be set against one: for against Voluntary is set that which is done by violence, and also that which is done unwittingly. Hereunto we answer, that there is but one set against one: constraint or Not voluntary, is set against willingness or voluntary. But this unwillingness or not voluntary, is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is done by violence, & an other which is done by unskilfulness.
Violence is defined what it is after this maner; It is a vehement inforcing, which either not at all, or verie difficultlie can be abidden. But some man will maruell, how two things may be set against one: for against Voluntarie is set that which is doone by violence, and also that which is doone vnwittinglie. Herevnto we answer, that there is but one set against one: constraint or Not voluntarie, is set against willingnesse or voluntarie. But this vnwillingnesse or not voluntarie, is afterward distributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is doone by violence, & an other which is doone by vnskilfulnes.
41 Aristotle in his first booke of Ethiks treateth at large of that which is voluntarie, 1and of that which is not voluntarie: the reason whereof is, bicause praise, dispraise, pardon, and sometimes mercie be voluntarie. The argument is taken from the consequents. Praises and dispraises serue vnto morall knowledge; for as commendable maners and actions are to be desired, so those which are blame-woorthie are to be auoided. Howbeit, such praises and dispraises cannot be iudged of, vnlesse we knowe whether they be doon with a willing or vnwilling mind. Further, he added another cause; to wit, that this doctrine is a part of the ciuill facultie, wherto belongeth the making of lawes. And lawes set foorth rewards and punishments to the obseruers and transgressors of them: it is néedfull therefore that they knowe which be voluntarie things, and which be not voluntarie. 2For men that be vnwilling, doo not obteine rewards; and they which sinne by compulsion, should not suffer punishments. Some wrest this reason of lawe-makers herevnto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not those things, which of necessitie must be doon, nor those things, which are vnpossible to be doone; but onlie those, which be in our owne power: and that therefore it behooueth them to knowe what is the nature of voluntarie and not voluntarie. I knowe in verie déed, 3that this is the definition of lawe; that It is a reason commanding honest things, and calling backe from things that be dishonest. But that which these men auouch, to ⟨p. 281⟩wit, that it commandeth things which be possible, I would onelie grant it as touching ciuill laws, but not of diuine laws: for those require things that be vnpossible, especiallie in respect of the state of nature, corrupt & defiled. Howbeit, Aristotle vsed not this reson; he onlie touched these things which I haue mentioned of punishments & rewards. 4But whie did he speake of the affects, since those be not voluntarie, but are naturallie planted in our minds? The Gréek scholies answer; that, albeit as touching substance and root they be of nature, yet may they some kind of waie be called voluntarie, insomuch as by vse & exercise they may be inlarged or repressed. Or else we will answer, that Aristotle made mention of both, of affects I meane and of actions; but voluntarie must onelie be referred to the actions.