A14350:1170
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Whereupon Plato in his treatise Memnon, doth very well expound this. First he taketh this as granted, that there is no man which would be a miserable and unhappy man. Which being granted, he addeth, that then there is no man which desireth evil things; since to be miserable, and to be unhappy, is nothing else, than to be conversant in evil things, and to be delighted in them. So then it appeareth, that evil men do choose to themselves those things that be evil, unwittingly. And this error (as saith Cicero) we have sucked together even with our nurses milk. But the reason why this general ignorance maketh not a man to do against his will, is, for that it hindereth not his choosing of things, nay rather it is joined therewith: for ill men choose rather to steal than to labour, rather to be idle than to exercise any art, rather surfeiting than abstinence. It may be, that otherwhile the whole matter may be generally unknown, and sometime generally known, but unknown privately and particularly. As if any man shall say, he knoweth adultery to be sin; but that he is ignorant particularly, that this adultery is forbidden: neither of these ignorances is worthy of pardon. But if any man do not know the circumstances in general, and think that there is no consideration to be had of the end, nor of the place, nor of the time, nor of the matter that he is about to do; whether shall this man be worthy of mercy or pardon? No verily: for he ought to have known this. And this common kind of perceiving belongeth to the universal knowledge, which must in any wise be had: but the ignorance of this or that circumstance particularly may be excused, since no man either may or is able perfectly to know all those circumstances in every particular. Wherefore only the ignorance of them maketh the action to be an action done against the will.
Wherevpon Plato in his treatise Memnon, dooth verie well expound this. First he taketh this as granted, that there is no man which would be a miserable and vnhappie man. Which being granted, he addeth, that then there is no man which desireth euill things; since to be miserable, and to be vnhappie, is nothing else, than to be conuersant in euill things, and to be delighted in them. So then it appéereth, that euill men doo choose to themselues those things that be euill, vnwittinglie. And this error (as saith Cicero) we haue sucked togither euen with our nurses milke. But the reason whie this generall ignorance maketh not a man to doo against his will, is, for that it hindereth not his choosing of things, naie rather it is ioined therewith: for ill men choose rather to steale than to labour, rather to be idle than to exercise anie art, rather surfeting than abstinence. It may be, that otherwhile the whole matter may be generallie vnknowen, and sometime generallie knowen, but vnknowen priuatlie and particularlie. As if anie man shall saie, he knoweth adulterie to be sinne; but that he is ignorant particularlie, that this adulterie is forbidden: neither of these ignorances is worthie of pardon. But if anie man doo not knowe the circumstances in generall, and thinke that there is no consideration to be had of the end, nor of the place, nor of the time, nor of the matter that he is about to doo; whether shall this man be worthie of mercie or pardon? No verelie: for he ought to haue knowen this. And this common kind of perceiuing belongeth to the vniuersall knowledge, which must in anie wise be had: but the ignorance of this or that circumstance particularlie may be excused, since no man either maie or is able perfectlie to knowe all those circumstances in euerie particular. Wherefore onelie the ignorance of them maketh the action to be an action doone against the will.