A14350:1183
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Moreover (saith Aristotle) what ⟨p. 291⟩difference is there between those things to be done against the will, which are according unto reason, or which be wickedly done according to wrath, sith either of them are things that may be avoided? This reason seemeth to stand on the nature of sin: for seeing that sin consisteth in those things, which ought or can be avoided; and that this estate is found as well in those things, which are done amiss by reason, as in those, which are naughtily done of anger with a desire; they ought to be both called voluntary. Why then are these things, rather than those other, accounted of the adversaries to be done against the will?
Moreouer (saith Aristotle) what ⟨p. 291⟩difference is there betwéene those things to be doone against the will, which are according vnto reason, or which be wickedlie doone according to wrath, sith either of them are things that may be auoided? This reason semeth to stand on the nature of sinne: for séeing that sinne consisteth in those things, which ought or can be auoided; and that this estate is found as well in those things, which are doone amisse by reason, as in those, which are naughtilie doone of anger with a desire; they ought to be both called voluntarie. Why then are these things, rather than those other, accounted of the aduersaries to be doone against the will?
58 And as concerning humane affections, Aristotle doth thus argue; Because the unreasonable affections, which we have, be humane, and those be humane affections, which do arise of anger or desire, therefore are they also voluntary, and are done without constraint. For whatsoever is humane, is voluntary. But there is no man will say, that desires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, even as reason is in the self same men. Wherefore, if actions, which flow from reason be humane, because reason is a part of our mind; so likewise shall those be humane, which proceed from anger or desire. For the powers of anger, and of desire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be objected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or desire, proceed from the part unreasonable. True it is (saith Aristotle) but yet these be powers of an humane mind, and therefore shall the acts proceeding from thence be humane. And these powers, although by essence they have no reason, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the same: which thing cometh not to pass in brute beasts. Again, these affections and actions are the first beginnings done with the will; for they may be restrained by the will. And it standeth not with them, as it doth with the power that nourisheth and increaseth, which worketh even whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is absurd to affirm, that these things are done against the will, or by constraint.