A14350:1182
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
57 Moreover, whereas some which were against Aristotle, affirm that those things which are done by anger or lust, are done against the will; then it would follow, that either all such things should be done against the will; or else that good things are with the will, and evil things against the will. Howbeit, neither of these things may be granted. But this did Aristotle overthrow, and saith; Is it not a ridiculous thing to affirm, that these things are done with the will, and those by constraint and against the will; seeing that shameful acts, which are done through anger or lust, have no less the self same beginning that honest acts have, which proceed of the self same affects? No doubt but those things, which have all one beginning, must be accounted of the self same order. And further he saith, as touching anger, that this, by the law of honesty and justice is required at our hands, that we should be angry against some; namely, against vices, and against wicked men, whom unless that private men should rebuke, and magistrates should punish, they were to be blamed. Also there be many things, which if a man do not desire, and by great endeavour procure to himself, it is a great offence; as for example: health and doctrine. Shall we therefore say, that the law of honesty and justice doth require of us, things to be done against our will and by constraint, and such things as we are not able to perform; or from the which we are not able to abstain? This would be absurd as touching civill laws. And again, whatsoever things are done against the will, they bring grief and sorrow with them. But those things that are done through anger and lust are delightful, so far is it off, that they bring trouble and heaviness with them. As concerning lust, there is no doubt thereof. But as for anger, it may be doubted, because Aristotle in his Rhetorics entreating of those things which bring pleasure, in describing the affection of wrath, bringeth in the verse of Homer, which saith, that Anger unto Achilles was even as honey that melted under his tongue. Neither indeed is anger any other thing than a desire of revenge.
57 Moreouer, whereas some which were against Aristotle, affirme that those things which are doone by anger or lust, are doone against the will; then it would followe, that either all such things should be doone against the will; or else that good things are with the will, and euill things against the will. Howbeit, neither of these things may be granted. But this did Aristotle ouerthrowe, and saith; Is it not a ridiculous thing to affirme, that these things are doone with the will, and those by constraint and against the will; séeing that shamefull acts, which are doone through anger or lust, haue no lesse the selfe same beginning that honest acts haue, which procéed of the selfe same affects? No doubt but those things, which haue all one beginning, must be accounted of the selfe same order. And further he saith, as touching anger, that this, by the lawe of honestie and iustice is required at our hands, that we should be angrie against some; namelie, against vices, and against wicked men, whom vnlesse that priuate men should rebuke, and magistrates should punish, they were to be blamed. Also there be manie things, which if a man doo not desire, and by great indeuour procure to himselfe, it is a great offense; as for example: health and doctrine. Shall we therefore saie, that the lawe of honestie and iustice dooth require of vs, things to be doone against our will and by constraint, and such things as we are not able to performe; or from the which we are not able to absteine? This would be absurd as touching ciuill lawes. And againe, whatsoeuer things are doone against the will, they bring gréefe and sorrowe with them. But those things that are doone through anger and lust are delightfull, so farre is it off, that they bring trouble and heauinesse with them. As concerning lust, there is no doubt thereof. But as for anger, it may be doubted, bicause Aristotle in his Rhetoriks intreating of those things which bring pleasure, in describing the affection of wrath, bringeth in the verse of Homer, which saith, that Anger vnto Achilles was euen as honie that melted vnder his toong. Neither indéed is anger anie other thing than a desire of reuenge.