A14350:1195
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
so as it cannot be judged by his actions, whether he be good or evil: but immediately, so soon as he showeth what choice he hath made, although he do no action, yet men give a judgement of him, either as touching his naughtiness, or his goodness. But how can it be said, that young children, and also brute beasts want the making of choice, 1when as they choose one meat before an other; play before discipline; and shun some things more than other things? We must answer, that making of choice is of two sorts. One is common, whereby one thing is either preferred before an other, or else is more eschewed than an other: and this kind of choice neither brute beasts nor children do want. The other is the very proper choice, which hath counsel going before, and is directed by the judgement of reason. And this kind of making choice can neither brute beasts nor children have: for when they pursue one thing before an other, or avoid one thing rather than an other, they are not lead by reason; but by sense. Also those things, which we do in hast, and upon the sudden, are without making of choice, not that we want reason while we commit those things, but because we admit no space of time to deliberate on them. Also the counsel, and the judgement, and deliberation of reason is hindered by the vehemency of the perturbation.
so as it cannot be iudged by his actions, whether he be good or euill: but immediatlie, so soone as he sheweth what choise he hath made, although he doo no action, yet men giue a iudgement of him, either as touching his naughtinesse, or his goodnesse. But how can it be said, that yong children, and also bruit beasts want the making of choise, 1when as they choose one meate before an other; plaie before discipline; and shunne some things more than other things? We must answer, that making of choise is of two sorts. One is common, whereby one thing is either preferred before an other, or else is more eschewed than an other: and this kind of choise neither brute beasts nor children doo want. The other is the verie proper choise, which hath counsell going before, and is directed by the iudgement of reason. And this kind of making choise can neither bruit beasts nor children haue: for when they pursue one thing before an other, or auoid one thing rather than an other, they are not lead by reason; but by sense. Also those things, which we doo in hast, and vpon the sudden, are without making of choise, not that we want reason while we commit those things, but bicause we admit no space of time to deliberate on them. Also the counsell, and the iudgement, and deliberation of reason is hindered by the vehemencie of the perturbation.