A14350:1184
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
58 And as concerning humane affections, Aristotle doth thus argue; Because the unreasonable affections, which we have, be humane, and those be humane affections, which do arise of anger or desire, therefore are they also voluntary, and are done without constraint. For whatsoever is humane, is voluntary. But there is no man will say, that desires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, even as reason is in the self same men. Wherefore, if actions, which flow from reason be humane, because reason is a part of our mind; so likewise shall those be humane, which proceed from anger or desire. For the powers of anger, and of desire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be objected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or desire, proceed from the part unreasonable. True it is (saith Aristotle) but yet these be powers of an humane mind, and therefore shall the acts proceeding from thence be humane. And these powers, although by essence they have no reason, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the same: which thing cometh not to pass in brute beasts. Again, these affections and actions are the first beginnings done with the will; for they may be restrained by the will. And it standeth not with them, as it doth with the power that nourisheth and increaseth, which worketh even whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is absurd to affirm, that these things are done against the will, or by constraint.
58 And as concerning humane affections, Aristotle dooth thus argue; Bicause the vnreasonable affections, which we haue, be humane, and those be humane affections, which doo arise of anger or desire, therefore are they also voluntarie, and are doone without constreint. For whatsoeuer is humane, is voluntarie. But there is no man will saie, that desires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, euen as reason is in the selfe same men. Wherefore, if actions, which flowe from reason be humane, bicause reason is a part of our mind; so likewise shall those be humane, which procéed from anger or desire. For the powers of anger, and of desire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be obiected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or desire, procéed from the part vnreasonable. True it is (saith Aristotle) but yet these be powers of an humane mind, and therefore shall the acts procéeding from thence be humane. And these powers, although by essence they haue no reason, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the same: which thing commeth not to passe in brute beasts. Againe, these affections and actions are the first beginnings doone with the will; for they may be restreined by the will. And it standeth not with them, as it dooth with the power that nourisheth and increaseth, which worketh euen whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is absurd to affirme, that these things are doone against the will, or by constreint.