A14350:1197
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
but the incontinent man, while he is carried away by desire, heareth no counsel. And on the other side, the continent man giveth no ear to desire, but followeth his right choice. And this reason may be applied unto anger; for he also that doth any thing by anger, doth it not by choice: and this we may see in angry men. And herein it shall suffice to have said, that an incontinent man is not altogether without choice; but yet he followeth not that which he hath in his mind.
but the incontinent man, while he is carried awaie by desire, heareth no counsell. And on the other side, the continent man giueth no eare to desire, but followeth his right choise. And this reason may be applied vnto anger; for he also that dooth anie thing by anger, dooth it not by choise: and this we may sée in angrie men. And héerein it shall suffice to haue said, that an incontinent man is not altogither without choise; but yet he followeth not that which he hath in his mind.
He is compared to a man that sleepeth, to him that is drunken, & to a city wherein good laws are not regarded. Here Aristotle reasoneth; Choice is contrary to desire; But desire is not contrary to desire; Ergo desire is not choice. This argument is in the second figure. The reason is this; Those things that agree in one third, they also agree in themselves: Even so those ⟨p. 295⟩things that do not oppose themselves against one third, do not agree together at once themselves. But there ariseth a doubt: 1because desire seemeth to be against desire. Some man desireth fame, and to have his name renowned, and the same man is much desirous of money; one of these desires is repugnant to an other. Augustus desired sovereignty, and yet was desirous to imitate Sulla, in giving up of sovereignty. These things seem to be repugnant. Pamphilus longed to be with his lover Glycerie, and yet was desirous not to offend his father. These things declare, that desires be contrary. The answer is many ways to be made. Contraries must always be contrary: but these things are not always contrary, as appeareth in the Sophister, which at one time hath both these desires; namely, the desire of glory, and the desire of money. Moreover, it behooveth that contraries have respect to one and the self same thing: but the one of these desires respecteth fame, the other money. Those things that respect one thing, after a quite contrary manner, are very contraries, and cannot be both at once together. As, to desire to have fame, and to desire not to have fame; to be noble, and not to be noble; to be maintained, and not to be maintained: these be contrary desires, and cannot be both at once together. Aristotle was not of the mind, that among desires there is no contrariety, but that contrary desires cannot be together at once in one man. But evil desire is always an enemy to sound choice in one and the self-same man, and at one and the self-same time. Neither is every choice always an adversary to every desire: for the desire of theft is not against the choice, whereby a man determineth to become rich, though it be by unjust means. And the desire of slaughter is not against the choice, which a tyrant hath made. But a sound choice (as it hath been said) is evermore against an evil desire. But what manner of contrariety is this of desire & choice?