A14350:1196
The Common Places
The common places of the most famous and renowned divine Doctor Peter Martyr divided into four principal parts: with a large addition of many theological and necessary discourses, some never extant before. Translated and partly gathered by Anthony Marten, one of the sewers of her Majesties most honourable chamber.The common places of the most famous and renowmed diuine Doctor Peter Martyr diuided into foure principall parts: with a large addition of manie theologicall and necessarie discourses, some neuer extant before. Translated and partlie gathered by Anthonie Marten, one of the sewers of hir Maiesties most honourable chamber.
Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rowe, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henry Denham, Thomas Chard, William Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583Imprinted at London : In Pater noster Rovve, by Henry Denham and Henry Middleton at the costs and charges of Henrie Denham, Thomas Chard, VVilliam Broome, and Andrew Maunsell, 1583
No title page in the transcription: set from the catalogue record.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1Wherefore there be reckoned up three things, that want the making of choice. First, brute beasts, because they are not capable of reason. Secondly, young children; which although they be endued with reason, yet can they not use the same, because of their tender age: in the third place are counted sudden and hasty motions of the mind: wherein, although men have reason enough and also years, yet do they want time of deliberation. Wherefore they, which do any thing by the force of any affection, are wont to say, that they did it not of purpose, or advisedly. Since that making of choice doth belong unto the mind, it is either of the power of knowing, 2or the power of appetite. All appetite is divided into three parts. Either it is of the more noble part of the mind, and is joined with reason, and is called the will; or else it is of the grosser part, and then it is divided into the desiring power, and into the angry power. Hereupon Aristotle said, that some thought choice to be the will, others thought it to be anger, others thought it to be desire: but if it belong unto the knowledge, then come they which affirm choice to be an opinion, who perhaps were the Stoics. But first Aristotle treateth of desire and anger, 3and reasoneth that their opinion is fond, because that then we should yield, that brute beasts have choice: for they are moved both with desire and anger, which he rejecteth, as an absurd and unworthy thing. Wherefore it plainly appeareth, that Aristotle did utterly remove desire from choice, because we may not by any means say, that desire is choice: which cannot so be judged of, as touching willingness. Indeed willingness differeth from choice, but it cannot be sundered from the same; seeing every choice is according to the will. And the argument which he used is this; If desire were choice, whatsoever thing worketh by desire, should (no doubt) work by choice; But not every thing that worketh by desire, doth work by choice. The overthrow of the consequent appeareth in this, because an incontinent man worketh by desire, but not by choice; for that he followeth it not. He determined to do well, but he stood not to his determination; therefore he dealt not according to the choice, which he had conceived in his mind. Choice is an appetite, which is a counsellor;