Of mans Election, or making of choice.Of mans Election, or making of choise.
pp. 293–29714 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Of mans Election, or making of choice.
Of mans Election, or making of choise.
61 Aristotle saith; 1that making of choice is most proper to virtue. For in the definition, which he made of virtue, first was placed the general kind, namely the habit; then he added the difference, to wit, mediocrity; after that were joined together the two properties; namely, that through virtue we do things of our own accord; and then, that we do them by making of choice. Howbeit, of these two properties, making of choice is the more proper: neither only, if it be compared with that, which is of our own accord, but also if it be compared with the other properties of virtue, which no doubt are many. For this cause are the actions proceeding from virtue commended, because they come from the making of choice. 2Manners (saith Aristotle) •re more judged by making of choice, than by actions. True indeed it is, that manners are known by actions, as a tree is by the fruit: but yet that judgement is deceivable; for hypocrites do very oftentimes make a counterfeit show, and otherwhile we see things done of a far other purpose, than it is meet they should be. The Manichees abstained from wives; also from the eating of flesh: not because they were given to chastity or sobriety; but because of their erroneous and blasphemous opinions. Tyrants do sometimes deal courteously with their subjects, but to beguile them. And wicked men do sometimes ⟨p. 294⟩abstain from wickedness, but that is for fear of punishments, not for the love of justice. Evil men forbear to sin for the fear of punishment. Wherefore in judgements, when the fact is apparent, there is oftentimes inquiry made of the will, mind, and purpose of him that doth it. Neither at any time is the making of choice subject to fortune, as is action. Yea rather, they, which are found in any crime, are oftentimes accustomed to say, that they meant to have done otherwise, and that they purposed not in their mind, that such things should happen. And we easily grant, that the actions are more apparent, since they are laid open to every mans eyes; but yet they make not the judgement either surer, or more certain. Men do judge of manners, by that which followeth, namely by the work: but the judgement of choosing proceedeth from the cause, and (as they use to speak) from that which went before. And sometimes it happeneth, that a man doth no action;