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unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferiors rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholic need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to calumniate
⟨p. 271⟩
most odiously and falsely, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferious rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastned upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholick need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuites, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxime they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to caluminate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsly, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
(g)Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative. Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in 22. q. 73. art. 2.
(h)Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graft. ibid. n. 23.Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graff. ibid. n. 23.
(i)Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, & ad majorem emendam, &c. Idem ibid. n. 24. Soto, ibid. q. 9. art. 2.
(k)Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graft. ibid. n. 9.Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 9.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsly with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruine his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
(l)Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navarre. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navar. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.
Flattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruin: because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easy a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too. (t)'Tis no sin at all, if it be for his fault, and gives the Devil but his due. Cursing (u)may be ones usual practice as innocently. It is scarce so bad as a Venial, (x)when cursing is used for honest recreation. And he may (y)curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
FLattery also (that falsness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and incouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the vertue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extoll the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruine: because (saies Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and incouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easie a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too.
(m)Est adul•tio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, & utrumque istorum est veniale. Graff. decis, pars 2. l. 3. c. 3. n. 5.
(n)Quam aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare etiamsi si stiat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen & debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia 12 horae su•t diei, & potest in instanti homo illuminari, & mutari à divina miserecordia. Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.
(o)Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graft. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.
(p)Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortal? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis venial, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.
(q)Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graft. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navarre. cap. 23. n. 13.
I Have been long in viewing their account of Venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification; Will excuse me. They venture hard, ⟨p. 274⟩to leave in a manner no mortal sin; and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest, by what they determine concerning those few sins, which they style mortal, or capital: they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly Venial; in others of them, they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness, which is not rare, and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness; and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.
Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides charity. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navarre (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withal, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
Covetuousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides chartty. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former vertue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navar (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signifie no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withall, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawfull, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
(z)Simplititer & absolute non est peceatum mortale ex suo genera quiá non est contra, sed prater charitatem. Sum. v. Avaritia.
(a)Ut contrariatur liberalitati, & sic significat inordin•um oppetitum pecu•ia: & sic communiter est peccatum veniale. ibld.
(b)Cap. 23. n. 70.
(c)De Just. l. 4. q. 5. art. 2. p. 11 •
(d)2• q. 118. art. 4.
(e)Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiators fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.
I have showed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they encourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all: for says Navarre, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted with will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navarre. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says (m)that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
I have shew'd before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they incourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the perswasion of them all: for says Navar, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they sign•fie no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted wich will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloyster'd pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navar seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navar. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shews that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)
(f)Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Navarre. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Na•ar. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.
(g)In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navarre. ibid. n. 11.In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navar. ibid. n. 11.
(h)Q•eritur utrum & quomodo ludus diabolicus alearis sit peccatum? & dico quod hic l•dus non •st pecca•um, vel est veniale quum luditur aliquid modicum, &c. Sylvest. sum. v. ludus. n. 4.
(i)Navarre. ibid. n. 3.Navar. ibid. n. 3.
(k)Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navarre. ibid. n. 14.Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navar. ibid. n. 14.
(l)Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navarre. c. 19. n. 90. (Toll. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navarre. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villainous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navarre. & ally. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navar. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by vertue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the incouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a sact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navar. & ali•. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
(n)Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navarre. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navar. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.
(o)Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navarre. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navar. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.
(p)Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; & qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi, vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 6. & punct. 3. n. 8.
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villainy, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extreme necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others, (b)is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously injoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extream covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extream necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be imbittered with one act of charity; he may injoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others,
(q)Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à. S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. & ab aliis complurimis, quod restitutis, quae non est facienda alicui certae personae, sed pauperibus non debetur ex praecepto, sed solum ex consilio. Navar. ibid. c. 17. n. 30.
(r)Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.
(s)Per duritiam cordis, & inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties t•nentur de precepto obligante ad mortale—alias enim hac venialia tantum sunt. Navar. c. 23. n. 76.
(t)Idem. Cap. 24. n. 5.
(u)Idem C. 23. n. 95.
(x)Vict. supra.
(y)Glossa communiter recepta. Ibid. n. 74.
(x)(z) Idem ibid. n. 95.
(a)Idem c. 24. n. 5.
(b)Quia haec fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, • sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quae per predictam duritiam & inquietudinem admittuntur. Idem c. 2•. n. 76.
But that they may not be partial, they show themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, because i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navarre, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extream; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, becaus• i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navar, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
(c)Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est • quiae minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quum sipura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed pr•er. illam. Cajetan. sum. v. Prodigal.
Pride is another capital crime, they style it (f)the Queen of mo• tal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high, before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it; and so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for Venial. In Aquinas (g)it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him •d his will; not upon other accounts (to wit desire of pleasure or profit, &c.) but out of contempt. So (h)Cajetan also, • others after him. Navarre says (i)they make it an actual conte• of being subject to God, and adds, thanks be to God, this is but […] in few Christians, though all are truly proud; so that mortal pride, by that account which the Oracle of their School, and his followers give of it; is rarely to be found in the Christian world, ⟨p. 281⟩'Tis questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal, which Aquinas judged to be so, he says (k)few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it. However (l)Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is Venial; and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shows himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the Apostle says, what hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? where by glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected, as to be s•cure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost; or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride: because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spy in his mind or fancy, the defects of others or to excuse his own naughtiness, and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride; when he will have himself to be great, as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the Heavenly country; for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming, or scarce •ake, has a fourth kind of pride: for he presumes he is a Heavenly Citi•h, a friend of God, a Son, a Member; when such negligence and carelessness are no evidence of his favours:
PRide is another capital crime, they style it (f)the Queen of mo• tal sins; but then they will have it advanced so high, before it be mortal, that the proudest person amongst Christians can seldom reach it; and so all pride which is not of an extraordinary size, and such as is rarely found, must pass for Venial. In Aquinas (g)it is an aversion to God, in that he will not be subject to him •d his will; not upon other accounts (to wit desire of pleasure or profit, &c.) but out of contempt. So (h)Cajetan also, • others after him. Navar says (i)they make it an actual conte• of being subject to God, and adds, thanks be to God, this is but 〈…〉 in few Christians, though all are truly proud; so that mortal pride, by that account which the Oracle of their School, and his followers give of it; is rarely to be found in the Christian world, ⟨p. 281⟩'Tis questionable whether Scotus did count that pride mortal, which Aquinas judg'd to be so, he says (k)few learned men know in what degree it is deadly, and others are not bound to know it. However (l)Cajetan ventures to tell us what pride is Venial; and his account is worth our view. It is thus at large: He that shews himself so irreligious and ungrateful, as if he had not received all from God, is proud (says he) in the first kind; for of a like effect the Apostle says, what hast thou which thou hast not received? why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received? where by glorying, as the effect, the inward pride is manifested, as though he had not received it. Likewise when one is so affected, as to be s•cure concerning the good he hath, or querulous for the good which is lost; or wonders that he is not heard of God, this is the second kind of pride: because such a one makes account that such things are due to him. But he that prefers himself before others, and is prone to spie in his mind or fancie, the defects of others or to excuse his own naughtiness, and to aggravate that of others, has a third sort of pride; when he will have himself to be great, as if he alone were great. Further, he who caring little for the Hvaeenly countrey; for the members of Christ, for the expiation of his sins, passing his days as one dreaming, or scarce ake, has a fourth kind of pride: for he presumes he is a Heavenly Citih, a friend of God, a Son, a Member; when such negligence and carelesness are no evidence of his favours:
(g)Exparte aversionis superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo à Deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter disiderium cujuscunque alterius boni. Sed superbia habet aversionem à Deo ex hoc ipso qui non vult Deo & ejus regulae subject—cujus natus est Dei contemptus. Aquin. 22. q. 162. n. 6.
(h)Sum. v. superbia, vid. Sylvest. v. superbia.
(i)Requirunt uterque Thomas communiter recepti ad ejus essentiam actualem contemptum subjiciendi se Deo & legi ejus—cum id (Gratia Deo) pauci Christiani faci• & v•r• omnes aliquo modo superbiamus, c. 23. n. 5. certe paucissimi Christiani, &c. 2. 6.
(k)Quilibet tenetur vitare omne peccatum mortale, tamen non tenetur scire in quo grade, superbia est peccatum mortale, quia nec multi experti sciunt. Scotus, in St. Cl•r. Probl. 15. p. 94.
the love of God where it is producing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his Neighbours crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not enduring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do show, that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c. So great a littler of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then strokes all gently over, calling them Venials. (m)These, says he, and many others are a sort of imperfect pride, and are ⟨p. 282⟩commonly Venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others. Yet (that we may be the more amazed, to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins (he adds) hinder spiritual life exceedingly; being of the stock of pride; when it is written, that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full height; (n)Aquinas out of Gregory, and (o)others after both, give an account of it in some particulars; the prime are these, (p)When o• thinks that good he has, is from himself. When he thinks that what he has from God, is for his merits. And when he boasts that he hath what he has not. If their great Azpilcue•a could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and condignity before him; either his sight failed him, or his Church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, (q)where this is part of a Creed: To make up one article, of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only Church. Seriously, finding so many of their Authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their Doctors, but the most infallible of their Bishops; I have wondered why they did not either make that none of their faith, or this no such sin. What sal• they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not: but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that founds like the worst of pride) they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a Venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is ⟨p. 283⟩says Cajetan, 6frequently Venial, when without prejudice of others, a man values himself as having more knowledge, or goodness, or authority than he hath;
the love of God where it is produeing (those) great things. And likewise in reference to his Neighbours crudeness of mind, and incompassionateness to others, counting injuries intolerable, impatience, not induring to be slighted, indignation, and the like, do shew, that the man thinks better of himself than he is, &c. So great a littler of this monster he exposes to our view, telling us its issue is much more numerous; and then stroaks all gently over, calling them Venials. (m)These, says he, and many others are a sort of imperfect pride, and are ⟨p. 282⟩commonly Venial sins for the imperfectness of them, since they occur in the manner of passions, without injury to God or others. Yet (that we may be the more amazed, to see all this pass for a little fault) such sins (he adds) hinder spiritual life exceedingly; being of the stock of pride; when it is written, that God resists the proud. As for that pride which they count mortal, and grown to its full heighth; (n)Aquinas out of Gregory, and (o)others after both, give an account of it in some particulars; the prime are these, (p)When o• thinks that good he has, is from himself. When he thinks that what he has from God, is for his merits. And when he boasts that he hath what he has not. If their great Azpilcue•a could see none of this most deadly crime amongst Christians, having the merit of congruity and condignity before him; either his sight fail'd him, or his Church was not visible. Others, with his eyes, can see not only mortal pride, but (as deadly a sin) infidelity, (q)where this is part of a Creed: To make up one article, of two deadly sins, must be a sure mark of the only Church. Seriously, finding so many of their Authors on this head, charging the opinion of merit, with mortal pride; and therein following not only the greatest of their Doctors, but the most infallible of their Bishops; I have wondred why they did not either make that none of their faith, or this no such sin. What sal• they will find against deadly sin, when it is in their faith, I know not: but if part of their belief had proved arrogance (though that founds like the worst of pride) they might have come off well enough, for arrogance is a Venial sin, except in some rare cases. It is
(m)Sunt autem haec & multa alia, quae imperfectae sunt superbiae, communiter venialia peccata propter imperfectionem actus, dumb per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei & proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmo li peccata valde vitam spiritualem: utpote ex genere superbiae existentia: quum scriptum sit superbis Deus resistit. Ibid. p. 548.Sunt autem haec & multa alia, quae imperfectae sunt superbiae, communiter venialia peccata propter imperfectionem actus, dum per modum passionum occurrunt absque injuria Dei & proximorum. Impediunt autem hujusmo li peccata valde vitam spiritualem: utpote ex genere superbiae existentia: quum scriptum sit superbis Deus resistit. Ibid. p. 548.
(n)22 q. 142. art. 4.
(o)Angelus, v. superb. Sylvest. v. superb. Navarre. c. 23. n. 7. alii communiter.Angelus, v. superb. Sylvest. v. superb. Navar. c. 23. n. 7. alii communiter.
(p)Secundum hoc sumuntur duae primae superbiae species, scilicet cum quis à semet ipso habere aestimat quod à Deo habet, vel oum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit.—Sic est tertia species superbiae cum scilicet aliquis jactat se habere quod non babet. Aquinas, ibid.
(q)Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus—infidelitatis. Navarre. ibid. n. 8. In universally dicere—bonum aliquod habere à se & non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc p•rtinet ad infidelitatem & est mortale peccatum infidelitatis. Angel. sum. v. super•i•.Credere id (viz. predicta) in genere est actus—infidelitatis. Navar. ibid. n. 8. In universali dicere—bonum aliquod habere à se & non à Deo, vel suis meritis, hoc p•rtinet ad infidelitatem & est mortale peccatum infidelitatis. Angel. sum. v. super•i•.
6(r) Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dumb absque prejudicio proximi astimat quis▪ se plus scientiae, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet Sum. v. arrogantia peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum. aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in bujusmodi elation ponatur. Ibid.)
and again, it is a sin, but it is not mortal, unless when it usurps against God, as the King of Tyre, when he said, I am God (now none are observed to do this, except the Pope, who has the Law in his own hand); or against others by Tyranny (which is so odious as all disclaim it: and affecting it, is no worse than affecting to kill men without consent; which, with him is (s)not deadly): or unless it be made ones ultimate end (which none will own). Accordingly, Angelus determines, that (t)arrogancy is commonly a Venial fault, unless upon the account of something else that is mortal, as when it arises from mortal pride; but that (as he and others define it, we heard before) is scarce to be found amongst Christians.
(s)Ibid, v. vovendi condit.
(t)Utrum sit mortal peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit quae sit mortalis—alias communiter peccatum venial erit. Sum. v. arrogantia.Utrum sit mortale peccatum? Resp. quod sic, quum ex tali superbia vel contentione fit quae sit mortalis—alias communiter peccatum veniale erit. Sum. v. arrogantia.
Ambition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the Church too, has reason to judg it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins, may be imputed to it; but the Church of Rome and her Champions are concerned not to think so ill of it; stilo curiae, in the sense of the Court, it may pass for Venial. Angelus inquires, (u)whether ambition be a mortal sin? he answers▪ negatively it is not ⟨p. 284⟩so simply, but may be so, in respect of its end (and so may any thing in it self lawful be, if its end be criminal); or it may be so, if the thing affected be▪ a crime; but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness; the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds, if the honour and power affected, be lawful. Thus Cajetan he will yield it more than (x)Venial, when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a God; accordingly it is resolved by Sylvester, (y)with Navarre, (z)regularly an inordinate appetite (or greediness) of Honour, exceeds not the bounds of a Venial fault. Indeed if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable; two Cardinal virtues had been concerned; and, which is more, the Vatican Throne, both in its foundation and supports.
AMbition was wont to be counted a deadly crime; the world and the Church too, has reason to judg it so, since the most of their miseries and ruins, may be imputed to it; but the Church of Rome and her Champions are concerned not to think so ill of it; stilo curiae, in the sense of the Court, it may pass for Venial. Angelus inquires, (u)whether ambition be a mortal sin? he answers▪ negatively it is not ⟨p. 284⟩so simply, but may be so, in respect of its end (and so may any thing in it self lawful be, if its end be criminal); or it may be so, if the thing affected be▪ a crime; but that is accidental, and still ambitiousness; the inordinacy of the affection is excused, and may transgress all bounds, if the honour and power affected, be lawful. Thus Cajetan he will yield it more than (x)Venial, when one will be honoured for a crime, or would be counted a God; accordingly it is resolved by Sylvester, (y)with Navar, (z)regularly an inordinate appetite (or greediness) of Honour, exceeds not the bounds of a Venial fault. Indeed if pride and ambition had been branded as damnable; two Cardinal vertues had been concern'd; and, which is more, the Vatican Throne, both in its foundation and supports.
(u)Utrum ambitio sit peccatum mortale? Resp. quod non simpliciter sed pro ratione finis—vel secundo ratione rei quae appetitu. Sum. v. ambitio.
(x)Non est autem mortale peccatum, nisi vel ex parte rei in qua appetitur honor: puta, si quis vult honorari ob crimen aliquod; vel ex parte finis—quia vult haheri ut Deus. Cajetan. v. ambit.
(y)Sum. v. superbia. n. 7.
(z)Quamvis regulariter, appetitus inordinatus honoris, non excedat metas culpae venialis, Cap. 23. n. 15.
Vain glory is another capital crime in their account, and pregnant with many other; they define it to be an inordinate affecting of humane glory; and yet determine, that an (a)inordinate affecting of praise, or favour, or honour, or reverence, or glory, is but regularly a Venial sin; only it may happen to be mortal in some case, as when one would inordinately have glory from others for a deadly end, or for a mortal sin, or that which he makes his last end; in all other cases, this capital evil is but a slight fault. According to their common Doctrine, Cajetan will have it to be mortal (b)then only, when one glories ⟨p. 285⟩in mortal sin (but to glory in Venials they count it a small fault) or sets his ultimate end in vain glory. (c)Angelus collects out of Alexander and Aquinas, that vain glory of it self imports not any thing contrary to the love of God or man. Aquinas himself says, (d)that if love of humane glory, though vain, be not perfectly repugnant to charity, it is not Mortal. And Sylvester (e)delivers this as the sense of their Oracle, that the desire of vain glory in its own nature is not mortal. Angelus (f)concludes, that this may be a mans end in all things, but the Scripture and the Sacraments; but this limitation is too strict in the judgment of their Doctors which are of greatest repute: for they determine, that he who does those things which are (g)principally instituted for the honour and worship of God, and the Salvation of Souls for vain glory as his chief end, as for example, he that in Preaching, or Praying, or celebrating, makes vain glory his Principal end, and aims at nothing higher, sins but Venially. Angelus had made it worse, but others had confuted him effectually, and Navarre after them. Aquinas the Angel of their Schools, was it seems of this persuasion, that vain glory may be actually our principal end in worshipping God, without any mortal sin: for Sylvester tells us, that Angelus did (h)contradict, not only the truth, but Saint Thomas, in saying it is a mortal evil when those things which were ordained for the glory of God, are done principally for a mans own glory, as the Sacraments and the Scripture. And they are highly concerned to maintain this, ⟨p. 286⟩for says he, if (i)this were a mortal sin, the whole Clergy in a manner were in an ill condition; he means they were in a state of damnation.
VAin glory is another capital crime in their account, and pregnant with many other; they define it to be an inordinate affecting of humane glory; and yet determine, that an (a)inordinate affecting of praise, or favour, or honour, or reverence, or glory, is but regularly a Venial sin; only it may happen to be mortal in some case, as when one would inordinately have glory from others for a deadly end, or for a mortal sin, or that which he makes his last end; in all other cases, this capital evil is but a slight fault. According to their common Doctrine, Cajetan will have it to be mortal (b)then only, when one glories ⟨p. 285⟩in mortal sin (but to glory in Venials they count it a small fault) or sets his ultimate end in vain glory. (c)Angelus collects out of Alexander and Aquinas, that vain glory of it self imports not any thing contrary to the love of God or man. Aquinas himself says, (d)that if love of humane glory, though vain, be not perfectly repugnant to charity, it is not Mortal. And Sylvester (e)delivers this as the sense of their Oracle, that the desire of vain glory in its own nature is not mortal. Angelus (f)concludes, that this may be a mans end in all things, but the Scripture and the Sacraments; but this limitation is too strict in the judgment of their Doctors which are of greatest repute: for they determine, that he who does those things which are (g)principally instituted for the honour and worship of God, and the Salvation of Souls for vain glory as his chief end, as for example, he that in Preaching, or Praying, or celebrating, makes vain glory his Principal end, and aims at nothing higher, sins but Venially. Angelus had made it worse, but others had confuted him effectually, and Navar after them. Aquinas the Angel of their Schools, was it seems of this perswasion, that vain glory may be actually our principal end in worshipping God, without any mortal sin: for Sylvester tells us, that Angelus did (h)
(a)Appetitus eorum etiam inordinatus regulariter est venialis. &c. Idem ibid. n. 9.
(b)Solum peccat mortaliter, qui gloriatur de aliquo quod est peccatum mortale: secundo qui ponit suum finem ultimum in gloria humana. Sum. v. glor. van.
(c)Colligo ex Alex. in 2. 2. & Thom. 2. 2. q. 132. & Henr. de Gandavo in quodl. 1. q. 24. quod vana gloria de se non dicit aliquid quod sit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi. Sum. v. van. glor. n. 1.
(d)Inanis gloria non est mortale peccatum, uisi charitati perfect adversatur. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 132. art. 3.Inanis gloria non est mortale peccatum, uisi charitati perfecte adversatur. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 132. art. 3.
(e)Intendit ergo S. Tho. quod appetitus vanae gloriae ex suo genere non sit mortale. Sum. v. van. gl. n. 2.
(f)Si aliquid aliud quod non pertinet ad divinam scripturam vel sacramenta propter gloriam faceret, peccaret venialiter. Sum. ibid.
(g)Navarre. Cap. 23. n. 13. supra. Quamvis eximius vir ille Angelus teneat, concionari, missam celebrare & alia principaliter divino cultui dedicata facere propter honorem aut inanem gloriam, esse mortale, contrarium tamen tenendum est, ut latissime demonstravimus. Idem c. 21. n. 40. Vid. Soto, in Suarez. supra.Navar. Cap. 23. n. 13. supra. Quamvis eximius vir ille Angelus teneat, concionari, missam celebrare & alia principaliter divino cultui dedicata facere propter honorem aut inanem gloriam, esse mortale, contrarium tamen tenendum est, ut latissime demonstravimus. Idem c. 21. n. 40. Vid. Soto, in Suarez. supra.
(h)Contra S. Tho. & veritatem dicit quod est mortale quando ea quae ordinata sunt ad gloriam Dei quis principaliter facit ad gloriam suam, ut sacramenta & scripturae sacrae. Sum. v. van. glor. n. 4.
(i)Alias si is qui gloriatur de sacris vestibus, aut cautu divivorum, vel conditions theologica, actualiter nullum alum finem intendens, peccaret mortaliter, totus poene clerus esset in malo statu.Alias si is qui gloriatur de sacris vestibus, aut cautu diviuorum, vel conditions theologica, actualiter nullum allum finem intendens, peccaret mortaliter, totus poene clerus esset in malo statu.
So that it was high time for the Roman Doctors to form a Divinity of new Maxims, since those of Scripture and Antiquity, left them in a damnable condition. One would think, that to count it but a peccadillo, to make vain glory the cause or motive without which a man would not Preach, or pray, or perform any worship, should be a prodigious thing for any that calls himself a Christian: but he that will allow it, under no greater censure than that of a petty fault, to be the principal end of worship, and the great concern of Salvation, (k)advances it higher. He (l)that takes a Church-living or Spiritual benefice, principally for honour or temporal profit offends but Venially, unless he be unworthy because of his ignorance, or other defect. So that in their Church, for any or all of them, from the Pope to the meanest officer, to make honour and profit their chief end, in taking the charge of Souls, or other place or employment, which concern the worship of God, or the Salvation of the people, is so slight a thing as needs never trouble them; ten thousand faults of this nature, ten thousand times▪ over▪ would never hazard their Souls. These two last conclusions; will help us to discern of what complexion Popery is upon what it is founded; for what ends they may think it safe to maintain it, and persist in it, without, or against any conscientious or Spiritual consideration: And why they may make Religion all along serve a worldly interest and truckle under it. There's no danger in all this; it's a harmless Venial by their Doctrine, to thrust the great God and his glory into an inferior place, below their honour and profit; even in those things which they say were principally instituted for his ⟨p. 287⟩Sovereign Honour; this is a fault, with them, next to nothing. If they should in the worship of God, aim at him in the first place, and at their own glory and profit in the next, there might be some danger, lest they should too much oblige him: for thus to join God and their carnal interest together, as their end in any religious concern, is, (m)a meritorious act, according to Aquinas. Further (n)vain glorious boasting, though it be with irreverence to God, and injury and scandal to others, if that be not much; is only Venial, according to Aquinas and Alensis. And a man may vain-gloriously praise himself for something that is good, though it be false;
So that it was high time for the Roman Doctors to form a Divinity of new Maxims, since those of Scripture and Antiquity, left them in a damnable condition. One would think, that to count it but a peccadillo, to make vain glory the cause or motive without which a man would not Preach, or pray, or perform any worship, should be a prodigious thing for any that calls himself a Christian: but he that will allow it, under no greater censure than that of a petty fault, to be the principal end of worship, and the great concern of Salvation, (k)advances it higher. He (l)that takes a Church-living or Spiritual benefice, principally for honour or temporal profit offends but Venially, unless he be unworthy because of his ignorance, or other defect. So that in their Church, for any or all of them, from the Pope to the meanest officer, to make honour and profit their chief end, in taking the charge of Souls, or other place or imployment, which concern the worship of God, or the Salvation of the people, is so slight a thing as needs never trouble them; ten thousand faults of this nature, ten thousand times▪ over▪ would never hazard their Souls. These two last conclusions; will help us to discern of what complexion Popery is upon what it is founded; for what ends they may think it safe to maintain it, and persist in it, without, or against any conscientious or Spiritual consideration: And why they may make Religion all along serve a worldly interest and truckle under it. There's no danger in all this; it's a harmless Venial by their Doctrine, to thrust the great God and his glory into an inferiour place, below their honour and profit; even in those things which they say were principally instituted for his ⟨p. 287⟩Soveraign Honour; this is a fault, with them, next to nothing. If they should in the worship of God, aim at him in the first place, and at their own glory and profit in the next, there might be some danger, lest they should too much oblige him: for thus to joyn God and their carnal interest together, as their end in any religious concern, is, (m)a meritorious act, according to Aquinas. Further (n)vain glorious boasting, though it be with irreverence to God, and injury and scandal to others, if that be not much; is only Venial, according to Aquinas and Alensis. And a man may vain-gloriously praise himself for something that is good, though it be false;
(k)Vid. Navarre. c. 20. n. 11. &c. 21. n. 40. &c. 23. n. 101.Vid. Navar. c. 20. n. 11. &c. 21. n. 40. &c. 23. n. 101.
(l)Peccat. Qui accipit beneficium Ecclesiasticum spirituale principaliter propter honorem aut utilitatem temporariam secundum S. Antonin. Quod limito procedere in eo qui est eo indignus ob ignorantiam, vel alium defectum: Nam supra diximus, quod falsum est esse mortale facere ordinata ad cultum divinum principaliter ob bona temporalia. Idem c. 23. n. 15.
(m)Nullum autem peccatum immo meritum est sacere illa principaliter propter Deum, vel quia honesta sunt & Sancta, & secundario propter gloriam, vel laudem humanam in finem aptum relatum. Idem ibid. post Sanctum Thomum.
(n)Peccat. Qui per jactantiam see aut suos laudat cum irreverentia notabili Dei, aut cum injuria vel scandalo proximi notabili: alias enim solum est veniale juxta S. Tho. receptum. Alexand. Allens. Idem ibid. n. 16.Peccat. Qui per jactantiam se aut suos laudat cum irreverentia notabili Dei, aut cum injuria vel scandalo proximi notabili: alias enim solum est veniale juxta S. Tho. receptum. Alexand. Allens. Idem ibid. n. 16.
Aversation to, or grief at Spiritual and Divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called Acedia. The object is God, as to mans friendship and communion with him, and the spiritual acts and duties requisite thereto: the act they express by sloth, and loathness to meddle with these things, coldness tepidness about them, not caring for them, nauseating and accounting them a grievance▪ This some of them do not deny to be a mortal sin, but they will have it mortal only upon such strange terms, that any one ⟨p. 288⟩may have a great aversation for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt; for they define (p)it by an aggrievedness at what is Spiritual and Divine, quatenus est divinum, as it is Divine, and not otherwise: not (q)because it is laborious or troublesome to the flesh, or any impediment to its pleasures, which are Aquinas words; but under that formality, in that it is divine, (r)as his followers understand it. So that the greatest disaffection to spiritual things, if it be because they are unsuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the flesh it's ease and pleasure (which is the common and ordinary cause of it), if it be not on an account (s)that rarely falls out, as they acknowledge, and which a man can scarce ever deliberately be subject to; it brings him not under this guilt. So Cajetan tell us, (t)if a man not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this (viz) that he is to be a Citizen with the Saints and one of Gods family); because he little cares for the happiness of this Divine friendship, neglecting to attain it, because, he gives up himself to other delights; he is not guilty of this sin. Angelus, that he may discover when this disaffection to Spiritual and Divine things is mortal, and when Venial, tells us, that (u)when it consists in the omission of things not necessary to Salvation, it is Venial; that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worship, all the acts of grace and Christian virtues, are ⟨p. 289⟩omitted: for we cannot yet discern that they account any of these necessary to Salvation, and by the premises it appears that they do not. It is Venial, says Sylvester, (x)when a man counts the doing of it grievous, but yet omits not what he is bound to. Angelus expresseth it more significantly;
AVersation to, or grief at Spiritual and Divine things, is another capital crime in their reckoning, which is called Acedia. The object is God, as to mans friendship and communion with him, and the spiritual acts and duties requisite thereto: the act they express by sloth, and lothness to meddle with these things, coldness tepidness about them, not caring for them, nausiating and accounting them a grievance▪ This some of them do not deny to be a mortal sin, but they will have it mortal only upon such strange terms, that any one ⟨p. 288⟩may have a great aversation for God, and the things of God, without danger of deadly guilt; for they define (p)it by an agrievedness at what is Spiritual and Divine, quatenus est divinum, as it is Divine, and not otherwise: not (q)because it is laborious or troublesome to the flesh, or any impediment to its pleasures, which are Aquinas words; but under that formality, in that it is divine, (r)as his followers understand it. So that the greatest disaffection to spiritual things, if it be because they are unsuitable to corrupt nature, not agreeable to the flesh it's ease and pleasure (which is the common and ordinary cause of it), if it be not on an account (s)that rarely falls out, as they acknowledg, and which a man can scarce ever deliberately be subject to; it brings him not under this guilt. So Cajetan tell us, (t)if a man not as to his affection, but in effect, be grieved at this (viz) that he is to be a Citizen with the Saints and one of Gods family); because he little cares for the happiness of this Divine friendship, neglecting to attain it, because, he gives up himself to other delights; he is not guilty of this sin. Angelus, that he may discover when this disaffection to Spiritual and Divine things is mortal, and when Venial, tells us, that (u)when it consists in the omission of things not necessary to Salvation, it is Venial; that is, it is little or no fault, if all the duties of real worship, all the acts of grace and Christian vertues, are ⟨p. 289⟩
(p)Definiri potest, esse vitium inclinans ad tristandum de bono spirituali divino, quatenus est divi•um secundum mentem utriusque Thomae. 2. 2. q. 35, art. 2. Navarre. cap. 23. n. 124. Tristitia de bono spirituali in quantum est divinum. Sylvest. sum. v. Acedia. n. 1.Definiri potest, esse vitium inclinans ad tristandum de bono spirituali divino, quatenus est divi•um secundum mentem utriusque Thomae. 2. 2. q. 35, art. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 124. Tristitia de bono spirituali in quantum est divinum. Sylvest. sum. v. Acedia. n. 1.
(q)Non prout est laboriosum vel molestum corpori aut delectationis ejus impeditivum. 22 q. 35. art. 2.
(s)Peccatom est valde grave, generoque suo mortale, cum deliberato, & advertente animo admittitur, quod raro videtur contingere. Navarre. ibid,Peccatom est valde grave, generoque suo mortale, cum deliberato, & advertente animo admittitur, quod raro videtur contingere. Navar. ibid,
(t)Si vero de hoc (ut sit civis sanctorum & nomesticus Dei, &c.) non tristatur secundum affectum, sed secundum effectum, quia parum de hujusmodi amicitiae bono curat; negligens adipisci illum, quia vacat delectabilibus humanis, peccatum Acediae non incurrit. Cajet. sum. v. Acedia.
(u)Aut (consistit) in omissione eorum quae non sunt necessaria & sic est veniale peccatum. Sum. v. Acedia. n. 1. Si omittit ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis, peccat mortaliter: si vero alias debita peccat venial•ter. Cajetan. sum. v. Inconst.
(x)Est autem veniale, quando homo quidem in operando attaediatur, sed tamen ea ad quae tenetur, non omittit. Ibid. n. 2.
by this it appears (y)says he, what is to be said of him, who counts grievous, and abominates Divine and Spiritual things, since unless they be necessary to Salvation, and he declines them or is deliberately disposed to decline them, he sins not mortally. So that Spiritual and Divine things (all that they count not necessary; that is, all in a manner which is requisite for a Christian) may be abhorred, without any mortal guilt. And herein the two sums agree well enough, though they seem to be at some odds. It is false, (z)says Sylvester, (not limiting it to things necessary) that abominating of Spiritual things, is always a mortal sin. Accordingly he determines, that (a)rancour against those who would induce us to Spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God or the things of God), is a Venial fault. It is no mortal sin (say others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of those who persuade to what is Spiritual (so as not to endure to hear or see them), whether Preachers or others. We see by this (as by other instances) that sins so stated, as they are scarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal; but common provocations, and such of which there is most danger, must pass for Venials; yea, there are some amongst them, who will have this capital crime, though it have such a deadly aspect, both in itself, and in its effects, to be no mortal sin. Laisius Turrian. ibid. sect. 3. n. 2.
by this it appears (y)says he, what is to be said of him, who counts grievous, and abominates Divine and Spiritual things, since unless they be necessary to Salvation, and he declines them or is deliberately disposed to decline them, he sins not mortally. So that Spiritual and Divine things (all that they count not necessary; that is, all in a manner which is requisite for a Christian) may be abhorred, without any mortal guilt. And herein the two sums agree well enough, though they seem to be at some odds. It is false, (z)says Sylvester, (not limitting it to things necessary) that abominating of Spiricual things, is always a mortal sin. Accordingly he determines, that (a)rancour against those who would induce us to Spiritual things (that is, would draw us to God or the things of God), is a Venial fault. It is no mortal sin (say others) to conceive an indignation and loathing of those who perswade to what is Spiritual (so as not to indure to hear or see them), whether Preachers or others. We see by this (as by other instances) that sins so stated, as they are scarce ever practicable, they can be content to have them counted mortal; but common provocations, and such of which there is most danger, must pass for Venials; yea, there are some amongst them, who will have this capital crime, though it have such a deadly aspect, both in itself, and in its effects, to be no mortal sin. Laisius Turrian. ibid. sect. 3. n. 2.
(y)Et ex hoc patet quid dicendum de eo qui attaediatus abhominatur divina & spiritualia: quia nisi sint necessaria ad salutem, & ea dimittat vel deliberate disponat dimittere non peccat mortaliter. Sum. ibid.
(z)Falsum est, quod dicta abominatio (spiritualium) semper sit peccatum mortal. Sum. v. malitia.Falsum est, quod dicta abominatio (spiritualium) semper sit peccatum mortale. Sum. v. malitia.
(a)Rancour 1. displicentia hominum inducentium ad spiritualia & est veniale. v. Acedia n. 4. Neque mortaliter peccat, qui fastidiam, indignationem, & quandam aversionem concipit in eos, qui spiritualiae consulunt, ut in concionatores, aut alios. Bonacin. 1. praeeept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. sect. 1. n. 6.Rancor 1. displicentia hominum inducentium ad spiritualia & est veniale. v. Acedia n. 4. Neque mortaliter peccat, qui fastidiam, indignationem, & quandam aversionem concipit in eos, qui spiritualiae consulunt, ut in concionatores, aut alios. Bonacin. 1. praeeept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. sect. 1. n. 6.
Anger stands in their general account, as another capital crime. I have touched it before; but here let us see how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is considered in respect of the mode or degree; and the tendency or effects of it. As to the degree of it, how high soever it rise, to what excess soever it transport one, inwardly or outwardly, (b)it is not in its own nature mortal, unless it be so vehement as to bear down both love to God and man, and leave the passionate person, neither which yet it will not do, though it sally out furiously into curses or blasphemies against God or man, if this be but merely Verbal, as (c)we saw before. The tendency of it, that which it leads to, is revenge; and as to that, it will be Venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too if the passion he but quick and great enough. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do, and be innocent, if the passion (d)prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it stays: both it, and the effects of it, how horrid soever, will be Venial. So that if one be angry enough, he may Blaspheme God, renounce Christ, perjure himself, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little, or no fault. Thus by their Doctrine, this capital crime seems more like a virtue, than a vice, since the greater is the better; or at least the less it has to do with reason, the more excusable and Venial. ⟨p. 291⟩Other extravagant passions meet with as favourable measures. (e)Indignation, which makes a man disdain others, as unworthy of his conversation or affable treatment, it is commonly Venial. (f)Audaciousness, in it self, is no worse; nor excessive wrath and immoderate fear, because they are not contrary to Charity, but exorbitant from the right measures of reason. So Intimidity, or (z)Fool-hardiness is Venial, when it proceeds from tolerable foolishness; but the folly may be so great, that the fault will be none. Also (h)incontinent desires, or Lusts: Love likewise, whether of the Flesh, or the World. Of the former thus Angelus; (i)Immoderate self-love, when one excessively seeks the delight of the body, and ease of the flesh, it proceeds from Luxury, yet it is commonly Venial, when it causes not other mortal acts, or neglects.
ANger stands in their general account, as another capital crime. I have touch'd it before; but here let us see how criminal they make it, when in particulars they bring up their reckoning. It is considered in respect of the mode or degree; and the tendency or effects of it. As to the degree of it, how high soever it rise, to what excess soever it transport one, inwardly or outwardly, (b)it is not in its own nature mortal, unless it be so vehement as to bear down both love to God and man, and leave the passionate person, neither which yet it will not do, though it sally out furiously into curses or blasphemies against God or man, if this be but meerly Verbal, as (c)we saw before. The tendency of it, that which it leads to, is revenge; and as to that, it will be Venial if the revenge be but little, or it may be great when it can be taken legally; or it may be great and illegal too if the passion he but quick and great enough. The more excessive it is, the more mischief it may do, and be innocent, if the passion (d)prevent deliberation when it comes, and hinder it while it stays: both it, and the effects of it, how horrid soever, will be Venial. So that if one be angry enough, he may Blaspheme God, renounce Christ, perjure himself, kill or burn whom or what he will, with little, or no fault. Thus by their Doctrine, this capital crime seems more like a vertue, than a vice, since the greater is the better; or at least the less it has to do with reason, the more excusable and Venial. ⟨p. 291⟩Other extravagant passions meet with as favourable measures. (e)Indignation, which makes a man disdain others, as unworthy of his conversation or affable treatment, it is commonly Venial. (f)Audaciousness, in it self, is no worse; nor excessive wrath and immoderate fear, because they are not contrary to Charity, but exorbitant from the right measures of reason. So Intimidity, or (z)Fool-hardiness is Venial, when it proceeds from tolerable foolishness; but the folly may be so great, that the fault will be none. Also (h)incontinent desires, or Lusts: Love likewise, whether of the Flesh, or the World. Of the former thus Angelus;
(b)Attenditur orde rationis in ira—ut scil. motus irae non immoderate fervescat interius vel exterius, qui ordo si praetermittatur non erit fine peccato—sed non erit mortale ex genere suo: sed possit esse mortale peccatum, puta si ex vehementia irae excidat à dilectione Dei vel proximi. Angel. sum. v. ira. n. 1. Sylvest. ibid. n. 4. Cajetan. sum. v. ira.
(c)Navat. c. 23. n. 117. & alii supra.
(d)Passiones nisi ad deliberatum consensum vindictae inducant, veniales sunt. Cajetan. v. rixa. possit esse veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia praevenit deliberationem. Sylv. v. ira n. 4. Angelus ibid.
(e)Indigratio (qua ex ira afficitur homo proximo tanquam indigno sua affabilitate, corversatione & hujusmodi), peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem; & communiter venial. Cajetan. Sum. v. Indignatio. Sylv. v. Indignatio. Angel. sum. v. diligere. n. 2.Indigratio (qua ex ira afficitur homo proximo tanquam indigno sua affabilitate, corversatione & hujusmodi), peccatum est propter inordinatam passionem; & communiter veniale. Cajetan. Sum. v. Indignatio. Sylv. v. Indignatio. Angel. sum. v. diligere. n. 2.
(f)Audacia si pura est communiter est, peccatum veniale: Sicut immoderata iracundia, & immoderatus timor; quia non contrariantur charitati, sed a recta exorbitant rationis regula. Cajetan. v. audacia.
(z)(g) Veniale autem peccatum hoc est, quando ex stultitia excusabili procedit—tantaque possit esse stoliditas, quod nullum esset peccatum.
(h)Idem. ibid. v. Incontinentia.
(i)Amor sui est, quum quis nimis diligit seipsum quaerendo delectationes corporis nimis, & quietem carnis, & procedi ex luxuria, quod est peccatum mortale solum, si propter eum non implet praecepta aut facit contra: aliter communit• est veniale, Sum. v. Amor sui.
As for love of the world (k)to love it for necessity, is no sin, and to love to stay a long time in the world, for the pleasures of it, is but a venial fault.
As for love of the world (k)to love it for necessity, is nosin, and to love to stay a long time in the world, for the pleasures of it, is but a venial fault.
(k)Diligitu• ad necessitatem, & sic non est peccatum—Est etiam diligere mundum i. e. longo tempore veil stare in mundo propter delitias, & sic est veniale peccatum. Idem. ibid. v. diligere. n. 3.Diligitu• ad necessitatem, & sic non est peccatum—Est etiam diligere mundum i. e. longo tempore velle stare in mundo propter delitias, & sic est veniale peccatum. Idem. ibid. v. diligere. n. 3.
Sect. 19. Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh against it, as (l)a Devilish wickedness; yet when they come to give particular rules for Conscience and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their Catholics: the general notion of it, is an excessive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet, who grieve at others good, because it may be prejudicial to themselves, or because they want it. So ⟨p. 292⟩far a man may envy all in the world, who have more worth, honour, or power, or prosperity than himself. (m)This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the desire of temporals, which when it is excessive, is of it self, by their doctrine, but Venial. Or they may grieve at others good, (n)because they think those who have it, unworthy of it. Grief or Indignation at the outward happiness of others, upon this account solely, is of it self a Venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan. But why evil at all? the reason is because, since that which is grieved at, is neither an evil of sin or punishment, it seems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injustice in the Dispenser of these things. All the envy in the world may find shelter and security in these decisions as a harmless Venial. If this last mentioned be not Envy, what is? why a grief at the good of others, as it lessens and obscures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himself far better, will think it a lessening and obscuring his own worth, to have it so over-looked; and that which they distinguish and mince in speculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuse Envy: it must be betwixt equals(o), and so Grief at the prosperity of Inferiors, or Superiors at least, will be acquitted. Also, if it be for little things, (p)it is Venial. Now all Temporals are little things to him who has the Eternal in his prospect; so way is made to acquit all envy for outward prosperity, which yet they make the only (q)object of envy. And if envy, upon a small ground, may ⟨p. 293⟩be excused as a little fault, envy upon a great occasion, will be excusable, as less; except when they derive the sinfulness of an act from its exorbitancy as to reason; that will be less sinful which is more unreasonable.
Sect. 19. Envy is another capital crime, and in general they inveigh against it, as (l)a Devilish wickedness; yet when they come to give particular rules for Conscience and practice, they leave room enough for the entertainment of it in the hearts and lives of their Catholicks: the general notion of it, is an excessive grief at the good of others, but all are acquitted from mortal quiet, who grieve at others good, because it may be prejudicial to themselves, or because they want it. So ⟨p. 292⟩far a man may envy all in the world, who have more worth, honour, or power, or prosperity than himself. (m)This may be good or evil, but evil in no other degree, than the desire of temporals, which when it is excessive, is of it self, by their doctrine, but Venial. Or they may grieve at others good, (n)because they think those who have it, unworthy of it. Grief or Indignation at the outward happiness of others, upon this account solely, is of it self a Venial fault with Aquinas and Cajetan. But why evil at all? the reason is because, since that which is grieved at, is neither an evil of sin or punishment, it seems in a manner to reprove God, and to grieve, as though there were injustice in the Dispenser of these things. All the envy in the world may find shelter and security in these decisions as a harmless Venial. If this last mentioned be not Envy, what is? why a grief at the good of others, as it lessens and obscures our proper worth or excellency. But he that thinks others more unworthy, and himself far better, will think it a lessening and obscuring his own worth, to have it so over-look'd; and that which they distinguish and mince in speculation, will go down together in practice. However, two limitations they add, which will commonly excuse Envy: it must be betwixt equals(o), and so Grief at the prosperity of Inferiours, or Superiours at least, will be acquitted. Also, if it be for little things, (p)it is Venial. Now all Temporals are little things to him who has the Eternal in his prospect; so way is made to acquit all envy for outward prosperity, which yet they make the only (q)object of envy. And if envy, upon a small ground, may ⟨p. 293⟩
(l)Soto de Just. & jur. l. 4. ar. p. 176.
(m)Si vero sit cirea temporalia, potest esse cum peccato vel sine, eo modo, quo & appetitus temporalium. Sylv. v. Invidia. ut si mediocris homo tr•stetur, quia non est rex, quia non est papa: & hoc veniale est ex se. Vid. Cajetan. v. Invid.
(n)Idem. ibid. n. 2. quia indignus est tali bono, hujusmodi indignatio, ut dicit S. Thom. & Cajetan.—mala est & ex se veniale; Nam cum id, de quo dolet, nec sit malum culpae, nec paenae, videtur quodammodo arguere Deum, & dolere, quasi injustitia sit ex parte Datoris, in Toll. l. 8. c. 65.Idem. ibid. n. 2. quia indignus est tali bono, hujusmodi indignatio, ut dicit S. Thom. & Cajetan.—mala est & ex se veniale; Nam cum id, de quo dolet, nec sit malum culpae, nec paenae, videtur quodammodo arguere Deum, & dolere, quasi injustitia sit ex parte Datoris, in Tol. l. 8. c. 65.
(o)Invidia qua homo tristatur de prosperitate alterius similis sen aequalis, Cajetan. Sum. v. Invid.
(p)Nec etiam (est mortale) si bonum de quo dolet, sit quid minimum, Sylv. ibid. n. 2. (Cajetan. ibid.) Possunt magna videri non aspicientibus aeterna. Idem. ibid.
They might as well have concluded directly, and without circumlocution, as Lorca the Dominican doth, that Envy is no more a mortal sin than Vain-glory or Covetousness, which they count Venial, unless heightened with some such circumstance, as will make an act otherwise good to be a deadly evil(*).
They might as well have concluded directly, and without circumlocution, as Lorca the Dominican doth, that Envy is no more a mortal sin than Vain-glory or Covetousness, which they count Venial, unless heightned with some such circumstance, as will make an act otherwise good to be a deadly evil(*).
(*)Vid. Bonacin. 1 precept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. Sect. 2. n. 3.Vid. Bonacin. 1 praecept. d. 3. q. 4. p. ult. Sect. 2. n. 3.
Sect. 20. Intemperance, which they call Gula, comprising both Gluttony and Drunkenness, may well pass for a Cardinal crime, yet both together, by an after reckoning, make but a poor Venial(r). They define it an inordinate appetite of eating and drinking, (viz.) to excess, not for necessity but for pleasure. This when it is excessive every way in the charge, the time, the quality, the pleasure, the quantity, (s)is not in its own nature a mortal sin, according to the doctrine of Aquinas, though it be a Capital Vice, and the cause of many other. But then it may be deadly by accident, (t)if it be grievously hurtful to the body. So it becomes those to determine, who are more tender of the concerns of the body than of the soul. Yet that we may understand how the pleasure of sensuality may be preferred before either soul or body, they tell us, that if the damage done to the body by intemperance, be not grievous, (u)or if it prove so great, yet if the Glutton do not observe it; or if the great prejudice done to his health be not so frequent, that he is bound to observe it, it will be Venial still. But Cajetan troubles us not with this respect to health, but concludes ⟨p. 294⟩(x)it may be Venial (and of a large size sometimes), not only when it brings upon us other inconveniences, but other sins; and particularly when it is prejudicial to health. He has but one case wherein it will be more than Venial; (y)then only is it mortal, says he, when this pleasure in eating is a mans chief end, and his belly his God; that is, when for the pleasure of it, he (not only transgresses all rules of temperance, but) has no regard of any command of God, or the Church; as if a man will Steal to play the Glutton, &c. It seems this sensual Lust will never be criminal, unless one be so much at its devotion, (z)as to contemn God, and make nothing of any other wickedness to gratify it. And though there be no danger here, but when one makes his belly his God; yet there's no great danger of that, since a man may be a perfect Epicure, like the rich Glutton in the Gospel, and yet escape. (a)When one, says Angelus, for delight of his Appetite, resolves to give up his whole life to such (Gluttonous) pleasures as Dives, &c. this is near to mortal sin. It seems then it is not deadly, but only near it; though it brought the Epicure, not only near Hell, but into the torment of its flames.
Sect. 20. Intemperance, which they call Gula, comprizing both Gluttony and Drunkenness, may well pass for a Cardinal crime, yet both together, by an after reckoning, make but a poor Venial(r). They define it an inordinate appetite of eating and drinking, (viz.) to excess, not for necessity but for pleasure. This when it is excessive every way in the charge, the time, the quality, the pleasure, the quantity, (s)is not in its own nature a mortal sin, according to the doctrine of Aquinas, though it be a Capital Vice, and the cause of many other. But then it may be deadly by accident, (t)if it be grievously hurtful to the body. So it becomes those to determine, who are more tender of the concerns of the body than of the soul. Yet that we may understand how the pleasure of sensuality may be preferred before either soul or body, they tell us, that if the damage done to the body by intemperance, be not grievous, (u)or if it prove so great, yet if the Glutton do not observe it; or if the great prejudice done to his health be not so frequent, that he is bound to observe it, it will be Venial still. But Cajetan troubles us not with this respect to health, but concludes ⟨p. 294⟩(x)it may be Venial (and of a large size sometimes), not only when it brings upon us other inconveniencies, but other sins; and particularly when it is prejudicial to health. He has but one case wherein it will be more than Venial; (y)then only is it mortal, says he, when this pleasure in eating is a mans chief end, and his belly his God; that is, when for the pleasure of it, he (not only transgresses all rules of temperance, but) has no regard of any command of God, or the Church; as if a man will Steal to play the Glutton, &c. It seems this sensual Lust will never be criminal, unless one be so much at its devotion, (z)as to contemn God, and make nothing of any other wickedness to gratifie it. And though there be no danger here, but when one makes his belly his God; yet there's no great danger of that, since a man may be a perfect Epicure, like the rich Glutton in the Gospel, and yet escape.
(r)In general with them, all sins against temperance and modesty are regularly Venial, vid. Nav.
(s)Dico secundum S. Thom. (2. 2. q. 148. art. 1.) & secundum mentem ejus in multis lecis, quod (Gula) non est mortale ex suo genere, licet sit vitium capitale, id est, ex quo vitia multa nascuntur, Sylv. v. Gula. n. 2.
(t)Quando quis scienter comedit vel bibit, in grave corporis nocumentum secundum, S. Thom. Idem. ibid.
(u)Si hoc (grave nocumentum) fiat inadvertenter, non est mortale, nisi adeo frequenter fiat, quod tenetur advertere, sicut de ebrietate dictum est. Similiter nec si nocumentum sit modicum, Idem. ibid.
(x)Frequenter autem est veniale & quandoque valde grave, ut cum delectatio cibi allicit ad comedendum usque ad vomitum, aut alia inconvenientia, & similiter cum inducit ad alia peccata: puta ad nimium sumptum, vel ad nocendum propriae sanitati, & ad quaecunque alia peccata, Cajetan. v. Gula.
(y)Tunc solum est mortale, quando delectationem cibi habet quis pro ultimo fine juxta il•u•; qu•rum Deus venter est: hoc autem cognoscitur ex hoc, quod homo ob delectationem in com•dendo, non curat transgredi praeceptum Dei aut Ecclesiae: ut si propter hoc furetur, &c Idem. ibid. vid. Sylv. ibid. Angelus. v. Gula. n. 2. paratus facere quaecunque ut eam consequatur.
(z)Sylvest. ibid.
(a)Quum propter talem delectationem appetitus, ducit totam vitam hujusmodi delectation bus deputare, sicut Dives qui epulabatur quotidie. Et hoc est multum vicimum mortali. Sum. •bid. n. 2.
Yea further, if Intemperance proceed to beastliness, and pollute not only the soul, but the body loathsomely, if the Glutton load himself with more than he can bear, and so burden nature, that it is forced to ease it self in nasty ways, this will be no more a fault, (b)Intemperance, says Navarre, is regularly Venial, though without any profit. ⟨p. 295⟩and out of design, one stuff himself so full with meat and drink, even to Vomiting. If he eat so much till he Vomit, on purpose that he may be at it again the sooner, and so may be still gormandizing, it is no worse Uncleanness, says (c)Angelus, which is the issue of Intemperance, when one provokes himself to Vomit, that he may eat the oftener; or when he eats so much, that he must of necessity Vomit, is commonly a venial fault. (d)Cajetan more fully. Uncleanness is used for the sin of voiding Excrements excessively, as of meat by Vomiting, and the like, proceeding from Intemperance; it is frequently a Venial sin, since it is neither against the love of God nor man; yet it is filthy, since it brings with it even bodily nastiness. So that intemperance, even when it bewrays it self, and vents it filth, by all the passages, that oppressed Nature can find in the Gluttons body, is but a small fault. To be half Drunk is no mortal sin. So Lopez (e)after (f)Aquinas; herein they all agree, says a learned (z)Cardinal. Take their sense in the words of Cajetan(h). Drunkenness not complete, (when one by drinking Wine is made too merry, or is disturbed i•⟨p. 296⟩his fancy, so that the House seems to whirl round, or the like effect of intoxication befalls him, but he does not quite lose the use of Reason), without doubt is a great sin (but not big enough to be feared) unless it be done for medicine; because it is excessive drinking in quantity or quality, when fallen into it knowingly or negligently: But it is worse, when it is out of design (when one drinks too much, with an intention thus to disorder himself); because then it is almost mortal (there's no danger in all this, since he adds) but yet it is not mortal, since it reaches not the complete notion of Drunkenness, and is without signal damage to reason. So that if a man be not dead Drunk, and utterly deprived of the use of reason, he falls short of that perfection which is requisite to make this a deadly evil.
Yea further, if Intemperance proceed to beastliness, and pollute not only the soul, but the body loathsomly, if the Glutton load himself with more than he can bear, and so burden nature, that it is forced to ease it self in nasty ways, this will be no more a fault, (b)Intemperance, says Navar, is regularly Venial, though without any profit. ⟨p. 295⟩and out of design, one stuff himself so full with meat and drink, even to Vomiting. If he eat so much till he Vomit, on purpose that he may be at it again the sooner, and so may be still gormandizing, it is no worse Ʋncleanness, says (c)Angelus, which is the issue of Intemperance, when one provokes himself to Vomit, that he may eat the oftner; or when he eats so much, that he must of necessity Vomit, is commonly a venial fault. (d)Cajetan more fully. Ʋncleanness is used for the sin of voyding Excrements excessively, as of meat by Vomiting, and the like, proceeding from Intemperance; it is frequently a Venial sin, since it is neither against the love of God nor man; yet it is filthy, since it brings with it even bodily nastiness. So that intemperance, even when it bewrays it self, and vents it filth, by all the passages, that oppressed Nature can find in the Gluttons body, is but a small fault. To be half Drunk is no mortal sin. So Lopez (e)after (f)Aquinas; herein they all agree, says a learned (z)Cardinal. Take their sense in the words of Cajetan(h). Drunkenness not compleat, (when one by drinking Wine is made too merry, or is disturbed i•⟨p. 296⟩his fancy, so that the House seems to whirle round, or the like effect of intoxication befalls him, but he does not quite lose the use of Reason), without doubt is a great sin (but not big enough to be feared) unless it be done for medicine; because it is excessive drinking in quantity or quality, when fallen into it knowingly or negligently: But it is worse, when it is out of design (when one drinks too much, with an intention thus to disorder himself); because then it is almost mortal (there's no danger in all this, since he adds) but yet it is not mortal, since it reaches not the compleat notion of Drunkenness, and is wothout signal dammage to reason. So that if a man be not dead Drunk, and utterly deprived of the use of reason, he falls short of that perfection which is requisite to make this a deadly evil.
(b)Gula regulariter est venialis, etiamsi absque u•ilitate usque ad vomitum, etiam intentum sese quis cibo & potu ingurgitet, Ut sentit Cajetan. Cap. 23. n. 119.
(c)Immundicia est filia gulae, quum quis provocat se ad vomitum, ut saepius comedere possit: vel tantum comedit quod necesse habet evomere, communiter est veniale peccatum, Sum. v. Immundicia.
(d)Usurpatur pro peccato inordinatae emissionis superfluorum, ut cibi per vomitum, & similium ex gula procedentium, & sic ponitur filiagulae, frequenter est peccatum veniale, utpote nec contra Dei nec proximi dilectionem: turpe tamen, utpote etiam corporalem immunditiam inferens, Sum. v. Immunditia.
(e)Quando aliquis bene potatus, ita bene confo•tatus est capite quod rationis incompos non est factus, & tamen sibi videtur quod domus moveatur, haec semiplena ebrietas, sicut non est mortalis, licet sit grave peccatum, quia secundum m•ntem.
(f)D. Tho. & Cajet. ibi. ratio non obumbratur, cap. 2. n. 11. 22. q. 150. art. 1. & 5.
(z)(g) Quando ebrietas non est perfecta, sed imperfecta, quae turbat aliquo modo rationem, sed non omnino, tunc est grave veniale. In his omnes conveniunt, Tol. Instr. l. 8. c 61.
(h)Ebrietas non plena (quando aliquis potu vini redditur nimis laetus, aut turbatur in phantasia, dumb videtur •i quod d•mus gyretur, aut hujusmodi aliquid incurrit: non tamen perdit usum rationis) peccatum proculdubio grave est, nisi causa medicinae fiat: quia immoderatus est potus secundum quantitatem vel qualitatem, & hoc si advertenter aut negligenter accidit. Pejus tamen, si ex intentione: est enim tunc prope mortale: non tamen est mortale, quia nec attingit ad completam ebrietatis rationem; nec notabile damnum rationis eligitur, Sum. v. Ebrietas.Ebrietas non plena (quando aliquis potu vini redditur nimis laetus, aut turbatur in phantasia, dum videtur •i quod d•mus gyretur, aut hujusmodi aliquid incurrit: non tamen perdit usum rationis) peccatum proculdubio grave est, nisi causa medicinae fiat: quia immoderatus est potus secundum quantitatem vel qualitatem, & hoc si advertenter aut negligenter accidit. Pejus tamen, si ex intentione: est enim tunc prope mortale: non tamen est mortale, quia nec attingit ad completam ebrietatis rationem; nec notabile damnum rationis eligitur, Sum. v. Ebrietas.
In fine, however the Scripture, ancient Christians, and all that are sober, brand Drunkenness as a most deadly Vice; yet the Roman Doctors have discovered two admirable Virtues in it; one is that the full dose, (perfect Drunkenness) will make the highest impieties the greatest Outrages and Villainies to be no sins at all. So (i)Angelus, who proves it by the Canon Law. So likewise Rosella (k)after others. Those of their Writers which seem most cautions, (l)except culpable Drunkenness; as to this only, when such outrages are the usual effects of it. So that unless both Drunkenness, and the criminal issues of it, be customary, this will not be sin, or imputable to the Drunkard. Hereby they furnish the Christian world with a new Argument, to prove Mahomet a false Prophet, seeing he was so greatly mistaken in making his Law so severe against wine; which in its greatest abuse, is of such sovereign efficacy, as to drown so much mortal sin, and to ⟨p. 297⟩make all crimes what-ever, lose their deadly quality. But that Impostors head was not so intoxicated, but he might discern, that such who are guilty in the cause, are chargeable in the effects; nor was he so much a Prophet, as to fore-see, that in after-times, any thing under the disguise of Divinity, should stumble at this. The other virtue of this sin, is, that the moiety of it (half Drunkenness) will make any the most horrid crimes to be but small faults. (m)Weakness of judgement (says one) such as they have who are half asleep, or half drunk; though it be enough to make a sin venial, yet not mortal. When those, says (n)another, that are half asleep, or half drunk, perpetrate any wicked thing what-ever, since they are plainly under weakness of judgement, they are quitted of mortal guilt. So that if any one will but make himself half Drunk, every morning early (and it will be no worse than a venial to do it purposely); he may, what-ever wickedness he acts, be free from mortal sin all his life: and thus, he that lives all his days like a Devil, may escape Hell notwithstanding, and be saved by being daily half Drunk.
In fine, however the Scripture, ancient Christians, and all that are sober, brand Drunkenness as a most deadly Vice; yet the Roman Doctors have discovered two admirable Vertues in it; one is that the full dose, (perfect Drunkenness) will make the highest impieties the greatest Outrages and Villanies to be no sins at all. So (i)Angelus, who proves it by the Canon Law. So likewise Rosella (k)after others. Those of their Writers which seem most cautions, (l)except culpable Drunkenness; as to this only, when such outrages are the usual effects of it. So that unless both Drunkenness, and the criminal issues of it, be customary, this will not be sin, or imputable to the Drunkard. Hereby they furnish the Christian world with a new Argument, to prove Mahomet a false Prophet, seeing he was so greatly mistaken in making his Law so severe against wine; which in its greatest abuse, is of such soveraign efficacy, as to drown so much mortal sin, and to ⟨p. 297⟩make all crimes what-ever, lose their deadly quality. But that Impostors head was not so intoxicated, but he might discern, that such who are guilty in the cause, are chargeable in the effects; nor was he so much a Prophet, as to fore-see, that in after-times, any thing under the disguise of Divinity, should stumble at this. The other vertue of this sin, is, that the moiety of it (half Drunkenness) will make any the most horrid crimes to be but small faults. (m)Weakness of judgement (saies one) such as they have who are half asleep, or half drunk; though it be enough to make a sin venial, yet not mortal. When those, saies (n)another, that are half asleep, or half drunk, perpetrate any wicked thing what-ever, since they are plainly under weakness of judgement, they are quitted of mortal guilt. So that if any one will but make himself half Drunk, every morning early (and it will be no worse than a venial to do it purposely); he may, what-ever wickedness he acts, be free from mortal sin all his life: and thus, he that lives all his days like a Devil, may escape Hell notwithstanding, and be saved by being daily half Drunk.
(i)Quoad culpam excusat a toto quod fecit in ebrietate ex quo est sine usu totally rationis. Sum. v Ebrictas. n. 3.Quoad culpam excusat a toto quod fecit in ebrietate ex quo est sine usu totali rationis. Sum. v Ebrictas. n. 3.
(k)In Sylvest. v. Ebriat. n. 5. Toll. l. 5. c. 10. Rosella, v. Ebriat. n. 2. Actus vel omissiones contra praecepta contingents tempore somni, vel Ebrietatis, etiamsi fuerint voluntarii in causa, non denominari tunc peccata, sed tantum effectus peccati praecedentis; ut late defendit Vasquez referens pro ea sententia, Paludan, Major, Gabriel, & Adrian. Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 7. n. 7.In Sylvest. v. Ebriat. n. 5. Tol. l. 5. c. 10. Rosella, v. Ebriat. n. 2. Actus vel omissiones contra praecepta contingentes tempore somni, vel Ebrietatis, etiamsi fuerint voluntarii in causa, non denominari tunc peccata, sed tantum effectus peccati praecedentis; ut late defendit Vasquez referens pro ea sententia, Paludan, Major, Gabriel, & Adrian. Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 7. n. 7.
(l)An actus ma•i, quos Ebrius facit in ebrietate existens, sint peccata, si fornicetur, si occidat, &c. ad hoc Respondent, S. Tho. 2. 2. q. 150. art. 4. Cajetan. Sylvest. & responsio in his consistit—quando culpabilis suit ebrietas—quando non erat Solitus talia mala facere, nec timebantur, tunc non sunt nova peccata, in Toll. l. 8. c. 61.An actus ma•i, quos Ebrius facit in ebrietate existens, sint peccata, si fornicetur, si occidat, &c. ad hoc Respondent, S. Tho. 2. 2. q. 150. art. 4. Cajetan. Sylvest. & responsio in his consistit—quando culpabilis suit ebrietas—quando non erat Solitus talia mala facere, nec timebantur, tunc non sunt nova peccata, in Tol. l. 8. c. 61.
(m)Parvitas judicii, qualem habent semidormientes & semiebrij vel adeo turbati, licet sufficiat ad veniale, non tamen ad mortale, Navar. praelud. 9. n. 12.
(n)Quando semidormientes, vel semiebrij quidvis patraverint, cum parvitate judicij aperte laborent, & lethally culpa redduntur immunes. Graft. l. r. cap. 14. n. 4. Bonacin. de Matrim. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. ubi. Navar. Cajetan. & alij Communiter.Quando semidormientes, vel semiebrij quidvis patraverint, cum parvitate judicij aperte laborent, & lethali culpa redduntur immunes. Graff. l. r. cap. 14. n. 4. Bonacin. de Matrim. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. ubi. Navar. Cajetan. & alij Communiter.
There are multitudes of particular sins which they comprise under these seven Capitals, and call them their Daughters, after Gregory and Aquinas; but they need not be taken notice of as mortal, by common Confessors, much less by their Consitents; for such Confessors need not know whether they are mortal or no; (o)as Angelus tells us after Henricus, and so must Absolve Sinners, though they never resolve, or think of leaving their sins.
(o)(n) Ali sunt peecata, quae sunt filiae peccatorum Capitalium, & de talibus non—ordinarius non tenetur scire, utrum sint mortalia vel non. Sed curatus Ordinarius, ut Episcopus, Archiepiscopus & caeteri alij superiors ten•ntur scire. Sum. v. confessio. 4. n. 3.(n) Ali sunt peecata, quae sunt filiae peccatorum Capitalium, & de talibus non—ordinarius non tenetur scire, utrum sint mortalia vel non. Sed curatus Ordinarius, ut Episcopus, Archiepiscopus & caeteri alij superiores ten•ntur scire. Sum. v. confessio. 4. n. 3.
Sect. 21. By the premises we may see what, and how many sins may pass for Venial in the Church of Rome, and they have presumed to make them so without evidence from Scripture, as even a (p)Jesuit ⟨p. 298⟩will acknowledge. The Maxims they proceed on therein (though eternal life or death depend on it) are purely their own conceits; no wonder if they leave them at great uncertainty. (q)Many sins are believed to be venials, which are mortal, says Bonaventure, and it is most difficult to discern them. So that they have no sufficient direction from any rule, no not their own, but they are encouraged to venture upon all this wickedness in the dark and blindfold. The instances I have given, may serve for a taste, there is a world more, nor have I picked out all the worst, more time and diligence may discover more, as bad or worse. But by these we may discern, that what-ever the Lord hath forbidden in his Law, they have ways to reduce it to the rank of Venials; for the whole matter of the divine Law, is, in it self, either of less, or greater weight; if it be small, or they please to count it so, they conclude presently upon that account, it is not mortal: what-ever appears not to be a grand enormity, whether it be against God, others, or our selves, must be venial, according to that of Richard de Sancto Victore. (r)Mortal sin cannot be committed by any, but by a grand corrupting of himself, or contempt of God; or grievous mischief of others; all the rest are Venial. Whatever is not in their apprehension, grand and grievous, is next to nothing. Yea, one Member of the three, is in a manner, wholly shrivelled away into Venials. (s)A man can scarce do any thing against himself, which will be big enough to make a mortal sin of. Indeed, it may seem no more than requisite to make it no crime for a man to damn himself, when they animate him to venture on so many damnable things, as if they were nothing. Thus they serve whatever the great God hath forbidden, which they have the confidence to count small; but if they cannot choose but think it great, they have other expedients to level it (according to the exigence of mens Lusts), and diminish it into a Venial. To make it more, they ⟨p. 299⟩require so very much, that a Sinner may make shift enough to be without some of it, and so scape the mortalness (as they will have him dream) though he practise the wickedness.
Sect. 21. By the premises we may see what, and how many sins may pass for Venial in the Church of Rome, and they have presumed to make them so without evidence from Scripture, as even a (p)Jesuit ⟨p. 298⟩will acknowledge. The Maxims they proceed on therein (though eternal life or death depend on it) are purely their own conceits; no wonder if they leave them at great uncertainty. (q)Many sins are believed to be venials, which are mortal, says Bonaventure, and it is most difficult to discern them. So that they have no sufficient direction from any rule, no not their own, but they are incouraged to venture upon all this wickedness in the dark and blindfold. The instances I have given, may serve for a tast, there is a world more, nor have I pickt out all the worst, more time and diligence may discover more, as bad or worse. But by these we may discern, that what-ever the Lord hath forbidden in his Law, they have ways to reduce it to the rank of Venials; for the whole matter of the divine Law, is, in it self, either of less, or greater weight; if it be small, or they please to count it so, they conclude presently upon that account, it is not mortal: what-ever appears not to be a grand enormity, whether it be against God, others, or our selves, must be venial, according to that of Richard de Sancto Victore. (r)Mortal sin cannot be committed by any, but by a grand corrupting of himself, or contempt of God; or grievous mischief of others; all the rest are Venial. Whatever is not in their apprehension, grand and grievous, is next to nothing. Yea, one Member of the three, is in a manner, wholly shrivell'd away into Venials. (s)A man can scarce do any thing against himself, which will be big enough to make a mortal sin of. Indeed, it may seem no more than requisite to make it no crime for a man to damn himself, when they animate him to venture on so many damnable things, as if they were nothing. Thus they serve whatever the great God hath forbidden, which they have the confidence to count small; but if they cannot choose but think it great, they have other expedients to level it (according to the exigence of mens Lusts), and diminish it into a Venial. To make it more, they ⟨p. 299⟩require so very much, that a Sinner may make shift enough to be without some of it, and so scape the mortalness (as they will have him dream) though he practise the wickedness.
(p)Ex Scripturis divinis quamvis de multis peccatis constat, quod sunt mortalia, tamen vix de ullis expresse satis videtur constare, quod sint tantum venialia, Greg. de V• lent. Tom. 2. disp. 6. q. 18.
(q)Multa enim creduntur esse venialia, quae mortalia sunt, & difficillimum est in talibus discernere, 2. dist. 24. n. 53.
(r)Mortale non potest a quoquam comity sine grandi corruption sui, aut contemptu Dei, aut gravi laesione proximi; & reliquaomnia esse venialia, vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 8•.Mortale non potest a quoquam committi sine grandi corruptione sui, aut contemptu Dei, aut gravi laesione proximi; & reliquaomnia esse venialia, vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 8•.
(s)Quando sunt contra bonum proprium tantum, sunt magna ex parte venialia.
That any sin may be mortal, there must be judicium integrum (t)an entire judgment, not distracted, not weakened, not disturbed, as they prove out of their Canon Law: Also there must be (u)perfect deliberation, 'tis venial (how grievous soever otherwise), where there is not perfect deliberation: If by any means, deliberation not only in it self, but in its perfection, be either prevented (and the thing be done before the mind take due cognizance of it,) or hindered (while it is under debate) it cannot be mortal. And that deliberation may be perfect, there must be a (x)sufficient presenting of the evil in its object, and its circumstances. If the mind only consider the advantage, or pleasure, and not the sinfulness and danger; 'tis but a semi-deliberation, and not full enough to make a sin mortal. Besides it will require (y)time to perfect it, and here they may favour the Sinner as much as they please by determining what time is sufficient for humane frailty; but if he be in hast, and do not stay this time, because he is so forward to sin, he will but sin Venially. Finally, there must be full consent of will. If the inferior and sensual part take never so much complacency in a wicked thing; yet so ⟨p. 300⟩long as the Superior takes no notice of it, there's no harm(z), 'tis certainly no more than a Venial: Or if the superior part takes cognizance of it, and be some way inclined to the wickedness, yet that may not make it criminal, for every (a)inclination is not sufficient for this purpose, but full consent of will, such as is perfectly deliberate; neither is a tacit and constructive consent sufficient. (b)A neglect to repel or suppress the delight in sin, with some reluctancy of reason, is with Bonaventure constructive consent, which in the opinion of many Doctors is no mortal sin. Now if there be not a concurrence of all these, the horridest crime that can be perpetrated will be a Venial. If a man should Blaspheme God, or Curse Christ, or renounce the Faith, or Murder his own Father, or Ravish his own Child, or Mother, or fire Cities and Countries; yet if he did it not with such perfection of judgment, deliberation, and consent, as is expressed; it would be a petty fault. And he may be easily furnished with many things, which will any of them so weaken this, as not to hurt him.
That any sin may be mortal, there must be judicium integrum (t)an intire judgment, not distracted, not weakened, not disturbed, as they prove out of their Canon Law: Also there must be (u)perfect deliberation, 'tis venial (how grievous soever otherwise), where there is not perfect deliberation: If by any means, deliberation not only in it self, but in its perfection, be either prevented (and the thing be done before the mind take due cognizance of it,) or hindered (while it is under debate) it cannot be mortal. And that deliberation may be perfect, there must be a (x)sufficient presenting of the evil in its object, and its circumstances. If the mind only consider the advantage, or pleasure, and not the sinfulness and danger; 'tis but a semi-deliberation, and not full enough to make a sin mortal. Besides it will require (y)time to perfect it, and here they may favour the Sinner as much as they please by determining what time is sufficient for humane frailty; but if he be in hast, and do not stay this time, because he is so forward to sin, he will but sin Venially. Finally, there must be full consent of will. If the inferiour and sensual part take never so much complacency in a wicked thing; yet so ⟨p. 300⟩long as the Superiour takes no notice of it, there's no harm(z), 'tis certainly no more than a Venial: Or if the superiour part takes cognizance of it, and be some way inclined to the wickedness, yet that may not make it criminal, for every (a)inclination is not sufficient for this purpose, but full consent of will, such as is perfectly deliberate; neither is a tacit and constructive consent sufficient. (b)A neglect to repell or suppress the delight in sin, with some reluctancy of reason, is with Bonaventure constructive consent, which in the opinion of many Doctors is no mortal sin. Now if there be not a concurrence of all these, the horridest crime that can be perpetrated will be a Venial. If a man should Blaspheme God, or Curse Christ, or renounce the Faith, or Murder his own Father, or Ravish his own Child, or Mother, or fire Citys and Countrys; yet if he did it not with such perfection of judgment, deliberation, and consent, as is expressed; it would be a petty fault. And he may be easily furnished with many things, which will any of them so weaken this, as not to hurt him.
(t)Ad constituendum peccatum mortal judicium integrum requiritur, Navarre. cap. 16. n. 8. Ad constituendum peccatum mortal integrum judicium requiri debet, cap. 1. de delict. puer. Graft. l. 1. c. 14. n. 4. requiritur plena advertentia, & non sufficit semiplena, qualis in semiebrijs, semidormientibus, & eis qui alio distrabuntur ut Cajetan, Navar. & alij communiter cum Bonacin de Matr. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. p. 313.Ad constituendum peccatum mortale judicium integrum requiritur, Navar. cap. 16. n. 8. Ad constituendum peccatum mortale integrum judicium requiri debet, cap. 1. de delict. puer. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 4. requiritur plena advertentia, & non sufficit semiplena, qualis in semiebrijs, semidormientibus, & eis qui alio distrabuntur ut Cajetan, Navar. & alij communiter cum Bonacin de Matr. q. 4. punct. 7. n. 6. p. 313.
(u)Vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 79. & Toll. l. 4. c. 12. Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. mores. p. 112.Vid. St. Clar. Probl. 14. p. 79. & Tol. l. 4. c. 12. Cajetan. Sum. v. delect. mores. p. 112.
(x)Veniale ex imperfectione operis, licet in re gravi, ubi deest perfecta deliberatio, vel presentatio sufficiens malitiae in objecto, &c. St. Clar. ibid.
(y)Per sufficientem deliberationem intelligit (Bonaventura) tempus sufficiens ad deliberandum postquam ratio advertit. Sylvest. v. Consens. n. 1. Intelligitur si advertentia sit satis deliberata. Nam si est motus surreptitius, adeo ut sit subita deliberatio non autem plena, poterit esse veniale (perjurium): scilicet si tempus non suppetebat ad plene deliberandum, Soto de Just. lib. 8. q. 2. ar 3. p. 271. sufficiens advertentia & deliberatio non habetur sine discursu: discursus autem in tempore sit, Suar. de Vot. l. 1. c. 9.
(z)Contingit igitur delectari ad apprehensionem delectabilis, ante adversionem delectationis, & hoc est sensualitatis, & absque dubio est veniale peccatum. Bonaventura 2. dist. 24. n. 74.
(a)Vid. Bonavent. ibid. n. 64.
(b)Negligentia repellendi complacentiam, cum displicentia rationis de ea secundum Bonaventur. est consensus interpretativus: quod non est mortale▪ peccatum secundum multos magistros, Sylv. v. Consensus▪ n. 1. Necessaria est positiva complacentia—& non sufficit consensus interpretativus, Cajetan. & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8. Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 21. n. 3. & ibi. Adrian. Cajetan. Armilla. Navarre. D. Thom. D. Bonavent. & 30. alij.
Ignorance, drowsiness, disorder by drink, inconsiderateness, negligence, forgetfulness, precipitancy natural or accidental, levity, passion, custom, or habit, and the like, will serve to excuse any wickedness from mortal guilt. Let me but add one more (which serves to make clear work) the opinion of their Doctors, one or more, will make any crime not to be mortal to him that follows it; any person upon this ground may venture upon the most deadly sin, as if it were Venial. It will be no more dangerous, for he is to be Absolved by their Doctrine, though he declares, ⟨p. 301⟩that he will not forsake such a sin. (c)The Confessor ought to Absolve him, though in his own opinion, and the judgment of other Divines also, it be a mortal crime. This is their common doctrine delivered (d)by multitudes of their Writers. So that hereby a fair way is opened to leave no mortal sin in the world, at least in the Consciences of all that will regard their Doctors. In the mean time, the far greatest part of sins the world is guilty of, are by this and their other maxims, become peccadilloes, and they bid fair for all. The principles, by virtue of which they have done so much already, a little improved (though extended no further than they will reach) would go near to leave no deadly sin at all. To be sure, he that will regulate himself by their maxims, may act any wickedness in the world without fear of deadly guilt. And hereby it appears plainly, how very needless holiness of life is in that Church (which pretends to a Monopoly of all the holiness on earth) since by their doctrine they may not only neglect acts of Piety, Righteousness, and common Honesty; but may live securely in practices opposite to, and inconsistent therewith. They may continue in customary Blaspheming of God, in common Swearing and Perjuries, in Perfidiousness to God and Men, in a neglect of all that is acceptable in divine worship, In a total profanation of all time which is indeed, or in their account holy, in impiousness and disobedience to Parents or Superiors, in divers degrees of uncleanness and Murder, in variety of Cheats and Stealing, in Unfaithfulness as to breach of Promise and compacts, in all Falseness and Lying; ⟨p. 302⟩every where and upon all occasions; in Slandering or Detraction, in Covetousness or Prodigality, which they will; in Unmercifulness and Outrageous passions; in Pride and Ambition;
Ignorance, drowsiness, disorder by drink, inconsiderateness, negligence, forgetfulness, precipitancy natural or accidental, levity, passion, custome, or habit, and the like, will serve to excuse any wickedness from mortal guilt. Let me but add one more (which serves to make clear work) the opinion of their Doctors, one or more, will make any crime not to be mortal to him that follows it; any person upon this ground may venture upon the most deadly sin, as if it were Venial. It will be no more dangerous, for he is to be Absolved by their Doctrine, though he declares, ⟨p. 301⟩that he will not forsake such a sin. (c)The Confessor ought to Absolve him, though in his own opinion, and the judgment of other Divines also, it be a mortal crime. This is their common doctrine delivered (d)by multitudes of their Writers. So that hereby a fair way is opened to leave no mortal sin in the world, at least in the Consciences of all that will regard their Doctors. In the mean time, the far greatest part of sins the world is guilty of, are by this and their other maxims, become peccadilloes, and they bid fair for all. The principles, by vertue of which they have done so much already, a little improved (though extended no further than they will reach) would go near to leave no deadly sin at all. To be sure, he that will regulate himself by their maxims, may act any wickedness in the world without fear of deadly guilt. And hereby it appears plainly, how very needless holiness of life is in that Church (which pretends to a Monopoly of all the holiness on earth) since by their doctrine they may not only neglect acts of Piety, Righteousness, and common Honesty; but may live securely in practices opposite to, and inconsistent therewith. They may continue in customary Blaspheming of God, in common Swearing and Perjuries, in Perfidiousness to God and Men, in a neglect of all that is acceptable in divine worship, In a total prophanation of all time which is indeed, or in their account holy, in impiousness and disobedience to Parents or Superiours, in divers degrees of uncleanness and Murder, in variety of Cheats and Stealing, in Unfaithfulness as to breach of Promise and compacts, in all Falseness and Lying; ⟨p. 302⟩every where and upon all occasions; in Slandering or Detraction, in Covetousness or Prodigality, which they will; in Unmercifulness and Outragious passions; in Pride and Ambition;
(c)Si paenitens nollet agnoscere tale quod peccatum, nihilominus absolvat eum, &c. quia ex quo ille credit opinionem quam sequitur esse veram, innixus authoritate probabili, non videtur peccare mortaliter: & sic debet absolvi. Sylvest. secundum Gofredum. v. Confess. 3. n. 11. Si diversitas esset inter Doctores, & paenitens ex aliqua rationabili causa vult adhaerere uni opinioni, non est sibi denegenda absolutio: sed suae conscientiae relinquenda. Caveat igitur confessor, ne sit praeceps in dando sententiam de mortali, ubi sunt variae opiniones doctorum Angel. Sum. v. Confess. 4. n. 3. & 13.Si paenitens nollet agnoscere tale quod peccatum, nihilominus absolvat eum, &c. quia ex quo ille credit opinionem quam sequitur esse veram, innixus authoritate probabili, non videtur peccare mortaliter: & sic debet absolvi. Sylvest. secundum Gofredum. v. Confess. 3. n. 11. Si diversitas esset inter Doctores, & paenitens ex aliqua rationabili causa vult adhaerere vni opinioni, non est sibi denegenda absolutio: sed suae conscientiae relinquenda. Caveat igitur confessor, ne sit praeceps in dando sententiam de mortali, ubi sunt variae opiniones doctorum Angel. Sum. v. Confess. 4. n. 3. & 13.
(d)Gofredus, Antoninus, Rosella, Armilla, Angelus, Sylvest. Conradus, Ledesma, Soto, Medina, Navarre. in cap. 23. n. 31. & in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 32. Sect. 5. & Victorel, l. 3. c. 20. Near 50. of their Authors are produced for this by Jo. Sancius, disp. 33. n. 54. p. 223, 224. Vid. Bonacin, & in eo alios, Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 7. punct. 4. n. 26.Gofredus, Antoninus, Rosella, Armilla, Angelus, Sylvest. Conradus, Ledesma, Soto, Medina, Navar. in cap. 23. n. 31. & in Suarez. tom. 4. disp. 32. Sect. 5. & Victorel, l. 3. c. 20. Near 50. of their Authors are produced for this by Jo. Sancius, disp. 33. n. 54. p. 223, 224. Vid. Bonacin, & in eo alios, Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 7. punct. 4. n. 26.
in Vain-glory and Hypocrisy; in Flattery or Cursing; in Gluttony and Drunkenness, &c. In Sins against God and Man, against Godliness, Righteousness, Mercy, Charity; in any of these, a little modified▪ in all of them, and many more than I can reckon. They may persist in them impenitently to the death, and yet (if Impostors may be trusted rather than the Word of God) not fall short of Salvation; their doctrine gives them encouragement to live in them without Conscience, and dye in them without Repentance. It takes off the motives which might work upon either fear or love (the main principles of such motions in us) to forsake them. They are taught by their best Authors that these sins may stand well with their love to God, that they do not so much as (e)impair the habit of Charity; that they do not hinder the increase of (f)Grace, or the effects of their Sacraments; that they do (g)not stain the soul; that they hazard not Gods favour thereby, (h)that they displease not God, that they are not against his will; that they are (i)consistent with a perfect fulfilling of the Law; that (k)they have not perfectly the nature of Sin; that they are not (l)against the Law, but only beside it; or if they be against it in any respect, as some of them think, (m)yet against no precept; the observance of which, is necessary for salvation, or (n)not against the end of the ⟨p. 303⟩Law, which is Charity; (o)that they are but as specks or motes, (p)we may look on them as nothing, that without the interposal of mercy, they are (q)such in their own nature, as ought to be past by, they (r)deserve pardon. They do not (as they teach) deserve eternal punishment; (s)and the Lord (as they Blaspheme) would be unjust, if he should condemn any for them. So that not only as long as God is merciful, but while he is just, the practice of these sins is safe. Neither love to God, nor fear of his displeasure, nor dread of Hell, nor desire of Heaven, nor a design for perfection, need move them to abandon any one of these sins. They need not fear, how much soever they multiply, or abound in them: if they should commit millions of them in a day, and continue the practice all the days of a long life; this would not damn them: (s)for all the Venial sins in the world, if they meet in one man, would not amount to so much as one damning sin. They may commit them not only out of ignorance or infirmity, but with a high hand (t)out of contempt.
in Vain-glory and Hypocrisie; in Flattery or Cursing; in Gluttony and Drunkenness, &c. In Sins against God and Man, against Godliness, Righteousness, Mercy, Charity; in any of these, a little modified▪ in all of them, and many more than I can reckon. They may persist in them impenitently to the death, and yet (if Impostors may be trusted rather than the Word of God) not fall short of Salvation; their doctrine gives them incouragement to live in them without Conscience, and dye in them without Repentance. It takes off the motives which might work upon either fear or love (the main principles of such motions in us) to forsake them. They are taught by their best Authors that these sins may stand well with their love to God, that they do not so much as (e)impair the habit of Charity; that they do not hinder the increase of (f)Grace, or the effects of their Sacraments; that they do (g)not stain the soul; that they hazard not Gods favour thereby, (h)that they displease not God, that they are not against his will; that they are (i)consistent with a perfect fulfilling of the Law; that (k)they have not perfectly the nature of Sin; that they are not (l)against the Law, but only beside it; or if they be against it in any respect, as some of them think, (m)yet against no precept; the observance of which, is necessary for salvation, or (n)not against the end of the ⟨p. 303⟩Law, which is Charity; (o)that they are but as specks or motes, (p)we may look on them as nothing, that without the interposal of mercy, they are
(e)Ex consensu omnium neque tollunt neque minuunt habitum charitatis, Bellarm. de Amiss. grat. l. 1. c. 13. p. 91.
(f)actual peccatum veniale non esse obicem in—Eucharistia (docet) D Thomas, unde à fortiore idem diceret de caeteris Sacramentis quae aninus digna sunt, de Baptismo affirmat Scotus,—frequentiores Theologi, Suar. tom. 3. disp. 7. p. 132.actuale peccatum veniale non esse obicem in—Eucharistia (docet) D Thomas, unde à fortiore idem diceret de caeteris Sacramentis quae aninus digna sunt, de Baptismo affirmat Scotus,—frequentiores Theologi, Suar. tom. 3. disp. 7. p. 132.
(g)Aquinas proprie loquendo peccatum veniale non causat maculam in anima, 1. 2. q. 89. art. 1.
(h)Bonavent. 2. dist. 42. Soto de nat. & gr. l. 1. c. 4. p. 132.
(i)Neque obstant quo minus justi, perfecti etiam dicantur, Soto, ibid.
(k)Non habet perfectam rationem peccati, Aquinas 1, 2. q. 88. art. 1. ad 1mum.
(l)Non est contra legem sed praeter legem. Idem. ibid. Lombard. 2. Sentent. dist. 35. Bonaventur. 2. dist. 43. Scotus a quo vocatur consilium, quod infringitur per peccatum venial, in St. Clar. ibid. p. 79. Bellarm. de Justific. l. 4. c. 14.Non est contra legem sed praeter legem. Idem. ibid. Lombard. 2. Sentent. dist. 35. Bonaventur. 2. dist. 43. Scotus a quo vocatur consilium, quod infringitur per peccatum veniale, in St. Clar. ibid. p. 79. Bellarm. de Justific. l. 4. c. 14.
(m)Durandus, Major, Vega Rada. Herrera.
(n)Estius. Becanu.
(o)Iste ergo vitiorum atque lapsuum quotidiani naevuli licet Christiani hominis vitam quasi pulvisculo aspergant handquaquam tamen defaedant turpiter Lindanus,
They (u)may praise themselves or others for them; they may (x)boast of and glory in them; they may perpetrate ⟨p. 304⟩them (y)out of malice. They may be so far from resolving to leave them, as it will be but a small fault(z), to bind themselves by Oath to commit them, and call God to witness, that they will thus sin against him. They (a)may dye with resolution to continue therein, if they might live; yea, they may breath out their souls with delight (b)and complacency in these sins, and yet be saved. To conclude, mark how they may act and multiply, and persist in them, and then view the nature and quality, and number of them, or guess thereat by the severals premised; and then suppose a man living after the rules of these conscientious Doctors, and Casuists, and taking but part of that liberty which the Roman Divinity allows; such a man would pass for a good Catholic with them, and be holy enough, according to the Holiness left among them, and made necessary by them; yet even by the rules of Heathen morality, he would appear little better than a Monster. So faithfully do they retain, and so much do they regard the rules of Christ in forming the Maxims of their new Divinity, that sober Heathenism would be ashamed thereof; and so like is practical Popery to true Christianity, in that wherein the reality, and triumphant splendour of it consists, Innocency and Purity. If an Atheist had a mind to render the Christian name odious, and to represent Christianity with a black and detestable visage to the sober part of the world; if he had a design to make men believe that Christ was a Minister of Unrighteousness, and the Gospel a licentious doctrine, tending to debauch ⟨p. 305⟩mankind; he would need no more, but persuade them that the maxims of the Roman Divines were conformed to the rules of the Gospel; but then, if he should attempt to prove this conformity, he might as easily demonstrate that darkness is light, or the Alcoran the Christian Gospel.
They (u)may praise themselves or others for them; they may (x)boast of and glory in them; they may perpetrate ⟨p. 304⟩them (y)out of malice. They may be so far from resolving to leave them, as it will be but a small fault(z), to bind themselves by Oath to commit them, and call God to witness, that they will thus sin against him. They (a)may dye with resolution to continue therein, if they might live; yea, they may breath out their souls with delight (b)and complacency in these sins, and yet be saved. To conclude, mark how they may act and multiply, and persist in them, and then view the nature and quality, and number of them, or guess thereat by the severals premised; and then suppose a man living after the rules of these conscientious Doctors, and Casuists, and taking but part of that liberty which the Roman Divinity allows; such a man would pass for a good Catholick with them, and be holy enough, according to the Holiness left among them, and made necessary by them; yet even by the rules of Heathen morality, he would appear little better than a Monster. So faithfully do they retain, and so much do they regard the rules of Christ in forming the Maxims of their new Divinity, that sober Heathenism would be ashamed thereof; and so like is practical Popery to true Christianity, in that wherein the reality, and triumphant splendour of it consists, Innocency and Purity. If an Atheist had a mind to render the Christian name odious, and to represent Christianity with a black and detestable visage to the sober part of the world; if he had a design to make men believe that Christ was a Minister of Unrighteousness, and the Gospel a licencious doctrine, tending to debauch ⟨p. 305⟩mankind; he would need no more, but perswade them that the maxims of the Roman Divines were conformed to the rules of the Gospel; but then, if he should attempt to prove this conformity, he might as easily demonstrate that darkness is light, or the Alcoran the Christian Gospel.
(u)Navarre. cap. 23. n. 13. & 16.Navar. cap. 23. n. 13. & 16.
(x)Secus etiamsi gloriaretur de repeccati Venialis solum, quoniam sic nou esset mortalis vana gloria, Angel. Sum. v. van. Gl. n. 1. Cajetin. Sum. v. glor. vana. Est mortale cum—laudant aliot & jactant de peccatis mortalibus quae fecerunt, secus esset de Veniali, quoniam non est contra Deum. Angel. v. Jactantia, n. 1.
(y)Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus, esse Veniale peccatum ex malitia: ut siquis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione bujus mali, quod est vane mentire, & non propter aliud, Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.
(z)Juramentum de peccato Veniali peccatum est, si tamen fiat cum proposito implendi illud, non est mortale, Cajetan, Soto, Antoninus, Sylvest. Tabien. Navarre. in Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 19. n. 3.Juramentum de peccato Veniali peccatum est, si tamen fiat cum proposito implendi illud, non est mortale, Cajetan, Soto, Antoninus, Sylvest. Tabien. Navar. in Suar. de Juram. l. 3. c. 19. n. 3.
(a)Potest quis dum moritur, habere voluntatem permanendi in peccato Veniali, Bellarm. de Purgat. l. 1. c. 7. p. 1359.
(b)Potest quis mori in complacentia peccati, Idem. ibid. cap. 10. p. 1370. Cum Venialis complacentia potest mori ac salvari, Sylvest. Sum. v. Contritio. n. 3.
curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graff. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 13.
(r)Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parents siliis, & colon•, & mullions bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes siliis, & colon•, & muliones bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.
(s)Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navarre. ibid.Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navar. ibid.
(t)Peccat qui maledicit diabolo ratione suae naturae quia illa bona est & a Deo facta secus si ratione suae culpae, & tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur. Idem. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.
(u)(Quum) malo usu bujusmodi profert & est veniale peccatum. Cajetan. ibid.
(x)Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale—vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo—talia verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affecta pensantur. Sylvest. v. maledict. n. 3. sit veniale—quod ex levi motu seu lusu. Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali carere possit, ut si fiat joco & ludo, vel causa recreationis honestae.
(y)Si paenitens dicat see maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graft. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navarre. ibid. n. 117.Si paenitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graff. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navar. ibid. n. 117.
restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says
that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navar. c. 19. n. 90. (Tol. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
(m)Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum secundum. Rodofred, s•d de consilio solum. Sum. v. Emptio, n. 10. Vid. Lopez. ibid.
is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
frequently Venial, when without prejudice of others, a man values himself as having more knowledg, or goodness, or authority than he hath;
(r) Est autem frequenter venialis arrogantia dum absque prejudicio proximi astimat quis▪ se plus scientiae, aut bonitatis aut authoritatis habere, quam habet Sum. v. arrogantia peccatum est quia contra rectam rationem est. Sed mortale non est nisi vel id quod sibi usurpat, sit contra divinam reverentiam: ut Rex Tyri, Ego Deus Sum. aut contra proximum: ut tyrannis, vel finis ultimus in bujusmodi elatione ponatur. Ibid.)
contradict, not only the truth, but Saint Thomas, in saying it is a mortal evil when those things which were ordained for the glory of God, are done principally for a mans own glory, as the Sacraments and the Scripture. And they are highly concern'd to maintain this,
this were a mortal sin, the whole Clergy in a manner were in an ill condition; he means they were in a state of damnation.
omitted: for we cannot yet discern that they account any of these necessary to Salvation, and by the premises it appears that they do not. It is Venial, says Sylvester,
Immoderate self-love, when one excessively seeks the delight of the body, and ease of the flesh, it proceeds from Luxury, yet it is commonly Venial, when it causes not other mortal acts, or neglects.
be excused as a little fault, envy upon a great occasion, will be excusable, as less; except when they derive the sinfulness of an act from its exorbitancy as to reason; that will be less sinful which is more unreasonable.
When one, says Angelus, for delight of his Appetite, resolves to give up his whole life to such (Gluttonous) pleasures as Dives, &c. this is near to mortal sin. It seems then it is not deadly, but only near it; though it brought the Epicure, not only near Hell, but into the torment of its flames.
Negligentia repellendi complacentiam, cum displicentia rationis de ea secundum Bonaventur. est consensus interpretativus: quod non est mortale▪ peccatum secundum multos magistros, Sylv. v. Consensus▪ n. 1. Necessaria est positiva complacentia—& non sufficit consensus interpretativus, Cajetan. & alii in Bonacin. ibid. n. 8. Vid. Jo. Sanc. disp. 21. n. 3. & ibi. Adrian. Cajetan. Armilla. Navar. D. Thom. D. Bonavent. & 30. alij.
and the Lord (as they Blaspheme) would be unjust, if he should condemn any for them. So that not only as long as God is merciful, but while he is just, the practice of these sins is safe. Neither love to God, nor fear of his displeasure, nor dread of Hell, nor desire of Heaven, nor a design for perfection, need move them to abandon any one of these sins. They need not fear, how much soever they multiply, or abound in them: if they should commit millions of them in a day, and continue the practice all the days of a long life; this would not damn them:
for all the Venial sins in the world, if they meet in one man, would not amount to so much as one damning sin. They may commit them not only out of ignorance or infirmity, but with a high hand
Veniale ex se venia dignum, Aquinas 1. 2. q. 88. art. 1. Veniale dicitur quod est venia dignum, Bellarm. ibid. p. 81. Cajetan. Estius 2. sent. dist. 42. Sect. 6.
(s)Negamus—posse Deum juste punire peccatum quodlibet etiam veniale, poena omnium gravissima, quae est mors aeterna, Bellarm. ibid. p. 92. & de Purgat. l. 1. c. 7. p. 1359.
(s)Etiamsi omnia peccata Venialia simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam effi•erent id, quod facit unum lethal, Bellarm. ibid. p. 91Etiamsi omnia peccata Venialia simul colligerentur in unum, nunquam effi•erent id, quod facit unum lethale, Bellarm. ibid. p. 91
(t)Non quasi ipse contemptus & vilipensio venialium sit mortale—quia nullibi est praeceptum ut istam curam habeamus, sed consulitur tantum, Sylvest. v. peccat. n. 4. peccare venialiter ex contemptu infra limites venialis, non est peccatum mortale, Cajetan. Sum. v. contemptus, Lopez. cap. 1. p. 8. Metina ibi. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 8. ibid. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 107. art. 3.