The Answer to the Additions.
pp. 6–170533 passagespart 6 of 14
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Therefore seeing the will of God is most effectual, it not only followeth that those things come to pass, which God will have come to pass, but that they come to pass after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to pass. Now God will have some things come to pass necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot fail, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may fail in working, from which effects are brought to pass contingently. So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to pass; but how? Not always necessarily or contingently. And that certain and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schools; but not necessity simply, but only upon suspicion, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more clear; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evil cause delight in confusion, and fear nothing more then the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either denial of Grace, which is joined with the permission of sin: Or damnation for sin, according to that on Aquinas, Reprobation includes 1the will of permitting sin, & inflicting damnation for sin. Now both the permission of sin, and damnation of God's part are his free acts; and therefore come to pass freely. But upon supposition that God will deny a man Grace, it is impossible that such a man should have grace. Secondly, secluding grace, there is no actual transgression for which a man is damned, but may be avoided; man having power for that naturally; though naturally he have no power to perform every good act. The reason is because amongst good acts some are supernatural, as the acts of the three Theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity: But no sinful act is supernatural, all such are natural. Now it is confessed on all hands that, notwithstanding man's corruption by reason of original sin, yet he hath still power and free will to perform any natural act, and accordingly he hath free power to abstain from it.
Therefore seing the will of God is most effectuall, it not only followeth that those things come to passe, which God will have come to passe, but that they come to passe after the same manner also, after which he will have them come to passe. Now God will have some things come to passe necessarily and some things contingently, that there may be an order in things for the perfection of the world. And therefore for the producing of some effects he hath fitted causes necessary, which cannot faile, by which effects are brought forth necessarily: And for the producing of other effects, he hath fitted causes contingent, such as may faile in working, from which effects are brought to passe contingently. So that upon suspicion that God doth will a thing, that thing shall certainly and infallibly come to passe; but how? Not allwaies necessarily or contingently. And that certaine and infallible eveniency of things is called also necessity in the Schooles; but not necessity simply, but only upon suspicion, which may well consist with absolute contingency. But to make the point yet more cleare; Let us distinctly consider the things decreed; For they that have an evill cause delight in confusion, and feare nothing more then the light of distinction. Now the things decreed by Reprobation are either deniall of Grace, which is joyned with the permission of sinne: Or damnation for sinne, according to that on Aquinas, Reprobation includes