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Now let us speak of the first. That which the Latins call Dolus (that is guile) the Grecians call [Greek or Hebrew], so that their word and the Latins, is almost all one. But the Hebrews call it Mirmah or Rimiah. Then we must know this, that guile is there used, where any thing lieth secret which is hidden,1 lest the guile should appear or easily be seen. Wherefore Plautus said, Guiles unless they be covered by craft, they are no guiles. Thus much as touching the name. Now let us come to the definition.
NOw let vs speake of the first. That whiche the Latines call Dolus (that is guile) the Grecians call 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, so that their worde and the Latines, is almost all one. But the Hebrues call it Mirmah or Rimiah. Then we must know this, that guile is there vsed, where any thing lyeth secret whiche is hidden,1 lest the guile should appeare or easely be sene. Wherfore Plautus sayd, Guiles vnlesse they be couered by craft, they are no guiles. Thus much as touching the name. Now let vs come to the definition.
In the digestes de dolo malo lege. 1.1 Seruius an interpreter of the law hath thus defined evil guile, namely to be a subtle invention or devise for to deceive another by, when as one thing is done and an other thing dissembled. Wheresoever therefore is guile, there is deceit by some dissimulation.2 It is true in deed that Labeo an interpreter of the law reproved the definition which Seruius brought and that by two arguments. Whereof the one is, that some may be beguiled without dissimulation or evil guile. Wherefore the definition is more strait and narrow than that which is defined, which all men count to be an error. The other argument is, because some sometimes by dissimulation do save and defend their own, or else other mens things, and yet thereby they beguile no man, neither do they hurt any man. Wherefore the definition is applied unto other things besides that which is defined:3 which thing also is reproved as a fault. Wherefore he thus defineth it: Naughty guile, is all craft, deceit and subtlety invented to beguile, delude, and deceive an other. Ulpianus in the same place alloweth the opinion of Labeo. Saving the authority of such a man I would say that Labeo did not well in removing dissimulation from the definition of deceit. And as touching the first argument which he hath, I deny, namely that men may be beguiled without dissimulation, because unless they should be together without sense, they would not easily, be brought to receive & to take that which they manifestly see will be hurtful unto them. Wherefore it is necessary, that there be some show and colour added, which can by no means be done without dissimulation. Then, where as he saith that there are very many, which by dissimulation may defend either their own things or else things of other mens: I grant that, but yet I affirm that the same is guile, although it be good guile, as afterward we shall more manifestly show. Wherefore as touching the definition of guile, it seemeth that feigning or dissimulation is always to be added. And for that cause the definition of Seruius pleaseth me better, which definition for all that I my self would rather apply unto guile in general, than unto evil guile as he did. Being by this means peradventure moved, because he understood by deceit that deceit which should be hurtful.
In the digestes de dolo malo lege. 1.1 Seruius an interpreter of the lawe hath thus defined euil guile, namely to be a subtile inuention or deuise for to deceaue another by, when as one thing is done and an other thing dissembled. Wheresoeuer therfore is guile, there is deceate by some dissimulation.2 It is true in dede yt Labeo an interpretor of the law reproued the definitiō which Seruius brought and that by two argumentes. Whereof the one is, that some may be beguiled without dissimulation or euill guile. Wherefore the difinition is more strayte and narrowe than that whiche is defined, whiche all men counte to be an error. The other argument is, bycause some sometymes by dissimulation do saue and defend their owne, or elles other mens thinges, and yet thereby they beguyle no man, neither do they hurte any man. Wherfore the definition is applyed vnto other thinges besides that whiche is defined:3 whiche thing also is reproued as a faulte. Wherfore he thus defineth it: Noughty guile, is all craft, disceate and subtility inuented to beguile, delude, and deceaue an other. Vlpianus in the same place alloweth the opinion of Labeo. Sauyng the authoritie of suche a man I would say that Labeo did not well in remouing dissimulation from the definitiō of deceate. And as touching the first argument whiche he hath, I deny, namely that men may be beguiled without dissimulation, bycause vnlesse they should be together without sense, they would not easely, be brought to receaue & to take that which they manifestly see wilbe hurtefull vnto them. Wherfore it is necessary, that there be some shewe and colour added, whiche can by no meanes be done without dissimulation. Then, where as he saith that there are very many, whiche by dissimulation may defend either their owne thinges or elles thynges of other mens: I graunt that, but yet I affirme that the same is guile, although it be good guile, as afterward we shal more manifestly shew. Wherfore as touching the definition of guile, it semeth that fayning or dissimulation is alwayes to be added. And for that cause the definitiō of Seruius pleaseth me better, which definition for all that I my selfe would rather apply vnto guile in generall, thā vnto euill guile as he did. Beyng by this meanes peraduenture moued, bycause he vnderstode by deceate that deceate whiche should be hurtefull.
Cicero in his first book of offices affirmeth that dissimulation or feigning,1 pertain chiefly unto the nature of guile. For he writeth that Aquilius his familiar friend being demanded what guile was, he answered, where one thing is done and an other thing dissembled. To this sentence Augustine assenteth,2 who (in his 7. treatise upon John expounding these words which Christ pronounced of Nathaniel, Behold a true Israelite in whom is no guile) saith: Then it is guile, when one thing is done and an other thing feigned, &c. And to speak this by the way, by this place is easily gathered,3 that Augustine preached his Sermons unto the people in Latin, because the Africans used the Roman tongue, although it were not pure, but in some words corrupt. For there Augustine admonished the people, that Dolus which is guile, signified not Dolour that is pain as many corruptly spake, saying Dolus illū torquet, that is as they meant. He is troubled with pain, when as in that place they should have said Dolour and not Dolus: to take away therefore the ambiguity of the word, he sayeth, that Dolus which is guile, signifieth feigning and dissimulation. And in the same place, to express what feigning beguiling signifieth, he addeth,4 that it cometh of doubleness of the heart. He allegeth th• 12. Psalm, where when mention is made of guileful men, David saith that they speak in hart and in harts, that is, as he ⟨image 91⟩interpreteth, in one part of their heart they do see the truth, & perceive how the thing is: & in the other part they go about dissimulation & deceit. But in those (saith he) is no guile, which when they see themselves to be sinners, do also count them selves for such, nether do they dissemble or boast of righteousness, as did the Pharisee, when he prayed by the publican, & as other hypocrites also do. Nathaniel had no guile in him, but not universally, because every man is a liar: & as Paul writeth, there dwelleth no good thing in our flesh, for as much as it is altogether guileful and deceitful. It could be only said of Christ in universal, that he wanted guile. But yet they are blessed (as David saith) to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose spirit there is no guile. For in as much as they are regenerate especially as touching the spirit that which they do they do it uprightly and simply:
and such a one Christ affirmeth Nathaniel to have ben.
and such a one Christ affirmeth Nathaniell to haue ben.
1The same Augustine in the 10 Tome and his book of 50. Homilies the first Homely, expoundeth this, which is written in the 33. Psalm of David what man is he, which would live, & loveth to see good days? Refrain thy tongue from evil, and thy lips that they speak no guile, then (saith he) it is guile, when nothing is close and secret in the heart, and an other thing is expressed, either in word or deed,2 as flatterers use to do, which commend some contrary to the which they think, thereby either to eat their meat & drink their drink, or else to get some other benefit at their hands. And that which he speaketh of flatterers, may also be understand of enemies & backbiters. But that it is convenient that men should do that which they do uprightly & simply,3 the very Ethnics saw. Wherefore Achilles in Homer saith, that he doth no less than death, hate those men, which speak otherwise than they think. Wherefore we think that it is not ill to affirm a subtle invention to deceive a man, when as one thing is done and an other thing dissembled is set for the general word in the definition of guile.
1The same Augustine in the 10 Tome and his booke of 50. Homelies the first Homely, expoundeth this, whiche is writtē in the 33. Psalme of Dauid what mā is he, which would lyue, & loueth to se good dayes? Refrayne thy tōgue frō euil, and thy lippes that they speake no guile, then (saith he) it is guile, when nothing is close and secret in the heart, and an other thing is expressed, either in word or dede,2 as flatterers vse to do, which cōmēd some contrary to ye which they think, therby either to eat their meat & drinke their drinke, or els to get some other benefite at their hāds. And yt which he speaketh of flatterers, may also be vnderstād of enemies & backbyters. But yt it is conueniēt yt men should do yt which they do vprightly & simply,3 ye very Ethnikes saw. Wherfore Achilles in Homere saith, that he doth no lesse thā death, hate those mē, which speake otherwise than they thinke. Wherfore we thinke yt it is not ill to affirme a subtile inuention to deceaue a mā, when as one thing is done and an other thyng dissembled is set for the generall worde in the definition of guile.
1But after this definition we must add a distinction. For some guile is good & other some is evil, we call the good, which is not hurtful: & when as it hurteth none, but sometimes profiteth. But evil guile is hurtful, & ever hurteth somebody. These members may easily be made plain by examples. Nurses do continually use good guile toward their little ones, thereby to please & still them: for with them they dissemble & feign very many things. Physicians also do after the same sort deceive them that are sick, because they would heal them. Yea and Chrysostom in his first book de Sacerdotio, writeth, that a certain Physician so beguiled one that was sick of an ague, that in drinking water, he thought he drunk wine. And the same Chrysostom in the same place affirmeth,2 that he himself used a good guile, to beguile Basilius to take upon him a bishopric, when that he in no case was minded that way. David by this kind of guile, escaped the hands of the king of the Philistines. For he feigned himself to be a fool, so that the king judged him unworthy to be punished. But of evil guile there are very many examples in the holy scriptures amongest which this act of Ehud which we now interpret, is one. And it is an other also which the Hebrews did, when they went forth of Egypt, who desired to borrow both of their neighbours & also of their friends precious garments, golden & silver vessels, & yet they minded utterly to rob them of them. To this kind also belongeth, that which Chusai the Arachite did in deceiving Absalom. This act also may be counted among them, which Simeon and Levi perpetrated against Emor & the Sichemites. I could bring a great many mo examples, if I would needless stand long about a thing that is manifest.
1But after this definition we must adde a distinctiō. For some guile is good & other some is euill, we call ye good, which is not hurtfull: & when as it hurteth none, but somtimes profiteth. But euil guile is hurtful, & euer hurteth somebody. These mēbres may easely be made playne by exāples. Nurces do cōtinually vse good guile toward their litle ones, therby to please & still thē: for with them they dissēble & fayne very many thinges. Phisitiās also do after ye same sorte deceaue them yt are sicke, bycause they would heale them. Yea and Chrisostome in his first boke de Sacerdotio, writeth, yt a certaine Phisitiā so beguiled one yt was sicke of an agew, yt in drinking water, he thought he dronke wine. And the same Chrisostome in the same place affirmeth,
Of the first kind of guile, which is called good & unhurtful, no man will contend, but that it is lawful to use it. But of the other kind there is a doubt. Whereof if I should be demanded,1 I would think this answer should be made. That we may not use evil guile with our friends, but against our enemies it is not prohibited, because it is as it were armour. Wherefore if it be lawful to make wars against them justly with armour, guiles also are to be admitted according to the saying of the Poet: Whether it be guile or power, who can require in an enemy?
Of ye first kind of guile, which is called good & vnhurtful, no mā wil cōtēd, but yt it is lawfull to vse it. But of ye other kind there is a doubt. Wherof if I shuld be demāded,1 I wold thinke this answere shuld be made. That we may not vse euil guile wyth our frendes, but agaynst our enemies it is not prohibited, bycause it is as it were armor. Wherfore if it be lawfull to make warres against thē iustly with armor, guiles also are to be admitted according to the saying of the Poete: VVhether it be guile or power, who can require in an enemy?
Howbeit this is to be observed,1 that we speak only of those enemies which either God him self, or the public wealth, or a just Magistrate declareth to be enemies, and not those which every private man hateth. Farther I doubt not, but that seeing it is lawful to repel violence by violence, when there is no other way to escape, it is also lawful to use guiles against guiles. For he which repelleth violence by violence, as the laws do permit, the same man is not to be counted a private man, for as much as he is armed by the Magistrate. Wherefore it is manifest that he doth not against the law, but with the law. So he that is suddenly oppressed, may lawfully escape by evil guile if he can. Moreover the Scriptures teach that this kind of guile is just.2 For Jerome saith, and it is written in the decrees .22. question 2. chap: Utilem. That Jehu did very well dissemble with the Priests of Baal, because he could not have killed them all, if he had begun to put some of them to death. Wherefore to gather them all together, he feigned himself to be much more studious to worship Baal than was Ahab, and by that mean he slew every one of them.
Howbeit this is to be obserued,1 that we speake only of those enemyes which either God him selfe, or the publicque wealth, or a iust Magistrate declareth to be enemyes, and not those whiche euery priuate man hateth. Farther I doubt not, but that seyng it is lawfull to repell violence by violence, when there is no other waye to escape, it is also lawfull to vse guiles agaynst guiles. For he whiche repelleth violence by violence, as the lawes do permitte, the same man is not to be counted a priuate man, for as muche as he is armed by the Magistrate. Wherfore it is manifest that he doth not agaynst the lawe, but with the lawe. So he that is sodenly oppressed, may lawfully escape by euill guile if he can. Moreouer the Scriptures teache that this kinde of guile is iust.2 For Ierome sayth, and it is written in the decrees .22. question 2. chap: Vtilem. That Iehu did very well dissemble with the Priestes of Baal, bycause he could not haue kylled them all, if he had begon to put some of them to death. Wherfore to gather them all together, he fayned hymselfe to be much more studious to worship Baal than was Achab, and by that meane he slewe euery one of them.
But this is to be taken heed of, that they which are so destroyed by guile,1 be very worthy of punishment, & as they are commonly called, notorious offenders, & such as can not be punished by an ordinary way. For which cause the king of Denmark of some is commended, which by guile destroyed most pernicious thieves, which he could not take. For he feigned a war, and made a proclamation that as many as would come should receive wages of him, and promised unto the thieves pardon for their wicked acts which they had hitherto committed. But I (as I shall afterward declare) do not so fully allow such examples.
But this is to be taken heede of, that they whiche are so destroyed by guile,1 be very worthy of punishment, & as they are cōmonly called, notorious offenders, & such as can not be punished by an ordinary waye. For whiche cause the kyng of Dēmarke of some is cōmēded, which by guile destroyed most pernicious thieues, which he could not take. For he fayned a warre, and made a proclamation that as many as would come should receaue wages of hym, and promised vnto the thieues pardon for their wicked actes whiche they had hitherto committed. But I (as I shall afterward declare) do not so fully allowe such examples.
Augustine (as it is found in the 14. question the 5. chap: Dixit, 1& it is a place in his questions upon Exodus) showeth that the Israelites deceived the Egyptians, when they borrowed of them golden & silver vessels, & yet it was not to be counted a fault in them, when as for all ye no man doubted, but that they did it by evil guile. The same 23. question .2. Dominus which is taken out of his questions upon the book of Joshua, rehearseth the place, wherein it is said ye God commanded the Hebrews, to fight against the city of Hay by wiles, which without doubt belong to guile. Jerome upon the 17. chap: of Ezekiel, bringeth this sentence as a worldly sentence:2 namely, Whether it be guile or power, who can require in an enemy?
Augustine (as it is found in the 14. question the 5. chap: Dixit, 1& it is a place in his questions vpō Exodus) sheweth that the Israelites deceaued ye Egyptians, when they borowed of thē golden & siluer vessels, & yet it was not to be counted a faulte in thē, when as for al ye no man doubted, but yt they did it by euill guile. The same 23. question .2. Dominus which is takē out of his questiōs vpon ye boke of Iosua, rehearseth ye place, wherin it is sayd ye God cōmaūded the Hebrues, to fight against the citie of Hay by wiles, which without doubt belong to guile. Ierome vpon the 17. chap: of Ezechiel, bringeth this sentence as a worldly sentēce:2 namely, VVhether it be guile or power, who can require in an enemy?
Howbeit he assenteth unto it, although he denieth that it can take place where an oath is made. But I will strait way expound that. Ambrose in the 14.1 question the 4. permitteth guile, or gainful fraud against enemies, & after this manner he interpreteth a place of Deut. where God gave the Jews liberty to put their money to usury to strangers, namely, that where the war is just, there also may usury take place. For the goods of the enemies are ours, & they may lawfully be taken away from them. And it skill not, whither it be done either by violence or by guile. There are which allege that which is written in the latter Epistle to the Corinthians the xii. chap: When I was crafty, I took you by guile. But it maketh nothing to the purpose, when as it is most manifest that he spake it in mockage. For he feigned, as though he had received money of the Corinthians by other men, which by himself he refused to receive, which thing he strait way putteth away. But those examples which we brought first, do manifestly prove that it is lawful to use guile, yea & evil guile against enemies, namely in keeping close our Counsels & doings, & using colourable works & words.2 Nether do the civil laws otherwise teach. In ye Code de commerciis et mercatoribus Lege. Non solū. The emperor decreed not only ye no gold should be carried unto the barbarous nations that were enemies of the pub. wealth, but also that by subtle guile or policy the gold which they had, should be taken from them. Also in ye digestes de captivis postliminio reversis. Lege. Nihil interest, it is decreed, ye captives how soever they returned into their country again, should recover again their own goods, & old state, whether they were sent home again, or whether they escaped by violence, or by guile. Although afterward in Lege postliminio Paragrapho captivis, ⟨image 92⟩it be restrained, if that they return with a mind to tarry at home. For if they should either promise or swear unto their enemies to return, they should not enjoy the right of returning.3 Wherefore Attilius Regulus enjoyed not the benefit, because he was sent to Rome to persuade the senate for the changing of captives. Wherefore for as much as he promised & was minded to return, he might not by the laws use evil guile.
1By this also appeareth it to be true, which a little before was said, namely that we may not use evil guile against our enemy, if there be an oath made. And that this may the playnlyer be understand, we must divide an oath as the lawyers do, so that one kind of oath is called an approving or an affirming of a thing, & an other a promising of a thing, or as they speak, the one affective, & the other promissory. For when we swear, either we do affirm or else deny some thing to be or to have ben, which we ought never to do with evil guile, if we add thereunto an oath. Or else we promise to perform something, & for as much as faith is to be kept even with our enemy, the same faith also is not to be broken with evil guile. Wherefore if those things which we have sworn unto our enemy to keep & observe, are temporal goods, as are money, honours, & life of the body, for these things the name of God is not to be profaned. Wherefore David in his .15. Psal. saith: He that sweareth to do evil, & changeth not. In Hebrew it is thus written Nischoah Leharah Velo Jamid, 2which place I know Kimhi expoundeth of those, which vow unto God certain hard & sharp things, which serve to the subduing of the flesh, neither do there change ye which they have promised. But the sentence me thinketh seemeth more simple, if it have a larger sense, namely of an oath hurtful unto us, which a good & godly man will not abrogate or change.3 Jerome also upon Ezekiel the 17. chap. is of this opinion. For there the Lord saith that he was very angry against Zedechias, because he had broken the oath which he had made unto Nebuchad-nezar king of Babylon. For although the Jews counted him as an enemy, yet as Jerome teacheth, he was now as a friend, when he had by an oath promised his faith unto Zedechias. For ye belongeth unto friends one to be faithful unto the other.4 Wherefore evil guile ought there to take no place. And Augustine in the 33. question the 1. chap: Noli existimare, writing unto Bonifacius admonisheth him to keep faith with his enemy also.5 Ambrose also in the 28. question the 4. chap. Innocens, admonisheth the same, & hath the same sentence in his book de officiis, where he bringeth the example of Joshua toward the Gibeonites, who although he might have made the oath void & of no force, yet by the consent of God he caused it to be kept & ratified.
Neither suffered be the Gibeonites to be slain, whom for all that he punished because of the guile which they used.1 But if the oath be given for an unjust or ungodly thing, it is utterly to be made frustrate, because an oath ought not to be a bond of iniquity. Neither is it of necessity, that a man to be absolved of these kinds oaths should come before some judge. Which I therefore speak, because the Pope claimeth this right unto himself, namely to release a bond in such kind of oaths, & as they commonly say, to dispense with them, as it appeareth in the 15. question the 6.2 where Nicholaus absolveth one Treverensis. And his pride & arrogancy hath so far now at the length extended his right or power, that he absolveth not only unlawful oaths, but he abrogateth also just and lawful oaths when it seemeth good unto himself. So Zechariah loosed the french men of an oath, wherein they were bound unto their king, and he put the king from his kingdom, and substituted Pepin in his place. But that is not to be marvelled at, when as it is a common saying in the court of Rome at this daye:3 Non est regum & magnatū, sed mercatorum stare juramentis, that is: It is not mete for kings and noble men, but for merchants to keep their oaths.
Neither suffered be the Gabaonites to be slayne, whō for all yt he punished bicause of ye guile which they vsed.1 But if ye othe be geuē for an vniust or vngodly thing, it is vtterly to be made frustrate, bycause an othe ought not to be a bond of iniquitie. Neither is it of necessitie, yt a mā to be absolued of these kindes othes should come before some iudge. Which I therfore speake, bycause ye Pope claimeth this right vnto himself, namely to release a bond in such kind of othes, & as they commōly say, to dispense with them, as it appeareth in the 15. question the 6.2 wher Nicholaus absolueth one Treuerensis. And his pride & arrogācy hath so farre now at the length extended his ryght or power, that he absolueth not onely vnlawful othes, but he abrogateth also iust and lawful othes when it semeth good vnto himselfe. So Zacharias losed the frenche men of an othe, wherein they were bound vnto their kyng, and he put the kyng from his kyngdome, and substituted Peppine in his place. But that is not to be meruayled at, when as it is a common saying in the courte of Rome at this daye:
Wherefore if there be an oath made, guile is not to be used unless peradventure the one party to whom the oath is made, shall go from the conditions and covenants, for then the common saying must take place, he that breaketh faith,1 let faith also be broken unto him. Wherefore Jerome ad Nepotianū ⟨p. 86⟩commendeth this saying of Domitius the Orator unto Phillip, when thou countest not me for a senator, I also will not count thee for a Consul. But hereof we have testimonies also in the holy scriptures: for Paul in the first to the Corinth: the .7. chap: writeth, as touching faith given in matrimony, If the unfaithful depart let him depart. A brother or a sister is not in subjection unto such, but God hath called us in peace. And those things which are alleged of an oath, I understand also to be of the same efficacy in promises & covenants. In which promises & covenants I affirm, ye godly & just men ought both to use plain & simple words, & also faithfully to fulfil them.2 Wherefore the Thracians are justly & worthily condemned who after the truce was made for 30. days, robbed & spoiled by night, excusing their act, for that their truce was made for the day & not for the night. Neither did the legate of the Romans uprightly, yea he Sophistically dealt with Antiochus, 3who when he had decreed that the one half of the ships should be given unto the Romans & the other half to the king, commanded them all to be divided & cut in sunder in very deed. But he did it that the king should be utterly destitute of a warlike Navy. Wherefore what soever a godly man shall promise, he ought before deeply to weigh with him self, whether he be able to stand by his words and promises. Wherefore Jerome hath written unto Celautia: 4things which thou shalt say, think thou swearest them.
Wherefore if there be an othe made, guile is not to be vsed vnles peraduenture the one partye to whom the othe is made, shall go from the condicions and couenauntes, for then the common saying muste take place, he that breaketh faith,1
As touching the end of the question, that the thing may be the more manifest, there remain certain doubts to be examined. First if a man promise unto any man armour and help & that for the space of three or four years: & in the mean time the same man becometh a traitor to his country, & maketh war against it, whether in this case he ought to perform his faith, or else by evil guile to break it? I answer, that neither in this case, nor in the like, is faith to be kept: because,1 as it is manifest, a mischievous act happeneth in the mean time which with a safe conscience we may not help. Neither in very deed is either evil guile or else perjury here committed. For he which hath sworn is not changed, but he to whom the oath was made. For oaths can pluck away or diminish nothing of those bonds which went before.2 Wherefore for as much as every man is bound unto the word of god & to the health of his country, before he sweareth any thing, ye which is afterward sworn must be understand, so that the first bonds be kept unbroken. The same also must take place in vows which are vowed. For although a man vow sole life, for so much as he before was bound unto the word of God, wherein it is said, that it is better to marry than to burn, & they which can not keep them selves chaste let them marry:3 he doth not by reason of the vow which followed take away the first bond. Wherefore if he can not keep him self chaste, or if he burn, he ought by the commandment of God to marry: neither can any oath or vow that is made, take away the power & strength of the commandment of God.
As touching the ende of the question, yt the thing may be the more manifest, ther remaine certain doubts to be examined. First if a mā promise vnto any mā armor and helpe & that for the space of thre or foure yeares: & in the meane tyme ye same man becōmeth a traitor to hys contrey, & maketh warre against it, whether in this case he ought to performe his fayth, or els by euill guile to breake it? I answere, yt neither in this case, nor in the like, is faith to be kept: bycause,1 as it is manifest, a mischieuous acte hapeneth in ye meane time whiche with a safe cōscience we may not helpe. Neither in very dede is either euill guile or els periury here cōmitted. For he which hath sworne is not changed, but he to whom the othe was made. For othes can plucke awaye or diminishe nothing of those bondes which went before.
There ariseth also an other doubt, of those princes, which have given their public faith or safe conduct unto heretics for to come unto Counsels or to communications, whether they ought to stand by their promise,1 or violating their oath to keep still the heretics and to punish them. I answer, that they ought to keep whole and pure the promise made unto them.
There ariseth also an other doubt, of those princes, which haue geuē their publique faith or safeconduict vnto heretikes for to come vnto Coūsels or to communications, whether they ought to stande by their promise,1 or violating theyr othe to kepe still the heretikes and to punish them. I aunswere, that they ought to kepe whole and pure the promise made vnto them.
But say they, we will easily grant that it is then sin, when we give promise of a naughty thing. But if after we have promised, we keep & stand to our promises, we fall into an other grievous sin. For we execute not the office committed unto us, neither do we obey God. For it is our part according as God hath commanded, to punish and to correct Heretics, that they wast not the Church, and go forward to defend their pestiferous doctrine among the godly. Neither doth any man doubt but that Magistrates ought to defend the Churches. Wherefore it seemeth that Heretics are not to be let goo, when we have them once in our hands. I answer, that this in deed is the office of kings, to punish and to correct heretics, but yet then when they have them in their power. ⟨image 93⟩But if they give them a safe conduct to come unto them,1 then can they not say that they have them in their power. For they came under a promise & an oath to go & come harmless, otherwise they would not have come. Wherefore if there be a promise made, it is not lawful to break it. And this is the cause, why I before said, that I can not easily allow the act of the king of Denmark. Neither also would I judge Jehu to be without sin, when he promised that he would worship Baal, thereby to get all Baalites together: except peradventure he manifestly knew, that he was by God stirred up to do it. But of this thing we will entreat in an other place. Let them therefore, which defend the Counsel of Constantia, cease to lay for their pretence, that John Huss with a safe conscience could not be let go, because it is a heinous sin in all princes, if they suffer heretics to wander at liberty: for because that which they say is so far forth true, as they shall be in their power. But when they come by a safe conduct given them, then are they at liberty, neither are they said to be in the power of the princes, which call them.
But say they, we will easly graūt yt it is then sinne, when we geue promise of a naughty thing. But if after we haue promised, we kepe & stand to our promises, we fall into an other grieuous sinne. For we execute not the office cōmitted vnto vs, neither do we obey God. For it is our part accordyng as God hath cō maunded, to punishe and to correcte Heretikes, that they wast not the Church, and go forwarde to defende theyr pestiferous doctrine amonge the godly. Neither doth any man doubt but that Magistrates ought to defende the Churches. Wherefore it semeth that Heretikes are not to be let goo, when we haue them once in our handes. I aunswere, that this in dede is the office of kynges, to punish and to correct heretikes, but yet then when they haue them in their power.
1Other are in doubt, whether it be lawful to use evil guile against thieves, so that if a man fall into their hands, & by an oath be made unto them, is suffered to go home upon this condition, there to gather money to redeem himself, whether (I say) he ought to return unto them with the money, or without it, if he can not get it, as he hoped to have done, especially if in a manner he were assured, either to live in perpetual servitude, or else to be put to a most cruel death. I answer, that in my judgement he ought to return unto them, for as much as in this case there is no danger, but as touching goods of this world, of money (I say) liberty, & life of the body, which are not so much to be esteemed, that for their sakes an oath, or the name of GOD should be violated. And the verse of David before brought serveth aptly for this purpose. And this sentence is so firm & true that even an Ethnic,2 Marcus Attilius Regulus I say, knew it. For he returned to Carthago, where he knew certainly, that either he should be in perpetual servitude, or else lose his life, and that most cruelly. Neither canst thou answer me, that he did foolishly therein: because the Roman laws (as we have before said) de captivis, & postliminio reversis, in lege postliminiū Paragrapho Captivus, do ordain and holily decree that he should not be counted to enjoy the benefit of the law postliminius, which had promised to return again. Farther the nature of man persuadeth the self same thing, for it is civil & delighteth in society.
1Other are in doubt, whether it be lawfull to vse euill guile against thieues, so that if a man fall into their handes, & by an othe be made vnto them, is suffred to go home vpon this condicion, there to gather money to redeme himselfe, whether (I say) he ought to returne vnto thē with the money, or wtout it, if he cā not get it, as he hoped to haue done, especially if in a manner he were assured, either to liue in perpetual seruitude, or els to be put to a most cruel death. I aunswere, that in my iudgemēt he ought to returne vnto them, for as much as in this case there is no daunger, but as touching goods of this world, of money (I say) liberty, & life of the body, whiche are not so muche to be estemed, that for their sakes an othe, or the name of GOD should be violated. And the verse of Dauid before brought serueth aptly for this purpose. And this sentence is so firme & true that euen an Ethnike,
Wherefore next to God and godliness toward him, there is nothing which ought more to esteem, then faith, which wonderfully helpeth humane fellowship. For without it, it is not possible for men to live together. Farther who will not say, that the money, liberty, and life of one man is rather to be lost, then the money, liberties, and lives of innumerable men? For if covenants and promises be not kept with those thieves, henceforth they will give credet to no man that they shall take, they would send home none to their own house to fetch their ransom, but as many as they take, either they will kill them, or else keep them with them in miserable and perpetual bondage.
Wherefore next to God and godlines towarde him, there is nothing whiche ought more to esteme, then fayth, whiche wonderfully helpeth humane fellowship. For without it, it is not possible for men to liue together. Farther who will not say, that the money, liberty, and life of one man is rather to be lost, then the money, libertyes, and liues of innumerable men? For if couenantes and promyses be not kept with those thieues, henceforth they will geue credet to no man that they shall take, they would sende home none to their owne house to fetche their raunsome, but as many as they take, either they will kill them, or els kepe them with them in miserable and perpetuall bondage.
Lastly, this I think good to admonish you of, that in oaths let signs of universality trouble no man. As, if a man promise and swear unto his friend that he will be an helper unto him in all things, or if a man promise and swear unto a School or unto the Church, that he will do and observe all things which it shall decree.1 For all such kind of speeches (as it appeareth by that which we have said) are to be understand, so that the obedience of the word of God be kept. And undoubtedly, although that clause be by the nature of another understand always to be added, yet for all that it is the duty of godly men to express it, when they are received into any university, College, office, corporation, or fellowship, & according to the custom are compelled to swear for to observe statutes, laws & decrees. It is the sure way (I say) by express words to testify, that they will observe all those things, unless they shall find that any of the same are against ⟨p. 87⟩the word of god. And as touching this matter I think I have spoken sufficient now. Our Ehud used evil guile. I grant: but yet against his enemy. Neither doth the scripture make mention of any oath that was made between him & Eglon the king. And though there had ben an oath, yet he had ben quit of it, for as much as the stirring up of god, whereby god opened unto him his will, had abrogated it.
Lastly, this I thinke good to admonishe you of, that in othes let signes of vniuersality trouble no man. As, if a man promise and swere vnto hys frende that he wil be an helper vnto him in all thinges, or if a man promise and sweare vnto a Scoole or vnto the Churche, that he will do and obserue all thynges whiche it shall decree.1 For all suche kynde of speaches (as it appeareth by that whiche we haue sayde) are to be vnderstande, so that the obedience of the worde of God be kepte. And vndoutedly, althoughe that clause be by the nature of another vnderstād alwayes to be added, yet for al yt it is the duty of godly mē to expresse it, when they are receaued into any vniuersity, College, office, corporatiō, or felowship, & according to the custome are cōpelled to sweare for to obserue statutes, lawes & decrees. It is the sure way (I say) by expresse wordes to testifie, yt they wil obserue all those things, vnles they shal finde yt any of ye same ar against ⟨p. 87⟩
Cicero in his first booke of offices affirmeth that dissimulation or fayning,1 pertayne chiefly vnto the nature of guile. For he writeth that Aquilius his familiar frende beyng demaunded what guile was, he answered, where one thyng is doone and an other thyng dissembled. To this sentence Augustine assenteth,2 who (in his 7. treatise vpon Iohn expoundyng these wordes whiche Christ pronounced of Nathaniel, Beholde a true Israelite in whō is no guile) sayth: Thē it is guile, whē one thing is done and an other thing fayned, &c. And to speake this by the waye, by this place is easely gathered,3 that Augustine preached his Sermons vnto ye people in Latine, bicause ye Affricians vsed the Romane tongue, although it were not pure, but in some wordes corrupt. For there Augustine admonished the people, that Dolus which is guile, signified not Dolor that is pain as many corruptly spake, saying Dolus illū torquet, that is as they meant. He is troubled with payne, when as in that place they should haue said Dolor and not Dolus: to take awaye therfore the ambiguitie of the worde, he sayeth, that Dolus whiche is guile, signifieth fayning and dissimulation. And in the same place, to expresse what fayning beguilyng signifieth, he addeth,4 that it commeth of doublenesse of the hearte. He allegeth th• 12. Psalme, where when mention is made of guilefull men, Dauid sayth that they speake in hart and in harts, that is, as hee ⟨image 91⟩interpreteth, in one parte of their heart they do se the truth, & perceaue how the thing is: & in the other part they go about dissimulation & disceate. But in those (saith he) is no guile, which whē they se thēselues to be sinners, do also coūt thē selues for such, nether do they dissēble or boast of righteousnesse, as did ye Pharisey, whē he prayed by ye publican, & as other hipocrites also do. Nathaniel had no guile in him, but not vniuersally, bycause euery mā is a lyer: & as Paul writeth, there dwelleth no good thing in our flesh, for as much as it is altogether guilefull and disceatfull. It could be onely sayd of Christ in vniuersall, that he wanted guile. But yet they are blessed (as Dauid sayth) to whom the Lord hath not imputed sinne, and in whose spirite there is no guile. For in as much as they are regenerate especially as touching the spirite that whiche they do they do it vprightly and simply:
1By this also appeareth yt to be true, whiche a litle before was said, namely yt we may not vse euil guile against our enemy, if ther be an othe made. And yt this may the playnlyer be vnderstand, we must deuide an othe as ye lawyers do, so yt one kinde of othe is called an approuing or an affirming of a thing, & an other a promising of a thing, or as thei speake, ye one affectiue, & ye other promissory. For whē we swere, either we do affirme or els deny some thing to be or to haue ben, which we ought neuer to do with euil guile, if we adde therunto an othe. Or els we promise to performe somthing, & for as much as faith is to be kept euē with our enemy, ye same faith also is not to be broken with euill guile. Wherefore if those things which we haue sworne vnto our enemy to kepe & obserue, are temporal goods, as are money, honours, & life of the body, for these things the name of God is not to be prophaned. Wherfore Dauid in his .15. Psal. sayth: He yt sweareth to do euill, & changeth not. In Hebrew it is thus written Nischoah Leharah Velo Iamid, 2which place I know Kimhi expoundeth of those, which vowe vnto God certaine hard & sharpe things, which serue to ye subduyng of the fleshe, neyther do ther chaūge ye which they haue promised. But ye sentence me thinketh semeth more simple, if it haue a larger sense, namely of an othe hurtful vnto vs, which a good & godly man will not abrogate or chaunge.3 Ierome also vpon Ezechiell the 17. chap. is of this opinion. For there ye Lord saith yt he was very angry against Zedechias, bycause he had broken ye othe which he had made vnto Nebuchad-nezar king of Babilon. For although the Iewes counted him as an enemy, yet as Ierome teacheth, he was now as a frende, when he had by an othe promised his faith vnto Zedechias. For ye belōgeth vnto friends one to be faithful vnto the other.4 Wherfore euil guile ought there to take no place. And Augustine in ye 33. questiō ye 1. chap: Noli existimare, writing vnto Bonifacius admonisheth him to kepe faith wt his enemy also.5 Ambrose also in ye 28. questiō ye 4. chap. Innocēs, admonisheth the same, & hath ye same sentence in his boke de officiis, where he bringeth the example of Iosua toward the Gabaonites, who althoughe he might haue made the othe voyde & of no force, yet by ye consent of God he caused it to be kept & ratified.