pp. 8718 passages
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Now resteth to entreat of the second question, namely.1 Whether it be lawful for a good & godly man to lye. But first before I entreat of a lye. I think it good somewhat to speak of truth, which undoubtedly is an excellent virtue.
NOw resteth to intreate of the second question, namely.1 Whether it be lawfull for a good & godly mā to lye. But first before I entreat of a lye. I thinke it good somwhat to speake of truth, whiche vndoubtedly is an excellent vertue.
Truth (as saith Tullius de Inuentione) is, whereby things which are,1 which have ben, & which shall be are spoken unaltered. Wherein we first note, that it consisteth in words: for (saith he) they are spoken, not that I am ignorant, that both dumb men, & also other men speak sometime by signs,2 but because (as saith Augustine in his first book de doctrina Christiana) words among other signs are the principal & most plain. Farther we are hereby taught, that truth is not only to be considered as touching one difference of time, but as concerning three differences, for he saith, both those things which are, and which have ben, & which shall be. These things undoubtedly are then spoken truly, when they are set forth unaltered, that is, even as they are, & by speaking made neither more ample nor less than they are.3 This self same thing almost hath Augustine said in his book de vera Religione chap: 36. where he writeth, that the truth is, whereby ye which is, is signified.4 And it is a virtue because by it men are made prone & ready to speak that which is true. The general word of it is equality,5 whereunto is joined in stead of difference, this voice, namely, of words, to the things which are signified. And as it is well known of all men, all virtues level unto the middest, & fly from extremities.6 Wherefore in kind of speeches thou shalt find two faults namely if thou shalt speak more than the thing is, or else less than the thing is. Neither is virtue content with the middest only: for we must add also circumstances, which use continually to follow it. Wherefore the truth is not alway to be spoken to every man, neither at all times, nor yet of every thing, & yet we must not lye: but it is wisdom sometimes to keep close those things which we will not for just occasion have known. He which should vaunt abroad every where & unto all men the gifts of God given him, he should be counted foolish & unwise: as contrary, he which should boast of a crime,7 whereinto by humane weakness he hath fallen, should rightly, and worthily be reproved. Truth therefore requireth this, that those things which we have within us as touching our sense or will, be signified of us as it is, prudently & rarely. Farther the virtue, whereof we speak, hath chiefly simplicity joined unto it, & it is very much contrary unto doubleness. Besides this it is a part of justice.
Truth (as saith Tullius de Inuentione) is, wherby things which are,1 whiche haue ben, & which shalbe are spoken vnaltered. Wherin we first note, that it cō sisteth in wordes: for (saith he) they are spokē, not yt I am ignoraūt, yt both dumbe men, & also other mē speake somtime by signes,2 but bycause (as saith Augustine in his first boke de doctrina Christiana) wordes among other signes are ye principall & most playne. Farther we are hereby taught, that truth is not only to be considered as touching one difference of time, but as concerning thre differēces, for he saith, both those thinges which are, and whiche haue ben, & which shalbe. These things vndoubtedly are then spoken truly, when they are set forth vnaltered, that is, euen as they are, & by speaking made neither more ample nor lesse than they are.3 This selfe same thing almost hath Augustine sayd in his booke de vera Religione chap: 36. where he writeth, that the truth is, whereby ye whiche is, is signified.4 And it is a vertue bycause by it men are made prone & redy to speake that which is true. The generall worde of it is equalitie,5 wherunto is ioyned in steade of difference, this voyce, namely, of wordes, to the thinges which are signified. And as it is well knowen of all men, all vertues leuel vnto the middest, & flye frō extremities.6 Wherfore in kinde of speches thou shalt find two faultes namely if thou shalt speake more than the thing is, or els lesse than the thing is. Neyther is vertue content with the middest only: for we must adde also circumstances, which vse continually to followe it. Wherfore the truth is not alway to be spokē to euery man, neither at all times, nor yet of euery thing, & yet we must not lye: but it is wisedome sometimes to kepe close those thinges which we wil not for iust occasiō haue knowen. He which should vaunt abrode euery where & vnto all mē the gifts of God geuen him, he should be counted foolish & vnwise: as cōtrary, he which should boast of a crime,7 wherinto by humane weaknesse he hath fallen, should rightly, and worthely be reproued. Truth therfore requireth this, that those things which we haue within vs as touching our sense or wil, be signified of vs as it is, prudētly & rarely. Farther the vertue, wherof we speake, hath chiefly simplicitie ioyned vnto it, & it is very much contrary vnto doublenesse. Besides this it is a part of iustice.
For it rendereth unto things their words and to a neighbour the truth which of duty longeth unto him, without which truth humane fellowship can not consist. For if a man should continually suspect him self to be deceived by any man, he would never believe him in any thing.1 Whereby amongest men all trades and societies perish. Aristotle in his Ethics affirmeth that truth declineth sometimes to defection: especially when any man speaketh of himself. For the wisdom requireth, that a man boast not of himself. Wherefore Paul in his second Epistle to the Corinthians the 12: chap. writeth: If I will boast of my self, I shall not be unwise: but I will not, any man should think of me, more than he seeth in me, or that he heareth of me. By these words, he reproveth those as foolish and unwise which do boast & glory even of those good things which they have. And he saith that he will abstain from it.2 Neither (saith he) do I require, that any man should think more of me, than he either seeth in me or heareth of me. Neither is he which speaketh less of him self than it is, straightway to be accused as a liar. For that which is more comprehendeth and ⟨image 94⟩containeth in it self that which is less. For whosoever hath fifty, he may say truly that he hath twenty, although he speaketh not all that he hath. Howbeit the same man,3 if he should affirm that he had but only .xx. or else should deny that he had any thing, without doubt he should lye: which is not to be committed, either for modesty sake, or else (as they say) because of humility.
For it rēdreth vnto things their wordes and to a neighbour the truth which of duty longeth vnto him, without whiche truth humane fellowship can not consiste. For if a mā should cōtinually suspect him selfe to be deceaued by any man, he would neuer beleue him in any thyng.1 Wherby amongest men al trades and societies perishe. Aristotle in his Ethikes affirmeth that truth declineth sometimes to defection: especially when any man speaketh of himselfe. For ye wisedome requireth, that a mā boast not of himselfe. Wherfore Paul in his second Epistle to the Corinthians the 12: chap. writeth: If I will boast of my selfe, I shall not be vnwise: but I will not, any man shoulde thynke of me, more than he seeth in me, or that he heareth of me. By these wordes, he reproueth those as foolishe and vnwise whiche do boast & glory euen of those good things which they haue. And he saith that he wil abstaine from it.
And as for testimonies of the holy scriptures which do stir us up to speak the truth, I could undoubtedly bring a great many: but a few shall suffice. It is written in the x. commandments: Thou shalt not bear false witness, which commandment is not only to be observed in judgement, but in all things which in our talk we testify to be either true or false. Farther, God is set before us of us to be followed, whom the scriptures every where pronounce to be true. Wherefore we also ought to be most fervent lovers of the truth. And for that cause in Exodus the 18. chap: Jethro counselled Moses, that he should make rulers over the people, such men as feared god, strong men, lovers of the truth, & which hated covetousness. David saith also: Behold thou hast loved truth, & therefore thou hast made me to understand wisdom in the inward & secret parts of my mind. These words sufficiently declare, that we are for the cause taught of god both by inward inspiration, & also by outward doctrine: because he is a lover of the truth, neither doth he easily suffer, that his children should either err, or be deceived by lies. In Zechariah the viii. chap. it is written: Speak ye the truth every man to his neighbour, which self same sentence Paul useth to the Ephesians & he commandeth the same unto the Collos. But to the Corinth. the latter Epistle he saith of himself & of the other Apostles, that they can have nothing against the truth. Yea & the Scribes & Pharisees being joined with the Herodians, after this sort flattered Christ, whom they went about to entrap in his speech. Master, we know that thou acceptest no persons, yea thou teachest the way of god in truth. Hereby they declared that it is a singular virtue for a noble & notable man, to prefer the truth before all things. But let these testimonies of the holy scriptures be sufficient at this time. Now resteth to entreat of a lye.1 Augustine (who wrote of it to Cosentius) affirmeth a lye to be a false signification of a word. And undoubtedly all those things which before are declared of truth, we may by the contrarity affirm of this vice. And chiefly it is contrary to that that Marcus Tullius affirmed of truth, namely that to be truth, whereby things which are, which have ben, & which shall be, are spoken unaltered. And a lye is that, whereby is ye signified which is not: for Augustine contrariwise spake of the truth.
And as for testimonies of the holy scriptures which do stirre vs vp to speake ye truth, I could vndoubtedly bring a great many: but a few shal suffice. It is written in ye x. cōmaundements: Thou shalt not beare false witnesse, which cōmaū dement is not only to be obserued in iudgement, but in all things whiche in our talke we testifie to be either true or false. Farther, God is set before vs of vs to be followed, whom the scriptures euery where pronounce to be true. Wherfore we also ought to be most feruent louers of the truth. And for that cause in Exodus the 18. chap: Iethro counselled Moises, yt he shuld make rulers ouer ye people, such men as feared god, strong men, louers of the truth, & which hated couetousnesse. Dauid saith also: Behold thou hast loued truth, & therfore thou hast made me to vnderstand wisedome in the inward & secret partes of my minde. These wordes sufficiently declare, yt we are for ye cause taught of god both by inwarde inspiraciō, & also by outward doctrine: bycause he is a louer of the truth, neither doth he easely suffre, yt his children should either erre, or be deceaued by lyes. In Zacharie the viii. chap. it is writtē: Speake ye the truth euery man to his neyghbour, which selfe same sentence Paul vseth to the Ephesians & he cōmaundeth the same vnto the Collos. But to ye Corinth. the latter Epistle he saith of himselfe & of the other Apostles, yt they cā haue nothing against ye truth. Yea & the Scribes & Phariseys beyng ioyned with the Herodians, after this sorte flattered Christ, whom they went about to entrappe in his speache. Master, we knowe yt thou acceptest no persons, yea thou teachest ye way of god in truth. Hereby they declared yt it is a singular vertue for a noble & notable mā, to preferre the truth before all things. But let these testimonies of the holy scriptures be sufficiēt at this time. Now resteth to intreat of a lye.
This vice is so hurtful, that it maketh a man which is infected with it,1 to rejoice & to be glad in false things. The general word of truth was equality, & of the vice the general word shall be inequality. And as the virtue was very nigh joined with simplicity: so belongeth a lye to doubleness. Truth is a part of justice. But a lye is a part of uniustice. By truth humane fellowship is kept, but by a lye it is hurt & overthrown.2 But to return to Augustine who writeth, that he is said to lye, which with a will to deceive speaketh that which is false, & that to lye is nothing else, than to speak against the mind: for liars speak otherwise than they have in their heart. But the desire to deceive, is utterly against justice, love & amity,3 which we mutually owe one unto an other. There are three things therefore in a lye: first to speak that which is false: secondly his will in speaking: and thirdly a desire to deceive. The first part longeth to the matter of a lye: the other two parts pertain unto the form.
This vice is so hurtful, yt it maketh a mā which is infected with it,1 to reioyce & to be glad in false thinges. The generall word of truth was equalitie, & of the vice ye generall worde shalbe inequalitie. And as ye vertue was very nye ioyned wt simplicity: so belōgeth a lye to doublenes. Truth is a part of iustice. But a lye is a part of vniustice. By truth humane fellowship is kept, but by a lye it is hurte & ouerthrowen.2 But to returne to Augustine who writeth, yt he is sayd to lye, which wt a wil to deceaue speaketh yt which is false, & that to lye is nothing els, than to speake against the minde: for liers speake otherwise than they haue in their heart. But the desire to deceaue, is vtterly against iustice, loue & amitie,3 which we mutually owe one vnto an other. There are thre things therfore in a lye: first to speake that which is false: secondly his will in speaking: and thirdly a desire to deceaue. The first parte longeth to the matter of a lye: the other two partes pertayne vnto the forme.
1A lye is divided into a Serviceable lye, a Sportful lye, & a Pernicious lye. And this division cometh of no other thing but of the effects, or of the ends. For this is evermore true, that the ends them selves, may have the nature both of the cause and of the effect. For lies do either profit, or delight, or else hurt. The end of a pernicious lye, is to hurt. The end of a Sportful lye is to delight: and the end of a Serviceable lye is to profit. But Aristotle, because in virtue he chiefly considereth the mean,2 therefore if in speaking thou ⟨p. 88⟩exceed that mean, he calleth that boasting: but if thou want of the mean, he nameth it Irony. And in that evil this is chiefly hurtful, because an evil or false opinion is engendered in the mind of our neighbour.3 For the which cause the same Aristotle seemeth to have said well, that a lye is both evil, and also it is to be avoided. Which thing we may also prove by testimonies of the holy Scriptures. For to this belong all those things which we before brought to stir us up to speak the truth. And very many places are here and there set forth, which detest lies. David saith: Thou wilt destroy all those which speak lies.4 There are reasons also which persuade us the same: whereof one is, in a lye is an abuse of signs. And for as much as it is not lawful to abuse the gifts of God, a lye is understand also to be prohibited. Farther (as it is before said) a lye is contrary unto humane fellowship, for in lying the conceavinges of the mind are not communicated unto our brethren, but lies. Wherefore seeing man is by nature made unto fellowship, and communication, when he speaketh false things, he fighteth with his own nature. And as Augustine saith: Faith is therein hurt,5 for he which heareth, believeth those things which are spoken. Wherefore that faith, which he giveth unto other mens words, is made frustrate. And so great a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And lastly every man by lying, loseth his own credit: for being taken in a lye, he shall ever after be suspected. Wherefore though he would, he shall not be able by admonition or correction to help his neighbour. For the which cause the fault which is in a lye, pertaineth not only to the hurt and loss of our neighbour, but it is in it by the general word, as by that which we have already said manifestly appeareth.
But among lies,1 that lye seemeth to be most grievous, which is committed in religion, doctrine, and godliness, because in no other thing can guile be more hurtful & pernicious. For there if we shall err, we are thrust from the eternal felicity.2 Wherefore Augustine in his Enchiridion the .18. chap. hath very well written that they in deed do sin grievously, which deceive travelling men, showing them a contrary way: but they are much more detestable, which as touching godliness by lying, do bring men into errors.
But among lies,1 that lye semeth to be most grieuous, which is cōmitted in religion, doctrine, and godlynes, bicause in no other thing can guile be more hurtful & pernicious. For there if we shal erre, we are thrust from the eternal felicity.2 Wherefore Augustine in his Encheridion the .18. chap. hath very wel wrytten that they in dede doo synne grieuously, which deceaue trauelyng men, shewing them a contrary waye: but they are much more detestable, which as touching godlynes by lying, doo bryng men into errours.
If the three kind of lies should be compared together, I mean a pernicious lye, a sportful lye, and a serviceable lye: A pernicious lye,1 should rightfully be counted more detestable, because in it are two evils. One is the abuse of signs: the other is, the hurt of our neighbour. And that both of the mind which deceiveth (which thing is common unto all lies) and also of the thing which is lost. But as for other lies, although they are not without fault, yet is that not a little diminished by the good added unto it, either of delectation, or of help. And in deed a sportful lye, hath in it but a small and slender nature of a lye:2 for as much as the falsehood is straightway found out, neither can it be long hidden from the hearers.3 Yea Augustine writeth that such lies are not to be counted for lies. But as touching a serviceable lye, the judgement of it is more dark & hard. For some deny it to be sin: for they say it hath a consideration to this,4 to help our neighbour, whom we ought in words and deeds to relieve as much as we can. Wherefore they think, that thereby cometh no abuse of signs, for as much as all our things ought to have a respect to the commodity of our brethren. Neither do they think that in it is sin committed against humane society, when as by this kind of lye men are made safe, and kept harmless. Farther, they say, that where as it is in the holy scriptures written, that God will destroy all those which speak lies: the same is not to be understand of every kind of lye, but only of a pernicious lye. Which thing Augustine also in his Enchiridion the .18. chap. seemeth to grant.5 They bring also the opinion of Plato in his book de Repub, who although he feared away the people from lies, yet he gave Magistrates liberty to lye, especially in making of laws. But in my judgement, the thing is far otherwise, neither will I easily grant that a serviceable ⟨image 95⟩lye wanteth the abuse of signs.6
but yet by just and honest means, otherwise let us permit thefts, to be bestowed in alms giving. But the sentence of the Apostle must abide firm and stable, which is, that evil things must not be done, that thereby good things may come to pass. Neither do I think that true, that by those kind of lies humane fellowship is not hurt, for as much as take away faith, and there remaineth almost no traffic among men.
but yet by iust and honest meanes, otherwise let vs permit thefts, to be bestowed in almes geuing. But the sentence of the Apostle must abyde firme and stable, which is, that euil thinges must not be done, that therby good thinges may come to passe. Neither do I thinke that true, that by those kinde of lyes humane fellowship is not hurt, for as much as take awaye fayth, and there remaineth almost no trafficke among men.
But as touching that sentence of the holy scriptures, wherein it is said: Thou shalt destroy all them that speak lies. We grant with Augustine, that that sentence is not universally spoken, for as long as the power and conjunction of faith abideth with Christ, so long those sins are not imputed, which otherwise of their own nature should be our destruction. And this also will I easily grant of serviceable and sportful lies, because they are not so much against charity, as are pernicious lies. But this can no man deny, that in making a lye, we do against faith. And we must utterly grant, that he which lieth, looseth thereby his own credit, so that afterward he cannot profitably admonish, reprove, or with fruit give counsel, as he ought to do. For they which hear him, will easily believe that he serviceably lieth, to call them again into the way, & not that the thing is so in very deed.1 This undoubtedly was the cause that Augustine was against Jerome, who in a manner attributed a serviceable lye unto the holy scriptures. If this (saith he) should be so, the authority of the holy scriptures would soon decay. For the Readers of them would easily say, that the thing is not so, but that it is so written,2 to keep men in doing their duty. Nether ought the authority of Plato much to move us, for as much as in that place he very much erred, granting that in things pertaining unto God, they might feign fables, which might serve to bring forth and keep a good opinion of them. Without doubt we may not mock in matters touching God. Farther, the law of God is equal, and the self same, as it will not have the people to lye: so also it prohibiteth the same unto the Magistrates.
But as touching that sentence of the holy scriptures, wherin it is said: Thou shalt destroy al them that speake lyes. We graunt with Augustine, that that sentence is not vniuersally spoken, for as long as the power and coniunction of faith abideth with Christ, so long those sinnes ar not imputed, which otherwise of their own nature should be our destruction. And this also wil I easily graunt of seruiceable and sportful lyes, bicause they are not so much against charity, as are pernicious lyes. But this can no man deny, that in making a lye, we doo against faith. And we must vtterly graunt, that he which lyeth, looseth thereby his own credite, so that afterward he cannot profitably admonishe, reprooue, or with fruite geue counsel, as he ought to do. For they which heare him, will easily beleue that he seruiceably lyeth, to cal them againe into the way, & not that the thing is so in very dede.
1Howbeit they cannot justly be accused of a lye, which in their talk, are far from doubleness. For sometimes it cometh to pass that some speak that which is false, and yet they thought the same to be true. With which men they also are excused, which have given their promise to do a thing, which afterward they are not able to perform. Because at the beginning when they promised it, they were fully minded to do that which they had promised: and therefore they have not lied. If so be that afterward they do not accomplish those things which they have said, the same happeneth by some other means. And sometimes it happeneth, that he which delivereth his sword to some man to keep, falleth afterward mad: wherefore he ought not to restore the sword unto him, which hath left it with him: because a new case (as the Lawyers say) requireth a new help. After which self same sort Paul is excused, who said that he would go into Spain, when as for all that he went not thither. Paul also promised the Corinthians to come unto them, which he performed not: but yet he lied not: because when he spake those words, he was determined so to do, but God had otherwise appointed the thing, as Gelasius hath well written, as it is found in the .22. question the 2. chap. Beatus. Undoubtedly the disposition of God dissolveth and breaketh all bonds, as it is written in the .19. question, the .2. chap. duae sunt.
1Howbeit they cannot iustly be accused of a lye, which in their talke, ar farre from doublenes. For somtimes it cōmeth to passe that some speake that whych is false, and yet they thought the same to be true. With which men they also ar excused, which haue geuen their promise to do a thing, which afterward they are not able to performe. Bicause at the beginning when they promised it, they wer fully mynded to doo that which they had promised: and therefore they haue not lyed. If so be that afterward they doo not accomplish those thinges whiche they haue said, the same happeneth by some other meanes. And sometimes it happeneth, that he which deliuereth his sword to some man to kepe, falleth afterward mad: wherfore he ought not to restore the swoorde vnto him, which hath left it with him: bicause a new case (as the Lawyers say) requireth a new helpe. After which selfe same sort Paule is excused, who sayd that he would go into Spaine, when as for al that he went not thither. Paule also promised the Corrinthians to come vnto them, which he perfourmed not: but yet he lyed not: bicause when he spake those wordes, he was determined so to do, but God had otherwise appointed the thing, as Gelasius hath wel wrytten, as it is found in the .22. question the 2. chap. Beatus. Vndoubtedly the disposition of God dissolueth and breaketh all bondes, as it is written in the .19. question, the .2. chap. duae sunt.
1But what shall we say to Hyperbolical places which are in the holy Scriptures, which at the first sight seem lies? I answer, although there the sentences in signifying, hold not the mean, as touching quantity, yet as touching the ⟨p. 89⟩substance it keepeth it. For those Hyperboles or excessive speeches amplify a thing, for their nature is not only to set forth the thing, but also to bring men into admiration of them, which thing by that manner of speech is most aptly attributed unto. Neither have lies there any place, forasmuch as they breed not in the minds of the hearers and readers any froward or false sense. A mean therefore is there to be kept, not undoubtedly of the thing, but of the substance. The Evangelists also are not to be accused of a lye, when as they setting forth the acts of Christ, do not all use the self same words. For unto the truth it is sufficient that a thing be set forth as it was: but it is not required that it be expressed by the self same words. Yea it is often times done through the goodness of the holy ghost, that the form of the narration should vary. For by that means those things which are not sufficiently expressed in the one, are more amply declared by an other.
1But what shal we say to Hiperbolical places which are in the holye Scriptures, which at the first sight seeme lyes? I answer, although there the sentēces in signifieng, hold not the meane, as touching quantitye, yet as touching the ⟨p. 89⟩substaunce it keepeth it. For those Hiperbolis or excessiue speches amplifye a thing, for their nature is not onely to set forth the thing, but also to bryng men into admiration of them, which thing by that maner of speche is most aptly attriued vnto. Neither haue lyes there any place, forasmuch as they breede not in the myndes of the hearers and readers any froward or false sence. A meane therfore is there to be kept, not vndoubtedly of the thing, but of the substance. The Euangelistes also are not to be accused of a lye, when as they setting foorth the actes of Christ, do not al vse the selfe same woordes. For vnto the truth it is sufficient that a thing be set forth as it was: but it is not required that it be expressed by the selfe same woordes. Yea it is often times done through the goodnes of the holye ghost, that the forme of the narration shoulde varye. For by that meanes those thinges which are not sufficientlye expressed in the one, are more amply declared by an other.
But they use to object the Midwives of the Hebrews,1 which although they lied, yet God rewarded them: The same also happened to Rahab the Harlot, or a table keeper. Augustine answereth, that in the Midwives the lye pleased not the Lord, but the faith and fear which they had towards God, and the mercy which they showed unto the Israelites. And the same doth the holy history by express words testify. And no otherwise must we think of Rahab. 2But Gregory's opinion I never like, who saith, that for the lye which they made, their eternal reward was turned into a temporal reward, because for the celestial blessedness it is said that God builded them houses. But I judge, that by reason of the true faith, which was strong in them, so that it brought forth love and the fear of God, which are just and lawful fruits thereof, although of infirmity they lied, yet were not they therefore bereaved of eternal felicity.
But they vse to obiect the Midwiues of the Hebrues,1 which although they lyed, yet God rewarded them: The same also happened to Rahab the Harlot, or a table keeper. Augustine answereth, that in the Midwiues the lye pleased not the Lord, but the faith and feare which they had towards God, and the mercy which they shewed vnto the Israelites. And the same doth the holy history by expresse wordes testify. And no otherwyse must we thinke of Rahab. 2But Gregories opinion I neuer like, who saith, that for the lye which they made, their eternall reward was turned into a temporal reward, bicause for the celestial blessednes it is said that God builded them houses. But I iudge, that by reason of the true faith, which was strong in them, so that it brought foorth loue and the feare of God, which are iust and lawful fruites thereof, although of infirmity they lyed, yet were not they therefore bereued of eternal felicity.
Abraham also is objected, who said that Sarah was his sister.1 But therein (as Augustine teacheth) he lied not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not all the truth. And that is of no man required, to utter all that is true, which he knoweth. He did not tell that she was his wife: yet because she was his kinswoman, he might according to the manner of the Hebrews truly say that she was his sister. But he seemeth not to be utterly excused: for although he lied not in calling her sister, yet it seemeth that therein he fell, because in not opening that she was his wife, he put her in danger of losing her chastity. For he left her naked of that aid, whereby only she might have been defended from coming into strange loves. Neither is it necessary that I should labour utterly to defend Abraham: 2For he was a man, and by over much fear he might easily fall. Howbeit Augustine mentioneth, that Abraham was then in danger two manner of ways: one was least he should be killed himself, the other was the adultery of his wife. The first danger he might avoid by calling her sister: but the other, namely, least she should be defiled, he was not able to repel, for although he had said that he was her husband, that would not have served to have delivered her from the filthy lusts of the Egyptians. Wherefore he committed unto God that, which he himself could not turn from him. And in that which he had in his own power he would not tempt God. This seemeth to be Augustine's judgement. But what I judge, I have before declared.
Abraham also is obiected, who said yt Sara was hys syster.1 But therin (as Augustine teacheth) he lyed not: he told that which was true, but yet he spake not al the truth. And that is of no man required, to vtter all that is true, which he knoweth. He did not tel that she was his wife: yet bicause she was his kinswomā, he might according to the maner of the Hebrues truly say that she was hys syster. But he seemeth not to be vtterly excused: for although he lied not in calling her sister, yet it seemeth that therein he fel, bicause in not opening that she was hys wife, he put her in daunger of leesing her chastity. For he left her naked of that ayde, whereby onely she might haue bene defended from comming into straunge loues. Neither is it necessary that I should labour vtterly to defende Abraham:
But did not the same Abraham lye, when he said unto his servants: Tarry here, and we will return unto you: when as for all that he was minded to sacrifice his son: which if he had done, he should not then have returned together with his son, but alone? Jacob also by express words lied, when he said unto his father: I am Esau thy son. Paul likewise (as it is written in the Acts) saith that he knew not that he was the chief priest, which commanded him to be stricken: when as yet (as Augustine testifieth in his Sermon de puero Centurionis, and as it is written in the .23. Question the .1. chap. Paratus) he knew him well enough. Paul (saith he) was brought up among the Jews, he had learned ⟨image 96⟩the law at the feet of Gamaliel, wherefore he knew very well the chief priest from other men. Jehu also manifestly lied, when he said that he would worship Baal. 1Augustine writeth that there are two kinds of men mentioned in the holy scriptures. For hereby it is manifest that some were by God made so perfect, that although they were not without sin, yet we may not rashly judge evil of them, but rather see how we may defend those things, which in their works have a show of sin. They oftentimes were so moved by the holy ghost, that God by their words and acts would make open certain secretes. Wherefore we must believe that oftentimes they both spake and also did certain things by prophecy. So Abraham, when he said: we will return unto you, prophesied unawares, that which should be. For with Isaac in safety he returned from the mountain. And Jacob in saying: I am Esau thy son, would declare nothing else, but that he was the man, to whom the degree, blessing and dignity was due, which things seemed to pertain unto Esau that was first borne. Paul also prophesied what should at the length become of the high Priest, namely this, that he should be destroyed like a wall that is plucked down and as a thing altogether feigned and hypocritical. Farther (saith Augustine) there were other men not so perfect, but wicked, which in the old Testament are mentioned either to have lied, or else to have done something which seemeth sin. Of those men he thinketh, we may not so labour for to defend a good fame and opinion of them. Of this sort of men was Jehu:
But did not the same Abraham lye, when he said vnto his seruauntes: Tary here, and we wyl returne vnto you: when as for al that he was mynded to sacrifice hys sonne: which if he had done, he shoulde not then haue returned together with his sonne, but alone? Iacob also by expresse woordes lyed, when he said vnto his father: I am Esau thy sonne. Paule likewise (as it is written in the Actes) sayth that he knew not that he was the chiefe priest, which commaunded him to be stricken: when as yet (as Augustine testifieth in his Sermon de puero Centurionis, and as it is wrytten in the .23. Question the .1. chap. Paratus) he knew him well ynoughe. Paule (sayth he) was brought vp among the Iewes, he had learned
for although that murder pleased God, which he executed upon Ahab and his family, and also his weeding out of Baal, and the worshippers thereof, yet for all that he was a wicked king, neither departed he from the worshipping of golden Calves. Wherefore it is lawful for us to grant, that in lying he sinned.
for although that murther pleased God, whiche he executed vpon Achab and his familye, and also his weeding out of Baal, and the worshippers therof, yet for al that he was a wycked king, neyther departed he from the woorshipping of golden Calues. Wherefore it is lawfull for vs to graunt, that in lying he synned.
1And (as I think, and before admonished) by this only distinction, we may easily dissolve this doubt. Namely, that those men were stirred up to lye, either by the spirit of man, or by the motion of God. When they did it as men, we will not deny but that they sinned: but when they spake so by the inspiration God, we will marvel at their sayings and doings, but let us not take example by them, or follow them.
1And (as I thinke, and before admonished) by this onely distinction, we maye easily dissolue this doubt. Namely, that those men were styrred vp to lye, either by the spirite of man, or by the motion of God. When they dyd it as men, wee will not denye but that they synned: but when they spake so by the inspiration God, we will maruaile at their sayinges and doinges, but let vs not take example by them, or follow them.
1A lye is deuided into a Seruiceable lye, a Sportfull lye, & a Pernitious lye. And this deuision commeth of no other thyng but of the effectes, or of the endes. For this is euermore true, that the endes them selues, may haue the nature both of the cause and of the effecte. For lyes do either profyte, or delyte, or elles hurte. The ende of a pernitious lye, is to hurte. The ende of a Sportefull lye is to delyte: and the ende of a Seruiseable lye is to profyte. But Aristotle, bycause in vertue he chiefly considereth the meane,2 therefore if in speakyng thou ⟨p. 88⟩excede that meane, he calleth that boasting: but if thou want of the meane, he nameth it Irony. And in that euyl this is chiefly hurtful, bicause an euyl or false opinion is ingendred in the minde of our neighbour.3 For the which cause the same Aristotle semeth to haue sayd wel, that a lye is both euyll, and also it is to be auoyded. Which thing we may also proue by testimonies of the holy Scriptures. For to this belong al those thinges which we before brought to styrre vs vp to speake the truth. And very many places are here and there set forth, which detest lyes. Dauid saith: Thou wilt destroy al those which speake lyes.4 Ther are reasons also which persuade vs the same: whereof one is, in a lye is an abuse of signes. And for as muche as it is not lawful to abuse the giftes of God, a lye is vnderstand also to be prohibited. Farther (as it is before said) a lye is contrarye vnto humane fellowship, for in lying the conceauinges of the minde ar not cō municated vnto our brethren, but lyes. Wherfore seing man is by nature made vnto fellowship, and communication, when he speaketh false thinges, he fyghteth with his own nature. And as Augustine saith: Faith is therin hurt,5 for hee which heareth, beleueth those thinges which are spoken. Wherfore that fayth, which he geueth vnto other mens woordes, is made frustrate. And so great a thing cannot be hurt without blame. And lastly euery man by lying, leeseth hys own credite: for being taken in a lye, he shal euer after be suspected. Wherefore though he would, he shall not bee able by admonition or correction to helpe hys neighbour. For the which cause the fault which is in a lye, pertaineth not onely to the hurt and losse of our neighbour, but it is in it by the general woord, as by that which we haue already said manifestly appeareth.
If the three kinde of lyes should be compared together, I meane a pernitious lye, a sportefull lye, and a seruiceable lye: A pernitious lye,1 should rightfullye be counted more detestable, bicause in it are two euyls. One is the abuse of signes: the other is, the hurt of our neighbour. And that both of the minde which deceiueth (which thing is common vnto all lyes) and also of the thing whych is lost. But as for other lyes, although they are not without fault, yet is that not a litle diminished by the good added vnto it, either of delectacion, or of helpe. And in dede a sportefull lye, hath in it but a smal and sclender nature of a lye:2 for as much as the falsehood is straightway founde out, neither can it be long hydden from the hearers.3 Yea Augustine wryteth that suche lyes are not to be counted for lyes. But as touching a seruiceable lye, the iudgement of it is more darke & hard. For some deny it to be synne: for they say it hath a consideration to thys,4 to helpe our neighbour, whom we ought in woordes and dedes to relieue as much as we can. Wherfore they thinke, that therby commeth no abuse of signes, for as much as al our thinges ought to haue a respect to the commodity of our brethren. Neither do they thinke that in it is sinne committed against humane societie, when as by this kinde of lye men are made safe, and kept harmlesse. Farther, they say, that where as it is in the holy scriptures written, that God wyll destroy al those which speake lyes: the same is not to be vnderstand of euery kind of lye, but onely of a pernicious lye. Which thing Augustine also in hys Encheridion the .18. chap. seemeth to graunt.5 They bryng also the opinion of Plato in his booke de Repub, who although he feared away the people from lyes, yet he gaue Magistrates libertye to lye, especiallye in making of lawes. But in my iudgement, the thing is farre otherwyse, neither wyl I easily graunt that a seruiceable ⟨image 95⟩lye wanteth the abuse of signes.6 For Aristotle in his booke 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, defining woordes, saith that they are notes of those affections which we haue in our minde. Wherby it followeth, that al they abuse wordes, which signify thinges to be otherwise, than they thinke in their minde. Farther, that reason which they bring of loue, is a very weake reason. For we ought to help our neighbours: