Section 2
pp. 87–5831,173 passagespart 18 of 30
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Thirdly, it is false to say that the perfect knowledge of Gods essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge of all things that have been, are, or shall be. It includes I confess the knowledge of all necessary truths, and of all things possible; but as for the knowledge of contingent truths, and of these to come, it includes not that; unless under the essence of God, you comprehend the will of God. And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truths God knoweth by necessity of nature, but all contingent truths he knoweth by the determination of his own will; which indeed is a truth, but flat opposite to your opinion. But that things contingent cannot be known to be future, but upon the determination of Gods will, I prove thus. Things ⟨p. 325⟩cannot be known to be future until they are future; (for to apprehend or conceive things to be future, when they are not future, is not to know, but to err,) but contingent things, and only possible to be or not to be, do not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future. Therefore contingent things cannot be known to be future but upon the determination of God will.
Thirdly, it is false to say that the perfect knowledge of Gods essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge of all thinges that have beene, are, or shall bee. It includes I confesse the knowledge of all necessary truthes, and of all thinges possible; but as for the knowledge of contingent truthes, and of these to come, it includes not that; unlesse under the essence of God, you comprehende the will of God. And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truthes God knoweth by necessity of nature, but all contingent truthes he knoweth by the determination of his owne will; which indeed is a truth, but flatt opposite to your opinion. But that thinges contingent cannot be knowne to be future, but upon the determination of Gods will, I prove thus. Things ⟨p. 325⟩cannot be knowne to be future untill they are future; (for to apprehend or conceive things to be future, when they are not future, is not to know, but to erre,) but contingent things, and onely possible to be or not to be, doe not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future. Therefore contingent things cannot be knowne to be future but upon the determination of God will.