51 And these things which we have spoken of foreknowledge, pertain also to providence: 1for although in this universality of things, many things are said to be done by chance; yet notwithstanding, because that there is nothing, be it never so small, but it is subject unto the providence of God, therefore also hath it necessity, which we call, necessity of certainty; and others, of consequence. But if, forsomuch as ⟨p. 36⟩things may be called partly necessary, and partly also contingent, or free, as we have declared, thou wilt ask whether condition is most agreeable unto them? I answer, that that is most agreeable, which is natural and inward. Forsomuch therefore as the necessity, whereof we now entreat, cometh outwardly, and is only by supposition; therefore things ought in no wise to be esteemed according to it, but according to those principles, or grounds, which are understood of us: & so our works, which proceed from will, shall be said to be free; & those things, which are so produced in nature (that also their contrary may come to pass) are counted contingent. Howbeit, that necessity of certainty, or of consequence, which we affirm, is never to be denied; neither must we pluck away our works, either from nature, or from foreknowledge, or from the providence of God. And as touching the will of GOD, we must think, that in very deed it governeth and moderateth all things, which thing is of all men commonly granted. For although men perceive and feel, that they by will do decree and choose those things which they are minded to do: yet if they be godly men, they will alway say; This or that will I do, if God permit. But if they be yet without the religion of Christ (as were the Ethnics) yet notwithstanding, they always make mention of fate or destiny, of the three sisters called Parcae, or of chance, which is oftentimes read in the poets. Who (as we have said before) if by the word [Fate] or such like, they understood the connection of causes, over which God himself is the ruler, and moderateth & governeth it, then is there no hurt in that opinion; although, by reason of the abuse of the word, it is better utterly to abstain from it. There are some also, which dream of a certain fatal, mighty, and strong necessity, affixed unto the stars, and unto natural causes, which God himself cannot change:
51 And these things which we haue spoken of foreknowledge, perteine also to prouidence: 1for although in this vniuersalitie of things, manie things are said to be doone by chance; yet notwithstanding, bicause that there is nothing, be it neuer so small, but it is subiect vnto the prouidence of God, therefore also hath it necessitie, which we call, necessitie of certeintie; and others, of consequence. But if, forsomuch as ⟨p. 36⟩things may be called partlie necessarie, and partlie also contingent, or frée, as we haue decl•red, thou wilt aske whether condition is most agréeable vnto them? I answere, that that is most agreable, which is naturall and inward. Forsomuch therefore as the necessitie, whereof we now intreat, commeth outwardlie, and is onelie by supposition; therfore things ought in no wise to be estéemed according to it, but according to those principles, or grounds, which are vnderstood of vs: & so our works, which procéed from will, shall be said to be frée; & those things, which are so produced in nature (that also their contrarie may come to passe) are counted contingent. Howbeit, that necessitie of certeintie, or of consequence, which we affirme, is neuer to be denied; neiher must we plucke awaie our works, either from nature, or from foreknowledge, or from the prouidence of God. And as touching the will of GOD, we must thinke, that in verie déed it gouerneth and moderateth all things, which thing is of all men commonlie granted. For although men perceiue and féele, that they by will doo decrée and choose those things which they are minded to doo: yet if they be godlie men, they will alwaie saie; This or that will I doo, if God permit. But if they be yet without the religion of Christ (as were the Ethniks) yet notwithstanding, they alwaies make mention of fate or destinie, of the thrée sisters called Parcae, or of chance, which is oftentimes read in the poets. Who (as we haue said before) if by the word [Fate] or such like, they vnderstood the connexion of causes, ouer which God himselfe is the ruler, and moderateth & gouerneth it, then is there no hurt in that opinion; although, by reason of the abuse of the word, it is better vtterlie to abstaine from it. There are some also, which dreame of a certeine fatall, mightie, and strong necessitie, affixed vnto the stars, and vnto naturall causes, which God himselfe cannot change:
- 1These things belong also unto providence. Whether our actions shall be called necessary or contingent.These thinges belong also vnto prouidence. Whether our actions shalbe called necessarie or contingent.