OF THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.
pp. 180–219163 passagespart 4 of 5
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
pp. 180–219163 passagespart 4 of 5
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
NO confused or disordered things have their being, or are governed by the providence of God: But whatsoever things are under the Sun, are confused, 1because all are vanity: Therefore they are not ruled and governed by divine providence. Answ. The ⟨p. 208⟩2Major proposition, consisting of doubtful terms, is to be distinguished. No confuse things (true, if they be simply confuse) are governed by the providence of God, that is, the providence of God working them, as they are confuse. All things that are under the Sun, that is, humane things are confuse and vain: true, but not simply, so that no order and good at all lieth hid, and is found in that confusion. For if they were such, God, for his great goodness and justice, would not permit them to be done. Wherefore, if by the confusion of the world they collect and conclude, that there is no providence, there is more avouched in the conclusion, then was contained in the premisses; or they proceed from that which is in some respect so, to conclude the same to be simply and absolutely so. For whereas many things in the world are well ordered, as the celestial motions, the preservation of the kinds of all things, common-weals, the punishments of the wicked men, & many more, it may not by this argument be concluded of all things, but of those only, which are done against the order by God appointed, that they are not governed by his providence: but those things, in which a most manifest order doth appear, shall be an evident testimony of Gods wisdom and effectual working. But if then they conclude, that those disordered things are not ruled and governed of God; so also shall there be more said in the conclusion, than was in the premisses. For it followeth thereof, Not that the things confuse and troubled, but that the confusion or troubling of order, which is in them, is not of God: As the wicked were created of God, albeit their wickedness proceeded not from God, but from themselves. For every thing is not necessarily avouched of the concrete, or subject so qualified, which is affirmed of the abstract, or quality it self. Wherefore, if it be again replied, putting this Major, That disordered things are not, or are not ruled of God: and therefore many things in the world not done by his providence; even thus too, is the Major diversly faulty. For, 1.
NO confused or disordered things have their beeing, or are governed by the providence of God: But whatsoever things are under the Sunne, are confused, 1because all are vanity: Therefore they are not ruled and governed by divine providence. Answ. The ⟨p. 208⟩2Major proposition, consisting of doubtfull termes, is to be distinguished. No confuse things (true, if they be simply confuse) are governed by the providence of God, that is, the providence of God working them, as they are confuse. All things that are under the Sunne, that is, humane things are confuse and vaine: true, but not simply, so that no order and good at all lyeth hid, and is found in that confusion. For if they were such, God, for his great goodnesse and justice, would not permit them to be done. Wherefore, if by the confusion of the world they collect and conclude, that there is no providence, there is more avouched in the conclusion, then was contained in the premisses; or they proceed from that which is in some respect so, to conclude the same to be simply and absolutely so. For whereas many things in the world are well ordered, as the celestiall motions, the preservation of the kinds of all things, common-weals, the punishments of the wicked men, & many more, it may not by this argument be concluded of all things, but of those only, which are done against the order by God appointed, that they are not governed by his providence: but those things, in which a most manifest order doth appeare, shall be an evident testimony of Gods wisedome and effectuall working. But if then they conclude, that those disordered things are not ruled and governed of God; so also shall there be more said in the conclusion, than was in the premisses. For it followeth thereof, Not that the things confuse and troubled, but that the confusion or troubling of order, which is in them, is not of God: As the wicked were created of God, albeit their wickednesse proceeded not from God, but from themselves. For every thing is not necessarily avouched of the concrete, or subject so qualified, which is affirmed of the abstract, or quality it selfe. Wherefore, if it be again replied, putting this Major, That disordered things are not, or are not ruled of God: and therfore many things in the world not done by his providence; even thus too, is the Major diversly faulty. For, 1.
Be it that it be granted, that things disordered, if they be simply such, are not, or are not ruled of God:1 yet cannot this be granted of them, if both confusion and order in divers respects be found in them. Now neither Devils nor men commit any thing so repugnant to the order settled by God, wherein, albeit in respect of their corrupt will it be most disordered, there is not yet the most wise order of divine justice, power, and goodness lying hid under that confusion, which themselves had caused: and for the most part also the same doth manifestly appear; the event, or God himself by his word declaring it. Great confusion was there in the Jews detestable murder, when they crucified the Son of God, and yet notwithstanding the hand and counsel of God hath defined and determined nothing with more wonderful order and wisdom, than the death of his Son for our sins. All humane things therefore are vain; not in respect of the will and decree, or providence of God (for if we respect it, they are most well ordered, even such as in mens judgements seem most disordered) but in respect of men, as concerning both the fault and punishment. For, 1. All our things, God not enlightening, correcting, and directing us by his Spirit, are evil, and displeasing God. 2. They obtain not their expected and hoped events, or those at leastwise not firm and stable, neither such, wherein sound and solid felicity and blessedness doth consist. 3. That wisdom also, which is the knowledge of Gods will, and a true desire to be obedient thereunto, in this life is joined with manifold errors, sins, and calamities: Therefore humane matters are not ruled of God, that is, working them, as they are confuse, and sins: but are ruled of God permitting sins, even as they are sins, and directing them to most good ends; but working all that is good, even those things which lye hid in things disordered and confuse. Moreover, The evils which just men suffer, and the good which the unjust enjoy, seem disordered in mens judgements: but according to the judgment of God, there is a most just order in them, for those causes which are uttered in the word of God. And those things are to be removed from the will and working of God, not which in our judgement, but which in the judgement of God are disordered. Repl. They who are against God, are not ruled and guided by God.
Be it that it be granted, that things disordered, if they be simply such, are not, or are not ruled of God:1 yet cannot this be granted of them, if both confusion and order in divers respects be found in them. Now neither Divels nor men commit any thing so repugnant to the order settled by God, wherein, albeit in respect of their corrupt will it be most disordered, there is not yet the most wise order of divine justice, power, and goodnesse lying hid under that consusion, which themselves had caused: and for the most part also the same doth manifestly appeare; the event, or God himselfe by his word declaring it. Great confusion was there in the Jewes detestable murther, when they crucified the Sonne of God, and yet notwithstanding the hand and counsell of God hath defined and determined nothing with more wonderfull order and wisedome, than the death of his Sonne for our sins. All humane things therefore are vaine; not in respect of the will and decree, or providence of God (for if we respect it, they are most well ordered, even such as in mens judgements seeme most disordered) but in respect of men, as concerning both the fault and punishment. For, 1. All our things, God not illightning, correcting, and directing us by his Spirit, are evill, and displeasing God. 2. They obtaine not their expected and hoped events, or those at leastwise not firme and stable, neither such, wherein sound and solide felicity and blessednesse doth consist. 3. That wisdome also, which is the knowledge of Gods will, and a true desire to be obedient thereunto, in this life is joyned with manifold errours, sinnes, and calamities: Therefore humane matters are not ruled of God, that is, working them, as they are confuse, and sins: but are ruled of God permitting sinnes, even as they are sins, and directing them to most good ends; but working all that is good, even those things which lye hid in things disordered and confuse. Moreover, The evils which just men suffer, and the good which the unjust enjoy, seem disordered in mens judgements: but according to the judgment of God, there is a most just order in them, for those causes which are uttered in the word of God. And those things are to be removed from the will and working of God, not which in our judgement, but which in the judgement of God are disordered. Repl. They who are against God, are not ruled and guided by God.
Devils and wicked men are against God: Therefore they are not ruled and guided by his divine providence. Answ. We grant the whole reason in some respect, namely, that Devils and wicked men are not ruled of God ⟨p. 209⟩by his special providence, that is,1 by his holy Spirit lightning their minds with the knowledge of Gods will, and inclining their hearts not to respect and execute in their actions their own lusts, but the known will of God, and so themselves to work well together with God, who by them worketh well. But they are ruled and governed of God, by his general & secret providence or government, so that they cannot do any thing but what God hath decreed to do by them; and are the instruments of his punishments and benefits, though themselves think and respect some other thing. According to his will he worketh in the army of heaven, 2and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him, What doest thou? The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of waters: 3he turneth it whither soever it pleaseth him. God moveth, inclineth,4 and ruleth the wicked will of Josephs brethren in such wise, as not to kill Joseph, but freely to sell him to the Ishmaelites, that by this means he might transport the family of Jacob into Egypt, nourish, & multiply them, and being oppressed by long servitude and bondage, gloriously deliver them. Assur, though a wicked and proud King, yet is called, The rod of the Lords wrath. Likewise, the Assyrians are called, The sanctified of God, hired soldiers, 5doing service to God: whom yet their own ambition, cruelty and covetousness carried, to take weapons against the Jews. Likewise, every-where in Scripture God is said to infatuate and besot the wicked, to strike them with a giddiness, to mad and amaze them, to effeminate them, to fill them full of fear, so that their spirits fail them at the noise of the falling of a leaf: to rule the swords of the wicked with his hand, to obdurate and harden their hearts. By these and the like it is manifest, that even the deliberations, counsels, and actions of the wicked, are subject to his divine providence and government: and that it is not an idle permission in them, but an effectual working of God, inclining their wills, and guiding their actions at his good pleasure.
Divels and wicked men are against God: Therefore they are not ruled and guided by his divine providence. Answ. Wee grant the whole reason in some respect, namely, that Divels and wicked men are not ruled of God ⟨p. 209⟩by his speciall providence, that is,1 by his holy Spirit lightning their mindes with the knowledge of Gods will, and inclining their hearts not to respect and execute in their actions their owne lusts, but the knowne will of God, and so themselves to worke well together with God, who by them worketh well. But they are ruled and governed of God, by his generall & secret providence or government, so that they cannot doe any thing but what God hath decreed to doe by them; and are the instruments of his punishments and benefits, though themselves thinke and respect some other thing. According to his will he worketh in the army of heaven, 2and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him, What doest thou? The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of waters: 3he turneth it whither soever it pleaseth him. God moveth, inclineth,4 and ruleth the wicked wil of Josephs brethren in such wise, as not to kill Joseph, but freely to sell him to the Ismaelites, that by this means he might transport the family of Jacob into Egypt, nourish, & multiply them, and being oppressed by long servitude and bondage, gloriously deliver them. Assur, though a wicked and proud King, yet is called, The rod of the Lords wrath. Likewise, the Assyrians are called, The sanctified of God, hired souldiers, 5doing service to God: whom yet their own ambition, cruelty and coveteousnesse carried, to take weapons against the Jewes. Likewise, every-where in Scripture God is said to infatuate and besot the wicked, to strike them with a giddinesse, to mad and amase them, to effeminate them, to fill them full of feare, so that their spirits faile them at the noise of the falling of a leafe: to rule the swords of the wickedwith his hand, to obdurate and harden their hearts. By these and the like it is manifest, that even the deliberations, counsels, and actions of the wicked, are subject to his divine providence and government: and that it is not an idle permission in them, but an effectuall working of God, inclining their wils, and guiding their actions at his good pleasure.
Object. 1. All the actions and motions of all creatures are done by the will and working of God. Many actions (as the selling of Joseph, the Assyrians warring against the Jews) are sins: Therefore sins are done by the will and working of God, and by force of consequent, the opinion of universal providence maketh God the author of sin. Ans. There is a fallacy of the accident in the Minor proposition. Actions are sins, 1not in themselves, and as they are actions, but by an accident, by reason of the corruption of the instrument in those actions, which God worketh most justly by him, he not respecting this, as to obey therein the known will of God. This corruption or defect of the creature, and the action which God worketh by the creature, concur together by an accident. For neither is essential to other, neither the cause of other, but each is to other accidentary. For both God would have wrought that self same punishment, which he inflicted justly on the Jews by the Assyrians sinning, by an instrument not sinning: and the Assyrian, if it had pleased God to correct his will, might gave been notwithstanding the instrument of Gods wrath, and yet good, how great soever severity he had exercised toward the Jews: As when God by his good Angels slayeth the wicked host of the Assyrians. Sin therefore, which is in the actions of the creature, is not done by the will and working of God, but by an accident, to wit, as God willeth and worketh those actions, which are sins by the fault of the creature. The sum of all cometh to this: The good action of God, exercised by an evil and corrupt instrument, is no otherwise the sin of the bad instrument, than water which cometh pure out of the fountain, is made impure, running through unclean places: or the best wine coming out of a good vessel, waxeth sour and eager, being put in a corrupt vessel, according to that of Horace, Unless the vessel be pure, 2whatsoever thou pourest in, soureth: or further, than the good work of a good Judge, is the evil work of an evil servant or minister: or the riding of a good horse-man, is the halting of a lame horse. In all these is a Paralogism or fallacy of the accident: that is, there is a proceeding from the essence or thing it self, to that which is but an accident to the thing, and doth but by an accident concur with it:
OBject. 1. All the actions and motions of all creatures are done by the will and working of God. Many actions (as the selling of Joseph, the Assyrians warring against the Jewes) are sinnes: Therefore sinnes are done by the will and working of God, and by force of consequent, the opinion of universall providence maketh God the authour of sin. Ans. There is a fallacy of the accident in the Minor proposition. Actions are sinnes, 1not in themselves, and as they are actions, but by an accident, by reason of the corruption of the instrument in those actions, which God worketh most justly by him, he not respecting this, as to obey therein the known will of God. This corruption or defect of the creature, and the action which God worketh by the creature, concurre together by an accident. For neither is essentiall to other, neither the cause of other, but each is to other accidentary. For both God would have wrought that selfe same punishment, which he inflicted justly on the Jewes by the Assyrians sinning, by an instrument not sinning: and the Assyrian, if it had pleased God to correct his will, might gave been notwithstanding the instrument of Gods wrath, and yet good, how great soever severity he had exercised toward the Jewes: As when God by his good Angels slayeth the wicked hoast of the Assyrians. Sin therefore, which is in the actions of the creature, is not done by the will and working of God, but by an accident, to wit, as God willeth and worketh those actions, which are sins by the fault of the creature. The summe of all cometh to this: The good action of God, exercised by an evill and corrupt instrument, is no otherwise the sinne of the bad instrument, than water which cometh pure out of the fountaine, is made impure, running through uncleane places: or the best wine coming out of a good vessell, wexeth sowre and eager, being put in a corrupt vessell, according to that of Horace, Ʋnlesse the vessell bee pure, 2whatsoever thou powrest in, sowreth: or further, than the good worke of a good Judge, is the evill worke of an evill servant or minister: or the riding of a good horse-man, is the halting of a lame horse. In all these is a Paralogisme or fallacy of the accident: that is, there is a proceeding from the essence or thing it selfe, to that which is but an accident to the thing, and doth but by an accident concurre with it:
after this manner, The going ⟨p. 210⟩of a lame horse is a plain halting. The horse-man willeth and worketh the going of the lame horse: Therefore he willeth and worketh the halting. In like sort, the Devil is created and sustained by God. The Devil is wicked: Therefore the wickedness of the Devil is from God, as the author and effecter thereof. Both which reasons are alike sophistical and false.
after this manner, The going ⟨p. 210⟩of a lame horse is a plaine halting. The horse-man willeth and worketh the going of the lame horse: Therfore he willeth and worketh the halting. In like sort, the Divel is created and sustained by God. The Divel is wicked: Therefore the wickednes of the Divel is from God, as the author and effecter thereof. Both which reasons are alike sophisticall and false.
1Repl. 1. Those things which are in their own kind sins, or unto which the definition of sin agreeth, they are in themselves sins. Many actions are in their own kind sins, as theft, lying, adultery, murder: Therefore they are sins in themselves. Ans. It is a fallacy, reasoning from that which is in some respect so, to that which is simply so. For, the whole argument is granted concerning actions prohibited by God, in respect of the creatures, as they are committed of them against the law of God known unto them, either by general or special commandment, or they are not done to that end principally, as thereby to do and execute the known will of God. The reason thereof is certain, and express in the Scriptures; because the will of God, revealed in his word, is the only and surest rule of goodness and rightness in the creatures. Wherefore, if those motions and actions accord to the will of God, they are in themselves good and pleasing to God: but those actions which disagree from his will, are in themselves sins, which God abhorreth and punisheth. Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: that is,2 whatsoever resteth not on the certain commandment of God, neither is done to that end,3 as thereby to obey the known will of God. But the argument on the other side is false, if we respect the will of God moving and working all the motions and actions of all creatures. The reason is, for that God alone by his own nature can will, appoint, or do nothing that is unjust, whether he work by the good, or by the wicked: Because seeing he is most good, his will only is the rule of justice: and seeing he oweth nothing to any man, he cannot to any man be injurious. Wherefore to spoil another against the law and commandment of God, is sin in it self, and theft. But God commanding, by an especial commandment, the Israelites to spoil the Egyptians, it was not theft, but a work good in it self, both in respect of God,4 by this means punishing the unjustice of the Egyptians: as also of the Israelites doing it to this end, that they might obey therein the special will and commandment of God: which if they had done without this commandment, they had committed theft.
1Repl. 1. Those things which are in their owne kind sinnes, or unto which the definition of sin agreeth, they are in themselves sins. Many actions are in their own kind sins, as theft, lying, adultery, murder: Therfore they are sins in themselves. Ans. It is a fallacy, reasoning from that which is in some respect so, to that which is simply so. For, the whole argument is granted concerning actions prohibited by God, in respect of the creatures, as they are committed of them against the law of God knowne unto them, either by generall or special commandement, or they are not done to that end principally, as thereby to doe and execute the known will of God. The reason thereof is certain, and expresse in the Scriptures; because the will of God, revealed in his word, is the only and surest rule of goodnesse and rightnesse in the creatures. Wherefore, if those motions and actions accord to the will of God, they are in themselves good and pleasing to God: but those actions which disagree from his will, are in themselves sins, which God abhorreth and punisheth. Whatseever is not of faith, is sinne: that is,2 whatsoever resteth not on the certain commandement of God, neither is done to that end,3 as thereby to obey the knowne will of God. But the argument on the other side is false, if we respect the will of God moving and working all the motions and actions of all creatures. The reason is, for that God alone by his own nature can will, appoint, or doe nothing that is unjust, whether he worke by the good, or by the wicked: Because seeing he is most good, his will only is the rule of justice: and seeing he oweth nothing to any man, he cannot to any man be injurious. Wherefore to spoyle another against the law and commandement of God, is sinne in it selfe, and theft. But God commanding, by an especiall commandement, the Israelites to spoyle the Egyptians, it was not theft, but a worke good in it selfe, both in respect of God,4 by this meanes punishing the unjustice of the Egyptians: as also of the Israelites doing it to this end, that they might obey therein the speciall will and commandement of God: which if they had done without this commandement, they had committed theft.
Repl. 2. He that willeth and worketh an action, which is in it self sin, willeth and worketh sins: 1God willeth those actions, which in themselves are horrible sins; as are the heinous offences of Absalom, the lying of the Prophets, the cruelty of the Assyrians making waste of Jury: Therefore God willeth and worketh sin. Answ. The Major is true of one, who worketh an action which is sin, and disagreeth from the law of God in respect of his will, 2who worketh it; and is not true of others: but the Assyrians actions, and of others fining, which God effectually would, were sins, not in respect of the will of God, but of the will of the men themselves sinning: For, though God would the same thing; yet he would it not in the same sort that they. But that this answer, as also the former, may be the better understood, & may be with greater certainty opposed against the like sophisms, which humane reason in great number frowardly wresteth against Gods providence, this general rule is to be observed, the truth whereof is manifest, and the use great in Philosophy, both Natural, and Moral, as also in Divinity. One and the same work or action, 3or effect in subject or matter, is in consideration, manner, and form made most diverse, good and bad, according to the diversity of the causes both efficient and final. For, in consideration and respect of a good cause, it is good: in respect of a bad cause, bad: and a good cause is in it self a cause of good; by an accident a cause, of an evil and bad effect, or vice, which is inherent and remaining in the effect, by reason of a bad and vicious cause, concurring in the producing of that effect: and contrary, a bad and evil cause is in it self a cause of evil; but by an accident, of good: which good is in the effect, by reason of a good cause concurring there-with to the producing of that effect. Now then, whatsoever God doth, cannot be but most good, and most just: seeing both himself is most good, and hath no scope or ends of his counsels and works, but such as are most good, always agreeing with his nature and Law: namely, his glory, and the safety ⟨p. 211⟩and salvation of his chosen. But the creatures action is then good, when both themselves are good, and have a good end proposed unto them of their action:
Repl. 2. He that willeth and worketh an action, which is in it selfe sin, willeth and worketh sins: 1God willeth those actions, which in themselves are horrible sinnes; as are the hainous offences of Absolon, the lying of the Prophets, the cruelty of the Assyrians making waste of Jury: Therefore God willeth and worketh sin. Answ. The Major is true of one, who worketh an action which is sin, and disagreeth from the law of God in respect of his will, 2who worketh it; and is not true of others: but the Assyrians actions, and of others finning, which God effectually would, were sins, not in respect of the will of God, but of the will of the men themselves sinning: For, though God would the same thing; yet he would it not in the same sort that they. But that this answer, as also the former, may be the better understood, & may be with greater certainty opposed against the like sophisms, which humane reason in great number frowardly wresteth against Gods providence, this generall rule is to be observed, the truth whereof is manifest, and the use great in Philosophy, both Naturall, and Morall, as also in Divinity. One and the same worke or action, 3or effect in subject or matter, is in consideration, manner, and forme made most diverse, good and bad, according to the diversity of the causes both efficient and finall. For, in consideration and respect of a good cause, it is good: in respect of a bad cause, bad: and a good cause is in it self a cause of good; by an accident a cause, of an evill and bad effect, or vice, which is inherent and remaining in the effect, by reason of a bad and vicious cause, concurring in the producing of that effect: and contrary, a bad and evil cause is in it self a cause of evill; but by an accident, of good: which good is in the effect, by reason of a good cause concurring there-with to the producing of that effect. Now then, whatsoever God doth, cannot be but most good, and most just: seeing both himselfe is most good, and hath no scope or ends of his counsels and works, but such as are most good, alwaies agreeing with his nature and Law: namely, his glory, and the safety ⟨p. 211⟩and salvation of his chosen. But the creatures action is then good, when both themselves are good, and have a good end proposed unto them of their action:
which end they have, when as they execute the commandment of God either general or specials being moved by the cogitation of his commandment, whether they have, or have not any knowledge of the counsel and purpose of God, why he commandeth this or that thing to be done. And the action of creatures is evil, when hoth themselves are evil, as also when, being forsaken and not corrected by God, they do a thing without his commandment, or not to that end; as thereby to obey him. Wherefore that work, the working and doing whereof is ascribed by the Scripture both to God and to a corrupt and evil creature, must needs be good, in respect of God; and evil, in respect of the creature: neither what is evil in that work, may be attributed to God; neither what is good, unto the corrupt creature, but by an accident. So the afflicting or wasting of the Jews was in subject and matter one and the same work, which both God would, ordained, and wrought; and the Assyrians executed: yet in consideration and respect, it was not the same, but most diverse. For, in respect of God, purposing by this means to punish the sins of the Jews, it was the power and most holy work of God: in respect of the Assyrians, who were both wicked, cruel, ravenous, and bent not upon the will of God, which they were ignorant of, but on the fulfilling of their whole rapacity and hatred against the law of God, it was wicked robbery, the proper work of the Assyrians (as it is expressly showed, Isaiah 10.7.) which God neither would nor intended, nor wrought in the Assyrians. Wherefore neither the proper work of the Assyrians, can be attributed to God, nor the proper work of God unto the Assyrians, but by an accident; because namely in one and the same loss and waste which God brought upon the Jews by the Assyrians, the unjust work of the Assyrians did, by an accident, concur with the most just work of God. Even as a Judge is not therefore made a thief, nor a thief made a Judge, because a just Judge putteth to death a robber by an evil executioner, and a thief; but one and the same slaughter is a just punishment, in respect of the Judge; and murder, in respect of the executioner being a thief. So a Captain lawfully waging war, and laying waste the country of his enemies, doth well: but the wicked soldiers, who fulfil therein, and follow their own lusts, sin.
which end they have, when as they execute the commandement of God either generall or specialls being moved by the cogitation of his commandement, whether they have, or have not any knowledge of the counsell and purpose of God, why he commandeth this or that thing to be done. And the action of creatures is evill, when hoth themselves are evill, as also when, being forsaken and not corrected by God, they doe a thing without his commandement, or not to that end; as thereby to obey him. Wherefore that worke, the working and doing whereof is ascribed by the Scripture both to God and to a corrupt and evill creature, must needs be good, in respect of God; and evill, in respect of the creature: neither what is evill in that worke, may be attributed to God; neither what is good, unto the corrupt creature, but by an accident. So the afflicting or wasting of the Jewes was in subject and matter one and the same worke, which both God would, ordayned, and wrought; and the Assyrians executed: yet in consideration and respect, it was not the same, but most diverse. For, in respect of God, purposing by this meanes to punish the sins of the Jewes, it was the power and most holy worke of God: in respect of the Assyrians, who were both wicked, cruell, ravenous, and bent not upon the will of God, which they were ignorant of, but on the fulfilling of their whole rapacity and hatred against the law of God, it was wicked robbery, the proper work of the Assyrians (as it is expresly shewed, Esay 10.7.) which God neither would nor intended, nor wrought in the Assyrians. Wherefore neither the proper worke of the Assyrians, can be attributed to God, nor the proper worke of God unto the Assyrians, but by an accident; because namely in one and the same losse and waste which God brought upon the Jewes by the Assyrians, the unjust worke of the Assyrians did, by an accident, concurre with the most just worke of God. Even as a Judge is not therefore made a thiefe, nor a thiefe made a Judge, because a just Judge putteth to death a robber by an evill executioner, and a thiefe; but one and the same slaughter is a just punishment, in respect of the Judge; and murther, in respect of the executioner being a thiefe. So a Captaine lawfully waging warre, and laying waste the country of his enemies, doth well: but the wicked souldiers, who fulfill therein, and follow their owne lusts, sinne.
So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satan and the Chaldeans, spoiling and vexing him, for to fulfil their own lusts, and to destroy him, do wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.
So God afflicting Job, thereby to try him, doth justly: Satha• and the Caldeans, spoyling and vexing him, for to fulfill their owne lusts, and to destroy him, doe wickedly. Wherefore it is a most true rule: The end maketh the kind of action either the same or diverse.
1Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not only evils of pain and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denied: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or we may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtful meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and work it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sin then is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and work sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sin, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concur in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy work; while he indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himself will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.
1Repl. 3. That which cannot be done, God simply not willing it, is done, God willing it: But sin, as it is sin, cannot be done, God simply not willing it: because God is omnipotent, Therefore sin must needs be done, God willing it. And so it followeth, that not onely evils of paine and punishment, but evils of crime and offence also, are done by the providence of God. Ans. The consequence of this argument is to be denyed: because the Major hath not a sufficient enumeration: for this member is wanting, namely, God permitting it. For that which is not done, God not willing it, may be done, God either willing it or permitting it: Or wee may answer, that the Major hath an ambiguity and doubtfull meaning in it. For, God to will a thing, is taken sometimes, as for him to approve and worke it: sometimes, for his permitting, or not hindering a thing from being done. This, to permit, is in some sort to will, and that he will not inhibit it, although he dislike and punish it. Sinthen is said to be done, God willing it; not as if he doth intend, like, and worke sin, as it is sin; but because he doth permit it: that is, he by his just judgment suffereth sinne, which riseth from the corruption of his instruments, to concurre in the action, which he exerciseth by vicious and corrupt creatures, with his holy worke; while hee indeed moveth and bendeth them by objects whither himselfe will, but doth not correct them by his spirit, that so with God working well, they also may work well, that is, according to the knowledge of his divine will, and with purpose of being obedient thereunto.
1Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightness, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sin is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are four terms in this Syllogism: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keep the creature in that goodness, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This work of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and laws: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightness, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation cometh from God, as it is a punishment; and cometh not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.
1Repl. 4. The privation or bereaving of the knowledge of Gods will, and of rightnesse, is from God, as worker and effecter thereof. This privation is sin. Therefore sinne is from ⟨p. 212⟩God as efficient thereof. Ans. There are foure termes in this Syllogisrne: For, privation in the Major is taken actively, to derive, bereave, forsake, to withdraw the grace of his spirit, not to keepe the creature in that goodnesse, wherein he was created, nor to restore him to it, being lost. This worke of God is most just, nothing repugnant to his nature and lawes: either because it is the most just punishment of sin, or because God oweth nothing to any creature, & therefore cannot be injurious to any, or an accepter of persons, whatsoever he doth determine of his creature. In the Minor privation is taken passively, & signifieth as much as to want, or the want of rightnesse, which ought by the right of their creation to be in reasonable creatures. This want, because it is received, & is in the creatures, they themselves willing & procuring it, against the law of God, it is sin in them, & is not wrought by God: but God not continually ruling these reasonable creatures by his holy spirit, it is in them voluntarily, without God either furthering or enforcing it. Briefly privation commeth from God, as it is a punishment; and commeth not of God, as it is sin, and repugnancy in the creatures against the Law of God.
1Obj. 2. When a creature is said to be ruled of God, it is meant, that his actions are from God, and are directed to the glory of God, and the safety of his chosen: But the creatures, even when they sin, are ruled of God. Therefore sins are wrought by God. Ans. The conclusion pulleth in more, than was in the premisses. For this only followeth of them: therefore the actions also of sinners, as they are actions (that is, as they are not sins; but motions wrought by God) are from God, and are ruled of him. For he will the actions: but the pravity and naughtiness of the action, which is from men, he will not. Moreover, God through his great goodness ruleth and guideth sins also, as they are sins: yet not by working them, but by permitting them, and destining and directing them to certain ends, and those most good.
1Obj. 2. When a creature is said to be ruled of God, it is meant, that his actions are from God, and are directed to the glory of God, and the safety of his chosen: But the creatures, even when they sin, are ruled of God. Therefore sins are wrought by God. Ans. The conclusion pulleth in more, than was in the premisses. For this only followeth of them: therefore the actions also of sinners, as they are actions (that is, as they are not sins; but motions wrought by God) are from God, and are ruled of him. For he will the actions: but the pravity and naughtinesse of the action, which is from men, he will not. Moreover, God through his great goodnesse ruleth and guideth sins also, as they are sins: yet not by working them, but by permitting them, and destining and directing them to certain ends, and those most good.
Obj. 3. Of those things which are done by Gods providence, God himself is author and efficient. But all evils, even of crime and offence, are done by the providence of God. Therefore God is author of all that is evil. Ans. The Major is to be distinguished: Those things which are done by Gods providence, that is, Gods providence working them, or are done as proceeding from it, God worketh them. But all evil things are done by Gods providence; yet not all alike. Evils of punishment, because they have in them […] respect and consideration of good, are done as proceeding from the providence of God: for God hath from everlasting decreed them, and in time, order, and manner determined by him, worketh them. Evils of crime, or sins, as they are such, are not done as from or of the providence of God, but according unto the providence of God; that is, they are done by the providence of God, not working them, but permitting, determining, and directing them to most good ends, and most agreeable to his nature and law. For evils of crime, or sins as they are such, have not a respect & consideration of good in them, as evils of punishments have. Therefore God did not decree or will to work them, but he decreed to permit them, and not to hinder them from being done by others, and from concurring in actions with the holy and sacred work of God, partly to exercise his justice in punishing some, and partly to declare his mercy in forgiving others.
Obj. 3. Of those things which are done by Gods providence, God himself is author and efficient. But all evils, even of crime and offence, are done by the providence of God. Therefore God is author of all that is evill. Ans. The Major is to be distinguished: Those things which are done by Gods providence, that is, Gods providence working them, or are done as proceeding from it, God worketh them. But all evill things are done by Gods providence; yet not all alike. Evils of punishment, because they have in them 〈…〉 respect and consideration of good, are done as proceeding from the providence of God: for God hath from everlasting decreed them, and in time, order, and manner determined by him, worketh them. Evils of crime, or sins, as they are such, are not done as from or of the providence of God, but according unto the providence of God; that is, they are done by the providence of God, not working them, but permitting, determining, and directing them to most good ends, and most agreeable to his nature and law. For evils of crime, or sins as they are such, have not a respect & consideration of good in them, as evils of punishments have. Therefore God did not decree or will to worke them, but he decreed to permit them, and not to hinder them from being done by others, and from concurring in actions with the holy and sacred work of God, partly to exercise his justice in punishing some, and partly to declare his mercy in forgiving others.
He that in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, hath in him contradictory & flat repugnant wills: But God in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, as robberies, spoils, rapes, murders: Therefore he hath contradictory wills. Ans. I. We grant the whole argument, if therein be meant these evil actions in such sort as they are committed against the Law by the creatures, and so become sins. For in this sense God neither willeth them, nor alloweth of them, but only as they are certain motions, and punishments of sin.Answ. 2. The Major is to be distinguished: He contradicteth, or is contrary to himself, who will and will not the same work, that is, in the same manner and respect: God will and will not the same, but in a diverse manner and respect. He will and worketh it, as ⟨p. 213⟩it is a motion and action, and also a punishment of sin, or any thing agreeing with his Law and justice, as a trial, or exercise, or martyrdom of the godly. He willeth not, neither alloweth or commandeth, nor worketh any thing, as by reason of the corruption of the instrument, by which he exerciseth his work: it swerveth from his divine justice and law. Now in a divers manner and respect, to will, and not to will the same, and yet to determine on that part, whereof the reasons seem strongest, is not in us, much less in God, absurd or repugnant. The waste of Israel, which the Assyrians wrought, God willeth as a punishment, which his justice of right did require: he willeth it not, but condemneth, and afterwards most grievously revengeth it in the Assyrians, inasmuch, as it was not the execution of Gods wrath, but a fulfilling of their own wrath and lusts against his law. So God willeth, that all should obey his word and be saved: 1. In respect of his love towards all: for he is delighted with the death of no man. 12. In respect of his commandment, and inviting of all to repentance. But he will not that all be converted and so be saved, in respect of his working or efficacy: that is, he commandeth all men indeed to repent and believe, and promiseth life to all that believe; but he doth not any where promise that he will work by his spirit in all, that they should believe and be saved.
HEe that in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, hath in him contradictory & flat repugnant wils: But God in his secret will will that to be done which he forbiddeth in his law, as robberies, spoyles, rapes, murthers: Therefore he hath contradictory wils. Ans. I. We grant the whole argument, if therein bee meant these evill actions in such sort as they are committed against the Law by the creatures, and so become sinnes. For in this sense God neither willeth them, nor alloweth of them, but onely as they are certaine motions, and punishments of sinne.Answ. 2. The Major is to be distinguished: He contradicteth, or is contrary to himselfe, who will and will not the same work, that is, in the same manner and respect: God will and will not the same, but in a diverse manner and respect. Hee will and worketh it, as ⟨p. 213⟩it is a motion and action, and also a punishment of sin, or any thing agreeing with his Law and justice, as a triall, or exercise, or martyrdome of the godly. He willeth not, neither alloweth or commandeth, nor worketh any thing, as by reason of the corruption of the instrument, by which he exerciseth his work: it swerveth from his divine justice and law. Now in a divers manner and respect, to will, and not to will the same, and yet to determine on that part, whereof the reasons seeme strongest, is not in us, much lesse in God, absurd or repugnant. The waste of Israel, which the Assyrians wrought, God willeth as a punishment, which his justice of right did require: he willeth it not, but condemneth, and afterwards most grievously revengeth it in the Assyrians, in asmuch, as it was not the execution of Gods wrath, but a fulfilling of their own wrath and lusts against his law. So God willeth, that all should obey his word and be saved: 1. In respect of his love towards all: for he is delighted with the death of no man. 12. In respect of his commandement, and inviting of all to repentance. But he will not that all be converted and so be saved, in respect of his working or efficacy: that is, he commandeth all men indeed to repent and beleeve, and promiseth life to all that beleeve; but he doth not any where promise that he will work by his spirit in all, that they should beleeve and be saved.
For if he would this, it must needs be, that either all should obey Gods commandments and be saved, or that God should not be omnipotent. Repl. If God willeth one thing in signification, or by his commandment, and willeth effectually, or by his efficacy and working, another; he shall be changeable and a dissembler. Answ. This doth not thereof follow.1 For even when he willeth effectually those actions which are sins, he doth indeed detest them, as they are sins: and when he commandeth obedience, he doth in earnest exact it of all. But this will of signification, or commandment of God, doth not testify, or declare, what he will work in all; but what agreeth with his mind, what he alloweth, what he requireth, and what every one oweth unto him. God therefore dissembleth not, neither is contrary to himself: because he doth not in all places, nor at all times manifest his will unto his creatures: and his will of punishing is not disagreeing from his law.
For if he would this, it must needs be, that either all should obey Gods commandements and be saved, or that God should not be omnipotent. Repl. If God willeth one thing in signification, or by his commandement, and willeth effectually, or by his efficacy and working, another; he shall be changeable and a dissembler. Answ. This doth not thereof follow.1 For even when he willeth effectually those actions which are sins, he doth indeed detest them, as they are sins: and when he commandeth obedience, he doth in earnest exact it of all. But this will of signification, or commandement of God, doth not testifie, or declare, what he will work in all; but what agreeth with his mind, what he alloweth, what he requireth, and what every one oweth unto him. God therefore dissembleth not, neither is contrary to himself: because he doth not in all places, nor at all times manifest his will unto his creatures: and his will of punishing is not disagreeing from his law.
1That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsel, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and nearest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes always working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not always working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Soldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to do either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wills of the Soldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would choose the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeableness of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditional, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freeness of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomplisheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and showed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion choose or refuse that which ⟨p. 214⟩seemed good from everlasting to God, and was decreed of him. For, if when God worketh well by evil creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or providence of God, and his good working, that which is accidental to them, that is, corruption:
1THat which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently and freely. But all things are done by the unchangeable decree, or counsell, or providence of God: Therefore nothing is done contingently and freely. Answ. The Major is either particular, and so concludeth nothing, or being generally understood, is most false. For, An effect which is the same in subject and matter, is changeable and unchangeable, necessary and contingent, in respect not of the same cause, but of divers, of which together it is produced and doth depend, and whereof some are changeable, some unchangeable. In respect therefore of the second and neerest causes, some effects are necessary and certain, which are produced out of causes alwaies working after one sort; some are changeable, which have a changeable cause, that is, such as is not alwaies working after one sort, and producing the same effects. In respect of the first cause, namely, the decree of God, which is unchangeable, all effects are unchangeable and most certain, even those, which in respect of second causes are most uncertain. As, That the bones of Christ should not be broken, it was a thing contingent, in respect of the bones, which in their own nature might as well have been broken, as not broken; as also of the Souldiers, who, as concerning the nature of their will, might have chosen to doe either; but in respect of the decree of God, it was necessary: for by his decree were the wils of the Souldiers so ruled, that they could not then, neither would chuse the contrary. Wherefore the unchangeablenesse of the decree of God, which is a necessity by supposition, or conditionall, doth not take away either the contingency of events, or the liberty and freenesse of a created will, but rather maintaineth, and confirmeth it. For God accomp•isheth his decrees by reasonable creatures according to the condition of their nature, when as by objects represented and shewed to their understanding, he inclineth and bendeth their will, that it should with free and inward motion chuse or refuse that which ⟨p. 214⟩seemed good from everlasting to God, and was decreed of him. For, if when God worketh well by evill creatures, there is not taken away in them, through the decree or providence of God, and his good working, that which is accidentall to them, that is, corruption:
how much less shall that be taken away, which is essential unto them, even to work freely? So the blessed Angels are changeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are unchangeably and necessarily only good, according to Gods decree and directing of them; and yet freely: so that how much the more effectually they are moved by the Spirit of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacrity and propension they will, and do only that which is good. Judas, the Jews, Herod, Pilate, the Soldiers delivered and crucified Christ freely,1 and with great willingness and pleasure, and yet they did whatsoever the hand and counsel of God had determined before to be done.
how much lesse shall that be taken away, which is essentiall unto them, even to work freely? So the blessed Angels are changeably good, as concerning their nature: but they are unchangeably and necessarily only good, according to Gods decree and directing of them; and yet freely: so that how much the more effectually they are moved by the Spirit of God, so much the more freely, and with greater alacrity and propension they will, and doe onely that which is good. Judas, the Jewes, Herod, Pilate, the Souldiers delivered and crucified Christ freely,1 and with great willingnesse and pleasure, and yet they did whatsoever the hand and counsell of God had determined before to be done.
Object. 2. That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily. All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing is therefore done contingently, neither by Fortune nor Chance, but all necessarily: which is the Stoics doctrine of fate or destiny. Here, before we answer to this objection, we must know the signification of the words, and the difference between the opinion of the Stoics and Christians. Necessarily is that which cannot be otherwise than it is.1 Contingent is that, which is indeed, or is done, but might notwithstanding not have been, or have been done otherwise. Necessity therefore and contingency is the order which is between the cause and the effect, unchangeable or changeable. And because the effects follow of their causes unchangeably, either in respect of the nature it self of the causes, or in respect of some external cause, which designeth and appointeth another cause to a certain effect: and because also the effects themselves cannot be more unchangeable, than are their causes: therefore there is said to be a double necessity:2 One absolute or simple, which is of them, whose opposites or contraries are simply unpossible, in respect of the nature of the cause or subject whereof it is affirmed: as are the essential and personal properties of God: to wit, God is, God liveth, God is just, wise, &c. God is the eternal Father, Son, and holy Ghost. The other is necessity of consequence or by supposition, which is the immutability and unchangeableness of those effects which follow of causes, which causes being supposed or put, the effect must necessarily follow; but the causes notwithstanding themselves might either not have been, or might have been changed. So are those things necessary which God hath decreed that they should be done, in respect of the unchangeableness of his decree, which decree yet God most freely made; that is, he might from everlasting either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise, according to those words: Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he will give me moe than twelve legions of Angels? 3How then should the Scripture be fulfilled? Likewise, Those things are called necessary, which are done indeed by such second causes as are so made of God, that by their own nature, they cannot do otherwise than they do;
Object. 2. That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily. All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing is therefore done contingently, neither by Fortune nor Chance, but all necessarily: which is the Stoickes doctrine of fate or destiny. Here, before wee answer to this objection, wee must know the signification of the words, and the difference between the opinion of the Stoickes and Christians. Necessarily is that which cannot be otherwise than it is.1 Contingent is that, which is indeed, or is done, but might notwithstanding not have been, or have been done otherwise. Necessity therefore and contingency is the order which is between the cause and the effect, unchangeable or changeable. And because the effects follow of their causes unchangeably, either in respect of the nature it selfe of the causes, or in respect of some externall cause, which designeth and appointeth another cause to a certain effect: and because also the effects themselves cannot be more unchangeable, than are their causes: therefore there is said to be a double necessity:2 One absolute or simple, which is of them, whose opposites or contraries are simply unpossible, in respect of the nature of the cause or subject whereof it is affirmed: as are the essentiall and personall properties of God: to wit, God is, God liveth, God is just, wise, &c. God is the eternall Father, Sonne, and holy Ghost. The other is necessity of consequence or by supposition, which is the immutability and unchangeablenesse of those effects which follow of causes, which causes being supposed or put, the effect must necessarily follow; but the causes notwithstanding themselves might either not have been, or might have been changed. So are those things necessary which God hath decreed that they should be done, in respect of the unchangeablenesse of his decree, which decree yet God most freely made; that is, hee might from everlasting either not have decreed it at all, or have decreed it otherwise, according to those wordes: Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and hee will give mee moe than twelve legions of Angels? 3How then should the Scripture be fulfilled? Likewise, Those things are called necessary, which are done indeed by such second causes as are so made of God, that by their owne nature, they cannot doe otherwise than they doe;
but yet may be by God himself either taken away, or hindered, or altered and changed: As the Sun, and the shadow going forward in consequence (or order of nature) with the Sun; and yet consisting and standing still in that battle of Joshua, and returning backwards in the days of Hezekiah: the fire, burning bodies within the reach thereof, which are capable of burning; and yet not burning the three Children in the furnace of Babylon: or those things which are indeed in their own nature apt to produce a contrary or diverse thing, or to forbear producing of their effect; and yet notwithstanding, cannot do otherwise, because they are so moved by God, or by other causes; which although they be not changed, yet might have been changed; or when they work so, cannot withal not work, or work otherwise, because two contradictories cannot be both at one time true.
but yet may be by God himselfe either taken away, or hindered, or altered and changed: As the Sun, and the shadow going forward in consequence (or order of nature) with the Sun; and yet consisting and standing still in that battell of Joshua, and returning backwards in the daies of Ezechias: the fire, burning bodies within the reach thereof, which are capable of burning; and yet not burning the three Children in the furnace of Babylon: or those things which are indeed in their own nature apt to produce a contrary or diverse thing, or to forbeare producing of their effect; and yet notwithstanding, cannot doe otherwise, because they are so moved by God, or by other causes; which although they be not changed, yet might have been changed; or when they worke so, cannot withall not worke, or worke otherwise, because two contradictories cannot be both at one time true.
1Fortune and Chance are sometimes taken for the events themselves, or effects, which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes as are causes by and in themselves, but not known to us: as when we say, good or evil fortune, happy or unhappy chance. Sometimes they signify the causes of such events: either ⟨p. 215⟩the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be done by fortune, or by chance) or the hidden and unknown causes, which are causes by and in themselves: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate inevitable. And they are wont to call that fortune, which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions have some event, that seldom happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to build, findeth treasure. Chance they call an accidental cause in natural agents, whose motions have effects, neither proper to them, neither always happening, and that without any manifest cause directing it: as if a tile falling from an house, kill one that passeth by.
1Fortune and Chance are sometimes taken for the events themselves, or effects, which follow causes that are causes but by an accident, by reason of such causes as are causes by and in themselves, but not knowne to us: as when we say, good or evill fortune, happy or unhappy chance. Sometimes they signifie the causes of such events: either ⟨p. 215⟩the manifest causes, which are causes but by an accident (as when any thing is said to be done by fortune, or by chance) or the hidden and unknown causes, which are causes by and in themselves: As it is said in the Poet: Omnipotent fortune and fate inevitable. And they are wont to call that fortune, which is a cause by an accident in voluntary agents, whose actions have some event, that seldome happeneth, besides their appointment: As he that digging with purpose to build, findeth treasure. Chance they call an accidentall cause in naturall agents, whose motions have effects, neither proper to them, neither alwaies happening, and that without any manifest cause directing it: as if a tyle falling from an house, kill one that passeth by.
1By the name of Fate or Destiny, sometimes is understood the decree and providence of God: As that of the Poet, Leave off to hope that the fates of the Gods are moved with entreaty. But the Stoics by this word understood the immutable connection and knitting of all causes and effects, depending of the nature of the causes themselves; so that neither the second causes are able to work otherwise than they work, neither the first causes can work otherwise than doth the second; and therefore all effects of all causes are absolutely necessary. This opinion of the Stoics, because it spoileth God of his liberty and omnipotency, and abolisheth the order and manner of working in second causes, disposed by Gods wisdom, not only sounder Philosophy, but the Church also rejecteth and condemneth, and doth openly profess her dissenting from the Stoics: §11. Because the Stoics tie God to second causes, as if it should be necessary for him to work by them, as their nature doth bear and suffer. But the Church teacheth, that God worketh not according to the rule or lore of second causes; but second causes according to the prescript of God, as being their chief and most free Governor and Lord; and therefore are subject and tied to his will and pleasure. §22. The Stoics were of opinion, that neither God, n•r second causes, can do any thing of their own nature otherwise than they do. The Church affirmeth, that not only second causes are made and ordained by God, some to bring forth certain and definite effects, some variable and contrary; but God himself also could from everlasting either not have decreed, or have decreed and wrought otherwise, either by second causes, or without them, and by them either changeable in their own nature, or unchangeable, all things, whose contrary are not repugnant to his nature: and that he hath so decreed them, and doth so work them, not because he could not do otherwise; but because it so pleased him, as it is said: Our God is in heaven, he doth whatsoever he will. With God shall nothing be impossible: that is, which is not against his nature,2 or whereby his nature is not overthrown, as it is said, 2 Tim. 2.
1By the name of Fate or Destiny, sometimes is understood the decree and provide•ce of God: As that of the Poet, Leave off to hope that the fates of the Gods are moved with entreaty. But the Stoickes by this word understood the immutable connexion and knitting of all causes and effects, depending of the nature of the causes themselves; so that neither the second causes are able to work otherwise than they work, neither the first causes can worke otherwise than doth the second; and therefore all effects of all causes are absolutely necessary. This opinion of the Stoickes, because it spoyleth God of his liberty and omnipotency, and abolisheth the order and manner of working in second causes, disposed by Gods wisedome, not only sounder Philosophy, but the Church also rejecteth and condemneth, and doth openly professe her dissenting from the Stoickes: §11. Because the Stoickes tie God to second causes, as if it should be necessary for him to work by them, as their nature doth bear and suffer. But the Church teacheth, that God worketh not according to the rule or lore of second causes; but second causes according to the prescript of God, as being their chiefe and most free Governour and Lord; and therefore are subject and tied to his will and pleasure. §22. The Stoickes were of opinion, that neither God, n•r second causes, can doe any thing of their own nature otherwise than they doe. The Church affirmeth, that not only second causes are made and ordained by God, some to bring forth certain and definite effects, some variable and contrary; but God himself also could from everlasting either not have decreed, or have decreed and wrought otherwise, either by second causes, or without them, and by them either changeable in their own nature, or unchangeable, all things, whose contrary are not repugnant to his nature: and that he hath so decreed them, and doth so work them, not because he could not doe otherwise; but because it so pleased him, as it is said: Our God is in heaven, he doth whatsoever he will. With God shall nothing be impossible: that is, which is not against his nature,2 or whereby his nature is not overthrowne, as it is said, 2 Tim. 2.
Out of this then which hath been spoken, we answer unto the argument, which was, That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily: All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing therefore is done contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but all necessarily. First, we say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opinion of the Stoics is objected to the Church: For albeit the Church confesseth all events in respect of Gods providence, to be necessary: yet this necessity is not a Stoical fate and destiny; because the Church defendeth against the Stoics, both liberty in God governing things at his pleasure, and a changeableness in second causes; and showeth out of Gods word, that God could both now do, and from everlasting have decreed many things, which neither he doth, nor hath decreed. And therefore the Church also hath abstained from the name of fate, lest any should suspect her to maintain with the Stoics an absolute necessity of all things. Secondly,1 If removing Stoicism, yet notwithstanding the necessity of all things, and the abolishing of contingency, fortune, and chance, be objected: we make answer to the Major by distinguishing the words. For those things, which are done by the providence and decree of God, are done indeed necessarily; but by that necessity, which is by supposition, or of consequence, not by simple necessity or absolute: wherefore it followeth, that all things come to pass, not by simple and absolute necessity, but by that of supposition or consequence. And necessity of consequence doth not at all take ⟨p. 216⟩away contingency. The reason of this is: Because the same effect may have causes, whereof some may produce it by an order changeable, some by an unchangeable order; and therefore in respect of some it is contingent, and in respect of some, necessary. For as the originals or causes of contingency in things, are that liberty which is in the will of God, and Angels, and Men, and the mutable nature of the matter of the elements, together with the readiness or inclination thereof to divers motions and forms: so the cause of absolute necessity in God, is the very unchangeable nature of God;
Out of this then which hath been spoken, we answer unto the argument, which was, That which is done by the unchangeable decree of God, is not done contingently, but necessarily: All things are done by the unchangeable decree of God: nothing therefore is done contingently, neither by fortune or chance, but all necessarily. First, wee say, there is more in the conclusion than in the premisses, when the opinion of the Stoickes is objected to the Church: For albeit the Church confesseth all events in respect of Gods providence, to be necessary: yet this necessity is not a Stoicall fate and destiny; because the Church detendeth against the Stoickes, both liberty in God governing things at his pleasure, and a changeablenes in second causes; and sheweth out of Gods word, that God could both now doe, and from everlasting have decreed many things, which neither he doth, nor hath decreed. And therefore the Church also hath abstained from the name of fate, lest any should suspect her to maintaine with the Stoickes an absolute necessity of all things. Secondly,1 If removing Stoicisme, yet notwithstanding the necessity of all things, and the abolishing of contingency, fortune, and chance, be objected: wee make answer to the Major by distinguishing the words. For those things, which are done by the providence and decree of God, are done indeed necessarily; but by that necessity, which is by supposition, or of consequence, not by simple necessity or absolute: wherefore it followeth, that all things come to passe, not by simple and absolute necessity, but by that of supposition or consequence. And necessity of consequence doth not at all take ⟨p. 216⟩away contingency. The reason of this is: Because the same effect may have causes, whereof some may produce it by an order changeable, some by an unchangeable order; and therefore in respect of some it is contingent, and in respect of some, necessary. For as the originals or causes of contingency in things, are that liberty which is in the will of God, and Angels, and Men, and the mutable nature of the matter of the elements, together with the readinesse or inclination thereof to divers motions and formes: so the cause of absolute necessity in God, is the very unchangeable nature of God;
but the cause of that necessity, which is only by consequent, is the divine providence or decree coming between those things which are in their own nature mutable; and also the nature of things created, which is framed and ordained of God to certain effects, and yet subject to the most free will and government of God, either according, or besides, or contrary to this order which himself hath made. In respect therefore of second causes, some things are necessary, which are done by causes always working after one sort; as the motion of the Sun, the burning of any matter put into the fire, if it be capable of burning: some things are contingent, which have causes working contingently, that is, apt and fit to produce, or to forbear producing divers and contrary effects: as the blasts of winds, the local motions of living creatures, the actions of mens wills. But in respect of the first cause, that is, of the will of God, all things which are, or are done in Gods external or outward works, are partly necessary, partly contingent. Necessary, as even those things which have second causes most changeable: as that the bones of Christ on the Cross were not broken by the Soldiers, by reason of the unchangeableness or the decree and providence of God: Contingent (by reason of the liberty of his eternal and unchangeable decree, and the execution thereof) even those things, which, as concerning their own nature, have second causes most unchangeable, as the motion of the Sun and shadows. If therefore by contingency they mean the changeableness of effects, 1which they have by the natures of second causes, or by the power and liberty of God, it doth not follow that things are contingent, because of that necessity which they have by the providence of God. For, this doth not take away, but preserveth rather the nature, order and manner of working in second causes ordained by God. But if by contingency they mean the changeableness of second causes and effects, so floating and wavering, that they are not ruled and governed by Gods providence, any such contingency the Scripture doth not admit or approve.2
but the cause of that necessity, which is only by consequent, is the divine providence or decree coming between those things which are in their owne nature mutable; and also the nature of things created, which is framed and ordained of God to certaine effects, and yet subject to the most free will and government of God, either according, or besides, or contrary to this order which himselfe hath made. In respect therefore of second causes, some things are necessary, which are done by causes alwaies working after one sort; as the motion of the Sun, the burning of any matter put into the fire, if it be capable of burning: some things are contingent, which have causes working contingently, that is, apt and fit to produce, or to forbeare producing divers and contrary effects: as the blasts of windes, the locall motions of living creatures, the actions of mens wils. But in respect of the first cause, that is, of the will of God, all things which are, or are done in Gods externall or outward workes, are partly necessary, partly contingent. Necessary, as even those things which have second causes most changeable: as that the bones of Christ on the Crosse were not broken by the Souldiers, by reason of the unchangeablenesse or the decree and providence of God: Contingent (by reason of the liberty of his eternall and unchangeable decree, and the execution thereof) even those things, which, as concerning their own nature, have second causes most unchangeable, as the motion of the Sun and shadowes. If therefore by contingency they meane the changeablenesse of effects, 1which they have by the natures of second causes, or by the power and liberty of God, it doth not follow that things are contingent, because of that necessity which they have by the providence of God. For, this doth not take away, but preserveth rather the nature, order and manner of working in second causes ordained by God. But if by contingency they meane the changeablenesse of second causes and effects, so floating and wavering, that they are not ruled and governed by Gods providence, any such contingency the Scripture doth not admit or approve.2
Hereby we also understand, When it is demanded concerning the motions and effects of creatures, whether they are to be termed necessary or contingent, that some verily are more rightly and properly called contingent, than necessary, though both contingent and necessary, are wrought by divine providence. For they are rather to be called such as they are of their own nature, and by the nature of their nearest causes, than as they are in respect of Gods providence, which is a cause more removed, and farther off. And nothing is more either certain or manifest, than that, according to the nature of second causes, some things should be changeable, some unchangeable: yet by the power of God, though all things in the creatures may be changed, they are made notwithstanding unchangeable, because of the certainty of his decree and divine providence.
Hereby we also understand, When it is demanded concerning the motions and effects of creatures, whether they are to be termed necessary or contingent, that some verily are more rightly and properly called contingent, than necessary, though both contingent and necessary, are wrought by divine providence. For they are rather to be called such as they are of their own nature, and by the nature of their neerest causes, than as they are in respect of Gods providence, which is a cause more removed, and farther off. And nothing is more either certain or manifest, than that, according to the nature of second causes, some things should be changeable, some unchangeable: yet by the power of God, though all things in the creatures may be changed, they are made notwithstanding unchangeable, because of the certainty of his decree and divine providence.
So likewise we answer concerning fortune and chance. 1For if by these names be understood such causes or events by accident, as have no cause which is proper and by it self a cause, they ought to be far abandoned from the Church of Christ. But if we understand thereby a cause which is by it self a cause and proper, though unknown to our senses and reason; or such causes by accident, which have notwithstanding some secret proper cause adjoined; nothing hindereth (in respect of second causes, which are causes by accident, and in respect of our judgment, whereby we attain not to the proper, and that which is by it self the cause of these events) that to be, or to be a thing fortuning, or done by chance, which in respect of Gods providence cometh to pass by his most accurate and unchangeable counsel and decree: according to those sayings.2 One Sparrow shall not fall on the ground without your Father. And, The lot is cast into the lap, &c.
So likewise we answer concerning fortune and chance. 1For if by these names be understood such causes or events by accident, as have no cause which is proper and by it selfe a cause, they ought to be far abandoned from the Church of Christ. But if wee understand thereby a cause which is by it selfe a cause and proper, though unknowne to our senses and reason; or such causes by accident, which have notwithstanding some secret proper cause adjoyned; nothing hindereth (in respect of second causes, which are causes by accident, and in respect of our judgment, whereby we attain not to the proper, and that which is by it selfe the cause of these events) that to be, or to be a thing fortuning, or done by chance, which in respect of Gods providence cometh to passe by his most accurate and unchangeable counsell and decree: according to those sayings.2 One Sparrow shall not fall on the ground without your Father. And, The lot is cast into the lap, &c.
1That which shall be unchangeably and necessarily by the will and providence of God, in vain to the furthering or hindering of that are means applied; as the use of the ministry, the magistrates, laws, exhortations, promises, threatenings, punishments, prayer, our study and endeavours: But all things are done by the decree of God unchangeably, neither can they which work by the providence of God work otherwise then they do: Therefore all those means are vain and fruitless. Answ. It is not necessary that the first and principal cause being put, the second and instrumental cause should be removed and taken away. In vain are second causes and means applied, if God had determined to execute his decrees without means, neither had commanded us to use them: But seeing God hath decreed, by those means, in some to work faith and conversion, some to bridle and keep under means, and some to leave excuselesse, and hath for that cause commanded us to use them; they are not in vain used and applied: yea, when there cometh no profit by these, yet they profit to this, that they leave the wicked without excuse. As therefore the Sun doth not in vain daily rise and set, neither are the fields in vain sowed and watered with the rain, neither bodies in vain with food refreshed; though God createth light and darkness, bringeth forth the corn out of the earth, and is the life and length of our days; so neither are men in vain taught, or do study to conform their life unto doctrine, though all available actions and events proceed only from God: for God from everlasting decreed, as the ends, so the means also, and prescribed them unto us, whereby it seemed good to him to bring us unto them. Wherefore, we using those means, do well,2 and obtain profitable and fruitful events: but if we neglect them, either by our fault we deprive our selves or others of those blessings offered by God; or if God, even in this contempt of his word have mercy on us or others, yet our conscience accuseth us of open and grievous sin. Wherefore we must use means, 1. That we may obey God therein, who both hath decreed ends, and ordained means to those ends, and prescribed them unto us; neither tempt him, by contemning these, to our own peril and danger. 2. That we may obtain those blessings decreed for us according to his promise, and that to our salvation. 3.
1THat which shall be unchangeably and necessarily by the will and providence of God, in vain to the furthering or hindering of that are means applyed; as the use of the ministery, the magistrates, lawes, exhortations, promises, threatnings, punishments, prayer, our study and endeavours: But all things are done by the decree of God unchangeably, neither can they which work by the providence of God work otherwise then they doe: Therefore all those means are vain and fruitlesse. Answ. It is not necessary that the first and principall cause being put, the second and instrumentall cause should be removed and taken away. In vain are second causes and means applyed, if God had determined to execute his decrees without means, neither had commanded us to use them: But seeing God hath decreed, by those means, in some to work faith and conversion, some to bridle and keep under means, and some to leave excuselesse, and hath for that cause commanded us to use them; they are not in vain used and applyed: yea, when there cometh no profit by these, yet they profit to this, that they leave the wicked without excuse. As therefore the Sun doth not in vain daily rise and set, neither are the fields in vain sowed and watered with the rain, neither bodies in vain with food refreshed; though God createth light and darknesse, bringeth forth the corn out of the earth, and is the life and length of our dayes; so neither are men in vain taught, or do study to conform their life unto doctrine, though all available actions and events proceed only from God: for God from everlasting decreed, as the ends, so the means also, and prescribed them unto us, whereby it seemed good to him to bring us unto them. Wherefore, we using those means, doe well,2 and obtain profitable and fruitfull events: but if wee neglect them, either by our fault we deprive our selves or others of those blessings offered by God; or if God, even in this contempt of his word have mercy on us or others, yet our conscience accuseth us of open and grievous sin. Wherefore we must use means, 1. That wee may obey God therein, who both hath decreed ends, and ordained means to those ends, and prescribed them unto us; neither tempt him, by contemning these, to our own perill and danger. 2. That we may obtain those blessings decreed for us according to his promise, and that to our salvation. 3.
That we may retain a good conscience in using the means, although the expected events do not always follow, either in our selves or others.
That we may retain a good conscience in using the means, although the expected events do not alwaies follow, either in our selves or others.
Whatsoever is necessary doth not merit rewards or punishments: But all moral good and evil is done necessarily: Therefore neither the good meriteth reward, nor the evil punishment. Answ. This argument is handled by Aristotle in his Ethics:1 But the answer thereto is easy. First, The Major is either particular, and so there is no consequence or sequel; or being generally taken, is false, and that even in moral or civill consideration, to wit, in respect of those things which are necessary by supposition, and yet are done freely, as the actions of men. Secondly, We grant the reason, in respect of the judgement of God, concerning good works: For the creature cannot merit any thing, no not by his best works, of God; 2because both they are due, and are the effects of God in us: And therefore the more good things God worketh in us, so much the more he bindeth and indebteth us to him. Wherefore in the godly, God crowneth and rewardeth of his free bountifulness not their merits, but his own gifts. But as touching evil works, we deny the reason: For, they merit punishment, and that most justly: 3for although men forsaken of God cannot but sin; yet the necessity of fining both was purchased by their own fault (as who freely and willingly departed from God,) and remaineth in them joined and accompanied with great desire and delight. Wherefore to this, that they should merit punishment, their own will sufficeth, whereas especially the punishment was before denounced. This solution or answer Aristotle himself giveth ⟨p. 218⟩us,4 when as he showeth, That men are deservedly reprehended and punished for vices, either of mind or body, though they cannot avoid them, or leave them, because themselves are the cause of their own vices, and have purchased them unto themselves of their own accord, and voluntarily.
WHatsoever is necessary doth not merit rewards or punishments: But all morall good and evill is done necessarily: Therefore neither the good meriteth reward, nor the evill punishment. Answ. This argument is handled by Aristotle in his Ethicks:1 But the answer thereto is easie. First, The Major is either particular, and so there is no consequence or sequel; or being generally taken, is false, and that even in morall or civill consideration, to wit, in respect of those things which are necessary by supposition, and yet are done freely, as the actions of men. Secondly, Wee grant the reason, in respect of the judgement of God, concerning good works: For the creature cannot merit any thing, no not by his best works, of God; 2because both they are due, and are the effects of God in us: And therefore the more good things God worketh in us, so much the more hee bindeth and indebteth us to him. Wherefore in the godly, God crowneth and rewardeth of his free bountifulnesse not their merits, but his owne gifts. But as touching evill works, we deny the reason: For, they merit punishment, and that most justly: 3for although men forsaken of God cannot but sin; yet the necessity of finning both was purchased by their own fault (as who freely and willingly departed from God,) and remaineth in them joyned and accompanied with great desire and delight. Wherefore to this, that they should merit punishment, their own will sufficeth, whereas especially the punishment was before denounced. This solution or answer Aristotle himself giveth ⟨p. 218⟩us,4 when as he sheweth, That men are deservedly reprehended and punished for vices, either of mind or body, though they cannot avoid them, or leave them, because themselves are the cause of their own vices, and have purchased them unto themselves of their own accord, and voluntarily.
Last of all,1 they wrest also certain places of Scripture, by false interpretations, against Gods universal providence: As, When the devil speaketh a lie, then he speaketh of his own. God tempteth no man. He hath commanded no man to do ungodly, as also other the like places, which deny God to be the author of sin. But, those places attribute unto the wicked, and remove from God the sins, as lies, and temptations to s•n: but the actions themselves of the wicked, as they are not sins, but operations and motions serving for the exercising and manifesting of Gods goodness or justice, the whole Scripture showeth to be done by the will of God; and also, as they are sins, by his just permission: as, Of Satan deceiving the Prophets of Ahab: Of the false Prophets, by whom God trieth and openeth the hypocrisy or constancy of men in true religion. 2Satan filled the heart of Ananias. The god of this world hath blinded the hearts of unbelievers. In these and the like sayings also is discerned the work of the Devil unjustly blinding men, to destroy them; and of God justly blinding them by the Devil,3 to punish them. If this counsel be of men, it will come to nought. Woe be to the rebellious children, that take counsel, but not of me. The counsels of men are said to be not of God, but of themselves, in respect of the ends which men, letting pass the will of God revealed unto them, respect not, and attain not unto: but not in respect of the ends which God doth respect and attaineth unto, as well by the wicked not knowing or contemning his will, as by the godly: or (which is in effect the same) the counsels of men are said to be of them, not of God, as they are sins, that is, as they swerve from the known will of God; but not as they are the execution of Gods either secret or known will.4 God doth not take care for oxen: Not principally, or not in such sort as for men: For he giveth also to beasts their meat. Those words then, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn, were therefore spoken especially, that God might thereby show, what he would have by men unto men to be performed. So the wicked are often said to be cast out of the sight of God; not that the providence of God is not extended to them, but that he doth not tender them with his mercy and bounty, as he doth the godly.
Last of all,1 they wrest also certain places of Scripture, by false interpretations, against Gods universall providence: As, When the divell speaketh a lie, then he speaketh of his own. God tempteth no man. He hath commanded no man to do ungodly, as also other the like places, which deny God to be the author of sin. But, those places attribute unto the wicked, and remove from God the sinnes, as lies, and temptations to s•n: but the actions themselves of the wicked, as they are not sins, but operations and motions serving for the exercising and manifesting of Gods goodnesse or justice, the whole Scripture sheweth to be done by the will of God; and also, as they are sins, by his just permission: as, Of Sathan deceiving the Prophets of Achab: Of the false Prophets, by whom God tryeth and openeth the hypocrisie or constancie of men in true religion. 2Sathan filled the heart of Ananias. The god of this world hath blinded the hearts of unbeleevers. In these and the like sayings also is discerned the work of the Divell unjustly blinding men, to destroy them; and of God justly blinding them by the Divell,3 to punish them. If this counsell be of men, it will come to nought. Woe be to the rebellious children, that take counsell, but not of mee. The counsels of men are said to be not of God, but of themselves, in respect of the ends which men, letting passe the will of God revealed unto them, respect not, and attain not unto: but not in respect of the ends which God doth respect and attaineth unto, as well by the wicked not knowing or contemning his will, as by the godly: or (which is in effect the same) the counsels of men are said to be of them, not of God, as they are sins, that is, as they swerve from the known will of God; but not as they are the execution of Gods either secret or known will.4 God doth not take care for oxen: Not principally, or not in such sort as for men: For he giveth also to beasts their meat. Those words then, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the oxe that treadeth out the corn, were therefore spoken especially, that God might thereby shew, what hee would have by men unto men to be performed. So the wicked are often said to be cast out of the sight of God; not that the providence of God is not extended to them, but that he doth not tender them with his mercy and bounty, as he doth the godly.
For the godly also complain, That they are neglected of God▪ when they are afflicted: not that God is not present with them in affliction; but that humane sense and judgment suggesteth this unto us.1 And, God is said to set his face against the wicked, to cut them off.
Answ. That in adversity we may be patienta, and thankful in prosperityb, and have hereafter our chiefest hope reposed in God our most faithful Fatherc, being sure that there is nothing which may withdraw us from his loved, forasmuch as all creatures are so in his power, that without his will they are not able not only to do any thing, but not so much as once to movee.
Answ. That in adversity we may be patienta, and thankfull in prosperityb, and have hereafter our chiefest hope reposed in God our most faithfull Fatherc, being sure that there is nothing which may withdraw us from his loved, forasmuch as all creatures are so in his power, that without his will they are not able not only to do any thing, but not so much as once to movee.