Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians, in Support and Defence of the foremention'd Notions of Liberty, moral Agency, &c. and against the opposite Doctrine, are considered.
pp. 192–284206 passagespart 3 of 6
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In these Things is all the Difference from mere Machines, as to Liberty and Agency, that would be any Perfection, Dignity or Privilege, in any Respect: All the Difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the Pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves. (Tho' their Explications overthrow and abolish the Things asserted, and pretended to be explained) For they are forced to explain a self-determining Power of Will, by a Power in the Soul, to determine as it chooses or wills; which comes to no more than this, that a Man has a Power of choosing, and in many Instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different Thing from that Contradiction, his having Power of choosing his first Act of Choice in the Case.
In these Things is all the Difference from meer Machines, as to Liberty and Agency, that would be any Perfection, Dignity or Privilege, in any Respect: All the Difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the Pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves. (Tho' their Explications overthrow and abolish the Things asserted, and pretended to be explained) For they are forced to explain a self-determining Power of Will, by a Power in the Soul, to determine as it chuses or wills; which comes to no more than this, that a Man has a Power of chusing, and in many Instances, can do as he chuses. Which is quite a different Thing from that Contradiction, his having Power of chusing his first Act of Choice in the Case.
Or if their Scheme makes any other Difference than this, between Men and Machines, it is for the worse: It is so far from supposing Men to have a Dignity and Privilege above Machines, that it makes the Manner of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas Machines are guided by an understanding Cause, by the skilful Hand of the Workman or Owner; the Will of Man is left to the Guidance of nothing, but absolute blind Contingence.
SECTION VI. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
SECTION VI. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintain'd, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
WHEN Calvinists oppose the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of Will, and Contingence of Volition, and insist that there are no Acts of the Will, nor any other Events whatsoever, but what are attended with some Kind of Necessity; their Opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in their Doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his Opinion of Necessity.
WHEN Calvinists oppose the Arminian Notion of the Freedom of Will, and Contingence of Volition, and insist that there are no Acts of the Will, nor any other Events whatsoever, but what are attended with some Kind of Necessity; their Opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the antient Stoicks in their Doctrine of Fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his Opinion of Necessity.
It would not be worth while, to take Notice of so impertinent an Objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief Arminian Writers.— There were many important Truths maintained by the ancient Greek and Roman Philosophers, and especially the Stoics, that are never the worse for being held by them. The Stoic Philosophers, by the general Agreement of Christian Divines, and even Arminian Divines, were the greatest, wisest and most virtuous of all the Heathen Philosophers; and in their Doctrine and Practice came the nearest to Christianity of any of their Sects. How frequently are the Sayings of these Philosophers, in many of the Writings and Sermons, even of Arminian Divines, produced, not as Arguments of the Falseness of the Doctrines which they delivered, but as a Confirmation of some of the greatest Truths of the Christian Religion, relating to the Unity and Perfections of the Godhead, a future State, the Duty and Happiness of Mankind, &c. as observing how the Light of Nature and Reason in the wisest and best of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
It would not be worth while, to take Notice of so impertinent an Objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief Arminian Writers.— There were many important Truths maintain'd by the antient Greek and Roman Philosophers, and especially the Stoicks, that are never the worse for being held by them. The Stoic Philosophers, by the general Agreement of Christian Divines, and even Arminian Divines, were the greatest, wisest and most vertuous of all the Heathen Philosophers; and in their Doctrine and Practice came the nearest to Christianity of any of their Sects. How frequently are the Sayings of these Philosophers, in many of the Writings and Sermons, even of Arminian Divines, produced, not as Arguments of the Falseness of the Doctrines which they delivered, but as a Confirmation of some of the greatest Truths of the Christian Religion, relating to the Unity and Perfections of the Godhead, a future State, the Duty and Happiness of Mankind, &c. as observing how the Light of Nature and Reason in the wisest and best of the Heathen, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
And it is very remarkable concerning Dr. Whitby, that altho' He alleges the Agreement of the Stoics with us, wherein He supposes they maintained the like Doctrine with us, as an Argument against the Truth of our Doctrine; yet this very Dr. Whitby alleges the Agreement of the Stoics with the Arminians, ⟨p. 228⟩wherein he supposes they taught the same Doctrine with them, as an Argument for the Truth of their Doctrine. *So that when the Stoics agree with them, this (it seems) is a Confirmation of their Doctrine, and a Confutation of ours, as showing that our Opinions are contrary to the natural Sense & common Reason of Mankind: Nevertheless, when the Stoics agree with us, it argues no such Thing in our Favour; but on the contrary, is a great Argument against us, and shows our Doctrine to be Heathenish.
And it is very remarkable concerning Dr. Whitby, that altho' He alledges the Agreement of the Stoicks with us, wherein He supposes they maintain'd the like Doctrine with us, as an Argument against the Truth of our Doctrine; yet this very Dr. Whitby alledges the Agreement of the Stoicks with the Arminians, ⟨p. 228⟩wherein he supposes they taught the same Doctrine with them, as an Argument for the Truth of their Doctrine. *So that when the Stoicks agree with them, this (it seems) is a Confirmation of their Doctrine, and a Confutation of ours, as shewing that our Opinions are contrary to the natural Sense & common Reason of Mankind: Nevertheless, when the Stoicks agree with us, it argues no such Thing in our Favour; but on the contrary, is a great Argument against us, and shews our Doctrine to be Heathenish.
*Whitby on the five Points, Edit. 3. P. 325, 326, 327.
It is observed by some Calvinistic Writers, that the Arminians symbolize with the Stoics, in some of those Doctrines wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total Corruption and Depravity of Heart; and in what they held of Man's Ability to make Himself truly virtuous and conformed to God;— and in some other Doctrines.
It is observed by some Calvinistic Writers, that the Arminians symbolize with the Stoicks, in some of those Doctrines wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total Corruption and Depravity of Heart; and in what they held of Man's Ability to make Himself truly vertuous and conformed to God;— and in some other Doctrines.
It may be further observed, 'tis certainly no better Objection against our Doctrine, that it agrees in some Respects with the Doctrine of the ancient Stoic Philosophers, than it […] against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees in some Respects with the Opinion of the very worst of the Heathen Philosophers, the Followers of Epicurus, that Father of Atheism and Licentiousness, and with the Doctrine of the Sadducees and Jesuits.
It may be further observed, 'tis certainly no better Objection against our Doctrine, that it agrees in some Respects with the Doctrine of the antient Stoic Philosophers, than it 〈…〉 against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees in some Respects with the Opinion of the very worst of the Heathen Philosophers, the Followers of Epicurus, that Father of Atheism and Licentiousness, and with the Doctrine of the Sadducees and Iesuits.
I am not much concerned to know precisely what the ancient Stoic Philosophers held concerning Fate, in order to determine what is Truth; as tho' it were a sure Way to be in the right, to take good Heed to differ from them. It seems that they differed among themselves; and probably the Doctrine of Fate, as maintained by most of 'em, was in some Respects erroneous. But whatever their Doctrine was, if any of 'em held such a Fate, as is repugnant to any Liberty consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a Fate. If they held any such Fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal Notions that Mankind have of Liberty, Activity, moral Agency, Virtue and Vice; I disclaim any such Thing, and think I have demonstrated that the Scheme I maintain is no such Scheme. If the Stoics by Fate meant any Thing of such a Nature, as can be supposed to stand in the Way of the Advantage and Benefit of the Use of Means and Endeavours, or ⟨p. 229⟩makes it less worth the while for Men to desire, and seek after any Thing wherein their Virtue and Happiness consists; I hold no Doctrine that is clogged with any such Inconvenience, any more than any other Scheme whatsoever; and by no Means so much as the Arminian Scheme of Contingence; as has been shown. If they held any such Doctrine of universal Fatality, as is inconsistent with any Kind of Liberty, that is or can be any Perfection, Dignity, Privilege or Benefit, or any Thing desirable, in any Respect, for any intelligent Creature, or indeed with any Liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such Doctrine. If they held any such Doctrine of Fate as is inconsistent with the World's being in all Things subject to the Disposal of an intelligent wise Agent, that presides, not as the Soul of the World, but as the sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all Things by proper Will, Choice and Design, in the Exercise of the most perfect Liberty conceivable, without Subjection to any Constraint, or being properly under the Power or Influence of any Thing before, above or without himself; I wholly renounce any such Doctrine.
I am not much concerned to know precisely what the antient Stoic Philosophers held concerning Fate, in order to determine what is Truth; as tho' it were a sure Way to be in the right, to take good Heed to differ from them. It seems that they differed among themselves; and probably the Doctrine of Fate, as maintain'd by most of 'em, was in some Respects erroneous. But whatever their Doctrine was, if any of 'em held such a Fate, as is repugnant to any Liberty consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a Fate. If they held any such Fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal Notions that Mankind have of Liberty, Activity, moral Agency, Vertue and Vice; I disclaim any such Thing, and think I have demonstrated that the Scheme I maintain is no such Scheme. If the Stoicks by Fate meant any Thing of such a Nature, as can be supposed to stand in the Way of the Advantage and Benefit of the Use of Means and Endeavours, or ⟨p. 229⟩makes it less worth the while for Men to desire, and seek after any Thing wherein their Vertue and Happiness consists; I hold no Doctrine that is clog'd with any such Inconvenience, any more than any other Scheme whatsoever; and by no Means so much as the Arminian Scheme of Contingence; as has been shewn. If they held any such Doctrine of universal Fatality, as is inconsistent with any Kind of Liberty, that is or can be any Perfection, Dignity, Privilege or Benefit, or any Thing desirable, in any Respect, for any intelligent Creature, or indeed with any Liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such Doctrine. If they held any such Doctrine of Fate as is inconsistent with the World's being in all Things subject to the Disposal of an intelligent wise Agent, that presides, not as the Soul of the World, but as the sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all Things by proper Will, Choice and Design, in the Exercise of the most perfect Liberty conceivable, without Subjection to any Constraint, or being properly under the Power or Influence of any Thing before, above or without himself; I wholly renounce any such Doctrine.
As to Mr. Hobbes's maintaining the same Doctrine concerning Necessity;—I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his Opinion be what it will, we need not reject all Truth which is demonstrated by clear Evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad Man. This great Truth, that Jesus is the Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud Voice by the Devil. If Truth is so defiled because it is spoken by the Mouth, or written by the Pen of some ill-minded mischievous Man, that it must never be received, we shall never know when we hold any of the most precious and evident Truths by a sure Tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made […] bad Use of this Truth, that is to be lamented: but the Truth is not to be thought worthy of Rejection on that Account. 'Tis common for the Corruptions of the Hearts of evil Men, to abuse the best Things to vile Purposes.
As to Mr. Hobbes's maintaining the same Doctrine concerning Necessity;—I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his Opinion be what it will, we need not reject all Truth which is demonstrated by clear Evidence, meerly because it was once held by some bad Man. This great Truth, that Iesus is the Son of God, was not spoil'd because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud Voice by the Devil. If Truth is so defiled because it is spoken by the Mouth, or written by the Pen of some ill-minded mischievous Man, that it must never be received, we shall never know when we hold any of the most precious and evident Truths by a sure Tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made 〈…〉 bad Use of this Truth, that is to be lamented: but the Truth is not to be tho't worthy of Rejection on that Account. 'Tis common for the Corruptions of the Hearts of evil Men, to abuse the best Things to vile Purposes.
I might also take Notice of it's having been observed, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes †in many more Things than the Calvinists. As, in what he is said to hold concerning Original Sin, in denying the Necessity of supernatural Illumination, in denying infused Grace, in denying the Doctrine of Justification by Faith alone; and other Things.
†Dr. Gill, in his Answer to Dr. Whitby. Vol. 3. P. 183, &c.
SOME may possibly object against what has been supposed of the Absurdity and Inconsistence of a self-determining Power in the Will, and the Impossibility of it's being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every Case by some Motive, and by a Motive which (as it stands in the View of the Understanding) is of superior Strength to any appearing on the other Side; That if these Things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created Minds, but the Will of God Himself is necessary in all it's Determinations. Concerning which says the Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature (Pag. 85, 86.) What strange Doctrine is this, contrary to all our Ideas of the Dominion of God? Does it not destroy the Glory of his Liberty of Choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the World, that most free and sovereign Agent, all the Glory of this Sort of Freedom? Does it not seem to make Him a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's Doctrine of Fatality and Necessity, into all Things that God hath to do with? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency, but still to leave Him without a Will to choose among all the Objects within his View? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a Sort of almighty Minister of Fate, under it's universal and supreme Influence; as it was the professed Sentiment of some of the Ancients, that Fate was above the Gods.
SOME may possibly object against what has been supposed of the Absurdity and Inconsistence of a self-determining Power in the Will, and the Impossibility of it's being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every Case by some Motive, and by a Motive which (as it stands in the View of the Understanding) is of superiour Strength to any appearing on the other Side; That if these Things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created Minds, but the Will of God Himself is necessary in all it's Determinations. Concerning which says the Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature (Pag. 85, 86.) What strange Doctrine is this, contrary to all our Ideas of the Dominion of God? Does it not destroy the Glory of his Liberty of Choice, and take away from the Creator and Governour and Benefactor of the World, that most free and sovereign Agent, all the Glory of this Sort of Freedom? Does it not seem to make Him a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's Doctrine of Fatality and Necessity, into all Things that God hath to do with? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency, but still to leave Him without a Will to chuse among all the Objects within his View? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a Sort of almighty Minister of Fate, under it's universal and supream Influence; as it was the profess'd Sentiment of some of the Antients, that Fate was above the Gods.
This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an Application to Men's Imaginations and Prejudices, rather than to mere Reason.—But I would calmly endeavour to consider whether there be any Reason in this frightful Representation.—But before I enter upon a particular Consideration of the Matter, I would observe this: That 'tis reasonable to suppose, it should be much more difficult to express or conceive Things according to exact metaphysical Truth, relating to the Nature and Manner of the Existence of Things in the divine Understanding and Will, and the Operation of these Faculties (if I may ⟨p. 231⟩so call them) of the divine Mind, than in the human Mind; which is infinitely more within our View, and nearer to a Proportion to the Measure of our Comprehension, and more commensurate to the Use and Import of human Speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in Regard of Terms to express precise Truth concerning our own Minds, and their Faculties and Operations. Words were first formed to express external Things; and those that are applied to express Things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a Sort of figurative Sense. Whence they are most of 'em attended with a great Deal of Ambiguity and Unfixedness in their Signification, occasioning innumerable Doubts, Difficulties and Confusions in Enquiries and Controversies about Things of this Nature. But Language is much less adapted to express Things in the Mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.
This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an Application to Men's Imaginations and Prejudices, rather than to meer Reason.—But I would calmly endeavour to consider whether there be any Reason in this frightful Represe•tation.—But before I enter upon a particular Consideration of the Matter, I would observe this: That 'tis reasonable to suppose, it should be much more difficult to express or conceive Things according to exact metaphysical Truth, relating to the Nature and Manner of the Existence of Things in the divine Understanding and Will, and the Operation of these Faculties (if I may ⟨p. 231⟩so call them) of the divine Mind, than in the human Mind; which is infinitely more within our View, and nearer to a Proportion to the Measure of our Comprehension, and more commensurate to the Use and Import of human Speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in Regard of Terms to express precise Truth concerning our own Minds, and their Faculties and Operations. Words were first formed to express external Things; and those that are applied to express Things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a Sort of figurative Sense. Whence they are most of 'em attended with a great Deal of Ambiguity and Unfixedness in their Signification, occasioning innumerable Doubts, Difficulties and Confusions in Enquiries and Controversies about Things of this Nature. But Language is much less adapted to express Things in the Mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.
We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exactly of the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithstanding all the Progress which has been made in past and present Ages, in this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphysics, as it relates to these Things, is brought to greater Perfection than once it was; yet here is still Work enough left for future Enquiries and Researches, and Room for Progress still to be made, for many Ages and Generations. But we had need to be infinitely able Metaphysicians, to conceive with Clearness, according to strict, proper and perfect Truth, concerning the Nature of the divine Essence, and the Modes of the Action and Operation of the Powers of the divine Mind.
We find a great Deal of Difficulty in conceiving exactly of the Nature of our own Souls. And notwithstanding all the Progress which has been made in past and present Ages, in this Kind of Knowledge, whereby our Metaphysicks, as it relates to these Things, is brought to greater Perfection than once it was; yet here is still Work enough left for future Enquiries and Researches, and Room for Progress still to be made, for many Ages and Generations. But we had need to be infinitely able Metaphysicians, to conceive with Clearness, according to strict, proper and perfect Truth, concerning the Nature of the divine Essence, and the Modes of the Action and Operation of the Powers of the divine Mind.
And it may be noted particularly, that tho' we are obliged to conceive of some Things in God as consequent and dependent on others, and of some Things pertaining to the divine Nature and Will as the Foundation of others, and so before others in the Order of Nature: As, we must conceive of the Knowledge and Holiness of God as prior in the Order of Nature to his Happiness; the Perfection of his Understanding, as the Foundation of his wise Purposes and Decrees; the Holiness of his Nature, as the Cause and Reason of his holy Determinations. And yet when we speak of Cause and Effect, Antecedent and Consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute Simplicity and Immutability, and the first Cause of all Things; doubtless there must be less Propriety in such Representations, than when ⟨p. 232⟩we speak of derived dependent Beings, who are compounded, and liable to perpetual Mutation and Succession.
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned Author's Exclamation, about the necessary Determination of God's Will, in all Things, by what He sees to be fittest and best.
Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the foremention'd Author's Exclamation, about the necessary Determination of God's Will, in all Things, by what He sees to be fittest and best.
That all the seeming Force of such Objections and Exclamations must arise from an Imagination, that there is some Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always choose what is wisest and best; as tho' there were some Disadvantage, Meanness and Subjection, in such a Necessity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held him fast, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere Imagination and Delusion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Dishonour to a Being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the necessary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependence, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Ascendancy. †'Tis not inconsistent with ⟨p. 233⟩the absolute, and most perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do whatever pleases Him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can stay his Hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?—The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Control; without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the least Measure to any other Power; and so without any Hindrance or Restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any ⟨p. 234⟩Dependence of his Power on any other Power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is absolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has supreme Authority; absolute and most perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any superior Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any distinct independent Authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and also without Restraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependence, or proper Limitation. (3.)
That all the seeming Force of such Objections and Exclamations must arise from an Imagination, that there is some Sort of Privilege or Dignity in being without such a moral Necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always chuse what is wisest and best; as tho' there were some Disadvantage, Meanness and Subjection, in such a Necessity; a Thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in Servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible Power and Dominion over it, by Bonds that held him fast, and that he could by no Means deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all meer Imagination and Delusion. 'Tis no Disadvantage or Dishonour to a Being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy Manner, from the necessary Perfection of his own Nature. This argues no Imperfection, Inferiority or Dependance, nor any Want of Dignity, Privilege or Ascendancy. †'Tis not inconsistent with ⟨p. 233⟩the absolute, and most perfect Sovereignty of God. The Sovereignty of God is his Ability and Authority to do whatever pleases Him; whereby He doth according to his Will in the Armies of Heaven, and amongst the Inhabitants of the Earth, and none can stay his Hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?—The following Things belong to the Sovereignty of God; viz. (1.) Supreme, universal, and infinite Power; whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without Controul; without any Confinement of that Power, without any Subjection in the least Measure to any other Power; and so without any Hindrance or Restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any ⟨p. 234⟩Dependance of his Power on any other Power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any Need of: So far from this, that all other Power is derived from Him, and is absolutely dependent on Him. (2.) That He has supreme Authority; absolute and most perfect Right to do what He wills, without Subjection to any superiour Authority, or any Derivation of Authority from any other, or Limitation by any distinct independent Authority, either superiour, equal, or inferiour; he being the Head of all Dominion, and Fountain of all Authority; and also without Restraint by any Obligation, implying either Subjection, Derivation, or Dependance, or proper Limitation. (3.)
†It might have been objected with much more Plausibleness, that the supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the Whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's Purpose: For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity consistent with the greatest Freedom, and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly. Clark's Dom. of the Being "and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. Tho' God is a most perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the Whole. The Reason is evident▪ because perfect Wisdom and Goodness are as steady and certain Principles of Action, as Necessity itself; and as infinitely wise and good Being, indeed with the most perfect Liberty, can no more choose to act in Contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness, than a necessary Agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an Absurdity and impossibility in Choice, for infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in Nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no Necessity i• Nature, that God ••ould at first create such Beings as he has created, or indeed any Being at all; because he is in himself infinitely happy and All-sufficient. There was also no Necessity in Nature, that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was •it and wise and good, that infinite Wisdom should manifest, and infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that Things should be made at such a Time, and continued so long, and indeed with various Perfections in such Degrees, as infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should. ••id ▪ P. 112, 113. 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature, to desire, will and act, according to the last Result of a fair Examination.—This is so far from being a Restraint or Diminution of Freedom, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it: 'Tis not an Abridgement, 'tis the End and Use of our Liberty; and the further we are removed from such a Determination, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifference i• the Mind, not determinable by its last Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an Advantage and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great as Imperfection as the Want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfection on the other Side.— 'Tis as much a Perfection, that Dire or the Power of preferring should be determined by Good, as that the Power of acting should be determined by the Will: And the certainer such Determination is, the greater the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by ny Thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, e were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might attain the Good we choose; and therefore every Man is bro't under a Necessity by his Constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the Determination of some other than himself, which is Want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an End that he would not have, at the same Time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts, before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, at the same Time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.— If we look upon those superior Beings above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have Reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no Reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor nite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.— But to give a right View of this mistakes Part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined by wise Determinations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be at Liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad-men and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would choose to be mad, for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. 1. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. This ing having all Things always necessarily in View, must always, and eternally will according to his infinite Comprehension of Things; that is, must will all Things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this Consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this Way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the Will without Error Here then is the Origin of moral Necessity; and that is really, of Freedom.— Perhaps it may be said, when the divine Will is determined, from the Consideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impel'd, if that were possible. But it is Unskilfulness, to suppose this an Objection. The great Principle is once established, viz. That the divine Will is determined by the eternal Reason and Aptitudes of Things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutably determined, by the Consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with Power, but without Discerning and Reason. It is the Beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as Fate itself, with all the Advantage of Reason and Goodness.— It is strange, to see Men contend, that the Deity is not Free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a Man is allowed still the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by Reason and Truth. Enq into the "Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II, P. 403, 404.
That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on any Thing without Himself; being ⟨p. 235⟩in every Thing determined by his own Counsel, having no other Rule but his own Wisdom; his Will not being subject to, or restrained by the Will of any other, and others Wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his Wisdom, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said as in Isai. xl.14. With whom took He Counsel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the Path of Judgment, and taught Him Knowledge, and showed Him the Way of Understanding?—There is no other divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly absolute Sovereignty: No other is desirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatness of the divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determined by his own infinite all-sufficient Wisdom in every Thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferior Wisdom, or by no Wisdom; whereby it would become senseless Arbitrariness, determining and acting without Reason, Design or End.
That his Will is supreme, underived, and independent on any Thing without Himself; being ⟨p. 235⟩in every Thing determin'd by his own Counsel, having no other Rule but his own Wisdom; his Will not being subject to, or restrain'd by the Will of any other, and others Wills being perfectly subject to his. (4.) That his Wisdom, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient, and independent; so that it may be said as in Isai. xl.14. With whom took He Counsel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the Path of Iudgment, and taught Him Knowlege, and shewed Him the Way of Understanding?—There is no other divine Sovereignty but this: and this is properly absolute Sovereignty: No other is desirable; nor would any other be honourable, or happy: and indeed there is no other conceivable or possible. 'Tis the Glory and Greatness of the divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determin'd by his own infinite all-sufficient Wisdom in every Thing; and in nothing at all is either directed by any inferiour Wisdom, or by no Wisdom; whereby it would become senseless Arbitrariness, determining and acting without Reason, Design or End.
If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every Thing by supreme Wisdom, then it is in every Thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And certainly it would be a Disadvantage and Indignity, to be otherwise. For if the divine Will was not necessarily determined to that which in every Case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some Degree of undesigning Contingence; and so in the same Degree liable to Evil. To suppose the divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind Contingence, which is guided by no Wisdom, no Motive, no intelligent Dictate whatsoever, (if any such Thing were possible) would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and Meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity.—If it be a Disadvantage, for the divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And consequently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning Contingence, to act absolutely at Random, would be the supreme Glory.
If God's Will is stead•ly and surely determined in every Thing by supreme Wisdom, then it is in every Thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And certainly it would be a Disadvantage and Indignity, to be otherwise. For if the divine Will was not necessarily determin'd to that which in every Case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some Degree of undesigning Contingence; and so in the same Degree liable to Evil. To suppose the divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at Random, by the uncertain Wind of blind Contingence, which is guided by no Wisdom, no Motive, no intelligent Dictate whatsoever, (if any such Thing were possible) would certainly argue a great Degree of Imperfection and Meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity.—If it be a Disadvantage, for the divine Will to be attended with this moral Necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at Random, the greater Dignity and Advantage. And consequently to be perfectly free from the Direction of Understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless unmeaning Contingence, to act absolutely at Random, would be the supreme Glory.
It no more argues any Dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise Volition is necessary, than it argues a Dependence of his Being, that his Existence is necessary. If it be something too low, for the supreme Being to have his Will determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every Case, to will in the highest Degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low, for him to have his Existence, and the infinite Perfection of his Nature, and his infinite Happiness determined by Necessity? It is no more to God's Dishonour, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be to his Dishonour, then it is not to his Dishonour necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonourable, to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible Degree, no more is it mean or dishonourable, necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible Degree; or (which is the same Thing) to do that, in every Case, which above all other Things is wisest and best.
The Reason why it is not dishonourable, to be necessarily most holy, is, because Holiness in itself is an excellent and honourable Thing. For the same Reason, it is no Dishonour to be necessarily most wise, and in every Case to act most wisely, or do th• Thing which is the wisest of all; for Wisdom is also in it self excellent and honourable.
The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Virtue. For the sublimest of Virtues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Virtue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.
The forementioned Author of the Essay on the Freedom of Will &c. as has been observed, represents that Doctrine of the divine Will's being in every Thing necessarily determined by superior Fitness, as making the blessed God a Kind of almighty Minister and mechanical Medium of Fate: And he insists, P. 93, 94. that this moral Necessity and Impossibility is in Effect the same Thing with physical and natural Necessity and Impossibility: And in P. 54, 55. he says, The Scheme which dete•mines the Will always and certainly by the Understanding, and the Understanding by the Appearance of Things, seems to take away the true Nature of Vice and Vertue. For the sublimest of Vertues, and the vilest of Vices, seem rather to be Matters of Fate and Necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the Existence, the Circumstances, and present Situation of Persons and Things: For this Existence and Situation necessarily makes such an Appearance to the Mind; from this Appearance flows a necessary Perception and Judgment, concerning these Things; this Judgment necessarily determines the Will: And thus by this Chain of necessary Causes, Vertue and Vice would lose their Nature, and become natural Ideas, and necessary Things, instead of moral and free Actions.
And yet this same Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a perfectly wise Being will constantly and certainly choose what is most fit; and says, P. 102, 103. I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such an antecedent superior Fitness of Things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and particularly, in all his judicial Proceedings, as a Governor, and Distributer of Rewards and Punishments. Yea, he says expressly, P. 42. That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this Fitness and Goodness in Things.
And yet this same Author allows, P. 30, 31. That a perfectly wise Being will constantly and certainly chuse what is most fit; and says, P. 102, 103. I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such an antecedent superior Fitness of Things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and particularly, in all his judicial Proceedings, as a Governor, and Distributer of Rewards and Punishments. Yea, he says expresly, P. 42. That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this Fitness and Goodness in Things.
So that according to this Author, putting these several Passages of his Essay together, there is no Virtue, nor any Thing of a moral Nature, in the most sublime and glorious Acts and Exercises of God's Holiness, Justice, and Faithfulness; and He never does any Thing which is in it self supremely worthy, and above all other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate; and in what he does as the Judge, and moral Governor of the World, He exercises no moral Excellency; exercising no Freedom in these Things, because He acts by moral Necessity, which is in Effect the same with physical or ⟨p. 238⟩natural Necessity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical Fatality▪ as a Being indeed of vast Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency (as He said before) but without a Will to choose, being a Kind of almighty Minister of Fate, acting under it's supreme Influence. For He allows, that in all these Things God's Will is determined constantly and certainly by a superior Fitness, and that it is not possible for Him to act otherwise. And if these Things are so, what Glory or Praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent Course, in any one Instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common Sense of Mankind, it don't in the least derogate from the Honour of any Being, that through the moral Perfection of his Nature, he necessarily acts with supreme Wisdom and Holiness: But on the contrary, his Praise is the greater: Herein consists the Height of his Glory.
So that according to this Author, putting these several Passages of his Essay together, there is no Vertue, nor any Thing of a moral Nature, in the most sublime and glorious Acts and Exercises of God's Holiness, Justice, and Faithfulness; and He never does any Thing which is in it self supreamly worthy, and above all other Things fit and excellent, but only as a Kind of mechanical Medium of Fate; and in what he does as the Iudge, and moral Governor of the World, He exercises no moral Excellency; exercising no Freedom in these Things, because He acts by moral Necessity, which is in Effect the same with physical or ⟨p. 238⟩natural Necessity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical Fatality▪ as a Being indeed of vast Understanding, as well as Power and Efficiency (as He said before) but without a Will to chuse, being a Kind of almighty Minister of Fate, acting under it's supream Influence. For He allows, that in all these Things God's Will is determined constantly and certainly by a superiour Fitness, and that it is not possible for Him to act otherwise. And if these Things are so, what Glory or Praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent Course, in any one Instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common Sense of Mankind, it don't in the least derogate from the Honour of any Being, that through the moral Perfection of his Nature, he necessarily acts with supream Wisdom and Holiness: But on the contrary, his Praise is the greater: Herein consists the Height of his Glory.
The same Author, P. 56. supposes, that herein appears the excellent Character of a wise and good Man, that tho' he can choose contrary to the Fitness of Things, yet he does not; but suffers himself to be directed by Fitness; and that in this Conduct He imitates the blessed God. And yet He supposes 'tis contrariwise with the blessed God; not that he suffers Himself to be directed by Fitness, when He can choose contrary to the Fitness of Things, but that he cannot choose contrary to the Fitness of Things; as he says, P. 42. —That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than, according to this Fitness, where there is any Fitness or Goodness in Things: Yea, he supposes, P. 31. That if a Man were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the Fitness of Things.
The same Author, P. 56. supposes, that herein appears the excellent Character of a wise and good Man, that tho' he can chuse contrary to the Fitness of Things, yet he does not; but suffers himself to be directed by Fitness; and that in this Conduct He imitates the blessed God. And yet He supposes 'tis contrariwise with the blessed God; not that he suffers Himself to be directed by Fitness, when He can chuse contrary to the Fitness of Things, but that he cannot chuse contrary to the Fitness of Things; as he says, P. 42. —That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than, according to this Fitness, where there is any Fitness or Goodness in Things: Yea, he supposes, P. 31. That if a Man were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the Fitness of Things.
One Thing more I would observe, before I conclude this Section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the Glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior Fitness in some Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all Things; from any Thing in the Nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from God's Freedom, Independence, absolute Supremacy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State, or Manner of acting; or as implying any Infirmity, Restraint, or Subjection. And if the Thing be such as well consists with God's Glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many Things, lest thereby we should detract from God's Glory too much.
One Thing more I would observe, before I conclude this Section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the Glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior Fitness in some Things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all Things; from any Thing in the Nature of such Necessity, as at all detracting from God's Freedom, Independence, absolute Supr•macy, or any Dignity or Glory of his Nature, State, or Manner of acting; or as implying any Infirmity, Restraint, or Subjection. And if the Thing be such as well consists with God's Glory, and has nothing tending at all to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many Things, lest thereby we should detract from God's Glory too much.
THE Author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in Effect confessed, that in those Things where there is any real Preferableness, 'tis no Dishonour, nothing in any Respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of such a Necessity, with the Fate of the Stoics, and the Necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different Things, among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a resting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decision of another Point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible Things which are in God's View, and may be considered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who supposes, that in many Instances, between two or more possible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitness, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to answer any of his Designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident.
THE Author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly chuse what appears most fit, where there is a superior Fitness and Goodness in Things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in Effect confess'd, that in those Things where there is any real Preferableness, 'tis no Dishonour, nothing in any Respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the Agreement of such a Necessity, with the Fate of the Stoicks, and the Necessity maintain'd by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different Things, among which God chuses, there were evermore a superior Fitness or Preferableness on one Side, then it would be no Dishonour, or any Thing, in any Respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every Thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the Argument, from the Unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the Liberty, Supremacy, Independence and Glory of the divine Being; and a resting the whole Weight of the Affair on the Decision of another Point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible Things which are in God's View, and may be considered as capable Objects of his Choice, there is not evermore a Preferableness in one Thing above another. This is denied by this Author; who supposes, that in many Instances, between two or more possible Things, which come within the View of the divine Mind, there is a perfect Indifference and Equality as to Fitness, or Tendency to attain any good End which God can have in View, or to answer any of his Designs. Now therefore I would consider whether this be evident.
The Arguments brought to prove this, are of two Kinds. (1.) It is urged, that in many Instances we must suppose there is absolutely no Difference between various possible Objects of Choice, which God has in View: And (2.) that the ⟨p. 240⟩Difference between many Things is so inconsiderable, or of such a Nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any Consequence; or to suppose that any of God's wise Designs would not be answered in one Way as well as the other.
I. The first Thing to be considered is, Whether there are any Instances wherein there is a perfect Likeness, and absolutely no D•fference, between different Objects of Choice, that are proposed to the divine Understanding?
I. The first Thing to be considered is, Whether there are any Instances wherein there is a perfect Likeness, and absolutely no D•fference, between different Objects of Choice, that are propo•ed to the divine Understanding?
And here in the first Place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the Contradiction there is in the Terms of the Question proposed, don't give Reason to suspect that there is an Inconsistence in the Thing supposed. 'Tis inquired, whether differ••• Objects of Choice mayn't be absolutely without Difference? […] they are absolutely without Difference, then how are they different Objects of Choice? If there be absolutely no Difference in any Respect, then there is no Variety or Distinction: For Distinction is only by some Difference. And if there be no Variety among proposed Objects of Choice, then there is no Opportunity for Variety of Choice, or Difference of Determination. For that Determination of a Thing which is not different in any Respect, is not a different Determination, but the same. That this is no Quibble, may appear more fully anon.
And here in the first Place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the Contradiction there is in the Terms of the Question proposed, don't give Reason to suspect that there is an Inconsistence in the Thing supposed. 'Tis inquired, whether differ••• Objects of Choice mayn't be absolutely without Difference? 〈…〉 they are absolutely without Difference, then how are they different Objects of Choice? If there be absolutely no Difference in any Respect, then there is no Variety or Distinction: For Distinction is only by some Difference. And if there be no Variety among proposed Objects of Choice, then there is no Opportunity for Variety of Choice, or Difference of Determination. For that Determination of a Thing which is not different in any Respect, is not a different Determination, but the same. That this is no Quibble, may appear more fully anon.
The Arguments, to prove that the most High, in some Instances, chooses to do one Thing rather than another, where the Things themselves are perfectly without Difference, are two.
The Arguments, to prove that the most High, in some Instances, chuses to do one Thing rather than another, where the Things themselves are perfectly without Difference, are two.
1. That the various Parts of infinite Time and Space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and don't differ at all one from another: And that therefore, when God determined to create the World in such a Part of infinite Duration and Space, rather than others, he determined and preferred among various Objects, between which there was no Preferableness, and absolutely no Difference.
1. That the various Parts of infinite Time and Space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and don't differ at all one from another: And that therefore, when God determined to create the World in such a Part of infinite Duration and Space, rather than others, he determin'd and prefer'd among various Objects, between which there was no Preferableness, and absolutely no Difference.
Answ. This Objection supposes an infinite Length of Time before the World was created, distinguished by successive Parts, properly and truly so; or a Succession of limited and unmeasurable Periods of Time, following one another, in an infinitely long Series: which must needs be a groundless Imagination. The eternal Duration which was before the World, being only the Eternity of God's Existence; which is nothing ⟨p. 241⟩else but his immediate, perfect and invariable Possession of the whole of his unlimited Life, together and at once; Vitae interminabilis, tota, simul & perfecta Possessio. Which is so generally allowed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it.*
*If all created Beings were taken away, all Possibility of any Mutation or Succession of one Thing to another would appear to be also removed. Abstract Succession in Eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One Minute to another perhaps, velut undo supervenit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the Minutes are Things separately existing. This is the common Notion; and yet it is a manifest Prejudice. Time is nothing but the Existence of created successive Beings, and Eternity the necessary Existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no Change or Succession in his Nature, his Existence must of Course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double Oversight in this Case; first, we find Succession in the necessary Nature and Existence of the Deity himself: Which is wrong, if the Reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this Succession to Eternity, considered abstractedly from the eternal Being; and suppose it, one knows not what, a Thing subsisting by it self, and flowing▪ one Minute after another. This is the Work of pure Imagination, and contrary to the Reality of Things. Hence the common metaphorical Expressions; Time runs a-pace▪ let us lay hold on the present Minute, and the like. The Philosophers themselves mislead us by their Illustrations: They compare Eternity to the Motion of a Point running on forever, and making a traceless infinite Line. Here the Point i• supposed a Thing actually subsisting, representing the present Minute; and then they ascribe Motion or Succession to it: that •s▪ they ascribe Motion to a meer Non-entity, to illustrate to us a successive Eternity made up of finite successive Parts.—If once we allow an all-perfect Mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite Comprehension of all Things, always (and allow it we must) the Distinction of past and future vanishes with Respect to such a Mind.—In a Word, if we proceed Step by Step, as above, the Eternity or Existence of the Deity will appear to be Vitae interminabilis, tota, simul & perfecta Possessio; how much soever this may have been a Paradox hitherto. Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. 2. P. 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3.If all created Beings were taken away, all Possibility of any Mutation or Succession of one Thing to another would appear to be also removed. Abstract Succession in Eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One Minute to another perhaps, velut und• supervenit undam. But when we imagine this, we fancy that the Minutes are Things separately existing. This is the common Notion; and yet it is a manifest Prejudice. Time is nothing but the Existence of created successive Beings, and Eternity the necessary Existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this necessary Being hath no Change or Succession in his Nature, his Existence must of Course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double Oversight in this Case; first, we find Succession in the necessary Nature and Existence of the Deity himself: Which is wrong, if the Reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this Succession to Eternity, considered abstractedly from the eternal Being; and suppose it, one knows not what, a Thing subsisting by it self, and flowing▪ one Minute after another. This is the Work of pure Imagination, and contrary to the Reality of Things. Hence the common metaphorical Expressions; Time runs a-pace▪ let us lay hold on the present Minute, and the like. The Philosophers themselves mislead us by their Illustrations: They compare Eternity to the Motion of a Point running on forever, and making a traceless infinite Line. Here the Point i• supposed a Thing actually subsisting, representing the present Minute; and then they ascribe Motion or Succession to it: that •s▪ they ascribe Motion to a meer Non-entity, to illustrate to us a successive Eternity made up of finite successive Parts.—If once we allow an all-perfect Mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite Comprehension of all Things, always (and allow it we must) the Distinction of past and future vanishes with Respect to such a Mind.—In a Word, if we proceed Step by Step, as above, the Eternity or Existence of the Deity will appear to be Vitae interminabilis, tota, simul & perfecta Possessio; how much soever this may have been a Paradox hitherto. Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Vol. 2. P. 409, 410, 411. Edit. 3.
So this Objection supposes an Extent of Space beyond the Limits of the Creation, of an infinite Length, Breadth and Depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable Parts, limited at certain Stages, one beyond another, in an infinite Series. Which Notion of absolute and infinite Space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute ⟨p. 242⟩and infinite Duration. 'Tis as improper, to imagine that the Immensity and Omnipresence of God is distinguished by a Series of Miles and Leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite Duration of God is distinguished by Months and Years, one after another. A Diversity and Order of distinct Parts, limited by certain Periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our Imagination, in one Case as the other; and there is equal Reason in each Case, to suppose that our Imagination deceives us. 'Tis equally improper, to talk of Months and Years of the divine Existence, and Milesquares of Deity: And we equally deceive our selves, when we talk of the World's being differently fixed with Respect to either of these Sorts of Measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the World might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad Expanse of Infinity; or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long Line of Eternity: And all Arguments and Objections which are built on the Imaginations we are apt to have of infinite Extension or Duration, are Buildings founded on Shadows, or Castles in the Air.
So this Objection supposes an Extent of Space beyond the Limits of the Creation, of an infinite Length, Breadth and Depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable Parts, limited at certain Stages, one beyond another, in an infinite Series. Which Notion of absolute and infinite Space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mention'd, of absolute ⟨p. 242⟩and infinite Duration. 'Tis as improper, to imagine that the Immensity and Omnipresence of God is distinguished by a Series of Miles and Leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite Duration of God is distinguished by Months and Years, one after another. A Diversity and Order of distinct Parts, limited by certain Periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our Imagination, in one Case as the other; and there is equal Reason in each Case, to suppose that our Imagination deceives us. 'Tis equally improper, to talk of Months and Years of the divine Existence, and Milesquares of Deity: And we equally deceive our selves, when we talk of the World's being differently fix'd with Respect to either of these Sorts of Measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the World might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad Expanse of Infinity; or, that it might have been differently fix'd in the long Line of Eternity: And all Arguments and Objections which are built on the Imaginations we are apt to have of infinite Extension or Duration, are Buildings founded on Shadows, or Castles in the Air.
2. The second Argument, to prove that the most High wills one Thing rather than another, without any superior Fitness or Preferableness in the Thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different Parts of the World, Particles or Atoms of Matter that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned Author says, P. 78, &c. If one would descend to the minute specific Particles, of which different Bodies are composed, we should see abundant Reason to believe that there are Thousands of such little Particles or Atoms of Matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct Determination to the Will of God, where to place them. He there instances in Particles of Water, of which there are such immense Numbers, which compose the Rivers and Oceans of this World; and the infinite Myriads of the luminous and fiery Particles, which compose the Body of the Sun; so many, that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.
2. The second Argument, to prove that the most High wills one Thing rather than another, without any superior Fitness or Preferableness in the Thing prefer'd, is God's actually placing in different Parts of the World, Particles or Atoms of Matter that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned Author says, P. 78, &c. If one would descend to the minute specific Particles, of which different Bodies are composed, we should see abundant Reason to believe that there are Thousands of such little Particles or Atoms of Matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct Determination to the Will of God, where to place them. He there instances in Particles of Water, of which there are such immense Numbers, which compose the Rivers and Oceans of this World; and the infinite Myriads of the luminous and fiery Particles, which compose the Body of the Sun; so many, that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.
Answ. (1.) To this I answer: That as we must suppose Matter to be infinitely divisible, 'tis very unlikely that any two of all these Particles are exactly equal and alike; so unlikely, that it is a Thousand to one, yea, an infinite Number to one, but it is otherwise: And that altho' we should allow a great ⟨p. 243⟩Similarity between the different Particles of Water and Fire, as to their general Nature and Figure; and however small we suppose those Particles to be, 'tis infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in Dimensions and Quantity of Matter.— If we should suppose a great many Globes of the same Nature with the Globe of the Earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the same Number of Particles of Dust and Water in them. But infinitely less strange, than that two Particles of Light should have just the same Quantity of Matter. For a Particle of Light (according to the Doctrine of the infinite Divisibility of Matter) is composed of infinitely more assignable Parts, than there are Particles of Dust and Water in the Globe of the Earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these Particles should be equal; so it is, that they should be alike in other Respects: To instance in the Configuration of their Surfaces. If there were very many Globes, of the Nature of the Earth, it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same Number of Particles of Dust, Water and Stone, in their Surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with Respect to another, without any Difference, in any Part discernible either by the naked Eye or Microscope; but infinitely less strange, than that two Particles of Light should be perfectly of the same Figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real Parts on the Surface of a Particle of Light, than there are Particles of Dust, Water and Stone, on the Surface of the terrestrial Globe.
Answ. (1.) To this I answer: That as we must suppose Matter to be infinitely divisible, 'tis very unlikely that any two of all these Particles are exactly equal and alike; so unlikely, that it is a Thousand to one, yea, an infinite Number to one, but it is otherwise: And that altho' we should allow a great ⟨p. 243⟩Similarity between the different Particles of Water and Fire, as to their general Nature and Figure; and however small we suppose those Particles to be, 'tis infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in Dimensions and Quantity of Matter.— If we should suppose a great many Globes of the same Nature with the Globe of the Earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the same Number of Particles of Dust and Water in them. But infinitely less strange, than that two Particles of Light should have just the same Quantity of Matter. For a Particle of Light (according to the Doctrine of the infinite Divisibility of Matter) is composed of infinitely more assignable Parts, than there are Particles of Dust and Water in the Globe of the Earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these Particles should be equal; so it is, that they should be alike in other Respects: To instance in the Configuration of their Surfaces. If there were very many Globes, of the Nature of the Earth, it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same Number of Particles of Dust, Water and Stone, in their Surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with Respect to another, without any Difference, in any Part discernable either by the naked Eye or Microscope; but infinitely less strange, than that two Particles of Light should be perfectly of the same Figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real Parts on the Surface of a Particle of Light, than there are Particles of Dust, Water and Stone, on the Surface of the terrestrial Globe.
Ans. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two Particles or Atoms of Matter perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different Parts of the Creation; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two Bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different Places; yet it will not follow, that two different or distinct Acts or Effects of the divine Power have exactly the same Fitness for the same Ends. For these two different Bodies are not different or distinct, in any other Respects than those wherein they differ: They are two in no other Respects than those wherein there is a Difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those Things which are called Circumstances; as, Place, Time, Rest, Motion, or some other present or past Circumstances or Relations. For 'tis Difference only, that constitutes Distinction. If God makes two Bodies in themselves every Way equal and alike, and agreeing ⟨p. 244⟩perfectly in all other Circumstances and Relations, but only their Place; then in this only is there any Distinction or Duplicity. The Figure is the same, the Measure is the same, the Solidity and Resistance are the same, and every Thing the same, but only the Place. Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there should be the same Figure, the same Extension, the same Resistance, &c. in two different Places. And for this Determination he has some Reason. There is some End, for which such a Determination and Act has a peculiar Fitness, above all other Acts. Here is no one Thing determined without an End, and no one Thing without a Fitness for that End, superior to any Thing else. If it be the Pleasure of God to cause the same Resistance, and the same Figure, to be in two different Places and Situations, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some Determination or Act of God's Will, that is wholly without Motive or End, then we can argue that whenever, in any Case, it is a Man's Will to speak the same Words, or make the same Sounds at two different Times; there must be some Determination or Act of his Will, without any Motive or End. The Difference of Pl••e, in the former Case, proves no more than the Difference of Time does in the other. If any one should say with Regard to the former Case, that there must be something determined without an End; viz.
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It might have been objected with much more Plausibleness, that the supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the Whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's Purpose: For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity consistent with the greatest Freedom, and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will, and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly. Clark's Dom. of the Being "and Attrib. of God. Edit. 6. P. 64. Tho' God is a most perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the Whole. The Reason is evident▪ because perfect Wisdom and Goodness are as steady and certain Principles of Action, as Necessity itself; and as infinitely wise and good Being, indeed with the most perfect Liberty, can no more chuse to act in Contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness, than a necessary Agent can act contrary to the Necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an Absurdity and impossibility in Choice, for infinite Wisdom to chuse to act unwisely, or infinite Goodness to chuse what is not good, as it would be in Nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no Necessity i• Nature, that God ••ould at first create such Beings as he has created, or indeed any Being at all; because he is in himself infinitely happy and All-sufficient. There was also no Necessity in Nature, that he should preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created; because he would be self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation. But it was •it and wise and good, that infinite Wisdom should manifest, and infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of, that Things should be made at such a Time, and continued so long, and indeed with various Perfections in such Degrees, as infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it wisest and best that they should. ••id ▪ P. 112, 113. 'Tis not a Fault, but a Perfection of our Nature, to desire, will and act, according to the last Result of a fair Examination.—This is so far from being a Restraint or Diminution of Freedom, that it is the very Improvement and Benefit of it: 'Tis not an Abridgment, 'tis the End and Use of our Liberty; and the further we are removed from such a Determination, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifference i• the Mind, not determinable by its last Judgment of the Good or Evil that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an Advan••ge and Excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great as Imperfection▪ as the Want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an Imperfection on the other Side.— 'Tis as much a Perfection, that D••ire or the Power of preferring should be determined by Good, as that the Power of acting should be determined by the Will: And the certainer such Determination is, the greater the Perfection. Nay, were we determined by •ny Thing but the last Result of our own Minds, judging of the Good or Evil of any Action, •e were not free. The very End of our Freedom being, that we might attain the Good we chuse; and therefore every Man is bro't under a Necessity by his Constitution, as an intelligent Being, to be determin'd in willing by his own Thought and Judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the Determination of some other than himself, which is Want of Liberty. And to deny that a Man's Will, in every Determination, follows his own Judgment, is to say, that a Man wills and acts for an End that he would not have, at the same Time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present Thoughts, before any other, 'tis plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have, and not have it; will, and not will it, at the same Time; a Contradiction too manifest to be admitted.— If we look upon those superior Bei•gs above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have Reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their Choice of Good than we; and yet we have no Reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor ••nite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot chuse what is not Good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.— But to give a right View of this mistakes Part of Liberty, let me ask, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined by wise Determinations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of Freedom, to be at Liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If to break loose from the Conduct of Reason, and to want that Restraint of Examination and Judgment, that keeps us from doing or chusing the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, Mad-men and Fools are the only free Men. Yet I think no Body would chuse to be mad, for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad already. Locke, Hum. Und. Vol. 1. Edit. 7. P. 215, 216. This ••ing having all Things always necessarily in View, must always, and eternally will▪ according to his infinite Comprehension of Things; that is, must will all Things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this Consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this Way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that Knowledge which is infinite. Infinite Knowledge must direct the Will without Error Here then is the Origin of moral Necessity; and that is really, of Freedom.— Perhaps it may be said, when the divine Will is determined, from the Consideration of the eternal Aptitudes of Things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impel'd, if that were possible. But it is Unskilfulness, to suppose this an Objection. The great Principle is once established, viz. That the divine Will is determined by the eternal Reason and Aptitudes of Things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this Determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be: It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and Power are constantly, immutably determined, by the Consideration of what is wisest and best; instead of a surd Being, with Power, but without Discerning and Reason. It is the Beauty of this Necessity, that it is strong as Fate itself, with all the Advantage of Reason and Goodness.— It is strange, to see Men contend, that the Deity is not Free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a Man is allowed still the perfecter Being, the more fixedly and c••stantly his Will is determined by Reason and Truth. Enq•••• into the "Nature of the Hum. Soul. Edit. 3. Vol. II, P. 403, 404.