Section
pp. 176–20186 passagespart 2 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Anshelmus in the place above cited, saith, that God himself is the bringer forth of things, and that not only of substantial things, but also of accidental, universal, and particular things, yea, and of the evil motions of the will: for the power of God is infinite. Wherefore there is nothing can be brought forth whatsoever it be, but is under his action; for if any thing could escape the same, then should it not be infinite, then should it not fill all things? neither might our will break out into act, unless that high supreme will wrought together with us. Augustine in his treatise De vera religione, the 34. chapter, writeth thus; that The very being it self, be it never so little, is good; for the chiefest being, is the chiefest good. And a little after he ⟨p. 189⟩saith; The chiefest beauty is the chiefest good, the least beauty is the least good, yet is it good. So as, if that action, which we speak of, do by any means pertain to the being, it is of some goodness. Wherefore, if we dispute of sin, we must distinguish it, and we must see what is therein of the positive, as they reason in the schools: and the first subject it self must be considered; and on the other part, to see what defect and privation cleaveth thereunto. But in the very same privation, since we see a defect, the deficient cause thereof must be sought, and not the efficient cause. But that which is there found positive, hath need of an efficient cause; and the sum of all efficient causes is God.
Anshelmus in the place aboue cited, saith, that God himselfe is the bringer foorth of things, and that not alonelie of substantiall things, but also of accidentall, vniuersall, and particular things, yea, and of the euill motions of the will: for the power of God is infinite. Wherefore there is nothing can be brought foorth whatsoeuer it be, but is vnder his action; for if anie thing could escape the same, then should it not be infinite, then should it not fill all things? neither might our will breake out into act, vnlesse that high supreme will wrought together with vs. Augustine in his treatise De vera religione, the 34. chapter, writeth thus; that The verie being it selfe, be it neuer so little, is good; for the chéefest being, is the chéefest good. And a little after hée ⟨p. 189⟩saith; The chéefest beautie is the chéefest good, the least beautie is the least good, yet is it good. So as, if that action, which we speake of, doo by anie meanes perteine to the being, it is of some goodnes. Wherefore, if we dispute of sinne, wée must distinguish it, and we must sée what is therein of the positiue, as they reason in the schooles: and the first subiect it selfe must be considered; and on the other part, to sée what defect and priuation cleaueth therevnto. But in the verie same priuation, since we sée a defect, the deficient cause thereof must be sought, and not the efficient cause. But that which is there found positiue, hath néed of an efficient cause; and the summe of all efficient causes is God.