pp. 424–442107 passagespart 2 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Damascene also to expound the same matter, to wit, how the same things which belong to one nature should be communicated to the other, namely in person: writeth thus: The word doth appropriate unto it self those things which belong to man. For those things which pertain to his holy flesh be his: and he doth (by a manner of mutual predication) impart those things which are proper to himself, unto the flesh, by reason of the being of the parts mutually one within the other, and their hypostatical or personal union.
Damascene also to expound the same matter, to wit, how the same thinges which belong to one nature should be communicated to the other, namely in person: writeth thus: The word doth approprsate vnto it selfe those things which belong to man. For those thinges which pertaine to his holy flesh be his: and he doth (by a manner of mutuall praedication) impart those things which are proper to himselfe, vnto the flesh, by reason of the being of the partes mutually one within the other, and their hypostaticall or personall vnion.
Out of which place it evidently appeareth, first, that those things which are of the flesh are no less given to the word, then the things of the word, to the flesh: then, that they which belong to the word, are given to the flesh after no other manner, then they which pertain to the flesh, are given to the word: lastly, that this manner of giving is called the manner of mutual predication, not simply and in the abstractive names of the natures, but in the concretive noting the person.
Out of which place it euidently appeareth, first, that those things which are of the flesh are no lesse giuen to the word, then the things of the word, to the flesh: then, that they which belong to the word, are giuen to the flesh after no other manner, then they which pertaine to the flesh, are giuen to the word: lastlie, that this manner of giuing is called the manner of mutuall pradication, not simplie and in the abstractiue names of the natures, but in the concretiue noting the person.
Moreover what this manner of predication is, and why it is so called, the same Damascene expoundeth in the 4. chapter both by example, and by the cause in these words: This manner of mutual predication is, when those things which are proper to one nature, are spoken of the other nature, by reason of the hypostatical identity or personal union of them both; and for that the one nature is in the other: for example we may say of Christ, this our god was seen upon the earth and conversed with men: and this man is uncreated, not subject to passion, not circumscribed in any place.
Moreouer what this manner of praedication is, and why it is so called, the same Damascene expoundeth in the 4. chapter both by example, and by the cause in these wordes: This manner of mutuall praedication is, vvhen those things vvhich are proper to one nature, are spoken of the other nature, by reason of the hypostaticall identitie or personall vnion of them both; and for that the one nature is in the other: for example vvee may say of Christ, this our god was seene vpon the earth and conuersed with men: and this man is vncreated, not subiect to passion, not circumscribed in any place.
And the examples added do manifestly show how one nature doeth attribute those things which are proper unto it self to the other, and for what cause: For God, (in that, by this name is meant the divine essence) was not seen on earth: but only, in that the person is meant by it, which is both God and man.
And the examples added doe manifestlie shewe howe one nature doeth attribute those things which are proper vnto it selfe to the other, and for what cause: For God, (in that, by this name is ment the diuine essence) was not seene on earth: but onely, in that the person is ment by it, which is both God and man.
Therefore we mislike not that received description of the communicating of proprieties.
Therefore we mislike not that receiued description of the communicating of proprieties.
The communication of the proprieties, is a predication, wherein the propriety agreeable to one nature, is given to the person in a name concrete: because these two natures, the word and the humane nature taken, are one existence or person.
The communication of the proprieties, is a praedication, wherein the proprietie agreeable to one nature, is giuen to the person in a name concrete: because these two natures, the vvorde and the humane nature taken, are one existence or person.
Thus therefore we judge that the communication of the properties may not amiss be defined: ⟨p. 434⟩the communication of the proprieties, is a predication, or a manner of speech: wherein the propriety (that is the concrete name signifying the propriety of one nature) is spoken really of Christs person signified by the name of the other nature: and is spoken (only in word) of the other nature, in the concrete, by reason of the conjunction of the natures & the personal union thereof.
Thus therefore we iudge that the communication of the properties may not amisse be defined: ⟨p. 434⟩the communication of the proprieties, is a praedication, or a manner of speach: wherein the proprietie (that is the concrete name signifying the proprietie of one nature) is spoken really of Christs person signified by the name of the other nature: and is spoken (onely in worde) of the other nature, in the concrete, by reason of the coniunction of the natures & the personall vnion thereof.
But we say it is all one to be predicated or said of the person signified by the concrete name of the other nature: and to be said of the concrete name of the other nature signifying the person: as also the propriety, and the concrete name signifying the propriety of the one nature, are in this matter alone.
But we say it is all one to be praedicated or said of the person signified by the cōcrete name of the other nature: and to be said of the concrete name of the other nature signifying the person: as also the proprietie, and the concrete name signifying the proprietie of the one nature, are in this matter alone.
For this question was propounded by the fathers against the heretics, not so much about the things themselves, as about the manners of speaking, which the holy scripture useth speaking of Jesus Christ: when sometime it sayeth: The Lord of glory was crucified: sometime, The son of man when he was on earth, was also in heaven: and other such like: namely, how such phrases should be understood.
For this question was propounded by the fathers against the heretikes, not so much about the things themselues, as about the manners of speaking, which the holy scripture vseth speaking of Iesus Christ: when sometime it saieth: The Lord of glorie vvas crucified: sometime, The sonne of man vvhen he vvas on earth, vvas also in heauen: and other such like: namely, how such phrases should be vnderstood.
For none of any sound judgement ever doubted but as the natures, so also the essential proprieties of both the natures remained distinct, whole, and unconfounded in the person of ⟨p. 435⟩Jesus Christ after the union: so as (for example sake) neither the deity was made passible and local, nor the humanity impassible, and uncircumscribed: as some heretics falsifying the scriptures have blasphemed.
For none of any sound iudgemēt euer doubted but as the natures, so also the essentiall proprieties of both the natures remained distinct, whole, and vnconfounded in the person of ⟨p. 435⟩Iesus Christ after the vnion: so as (for example sake) neither the deitie was made passible and locall, nor the humanitie impassible, and vncircumscribed: as some heretickes falsifying the scriptures haue blasphemed.
Now the very foundation of this whole exposition was the true and near uniting of the two natures within themselves, and a meeting of them into one and the same person unspeakably made without conversion, without confusion, without division, without separation,
Now the very foundation of this whole exposition was the true and neere vniting of the two natures within themselues, and a meeting of them into one and the same person vnspeakably made without conuersion, without confusion, without diuision, without separation,
For Damascene declaring this after he had taught, how those things which are of the flesh, are given to the word, and likewise how the things of the word are communicated to the flesh, namely, according to this manner of praedica•ation: he adjoineth the cause thereof, saying: by reason of the meeting together of the parts one with the other: and the hypostatical or personal union: & in the 4. chapter. This is the manner (saith he) of mutual predication, whenas one nature doth give the proprieties of one nature to the other which it doth in respect of the personal identity, & the joining of the natures one with the other.
For Damascene declaring this after he had taught, how those things which are of the flesh, are giuen to the vvorde, and likewise how the things of the word are communicated to the flesh, namely, according to this manner of praedica•ation: he adioyneth the cause thereof, saying: by reason of the meeting together of the partes one with the other: and the hypostaticall or personall vnion: & in the 4. chapter. This is the manner (saith he) of mutuall predication, vvhenas one nature doth giue the proprieties of one nature to the other which it doth in respect of the personall identitie, & the ioyning of the natures one with the other.
Now this joining of the natures one with the other, is the very union, that is an inward, absolute and most perfect uniting them together. As Damascene both else where, & especially in his 4. book and 19. chapter expoundeth ⟨p. 436⟩it, saying: But the divine nature once going through the flesh, gave unto the flesh also, an unspeakable going to the divine nature: which we call the union.
Now this ioyning of the natures one with the other, is the very vnion, that is an inward, absolute and most perfect vniting them together. As Damascene both els where, & especially in his 4. booke and 19. chapter expoūdeth ⟨p. 436⟩it, saying: But the diuine nature once going through the flesh, gaue vnto the flesh also, an vnspeakable going to the diuine nature: vvhich vvee call the vnion.
We our selves add, that this union is also the final cause of this form of speaking: because therefore this reciprocal predication is delivered in the holy scripture, that the true unity of the natures in one person of Jesus Christ might be showed: which is the cause, why these verbal predications can by no means be said to be vain or to no purpose: seeing they have great use, showing how the two natures are united into one person without confusion.
We our selues add, that this vnion is also the finall cause of this forme of speaking: because therefore this reciprocall praedication is deliuered in the holie scripture, that the true vnitie of the natures in one person of Iesus Christ might be shewed: which is the cause, why these verball praedications can by no meanes be said to be vaine or to no purpose: seing they haue great vse, shewing how the two natures are vnited into one person without confusion.
Moreover, this same communication of the proprieties (for example, in this proposition God was crucified,) we say to be both verbal, and real, in divers respects. For in that, by this concrete word, (God) is meant a person, which is not only God, but also man; it is a real predication. For because he was man, therefore he truly and indeed died. But as the deity is meant by the formal signification, (as they speak) or as God simply is meant thereby: it is a verbal predication, and that a true one. For god is truly said to have died, by reason of the person together meant: and that, which is God indeed died not, nor could die, although he which is God did truly die.
Moreouer, this same communication of the proprieties (for example, in this proposition God was crucified,) we say to be both verball, and reall, in diuers respects. For in that, by this concrete word, (God) is ment a person, which is not onely God, but also man; it is a reall predication. For because he was man, therefore he truly and indeed died. But as the deitie is meant by the formall signification, (as they speake) or as God simply is meant thereby: it is a verball praedication, and that a true one. For god is truely said to haue died, by reason of the person togither meant: and that, which is God indeed died not, nor could die, although he which is God did truely die.
These things thus declared: it is easy to judge of the divers enunciations, which be true, and which false, and in what manner of Predication each one is to be taken. Neither one nature nor the proprieties thereof can by any means neither in the abstractive name nor in the concretive be predicated or spoken of the other nature signified in the abstractive. For it is as false to say, The human nature, or the humanity, is God: as to say, The humanity is the deity. And as false to say, the humanity is immeasurable and infinite: as to say, the humanity is very immeasurableness or infiniteness.
These thinges thus declared: it is easie to iudge of the diuers enunciations, which be tru, and which false, and in what manner of Praedication each one is to be taken. Neither one nature nor the proprieties thereof can by any meanes neither in the abstractiue name nor in the concretiue be predicated or spoken of the other nature signified in the abstractiue. For it is as false to say, The humaine nature, or the humanity, is God: as to say, The humanity is the dietie. And as false to say, the humanity is immeasurable and infinite: as to say, the humanity is very immeasurablenesse or infinitenes.
Therefore in all the scriptures is no such kind of speech to be found.
Neither can one nature or the proprieties thereof be spoken in the abstract, of the other nature signified either in an abstractive or concretive name. For both these propositions are false. God is the humanity, and, the Deity is the humanity.
Neither can one nature or the proprieties thereof be spoken in the abstract, of the other nature signified either in an abstractiue or concretiue name. For both these propositions are false. God is the humanity, and, the Deity is the humanity.
Of either of the natures signified by what name soever, the things that are proper thereunto may truly be spoken: and that of them both in the concrete: but of the divine in the abstract also, by reason of the simplicity thereof. For this proposition is as true and proper, he deity is omnipotent, as this God is omnipotent, yea ⟨p. 438⟩even omnipotency it self. And again, Humanity and a man is mutable.
Of either of the natures signified by what name soeuer, the thinges that are proper therevnto may truely be spoken: and that of them both in the concrete: but of the diuine in the abstract also, by reason of the simplicity thereof. For this proposition is as true and proper, he deity is omnipotent, as this God is omnipotēt, yea ⟨p. 438⟩euen omnipotency it selfe. And againe, Humanity and a man is mutable.
Of the person expressed by the proper name and that name, Rule. 4 which noteth both the natures, or by a name signifying the office of a mediator; as well the things which are proper to the one or to the other, or to both the natures together, may truly and properly be spoken: as, Christ is omnipotent: also, Christ is man, Christ died. Also, Christ is a redeemer, a mediator. Also, the mediator, is God, is man, is immortal, died, redeemed us.
Of the person expressed by the proper name and that name, Rule. 4 which noteth both the natures, or by a name signifying the office of a mediatour; as well the things which are proper to the one or to the other, or to both the natures together, may truely and properly be spoken: as, Christ is omnipotent: also, Christ is man, Christ died. Also, Christ is a redeemer, a mediatour. Also, the mediator, is God, is man, is immortall, died, redeemed vs.
Of the person signified by a name of one nature: Rule. 5 the things which are proper thereunto may truly and properly be spoken: as, This God or only begotten son of God, is eternal and omnipotent. Also, This man, or, the son of man, was borne in the last days, Rule. 6 died.
Of the person signified by a name of one nature: Rule. 5 the things which are proper therevnto may truely and properly be spoken: as, This God or onely begotten sonne of God, is eternall and omnipotent. Also, This man, or, the sonne of man, was borne in the last daies, Rule. 6 died.
Those things which are proper to the whole person, cannot be spoken (but by a Synecdoche, a part taken for the whole:) of one nature signified either by an abstractive or concretive name: as The flesh quickeneth, God redeemed his Church.
Those things which are proper to the wholle person, cannot be spoken (but by a Synechdoche, a part taken for the wholle:) of one nature signified either by an abstractiue or concretiue name: as The flesh quickeneth, God redeemed his Church.