The fourteenth Chapter. Of the office of Magistrates, especially in exercising of Judgement.The fourteenth Chapter. Of the office of Magistrates, especially in exercising of Iudgement.
pp. 245–27083 passagespart 1 of 3
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The fourteenth Chapter. Of the office of Magistrates, especially in exercising of Judgement.
The fourteenth Chapter. Of the office of Magistrates, especially in exercising of Iudgement.
Princes for the most part in the time of great quietness, 1as though they had made an end of their labours, use to give themselves to sports and to pleasures. For so Alexander, when he had overcome Darius, was made feeble through riotousness. But far otherwise did David behave himself. For he thought it not enough to have conquered his enemy: but thought that the private evils and injuries at home belonged also to his office: 2since that a public weal is corrupted, even as is a humane body, not only by outward discommodities, but also by inward evils, as it were by certain noisome humours. Yea, and such ought to be the end of war, that peace among Citizens and domesticall discipline may be established. 3And therefore Justinian in the Preface upon the Institutions of the Civill law: The Majesty of the Emperor (sayeth he) ought not only to be adorned with arms, but also armed by laws, that each time, aswell of war as of peace may be rightly governed, and that the Roman prince may not only be conqueror of his enemies in battles, but also by right course expel the lewdness of malicious detractors, and that he may become aswell most religious for the law as triumphant over his enemies. And the law is, not mans opinion (as some have foolishly thought) but an everlasting precept proceeding from nature being the guide, and from the law. And that which is here spoken as touching nature, that do we much more truly understand of God himself, the author of nature. For that which GOD hath set down ought to be a law unto us. And that law men do oftentimes understand by some light of nature, and (as Cicero sayeth) by a long experience of affairs, and government of common weals. For things being in such sort marked of wise men, committed to writing, and declared in their kinds and distributed in their parts become at the last a certain Art, or else some similitude of an Art. Ulpian in the Digests, in the Title De Jure & legibus, sayeth that Jus, that is, right, is so called of Justicia, that is, Justice. This agreeth not with the Grammarians.