THE Common Places of the famous and renowned divine, Peter Martyr Vermilius a Florentine, selected into four parts: out of his books and Commentaries.THE Common Places of the famous and renowmed diuine, Peter Martyr Vermilius a Florentine, selected into foure parts: out of his bookes and Commentaries.
pp. 1–3355,177 passagespart 14 of 130
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
2 The opinions of the philosophers concerning felicity, may thus be distinguished; 1so as we may say, that some of them were notable, having famous patrons; but others vile and obscure, because they came from men of no account, and be not confirmed by strong and evident reasons. And of this kind are found health, riches, and such like, whose defenders were no notable men. To the other kind belongeth pleasure, honesty, virtue, to live agreeable with the first gifts of nature, knowledge, &c. 2These indeed are the ends, which are accounted without mixture. And there be some that have other things joined with them: for some men unto virtue do join pleasure; others unto honesty join a freedom from sorrow; othersome with virtue do join the accomplishment of a perfect ⟨p. 133⟩life. Augustine against Julianus Scyllaeus blameth that good, which is compounded with pleasure; for in that honesty is placed therein, it representeth a show of man, the pleasure which is mingled, is a brutish thing. But he that will more fully understand of this matter, let him read Cicero as well in his second book De finibus, as in his Tusculans quest: and thou mayest also see, that sometimes some of them disagree with themselves; and that which they first judged to be the chiefest good, straightway they refuse it: for they which being whole, made small reckoning of health, afterward being destitute thereof, placed it in the chiefest good, which also happeneth to them that be pressed with poverty: for such, not only make great account of riches, but above all things seek for the same. And these, whom we have spoken of, do appoint some thing shat should be evident and manifest. For these things; namely, pleasure, riches, and honours be so plain and evident, that they are apparent, even to the senses. Yea and Epicurus said, that he therefore thought pleasure to be the chiefest good, because it was the most known, and most evident good thing. And he said, that pleasure was no less known to be the chiefest good, than snow to be white, or fire hot. Varro showeth, that the number of opinions concerning this matter, was very great, as Augustine declareth in his book De civitate Dei: for he saith, that there might be reckoned two hundred fourscore and eight opinions touching felicity.