And undoubtedly Damascene, in the second book, when he entreateth of free will, and other things, which be in us, nameth [Greek or Hebrew], but he defineth [Greek or Hebrew], where he entreateth [Greek or Hebrew], [of will.] I will add the reason why they differ, because [Greek or Hebrew] belongeth unto the general word of quality; for it is an affect and property of the will: but [Greek or Hebrew], is an action. And how quality and action do differ in themselves, all men know. That [Greek or Hebrew] is an action, the same author showeth in defining of it. He saith, that [Greek or Hebrew] is [Greek or Hebrew]; that is, Two things being propounded to choose, & prefer the one before the other. Further, the same author, where he speaketh of the will of the Lord, saith; that the word [Greek or Hebrew], that is, will, agreeth unto that, which undoubtedly is [Greek or Hebrew], that is, self power, & not [Greek or Hebrew], that is, free election. For that requireth consultation, which noteth a former ignorance, and that cannot be ascribed unto God. Furthermore, as we have it in Aristotle, ⟨p. 107⟩the third book of his Ethics, the word [Greek or Hebrew], is occupied about the end; but [Greek or Hebrew] about those things, which belong unto the end. Besides this, to [Greek or Hebrew] do belong those things which can be done of us: but the will is touching those things, which cannot be done of us; as when we would one wrestler to overcome another, & a ship to hold his right course. These things are in our power to will, but not to choose: for the will of his own accord and power would sometimes things unpossible, as not to die. But election is occupied only about things that be possible: wherefore they differ, so as [Greek or Hebrew] extendeth more largely; seeing it not only agreeth to [Greek or Hebrew], but also to [Greek or Hebrew]: yet is it not the general word of them.
And vndoubtedlie Damascene, in the second booke, when he intreateth of frée will, and other things, which be in vs, nameth 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, but he defineth 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, where he intreateth 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, [of will.] I will adde the reason why they differ, bicause 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 belongeth vnto the generall word of qualitie; for it is an affect and propertie of the will: but 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, is an action. And how qualitie and action doo differ in themselues, all men knowe. That 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 is an action, the same authour sheweth in defining of it. He saith, that 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 is 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; that is, Two things being propounded to choose, & prefer the one before the other. Further, the same author, where he speaketh of the will of the Lord, saith; that the word 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, will, agréeth vnto that, which vndoubtedlie is 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, selfe power, & not 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, that is, frée election. For that requireth consultation, which noteth a former ignorance, and that cannot be ascribed vnto God. Furthermore, as we haue it in Aristotle, ⟨p. 107⟩the third booke of his Ethiks, the word 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, is occupied about the end; but 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 about those things, which belong vnto the end. Besides this, to 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 doo belong those things which can be doone of vs: but the will is touching those things, which cannot be doone of vs; as when we wold one wrestler to ouercome another, & a ship to hold his right course. These things are in our power to will, but not to choose: for the will of his owne accord and power would sometimes things vnpossible, as not to die. But election is occupied onelie about things that be possible: wherefore they differ, so as 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 extendeth more largelie; séeing it not onelie agréeth to 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, but also to 〈non-Latin alphabet〉: yet is it not the generall word of them.