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pp. 1–212818 passagespart 15 of 21
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
1And when we do well, it doth not a little further to the confirming of us, if we have the commendation of good men. For even as we are in a manner all troubled with the disease of self-love, we are easily deceived in affairs & actions; and those things which we do least commendably, we make most account of them. And because this doth not seldom happen, it causeth the more ignorant sort to become more doubtful and ambiguous in their doing, unto the which men, honour, praise, and approbation would do much good, if by outward signs the same were yielded: for by these things their mind and judgement is established. But those which be not doubtful, nay rather be assured, that those things which they do, be right, when they are adorned by wise and good men with a just kind of honour, they cannot choose but exceedingly rejoice and be glad in themselves, that they have gotten so good and just judges; wherefore honours do also profit these men. Neither do these things, which we have said, differ from the opinion of Aristotle. For albeit he deny honour to be the chiefest good, yet doth he not exclude it from the number of good things. Touching those things, which I have spoken of firm and perfect honour, there is nothing so agreeable, 2as that that shall be the chiefest, which the faithful in the last day of judgement shall have of Christ, when he shall say unto them; Come ye blessed of my father, &c. For that praise shall proceed from the most wise judge, to whom all justice is best known, neither can our doings any way be hidden from him.
1And when we doo well, it doth not a little further to the confirming of vs, if we haue the commendation of good men. For euen as we are in a maner all troubled with the disease of selfe-loue, we are easilie deceiued in affaires & actions; and those things which we doo least commendablie, wée make most account of them. And bicause this doth not seldome happen, it causeth the more ignorant sort to become more doubtfull and ambiguous in their dooing, vnto the which men, honor, praise, and approbation would doo much good, if by outward signes the same were yéelded: for by these things their mind and iudgement is established. But those which be not doubtfull, nay rather be assured, that those things which they doo, be right, when they are adorned by wise and good men with a iust kind of honor, they cannot choose but excéedinglie reioise and be glad in themselues, that they haue gotten so good and iust iudges; wherefore honors doo also profit these men. Neither doo these things, which we haue said, differ from the opinion of Aristotle. For albeit he denie honor to be the chéefest good, yet doth he not exclude it from the number of good things. Touching those things, which I haue spoken of firme and perfect honor, there is nothing so agréeable,