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pp. 1–3801,530 passagespart 4 of 39
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That necessity also, which cometh outwardly, is of two sorts: the one violent, when ⟨p. 35⟩things are compelled to abide or to work contrary to their nature; the other is by supposition: by occasion whereof the School-men have said, that there is a necessity of the consequence & an other of the consequent. By which distinction, they meant nothing else, but that the connection is sometimes necessary, 1although that which is inferred, be not of it self necessary. The Logicians also have thus distinguished them; that they call the one a compounded sense, & the other a divided sense: as if thou wilt say, that it is not possible that white should be black; that will be granted, if these two things be taken conjunctively and together; namely, that one & the self-same thing, should be both white and black, which is by no means possible: but if they be taken apart, then it may be said not to be impossible; for that which is now white may changed & made black. Wherefore the School-men think, that the whole difficulty of this controversy consisteth in the necessity of the consequence, 2and of the consequent in the compounded sense. But we, for the more perspicuity, will add another distinction; that there is one necessity of certainty or infallibility, and another of coaction.
That necessitie also, which commeth outwardlie, is of two sorts: the one violent, when ⟨p. 35⟩things are compelled to abide or to worke contrarie to their nature; the other is by supposition: by occasion whereof the Schoole-men haue said, that there is a necessitie of the consequence & an other of the consequent. By which distinction, they ment nothing else, but that the connexion is sometimes necessarie, 1although that which is inferred, be not of it selfe necessarie. The Logicians also haue thus distinguished them; that they call the one a compounded sense, & the other a diuided sense: as if thou wilt saie, that it is not possible that white should be blacke; that will be granted, if these two things be taken coniunctiuelie and togither; namelie, that one & the selfe-same thing, should be both white and blacke, which is by no meanes possible: but if they be taken apart, then it may be said not to be impossible; for that which is now white may changed & made blacke. Wherfore the School-men thinke, that the whole difficultie of this controuersie consisteth in the necessitie of the consequence,