Crimes exceeding great and many, are but slight and Venial faults by the Popish Doctrine.
pp. 211–305107 passagespart 2 of 3
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Further, (r)when so many persons in no necessity, take each of them a little fruit from a Vineyard or an Orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner: yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault. And thus any men of estates, (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruin them, be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need, continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth, from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value; and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it: this altogether, is no more then a Venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft (s)(say some); no, nor if there were no such intervals (say (t)others.) The consequences of which is, as Lopez observes, (u)that any Inn-keeper or Tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole Town. And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but Venially? these of old were thought (x)alike. They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stolen, as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give. 1. A (y)man may steal to give Alms; We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their ⟨p. 242⟩good works: and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest Sacrilege) in their best acts; arrogating that to them, which is Christs peculiar; satisfaction and merit. And then, that the Charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stolen, is the
money from another, rather then he shall venture it in gaming; for it it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the Apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another,
and that not only in other sins (as Fryer Joseph would limit it) but such as are intrinsically evil: for example; If one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful (a holy act) to beseech, and persuade him to commit fornication.
Further, (r)when so many persons in no necessity, take each of them a little fruit from a Vineyard or an Orchard, or a little corn from a field, that there is nothing at all left for the owner: yet if they did not conspire together to do this, it is a small fault. And thus any men of estates, (since it holds in other cases, no less than those specified) may be utterly impoverished; and yet those that ruine them, be guilty of nothing that they need regard. Moreover, when any one without any need, continues so long in the stealing matters of less worth, from one person or many, that in time they rise to a great value; and the thief thrives into a good estate thereby, without designing it: this altogether, is no more then a Venial fault; nor will it be worse, though he never make restitution, if there was any considerable interval betwixt the acts of theft (s)(say some); no, nor if there were no such intervals (say (t)others.) The consequences of which is, as Lopez observes, (u)that any Inn-keeper or Tradesman may grow rich, and raise a fair estate, without mortal sin, by defrauding all that buy of them, a little, in false measures, and so fleecing a whole Town. And why might not they as well conclude, that he who beats another, so it be but with little blows, though he beat him to death, offends but Venially? these of old were thought (x)alike. They conclude also, that such a quantity may be stoln, as is sufficient to make it a mortal sin, without sinning mortally, if it be for a good end. These are some of the instances they give. 1. A (y)man may steal to give Alms; We need not wonder at this, since they think not much to rob Christ of his honour in all their ⟨p. 242⟩good works: and so commit the worst kind of robbery (the highest Sacriledg) in their best acts; arrogating that to them, which is Christs peculiar; satisfaction and merit. And then, that the Charitable thief, if he become rich, is not bound to restore what is stoln, is the (z)common opinion. Also one may steal (a)money from another, rather then he shall venture it in gaming; for it it is good divinity with them (whatsoever it was with the Apostle) that one evil may be done to hinder another, (b)and that not only in other sins (as Fryer Joseph would limit it) but such as are intrinsecally evil: for example; If one be about to commit adultery, it will be a lawful (a holy act) to beseech, and perswade him to commit fornication.
(r)Corduba. Navarre. Lopez. pars. 2: Cap. 93. p. 414.Corduba. Navar. Lopez. pars. 2: Cap. 93. p. 414.
(s)Navarre. c. 17. n. 139. Graft. l. 2. c. 92. n. 18.Navar. c. 17. n. 139. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 18.
(t)Angestus in Lopez. ibid. p. 416.
(u)Tabernarius seu quilibet negotiator posset ditescere sine mortall, et statum decentem fundare, et singulos emptores in modico mensuras curtando defraudare, totam civitatem sic depilando. ibid. p. 14.
(x)Nihil resert, an paulatim, an simul aliquem interimas, vel spolies. Jerom. ibid.
(y)Communis sententia ampliatur, ut non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro alio existent in extrema necessitate quis occulte subtrahere possit. Graff. c. 93. n. 12. Navarre. c. 17. n. 118. If a man be in mortal sin, his Wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in Alms, for his conversion. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct 2. n. 9.Communis sententia ampliatur, ut non tantum pro se, sed etiam pro alio existente in extrema necessitate quis occulte subtrahere possit. Graff. c. 93. n. 12. Navar. c. 17. n. 118. If a man be in mortal sin, his Wife may take of his goods privily, and give them away in Alms, for his conversion. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 10. punct 2. n. 9.
(z)in Navarre. ibid.in Navar. ibid.
(a)Antoninus quem sequitur. Nav. ibid. n. 5. p. 282.
(b)Licet inducere ad minus malum, paratum jam ad majus malum: ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuader percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata quae non sunt intrinseca mala sed cense• sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez. pars. 1. cap. 58. p. 297. Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus. quos sequitur Navarre. cap. 14. n. 40. Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant—non tantum licere suadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Vasq. opusc. Moral. p. 24. dub. 2. Bonacin. de rest disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 7. n. 9.Licet inducere ad minus malum, paratum jam ad majus malum: ut si quis proponit interficere, aut adulterari quis, licet ei persuadere percutere aut fornicari, contra fratrem Josephum, qui limitat hanc sententiam ad peccata quae non sunt intrinseca mala sed cense• sententiam hanc generaliter esse tenendam, prout eam tenet Navarrus, et Cajetanus, Lopez. pars. 1. cap. 58. p. 297. Adrianus, Cajetan. Sotus. quos sequitur Navar. cap. 14. n. 40. Luxurioso sancte consulitur ut non adulteretur, sed fornicetur. Cajetan. sum. v. Tyrannis. Medina, Sotus, Adrian existimant—non tantum licere suadere minus furtum latroni, sed etiam ipsum comitari, imo etiam adjuvare. in Vasq. opusc. Moral. p. 24. dub. 2. Bonacin. de rest disp. 1. q. 2. punct. 7. n. 9.
Or nearer the matter in hand; if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty; and so persuade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to persuade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a (c)woman if her Husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them, to provide for the future. If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his Wife may spend more of his estate than he would do, if he were sober or present. Bonacin ibio. Finally, they all agree, that to steal any thing of what value soever inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a Venial Trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore, it by their Principles, I understand not: since they hold that (d)no man is bound to ⟨p. 243⟩make restitution, but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the cult be Venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as (*)a small fault, not to make restitution, how much soever be stolen inconsiderately. By these and such like rules, they have opened a way, to make thievery small or great, practicable; without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars and those who count good Books their treasure, are by their Doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away heretical Books, from such as have not Licence to read them, is no theft; Bonacin. de restit disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 1. So that it will be no fault at all, to rob one of the best part of his Library, how valuable soever.
Or nearer the matter in hand; if one be ready to steal an hundred pounds, I may advise him to steal fifty; and so perswade to a mortal sin with some moderation. They think it not only lawful to perswade a thief to a smaller robbery, but also to accompany and assist him therein. Further, a (c)woman if her Husband be profuse, may against his command take away his goods, and conceal them, to provide for the future. If a man be distracted, or if he be absent, his Wife may spend more of his estate than he would do, if he were sober or present. Bonacin ibio. Finally, they all agree, that to steal any thing of what value soever inconsiderately, that is, without full and perfect deliberation, is but a Venial Trespass. And how he can be obliged to restore, it by their Principles, I understand not: since they hold that (d)no man is bound to ⟨p. 243⟩make restitution, but for a mortal offence. If in a matter that is weighty, the •ult be Venial, for want of full consideration, it will not be so much as (*)a small fault, not tomake restitution, how much soever be stoln inconsiderately. By these and such like rules, they have opened a way, to make thievery small or great, practicable; without any sin or danger, but what is small and inconsiderable in their account. Scholars and those who count good Books their treasure, are by their Doctrine exposed more particularly, for they teach, that to take away haeretical Books, from such as have not Licence to read them, is no theft; Bonacin. de restit disp. 2. q. 8. punct. 1. n. 1. So that it will be no fault at all, to rob one of the best part of his Library, how valuable soever.
(c)Sylvest. v. furtum. n. 15. Navarre. cap. 17. n. 154. Graft. l. 2. c. 92. n. 26:Sylvest. v. furtum. n. 15. Navar. cap. 17. n. 154. Graff. l. 2. c. 92. n. 26:
(d)Adrian. 4. de restit. fam. ad 8. Sylvest. v. culpa. q. 4. in Fill. tr. 32. n. 32.
They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to •eating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things: but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general Rule; (e)a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for. Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful, (f)for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can, which unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value (g)though he knows it and the owner understands it not, for a small matter, nor (h)needs be declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth; since that may be enquired of others. They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom it self to be a corruption: yet they are excused who use them, (i)if they do it for their own security, or for moderate ⟨p. 244⟩gain; as if in case, they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no Customers. So, by their Rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea or the substance of the Commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto: Corn or Wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the Merchant may fell it (k)by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a (l)man have very good Wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it; he may sell it at the rate they would g•ve for Rhenish, though it be not. So he may (m)mix his Wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price; as for example; (n)In case Wine were so dear, that scarce any would buy it at the price it is worth; he may mix it with water, and sell it at the rate they will give. So (o)Cloth or Silks may be sold for that of such a Country which is most esteemed, though it be of another.
They open as wide a gap, and give as much encouragement to •eating, and like unconscionable practices. They teach there is no necessity to be regulated in bargaining, by the just value of things: but they may sell for as much as they can extort, and buy answerably; and this they take for a general Rule; (e)a thing is worth so much as it can be sold for. Hence Sylvester concludes it lawful, (f)for any one to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as he can, which unlimited, gives liberty to all to prey upon one another, without equity or conscience. So one may buy a thing of great value (g)though he knows it and the owner understands it not, for a small matter, nor (h)needs be declare it, when he apprehends that it is much more worth; since that may be enquired of others. They conclude, that false measures and weights may be used, though the buyer be hereby deceived and damnified, and the custom it self to be a corruption: yet they are excused who use them, (i)if they do it for their own security, or for moderate ⟨p. 244⟩gain; as if in case, they should give full measure, the price would be greater, and consequently they would have few or no Customers. So, by their Rules, they may further deceive those that deal with them, by selling one thing for another, or adulterating what they sell; and so cheat them not only in the measure, but in the quality, yea or the substance of the Commodity. Instances hereof we have in Soto: Corn or Wine, when it is more worth than the set rate, the Merchant may fell it (k)by false measure, thereby to get his price. If a (l)man have very good Wine, but people, if they did not take it for Rhenish, would not give so good a price for it; he may sell it at the rate they would g•ve for Rhenish, though it be not. So he may (m)mix his Wine with water, and sell it for pure, taking but a just price; as for example;
(e)Justum praetium reputatur quod absque fraude extorqueri potest. Ità, Bannes, Medina, Aragon, Villalobos, Bonacina, & alii in Dian. 1. p. tr. 8. res. 55.Justum praetium reputatur quod absque fraude extorqueri potest. Ità, Bannes, Medina, Arragon, Villalobos, Bonacina, & alii in Dian. 1. p. tr. 8. res. 55.
(f)Res tantum valet quantum vendi potest—Et secundum hoc licet cuilibe• carius vendere, aut vilius emere quantum potest. Sumv. Emptio. n. 10.
(g)Vid. Cajetan. Sum. v. Emptio, p. 138.
(h)Emptor non tenetur ei explicit affirmare quantum valet: quam habeat alios, unde possit inquirere et scire. ibid.Emptor non tenetur ei explicite affirmare quantum valet: quam habeat alios, unde possit inquirere et scire. ibid.
(i)Tabernarii dantes vini mensuram diminutam secundum Arc. non excusantur: quia decipiunt & damnifiant emptores, non obstant• contra• consuetudine, quae est corruptela: nisi hoc faciunt ad suam indemnitatem, vel lucrum moderatum: puta, quia si darent plenas, oporteret pretium augere, ut consequenter n•llos aut paucos invenirent emptores. Sylv. Sum. ibid. n. 20. Vid. Soto, de just. & jur. lib. 6. q. 3. art. 2.
(k)Soto, ibid. p. 198.
(l)Ibid.
(m)Eadem ratione, & aqua possit vinum diluere. Idem ibid.
These conclusions, he says, are collected out of Aquinas, and to complete these Cheats, he tells us (p)that if perhaps the Seller should lie too, in these cases (for example, if he should affirm, that to be Rhenish Wine which is not, or that to be pure which is adulterated, or that to be full measure which is short of it, &c.) it would not be a mortal sin. And Sylvester determines, that a man with perjuries and lies, denying the badness of his Commodities, or making them better than they are; (q)the lies, if they do not much damnify the Buyer, are but Venial. They allow persons also to deceive those who intrust them to dispose of their Estates, or Goods. As, if one be employed to sell what is another's (r)at a certain price, if he sell it for more, ⟨p. 245⟩he may keep the over-plus to himself; yea, say (s)some, though he had a reward for his pains in selling, yet he may retain to himself the overplus of what is sold.
These conclusions, he says, are collected out of Aquinas, and to compleat these Cheats, he tells us (p)that if perhaps the Seller should lie too, in these cases (for example, if he should affirm, that to be Rhenish Wine which is not, or that to be pure which is adulterated, or that to be full measure which is short of it, &c.) it would not be a mortal sin. And Sylvester determines, that a man with perjuries and lies, denying the badness of his Commodities, or making them better than they are; (q)the lies, if they do not much damnifie the Buyer, are but Venial. They allow persons also to deceive those who intrust them to dispose of their Estates, or Goods. As, if one be employed to sell what is anothers (r)at a certain price, if he sell it for more, ⟨p. 245⟩he may keep the over-plus to himself; yea, say (s)some, though he had a reward for his pains in selling, yet he may retain to himself the overplus of what is sold.
(p)Forsan venditoris mendacium in talibus casibus, si alioqui praedicto modo servetur justitia, non est pernitiosum. Idem •bid. p. 199. quem sequitur in his omnibus, Tol. instr. l. 8. c. 49.
(q)Sum. Ibid. n. 22.
(r)Si accipit certo pretio ven dendum, retinere potest id quo pluris illud vendiderit, nisi excesserit pretium rigorosum. Navarre. c. 23. n. 97.Si accipit certo pretio ven dendum, retinere potest id quo pluris illud vendiderit, nisi excesserit pretium rigorosum. Navar. c. 23. n. 97.
Further, Panormitan (t)takes notice, that their Canon-law allows of deceit, if it be not extended beyond half the worth of the thing bargained or, (that is, if a man be not cozened of above fifty per Cent. in a bargain) But then to salve the reputation of the Law (which he like a true Canonist, says, was formed by the instinct of the holy Ghost), he will have it understood of deceit in the thing, not of fraud in the persons, and others after him; but Sylvester who sees no ground for that, uses another shift; (u)he says it may be understood, either of deceit in the thing, or fraud in the persons, which their Law tolerates, but approves not. Cajetan grants so great deceit (x)is lawful, by humane constitution: but says, it is condemned by the law of God; and so we leave this shameful Deceit, lawful by the Popes Decrees, but damnable by Gods Word.
(t)Dicit etiam Panormitan quod jura Canonica permittentia deceptionem usque ad dimidium, intelligi debent quando venit deceptio reipsa, in Silv. ibid. n. 9.
(u)Ego dico quod loquitur in foro contentioso, sive deceptio sit ex re, sive ex dolo: non quia illum approbat, sed quia tolerat. Ibid.
(x)Jure humano dicitur licitum decipere citra dimidium justi pretii: sed lex domini immaculata est, &c. Sum. v. emptore.
LET us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in Popery, or those that profess it: and whether their Rules, tend not to leave, neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness, and lying in words and deeds: A lye, as they define it, (y)is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to deliver ⟨p. 246⟩(a)what is false, if not on purpose, though it he without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such, as needs not be regarded; unless, where it is in testimony, or upon Oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by): because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then, a perfect lye with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent if it be for pleasure or in sport, ridentem dicere falsum quis •etat? to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury, to please himself, or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell (b)lies when he list, out of mere pleasure to be telling lies: yea (c)or out of malice (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most complete and perfect lies, (d)when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others; how much soever truth be injured, or others deceived thereby. So that their true Catholics, need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words; when the excluding of it from both, will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know, that in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of Conversation, or Religion. This being their Principle, (e)received by all Catholics, and universally acknowledged; we need not wonder, that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to ⟨p. 247⟩show false Relics, to divulge false Visions, and Revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious Writings; to corrupt the Monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them; to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth.
LET us see, in the next place, what truth may be expected in Popery, or those that profess it: and whether their Rules, tend not to leave, neither truth in the world, nor amongst themselves, by giving liberty to all falseness, and lying in words and deeds: A lye, as they define it, (y)is an asserting of what is false, with an intent to speak falsely, and to deceive others. Now they teach that to deliver ⟨p. 246⟩(a)what is false, if not on purpose, though it he without any care whether it be true or false; if it be a fault, is such, as needs not be regarded; unless, where it is in testimony, or upon Oath (and there they will excuse it too, by and by): because this is but a material lie, and not in its formal perfection. But then, a perfect lye with a design to speak what is false, and to deceive the hearers, is as innocent if it be for pleasure or in sport, ridentem dicere falsum quis •etat? to make a sport of violating truth, or in offering it such injury, to please himself, or others; any one may do it out of habit, and make a practice of it, and tell (b)lies when he list, out of meer pleasure to be telling lies: yea (c)or out of malice (though that be the highest aggravation of sin). An officious lie is with them as harmless, they have warrant enough for the most compleat and perfect lies, (d)when they are of any advantage to some, and no hurt to others; how much soever truth be injur'd, or others deceived thereby. So that their true Catholicks, need leave no place for truth, either in their heart or words; when the excluding of it from both, will, without hurt, serve either their pleasure or profit. However, herein they use true and plain dealing, in letting the world know, that in these cases, they are never to be trusted, either in matters of Conversation, or Religion. This being their Principle, (e)received by all Catholicks, and universally acknowledged; we need not wonder, that it hath been their common practice in several ages, and that they make no conscience of it still, to counterfeit false miracles, to forge false stories, to ⟨p. 247⟩
(y)Aquinas, 2. 2. q. 110. art. 1.
(a)Si dicatur falsum sed defit voluntas dicendi falsum—non est mendacium proprit aut perfect, & si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, & si non sit adh•bita, est veniale, 2. 2. q. 2. C. homines in Sylv. Sum. v. mendacinm. n. 1.Si dicatur falsum sed defit voluntas dicendi falsum—non est mendacium proprit aut perfecte, & si diligentia esset adhibita, non esset peccatum, & si non sit adh•bita, est veniale, 2. 2. q. 2. C. homines in Sylv. Sum. v. mendacinm. n. 1.
(b)Quod fit sola mentiendi libidine quod procedit ex habitu: nam mendax ex to quod talis est secundum habitum ipso mendacio gaudet, 4 Ethic.—reducitur ad jocosum, cum sit delectabile mentienti. Idem ibid. nec mendacium erat mortale ut in jocoso & officios•, ibid. n. 3.
(c)Contingit tamen propter imperfectionem actus esse veniale peccatum ex malitia: • si quis vana mendacia eligit dicere ex intentione hujus mali, quod est vane mentiri, & non propter aliud. Cajetan. Sum. v. malitia.
(d)Officiosum (mendacium) quod fine alicujus injuria dicitur, ut alicui prosit, & hoc etiam est veniale. Cajet. ibid. v. Mendac.
(e)Lex de non mentiendo jocose aut officiose sine dumno alterius—(ejus) transgressio est solum venialis, secundum omnes Catholicos. Navar. c. 23. n. 5.
For, all this falseness is officious, it serves the interest of the Church, it is to commend her Doctrine, and to maintain her authority over mens Consciences; and it does the world no hurt; For it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her Doctrine, and subject themselves to her Authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, Heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth, than these Catholics: if upon their supposition (that their way was the best), they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsify any Records against them: who sees not, that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledge of it? yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to Truth), is but a Venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety, to make lies for their Religion, as some (f)of themselves do acknowledge it has been accounted. To proceed, (g)there are five or six several sorts of lies, (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth), which they may make their practice without danger. It is the pernicious Lye only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless withal, it be against Justice: and a Lie, (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, (h)and in its own nature, be more than Venial, but only by accident; when it so falls out that it does mischief: And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies; there will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature: and by accident they ⟨p. 248⟩may do hurt alike. However, considering that Truth and their Religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious Lies need be shunned, yet not all of this sort neither: they give liberty to tell mischievous lies, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals: or though ye do the (i)greatest mischief that can be done, yet if you did not intend it to be great;
For, all this falsness is officious, it serves the interest of the Church, it is to commend her Doctrine, and to maintain her authority over mens Consciences; and it does the world no hurt; For it is (they say) the duty of all men, and would be their advantage, to entertain her Doctrine, and subject themselves to her Authority. Now if the rest of mankind, Jews, Turks, Heathens, had retained no more conscience nor reverence for truth, than these Catholicks: if upon their supposition (that their way was the best), they had proceeded by their rules and methods to broach any lies for them, or falsifie any Records against them: who sees not, that this had been a direct course to have left no truth at all in the world, nor means to come to the knowledg of it? yet this practice with the Romanists (so great friends are they to Truth), is but a Venial fault. Did I say they count it so bad? I do them wrong; it is a great piece of piety, to make lies for their Religion, as some (f)of themselves do acknowledg it has been accounted. To proceed, (g)there are five or six several sorts of lyes, (that they may have room enough still to avoid truth), which they may make their practice without danger. It is the pernicions Lye only that need be avoided, that which wrongs others, and is against justice; and thus no violation of truth, no injury to it, how great soever (so tender they are of it) will be a crime, unless withall, it be against Justice: and a Lie, (be it as gross as can be) will not of itself, (h)and in its own nature, be more than Venial, but only by accident; when it so falls out that it does mischief: And it may be as innocent to tell lies as truth, and as criminal to speak truth as lies; there will be no difference as to mortal guilt in their own nature: and by accident they ⟨p. 248⟩may do hurt alike. However, considering that Truth and their Religion are so much at odds, the world is obliged to them for being so indifferent as to truth and lies, and that these have no more the preference. But then, though none but pernicious Lyes need be shun'd, yet not all of this sort neither: they give liberty to tell mischievous lyes, as many and as oft as you please, so the mischief they do be not great, though it prejudice others in spirituals or temporals: or though ye do the (i)greatest mischief that can be done, yet if you did not intend it to be great;
(f)Fuerunt qui magnae pietatis loco ducerent mendaciola pro religione confingere. Ludovicus Vives, & Espensaeus, Come. in Tim. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.Fuerunt qui magnae pietatis loco ducerent mendaciola pro religione confingere. Ludovicus Vives, & Espensaeus, Com. in Tim. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156.
(g)Sylvest. ibid. n. 5.
(h)Mendacium si aliam non habet maculam quam falsitatis, non est genere suo mortale, patet, quia neque est contra religionem (Romanam) neque contra justitiam. Soto, ibid. l. 5, q. 7. art. 4. p. 168.
(i)Mortalis autem est omnis, & sola illa, quae fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quae fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocumenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utrobique per Cajetan. Navarre. c. 18. n. 1.Mortalis autem est omnis, & sola illa, quae fit animo notabiliter nocendi in bonis spiritualibus aut temporariis, quamvis non noceat, et illa quae fit nocendo notabiliter, aut dando causam ita nocendi sine tali animo, advertendo tamen, aut advertere debendo per illam notabiliter nocere, aut causam notabilis nocumenti dando, alias non, quamvis injuria gravissima sit juxta mentem. S. Thom. declaratam utrobique per Cajetan. Navar. c. 18. n. 1.
or if you should not, or did not observe and consider that it would be so; in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless Venials. They may by their Rules, lye to the prejudice of others in Soul, Body, or Estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but when it will be great, their Casuists cannot well determine; this is not confined to a point, there's a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion: and if he do much mischief instead of little, the Liar cannot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? and how can they think, that any injury done by lying, can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lies in point of Religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying, so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. (k)To ⟨p. 249⟩use lies, says de Graffiis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a Venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal: but he is confuted by the common judgment of their Doctors, who hold, that a Venial▪ how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once, this they may do daily and continually; and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernicious Lye which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.
or if you should not, or did not observe and consider that it would be so; in such cases even pernicious lies will be harmless Venials. They may by their Rules, lye to the prejudice of others in Soul, Body, or Estate, and that deliberately, and with design to do it, provided the damage be not great; but when it will be great, their Casuists cannot well determine; this is not confined to a point, there's a fair latitude, and liberty enough given for less or more, it is much left to discretion: and if he do much mischief instead of little, the Lyar caunot be charged with mortal guilt; for who can condemn any for transgressing bounds that are not set? and how can they think, that any injury done by lying, can be great, who count it better than innocent (as we saw before) to abuse the world with lyes in point of Religion? Sure if the injury be not great there, any will be small. And in other matters, they have fair leave to do great hurt by lying, so they do it but by degrees, and be not so hasty as to do it all at once. Take but an instance of it in commerce. (k)To ⟨p. 249⟩use lies, says de Graffiis, in bargaining, to get a good price, or the using of them to deceive others in a little, is but a Venial fault, though it were a daily practice. Hostiensis thought that this lying to cheat others, if it were their continual practice, might prove mortal: but he is confuted by the common judgment of their Doctors, who hold, that a Veni•l▪ how much soever multiplied or continued, can never become mortal. We see they may lie, and deceive those that deal with them, if they wrong them but a little at once, this they may do daily and continually; and so in time, that little will be much, yet the sin will be no more; the pernitious Lye which does great injury, will be as innocent as any.
(k)Mendaciis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcunque multiplicatur & continuetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut Doctores notant, &c. Graft. l. 2. c. 118. n. 10. Excusari tamen à mortali eum qui utitur amphibólogia in contractu cum juramento, &c. Idem. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 7. ubi Sayrus & alii.Mendaciis uti eo fine in venditione, ut pervenire possit ad justum pretium, vel ipsis uti tantum ad decipiendum in modico, peccatum veniale est, quamvis illis assidue utatur: licet Hostiensis dicat esse mortale, si assidue fiat, quod falsum est, quia veniale de se, quantumcunque multiplicatur & continuetur, nunquam fit mortale, ut Doctores notant, &c. Graff. l. 2. c. 118. n. 10. Excusari tamen à mortali eum qui utitur amphibólogia in contractu cum juramento, &c. Idem. Tom. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 7. ubi Sayrus & alii.
Others teach, that lying is Venial in Trading; for Example, if one affirm falsely, that his Wine is so many years old, or of such a Country, which if the Buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided all circumstances considered it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less. Bonacin. de contract. disp, 3. q. 1, punct. 2. sect. 2. n. 7. Or if the Sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the Buyer to a rigorous price: by thus lying for the most part they sin but Venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution: because such lies are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of Sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of Buyers, who affirm (falsely) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offered them for less; that they may get it at the lowest rate. Idem ibid. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 4. n. 3 1▪ after others; yea, if they not only lye but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great damage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce; yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in Judgment, and Courts of Judicature; since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in Judgment is destructive of humane Society, and tends to throw the World into confusion. Notwithstanding they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases, I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lye in Court, if the end of it be but delight, (l)is harmless. Also, Witnesses may lye there seriously, if they do it ⟨p. 250⟩not as Witnesses, and in (m)matters judicial: and (n)the Judg too, if he lye not as a Judg. Further, (o)they may bear false witness in favour of another; a false testimony for my Neighbour, is not mortal with them; and the reason is, because the Precept forbids false Witness against another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in Judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lye is Venial, whether it be for, or against another.
Others teach, that lying is Venial in Trading; for Example, if one affirm falsly, that his Wine is so many years old, or of such a Countrey, which if the Buyer know to be a lie, he would not buy it at all, or would not give so much for it, this seems no mortal sin, provided all circumstances considered it be as good, and as much worth, or not much less. Bonacin. de contract. disp, 3. q. 1, punct. 2. sect. 2. n. 7. Or if the Sellers affirm with a lie, that the thing cost so much, or was sold to others at such a rate, that they may draw the Buyer to a rigorous price: by thus lying for the most part they sin but Venially, and regularly they are not bound to restitution: because such lyes are customary, and men commonly know that these are the tricks of Sellers, to which those who deal with them give no credit; and for the same reason the same must be said of Buyers, who affirm (falsly) that they bought the thing cheaper, or had it offer'd them for less; that they may get it at the lowest rate. Idem ibid. disp. 3. q. 2. punct. 4. n. 3 1▪ after others; yea, if they not only lye but swear false too with some equivocation, they may be probably excused from mortal sin, if no great dammage be done thereby to another. But though they have no more regard of truth in common conversation, or in commerce; yet it may be expected that they will be more tender of it in Judgment, and Courts of Judicature; since they cannot but acknowledge that the perverting of truth in Judgment is destructive of humane Society, and tends to throw the World into confusion. Notwithstanding they maintain lying there also, and that in many cases, I shall but mention some of them. 1. To lye in Court, if the end of it be but delight, (l)is harmless. Also, Witnesses may lye there seriously, if they do it ⟨p. 250⟩not as Witnesses, and in (m)matters judicial: and (n)the Judg too, if he lye not as a Judg. Further, (o)they may bear false witness in favour of another; a false testimony for my Neighbour, is not mortal with them; and the reason is, because the Precept forbids false Witness against another, not for him. And upon the same account, Soto says, a false testimony may be excused, when it is to hinder one from doing injury. Likewise, when the matter in Judicial process, is not of great consequence, a lye is Venial, whether it be for, or against another.
(l)Durandus & Sylvester. ibid. n. 5.
(m)Navar. secundum Cajetanum. cap. 18. n. 3.
(n)Mortalia sunt judicis ut •c mendacia, reliqua sunt per accidens & ideo venialia. Cajetan. Sum. v. Mendac.
(o)Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortal•: neque adeo quando dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere: quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum. Praeceptum Ex. 20. sub illa forma constituitur. Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testionium. Soto, ibid. l. 5. q. 7. art. 4. Victoriae visum est non esse damnondum de mortali falsitate—qui ut suum tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus see ultra offerentibus ad testificandum salsum—jurando. Vid. Lopez. pars 2. c. 44. p. 264.Testimonium falsum in favorem proximi, non est mortal•: neque adeo quando dicitur, ut idem impediatur injuriam facere: quoniam neque hoc est contra ipsum. Praeceptum Ex. 20. sub illa forma constituitur. Non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testionium. Soto, ibid. l. 5. q. 7. art. 4. Victoriae visum est non esse damnondum de mortali falsitate—qui ut suum tueatur innocentiam, utitur testibus se ultra offerentibus ad testificandum salsum—jurando. Vid. Lopez. pars 2. c. 44. p. 264.
So Navarre (p)and in him Ledesma, (whom he calls the Glory of the Dominican Order) with Soto, (of the same Order and no less renown) maintain, that no lye is mortal in any Court exterior (that of the Judge) or interior (that of the Confessor); which is but Venial, out of Court. So that if the lye be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a Witness in a Trial before a Judge▪ in the face of the Country. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the Liar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A Lye, says Sylvester (q)in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal; because it subverts the truth of Judgment, which tends to the ruin of the Universe. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things, in which the Liar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to ⟨p. 251⟩any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no not in Courts: and in all these by their common Doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only) either they may lye plainly; or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of Judgment), secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person other wise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which, confessed, might endanger him; he and the Witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade, (by saying (r)I know not, or I remember not); may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, To discover it unto thee; and says, such Interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words, in usual (*)form. So that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navarre holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case; denying that to be done, which was done, secretly meaning, In such a Month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and (s)Lopez after him. Sylvester (t)concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the accused not subject to the Judge; in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lye he not lawful, yet it is not mortal, yea it will not be so much as Venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the Judges sense, (u)and true ⟨p. 252⟩in his own;
So Navar (p)and in him Ledesma, (whom he calls the Glory of the Dominican Order) with Soto, (of the same Order and no less renown) maintain, that no lye is mortal in any Court exterior (that of the Judge) or interior (that of the Confessor); which is but Venial, out of Court. So that if the lye be not signally injurious, it is not mortal, however or wherever it be delivered, though by a Witness in a Trial before a Judge▪ in the face of the Countrey. Moreover, it is as innocent in all those cases, wherein the Lyar is not obliged to speak truth, which are not few. A Lye, saies Sylvester (q)in judicial matters, is pernicious and mortal; because it subverts the truth of Judgment, which tends to the ruine of the Ʋniverse. But then he adds, this is to be limited to things, in which the Lyar is bound to speak the truth, and not extended to ⟨p. 251⟩any other. Now they hold, there are very many cases in which they are not obliged to speak the truth, no not in Courts: and in all these by their common Doctrine (not that of the Jesuits only) either they may lye plainly; or (which is all one as to the justice of the practice, and as to the subverting of Judgment), secretly, by equivocation or mental reservation. Antonius Corduba determines, that a person other wise virtuous, being unduly interrogated, whether such a thing was done, which, confessed, might endanger him; he and the Witnesses too, if they cannot otherwise evade, (by saying (r)I know not, or I remember not); may say, though it be false, that it was not done, with this reserve, To discover it unto thee; and says, such Interrogatories may be answered or evaded, by any, with equivocal words, in usual (*)form. So that he is not bound to tell the truth, though he be sworn to declare it. Navar holds that not only virtuous, but any person whatever, may so answer in like case; denying that to be done, which was done, secretly meaning, In such a Month; and this he asserts after Gabriel, Paludanus, Adrian, Vincentius Justinianus, and (s)Lopez after him. Sylvester (t)concludes, when the process is not judicial, or the aceused not subject to the Judge; in this case mentioned, or any other cause whatsoever, though a lye he not lawful, yet it is not mortal, yea it will not be so much as Venial, if answering cautiously, and, as they say, sophistically, he speak that which is false in the Judges sense,
(p)Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, to solo, quod, in judicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictum tale non esset. Navar. cap. 18. n. 3. Censeo in judicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod—ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navarre. Graft. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. & l. 2. c. 143. n. 7.Concludendo nullum mendacium esse mortale, to solo, quod, in judicio exteriori, vel interiori dicatur, quod extra illud dictum tale non esset. Navar. cap. 18. n. 3. Censeo in judicio mendacium circa rem ad id pertinentem levissimam tamen contingens, non esse mortale crimen quod—ostendunt. Domin. a Soto, Covarruvius, Navar. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. & l. 2. c. 143. n. 7.
(q)Mendacium de his quae ad judicium pertinent est perniciosum & mortale: quia subvertit veritatem judicii, quod tendit, in perniciem universitatis, quod limita quantum ad ea, in quibus qui mentitur, tenetur dicere veritatem, non aliter. Ibid. n. 3.
(r)Liceret sibi & testibus injustè interrogatis sic respondere: (quando tunc respondere nescio, non recordor non prodasstt) non furatus sum, intelligendo, ad jure revelandum tibi.—alias tenemur per verba, & modos assuetos, licèt aequivocos injuste, interroganti, respondere. Lopez. cap. 51. p. 264.
(*)Angel. Sum. v. Confess. n. 1.
(s)Intelligendo intra se quod isto vel illo mense non fuerit id res furatus—Navarre opinio testimoniis Gabriel Adriani, Paludens & Vincent. Justiniani, rata habetur. Ibid.
(t)Quum juridice non procedet, vel quia accusatus non est ei subjectus simpliciter vel in hoc casu, aut quacunque alia causa, tune licèt mendacium sic illicitum, non est tamen mortale—Immò non erit etiam veniale, si respondendo cautelose, &, ut aiunt Sophistice, dicat aliquid salsum, apud sensum judicis, & apud suum verum; quia eo casu cum non sit ejus subditus, non tenetur dicere veritatem ad ejus intentionem. Rationem dictorum assignat. Hen. de Gan. Sylv. Sum. v. accusatio. n. 10.
(u)Licèt ei uti aequivocatione, Soto de just. l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. Adrian dicit, talem reum posse dicere non seci, & Cajetan. Opusc. 16. q. 5. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Toll. Instr. l. 5. c. 58.Licèt ei uti aequivocatione, Soto de just. l. 5. q. 6. art. 2. Adrian dicit, talem reum posse dicere non seci, & Cajetan. Opusc. 16. q. 5. Dicit posse respondere se non habuisse complices, quamvis habuerit, in Tol. Instr. l. 5. c. 58.
(w)since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense, and alledges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use Equivocation. Cajetan permits him to deny his Complices, though he had them. If the Judge demand of a Priest upon Oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession? (y)AQUINAS, and all the Doctors conclude, that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, Because he knows it not as a man. And according to V•r•cellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the Judge, he may answer be knows nothing, with this inward reserve, AS A MAN; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks when he swears, he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, TO DISCOVER IT, because it cannot be denied, but that he knows it AS A MAN: (z)but this, says Sylvester, is said against the judgment of all his Doctors, and against the Canon Law, understood according to their common Doctrine, because the Priest is there said, to know it AS GOD. This needs no aggravation; a Priest rather than speak the truth (though (a)the discovery of it may be necessary to secure a Prince or a Nation from ruin), may with mental reservation delude Authority, and blaspheme God, and lye, and swear falsely in open Court; and be justified in all, by the authority ⟨p. 253⟩of the chief Saints and Doctors that Church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.
(w)since not being under him, he is not obliged to speak truth in his sense, and alledges Henricus de Gandavo, with his reason for it. Soto allows him to use Equivication. Cajetan permits him to deny his Complices, though he had them. If the Judge demand of a Priest upon Oath, whether he knew such a thing by confession? (y)AQƲINAS, and all the Doctors conclude, that he may swear he knows it not, though it hath been confessed to him, Because he knows it not as a man. And according to V•r•cellus, if he cannot otherwise decline the Judge, he may answer be knows nothing, with this inward reserve, AS A MAN; and in this Richard. de Sancto Victore, Bonaventure, Scotus and Panormitan agree; yet Angelus thinks when he swears, he knows it not, it had better be with this reserve, TO DISCOVER IT, because it cannot be deny'd, but that he knows it AS A MAN: (z)but this, saies Sylvester, is said against the judgment of all his Doctors, and against the Canon Law, understood according to their common Doctrine, because the Priest is there said, to know it AS GOD. This needs no aggravation; a Priest rather than speak the truth (though (a)the discovery of it may be nenessary to secure a Prince or a Nation from ruine), may with mental reservation delude Authority, and blaspheme God, and lye, and swear falsly in open Court; and be justified in all, by the authority ⟨p. 253⟩of the chief Saints and Doctors that Church has had, and such as she gloried in, before Ignatius had any disciples.
(w)Non tenetur respondere etiamsi jurasset dicere veritatem secundum, Henr. de Gand.—sed dicetne mendacium? Resp. quod non sed utetur aliis verbis duplicibus & silatis. Angel. Surn. v. Confess. n. 1.
(y)Quid. si judex instat, vel exigit juramentum à sacerdote an per confessionem sciat aliquid de tali facto? Et dico quod secundum, S. Tho. & omnes doctores, sacerdos si ab eo quaeretur, de aliquo absente, an aliquid sciat quod audivit in confessione jurare potest, se nescire illud: quia non scit illud in quantum homo—Secundùm Vervec, si alio modo iniquum judicem declinare non potest: respondere potest se nihil scire quia subintelligiter ut homo—& consentit Rich. Bonav. Scot. & Pan. Sylvest. v. confessio 3. n. 6.
(z)Quod ejus dictum est contra omnem doctrinam suorum Doctorum et contra C. si sacerd. intellectum juxta communem doctrinam: quia ibi dicitur sacerdos hoc scire ut Deus.
(a)Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantum esse, ut in nullo casu, & propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republice ab ingenti malo temporally aut spirituali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum Altisiod tenet. D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard, Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis. Adrian. Medina. Viguer. Sylv. & alii summistae, omnes Pet. Soto. Domin. Soto. Navarre. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma in Suar. Tom. 34. disp. 33. sect. 1. n. 2.Certum est obligationem hujus precepti tantum esse, ut in nullo casu, & propter nullum finem, etiam pro tuenda tota republice ab ingenti malo temporali aut spirituali, violare illud liceat. Ita docent theologi omnes contra unum Altisiod tenet. D. Tho. S. Bonav. Richard, Scotus, Durand. Palud. Major. Capreol. Gabriel. Alensis. Adrian. Medina. Viguer. Sylv. & alii summistae, omnes Pet. Soto. Domin. Soto. Navar. Covarruv. Simanca. Cajetan. Ledesma in Suar. Tom. 34. disp. 33. sect. 1. n. 2.
But though truth suffer so much by them in civil things; it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine Offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations: no, even there she is prostituted before their Altars, in their Pulpits, and their penitential Tribunals. Their Liturgies have been stuffed with Fables, and Lies made both the ground and part of their public devotion. Their own (1)Writers take notice of (2)plain lies recited in their daily Prayers. And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guess by a part. (3)Peter Abbot of Cluny declares, that in a Church hymn in praise of Saint Benet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all; yet he found 24 lies at least. Some reformation hereof was thought requisite, for shame of the World. But though the old sore smelt noisomely even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, least nothing at all of the old Service should be lest. Melchior Canus, (a Bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent where he sate), acknowledged some years after, that there are things read in their Church-Service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous and false too; but yet he thought it not advisable, to have this throughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account want prudence. They cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; They bring in grave stories ⟨p. 254⟩instead of what were false, but they change the Church-Service so far from what it was, that scarce any show of the old Religion seems less in the daily Prayers: whereby he lets us understand what their old Religion or religious Service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lies or forgeries were left therein. Another learned Bishop of their Church, who survived the Trent-Council, and all the Orders there made for Reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there; but of something worse too, in these words: (b)if the Bishop of Lyons, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their Missals and Antiphonaries; were now alive, and did behold them: Oh with what terms would be set them out? for our prayert are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation, through the fault of the Bishops.
But though truth suffer so much by them in civil things; it may be she may find sanctuary in their divine Offices, and be secured there from such shameful violations: no, even there she is prostituted before their Astars, in their Pulpits, and their penitential Tribunals. Their Lyturgies have been stuffed with Fables, and Lyes made both the ground and part of their publick devotion. Their own (1)Writers take notice of (2)plain lyes recited in their daily Prayers. And what store of them there were in the whole, we may guess by a part. (3)Peter Abbat of Cluny declares, that in a Church hymn in praise of Saint Benet, though reading it cursorily, and not marking all; yet he found 24 lyes at least. Some reformation hereof was thought repuisite, for shame of the World. But though the old sore smelt noisomly even to the sense of those amongst themselves who had any; yet it must be touched tenderly, and not all the corruption let out, least nothing at all of the old Service should be lest. Melchior Canus, (a Bishop from whom better things might be expected than most in the Council of Trent where he sate), acknowledged some years after, that there are things read in their Church-Service that are uncertain, counterfeit, frivolous and false too; but yet he thought it not adviseable, to have this throughly purged. Those that attempt it, in his account want prudence. They cure a sore nail, but mischief the head; They bring in grave stories ⟨p. 254⟩instead of what were false, but they change the Church-Service so far from what it was, that scarce any shew of the old Religion seems less in the daily Prayers: whereby he lets us understand what their old Religion or religious Service is, since so little or nothing of it would be left, if no lyes or forgeries were left therein. Another learned Bishop of their Church, who survived the Trent-Council, and all the Orders there made for Reformation, not only complains still of false and foolish things there; but of something worse too, in these words: (b)if the Bishop of Lyons, says he, who declared that he had corrected superfluous, and ridiculous, and blasphemous things, in their Missalls and Antiphonaries; were now alive, and did behold them: Oh with what terms would be set them out? for our prayert are defiled with most filthy corruptions; but the rest will admit of no reformation, through the fault of the Bishops.
(1)Vid. Espenc. come. in 2 Tom. c. 4. digr. 21.Vid. Espenc. com. in 2 Tom. c. 4. digr. 21.
(2)Nuper Raphael. Volateranus ausus est scribere dolendum, aperta in horis Canonicis legi mendacia. Ibid. p. 424.
(3)Nosti quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nugae canorae mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurimae sunt—mendacia ad minus 24 canticum id, citato percurrens animo, reperi. Ibid. p. 433. In res sacras hanc quoque mentiendi licentiam irrepsisse, seu potius aperte invectam esse. Ludovic. Vives, l. 2. de corruptis artibus, Espens. in 1 Tim. digr. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156. Quae in Ecclesia legi solent—quanquam nonnulla ex his incerta sunt, apocrypha levia, falsa. Loc. Theol. l. 11. c. 5. p. 911. In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dumb reduviam currant, capiti incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesiae officium usque eo praeter solitam immutant, ut vi• ulla antique religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur. Ibid. p. 910.Nosti quantum me pigeant falsa in Ecclesia Dei cantica, quantum nugae canorae mihi odibiles, inter quas, nam plurimae sunt—mendacia ad minus 24 canticum id, citato percurrens animo, reperi. Ibid. p. 433. In res sacras hanc quoque mentiendi licentiam irrepsisse, seu potius aperte invectam esse. Ludovic. Vives, l. 2. de corruptis artibus, Espens. in 1 Tim. digr. l. 1. c. 11. p. 156. Quae in Ecclesia legi solent—quanquam nonnulla ex his incerta sunt, apocrypha levia, falsa. Loc. Theol. l. 11. c. 5. p. 911. In his prudentia desideratur. Quidam namque dum reduviam curant, capiti incommodant, videlicet historias graves pro apocryphis reddunt quidem, sed divinum Ecclesiae officium usque eo praeter solitam immutant, ut vi• ulla antiqu• religionis forma in quotidianis precibus relicta esse videatur. Ibid. p. 910.
(b)Episcopus ille Lugdunensis qui dixit se in missaltbus & antiphonariis superflu•, levia falsa ridicula; blaspheme phantastica multa correxisse; si nunc viveret & ea con•iceret Deum immortalem! quo ea nomine depingeret? sunt (enim) preces (nostrae) turpissimis mendis conspurcatae: come. in Tim. 1. l. 1. 157. Espencaeus, in the words of Lindanus.Episcopus ille Lugdunensis qui dixit se in missaltbus & antiphonariis superflu, levia falsa ridicula; blaspheme phantastica multa correxisse; si nunc viveret & ea coniceret Deum immortalem! quo ea nomine depingeret? sunt (enim) preces (nostrae) turpissimis mendis conspurcatae: com. in Tim. 1. l. 1. 157. Espencaeus, in the words of Lindanus.
He signifies, that there was something worse in their Service-Books, than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff, which that ancient Bishop Agohardus corrected, in the old Missals and Antiphonaries: declaring expressly, that their prayers now were polluted with most filthy Corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them, in the Pulpit, though that (where is bears any sway at all) is its Throne. A Preacher may lye, by Cajetans (c)leave, if he does it not as a Preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty; and lying when he is Preaching, will be but Venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lye in the Pulpit, if he can do it wittily; (d)he may mix his Sermons with false stories, (if they ⟨p. 255⟩be facetious) to please his auditory, (e)that's commonly a Venial- He may (f)tell a tale in his Sermon, or any thing ridiculous, if he do it with some wit this is commonly no worse than Venial; no nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lye too, as a serious Divine; and instill false Doctrine into the people without any fault but what is Venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude. (g)They limit it indeed, to matters under Counsel; but this does not much straiten them; for practical Divinity being the most proper Subject for Sermons, and virtues, with Christian duties, (and the opposite sins,) being, by their common Doctrine, in a manner all reduced to Counsels, some way or other (as we have showed before): they have liberty enough left them, to do nothing else but lye instead of Preaching. But in any matters of Divinity whatsoever, speculative, or practical; enjoined, or but advised; they may lye at as easy a rate, if (h)it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger, and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publicly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some show of modesty, and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those, who held it was no mortal sin to lye in the Pulpit, and acted accordingly; 7and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lies as ⟨p. 256⟩the people would smell out. But this cautiousness, was not always thought needful;
He signifies, that there was something worse in their Service-Books, than that idle, false, ridiculous, and blasphemous stuff, which that antient Bishop Agohardus corrected, in the old Missals and Antiphonaries: declaring expresly, that their prayers now were poluted with most filthy Corruptions, and that without hope of amendment. Nor is truth more secure amongst them, in the Pulpit, though that (where is bears any sway at all) is its Throne. A Preacher may lye, by Cajetans (c)leave, if he does it not as a Preacher, or in things which belong to him as such. In other matters, it seems, he may take his liberty; and lying when he is Preaching, will be but Venial, unless it be scandalous. He may lye in the Pulpit, if he can do it wittily; (d)he may min his Sermons with false stories, (if they ⟨p. 255⟩be facetious) to please his auditory, (e)that's commonly a Venial- He may (f)tell a tale in his Sermon, or any thing ridiculous, if he do it with some wit this is commonly no worse than Venial; no nor so bad, if it be done succinctly, to make the people merry, so the mirth be honest. He may lye too, as a serious Divine; and instill false Doctrine into the people without any fault but what is Venial, if it be done without contempt or scandal, so Summa Angelica, and Rosella, with others, conclude. (g)They limit it indeed, to matters under Counsel; but this does not much straiten them; for practical Divinity being the most proper Subject for Sermons, and vertues, with Christian duties, (and the opposite sins,) being, by their common Doctrine, in a manner all reduced to Counsels, some way or other (as we have shew'd before): they have liberty enough left them, to do nothing else but lye instead of Preaching. But in any matters of Divinity whatsoever, speculative, or practical; injoyned, or but advised; they may lye at as easie a rate, if (h)it be but done out of a fluent faculty, or without danger, and design of doing signal mischief. Their practice publickly allowed, has outdone their rules; for these, though licentious enough, must have now and then some shew of modesty, and caution. Sylvester takes notice of those, who held it was no mortal sin to lye in the Pulpit, and acted accordingly;
(c)Sam. v. mendicium, p. 437. omne mendacium predicatoris contra veritatem spectantem ad predicatoris officium (est mortale)—quoniam haec tantum sunt predicatores ut sic—mendacia: reliqua sunt per accidens, & ideo venialia: nisi rationes scandali aliud occurrat censendum.
(d)Quaeritur utrum fit peccatum mortal predicatori mentiri in ambone? & dico quod non, in eis quae non spectant ad doctrinam puta, • dicat aliqua jocosa. Sylv. v. Mendac. n. 4. Graft. l. 2. cap. 143. n. 5. S. Thom. in opusc. 4. precept. 8.Quaeritur utrum fit peccatum mortale predicatori mentiri in ambone? & dico quod non, in eis quae non spectant ad doctrinam puta, • dicat aliqua jocosa. Sylv. v. Mendac. n. 4. Graff. l. 2. cap. 143. n. 5. S. Thom. in opusc. 4. precept. 8.
(e)Immiscere predicationi facetas fabellus delictaudi gratia quod B. Ambrosius reprehendit quia non debent, in tam gravi actione de rebus tam arduis qualia sunt divina verba, immisceri jocosa & ridicula. Communiter tamen est hoc veniale. Cajetan. sum. v. predicat: p. 481.
(f)Qui concioni fabulam & facetias, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum & Cajetanum, sed commaniter non plusquam venialiter, juxta •undem, imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit, Augustin. Triumphus Navarre. c. 25. n. 142-Qui concioni fabulam & facetias, aut aliquid ridiculum miscet, peccat quidem juxta S. Antoninum & Cajetanum, sed commaniter non plusquam venialiter, juxta •undem, imo non semper venialiter, ut cum ad hilaritatem honestam breviter dicuntur, ut tradit, Augustin. Triumphus Navar. c. 25. n. 142-
(g)In pertinentibus ad doctrinam tenent. Sum. Angel. & Rosell. quod non sit mortale, nisi ratione scandali vel contemptus doctrine annexi: vel nisi in his que sunt de necessitate facienda, intellige etiam omittenda, secus si ex consilio, Sylvest. v. mendac. n. 4.
(h)Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacrae scripturae vel morum—quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo & periculo nocendi notabiliter. Navarre. c. 18. n. 4.Peccat qui mentitur in materia fidei, sacrae scripturae vel morum—quod limitat Cajetanus, non procedere quando id fit per solum multiloquium, vel alias sine animo & periculo nocendi notabiliter. Navar. c. 18. n. 4.
he that reads the Legends, which served the people heretofore for Sermons: will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false; as may fully convince him, that the Spirit which acted them, was seven times worse, than that which inspired Ahab's Prophets. And where they are now disused: its not with any acknowledgement, that such notorious lies, were not fit to be Preached; but for shame of that part of the world, which they could no longer delude, and abuse. And even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their Priests since, have this testimony from one of their own Doctors: (k)The law says he, is perished from Priests; for History, they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lies; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of Devils. That such Doctrine, should have some confirmation, is no more than needs: they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espenceous calls, Devilish prodigies. And (l)false relics, or miracles, they allow to be showed, or published; it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre; and it is not filthy lucre, (m)if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.
he that reads the Legends, which served the people heretofore for Sermons: will find there multitudes of such stories, so absurdly, ridiculously, horridly false; as may fully convince him, that the Spirit which acted them, was seven times worse, than that which inspired Ahabs Prophets. And where they are now disused: its not with any acknowledgment, that such notorious lyes, were not fit to be Preached; but for shame of that part of the world, which they could no longer delude, and abuse. And even after their reformation, they could not quite leave their old habit; their Priests since, have this testimony from one of their own Doctors: (k)The law saies he, is perished from Priests; for History, they recite fables; for serious things, jests; for truth, lyes; for the power of God, feigned miracles, not to say the prodigies of Devils. That such Doctrine, should have some confirmation, is no more than needs: they provided such as was answerable to it, such are their false miracles, which their (now mentioned) Espenceous calls, Divilish prodigies. And (l)false reliques, or miracles, they allow to be shew'd, or published; it is not a mortal sin with them, unless it be done for filthy lucre; and it is not filthy lucre, (m)if it be done principally for a good end, and less principally for gain.
(k)Verum lex periit à sacerdotibus; recitant pro Historia fabulas, pro seriis joca, pro veritate mendacium,—pro virtute Dei fictitia miracula ne dicam portenta Dae• niorum. Espencaeus, Serm. 1. De officio pastorum. After he hath premised something of the preaching and writing of false Miracles, he adds: At facilius Augia stabulum, quam talibus fabellis multorum tam libros, tam concio nes repurges, in 2 Tim. c. 4. digr. 21. p. 424.
(l)Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis quaestus. Navarre. cap. 17: n. 169. Graft. l. 2. c. 134. n. 30. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, Si causa turpis quaestus fiat, id est, eo fine aliquid accipiendi pro ostensione earum.Peccat qui utitur falsis reliquiis aut veris, causa turpis quaestus. Navar. cap. 17: n. 169. Graff. l. 2. c. 134. n. 30. Idem dic de illo, qui utitur falsis reliquiis, Si causa turpis quaestus fiat, id est, eo fine aliquid accipiendi pro ostensione earum.
And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation, that they will be restrained from lying; unless in their Sacrament of Penance: that is, in their account, the holiest Rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech: Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect; one would think, in this act at least they should count themselves obliged, to be far from such a ⟨p. 257⟩crime, as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears, that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their Religion; they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them, where they will not find a place for lying and deceit: and that where-ever they have liberty of speech, they must have leave to lye. 'Tis the (n)common Doctrine, that they may lye in confession, which yet they say, is directed principally to God; and they look upon the Confessors chair as the Divine Tribunal. The confient may deny (o)that ever he committed those Venial sins which he is guilty of, (p)or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either Venial or mortal sin, to his Confessor, (q)if he be not sufficient. Or he may deny (r)that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed; if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his Confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him and looks upon him as God, and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before.) To this purpose, when their wickedness is too shameful to be made known to a sober Priest; a person may have (s)two Confessors, one a ⟨p. 258⟩lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins: denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their Confessors with plain lies, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (no Jesuit) offers us several instances; Select. disp. 9. He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it; if he think his Confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the Confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it; may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, I have no such custom, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present. n. 7.
And now I cannot devise where there can be any expectation, that they will be restrained from lying; unless in their Sacrament of Penance: that is, in their account, the holiest Rite, wherein the partakers have liberty of speech: Here they confess sin, and profess to do it with a sincere abhorrence of it, as before God, in order to pardon, which they then expect; one would think, in this act at least they should count themselves obliged, to be far from such a ⟨p. 257⟩crime, as offering violence to truth; but hereby it appears, that truth can in no wise be fastened to any part of their Religion; they let us know that there is nothing so holy amongst them, where they will not find a place for lying and deceit: and that where-ever they have liberty of speech, they must have leave to lye. 'Tis the (n)common Doctrine, that they may lye in confession, which yet they say, is directed principally to God; and they look upon the Confessors chair as the Divine Tribunal. The confient may deny (o)that ever he committed those Venial sins which he is guilty of, (p)or affirm he is guilty when he is not, or he may deny either Venial or mortal sin, to his Confessor, (q)if he be not sufficient. Or he may deny (r)that ever he acted those mortal sins which he has committed; if he has confessed them to another. And thus he may without mortal sin delude and cheat his Confessor, even when he is upon his knees before him and looks upon him as God, and not as man (for so they are taught to do, as we said before.) To this purpose, when their wickedness is too shameful to be made known to a sober Priest; a person may have (s)two Confessors, one a ⟨p. 258⟩lewd fellow like himself, to whom he may, without shame, confess the worst debauches; and the other more civil, to whom he may confess his lesser sins: denying, if he be asked, that he is guilty of any greater. And as they may abuse their Confessors with plain lyes, so likewise with equivocations. Joh. Sanchez (no Jesuite) offers us several instances; Select. disp. 9. He that is not able to make restitution, may affirm he has done it; if he think his Confessor be ignorant, and would not absolve him without it. He that is accustomed to some wickedness, and thinks the Confessor would not absolve him if he confessed it; may with equivocation deny it is his custom; to this sense, I have no such custome, not absolutely, but which I will confess at present. n. 7.
(n)Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. 1. n. 9. Nav. c. 21. n. 37. Graft. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. Covarruvius. Petr. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salonius, &c. in •ll•r. 4. n. 44. alii in Suar. Tom. 4. disp. 22. sect. 10. Circa eas circumstantias, quae nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis—non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendaciam, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale g•avias quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi, (viz. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma, Armilla, Angel•, Sylvest. Soto, Navarre. Pen Soto.) Idem ibid. n. 3▪ & 6.Angelus, v. Confess. Sylvest. v. Confess. 1. n. 9. Nav. c. 21. n. 37. Graff. l. 1. c. 14. n. 6. Covarruvius. Petr. Soto in Victorell. p. 530. Bannes, Salonius, &c. in •ll•r. 4. n. 44. alii in Suar. Tom. 4. disp. 22. sect. 10. Circa eas circumstantias, quae nullo modo pertinent ad materiam confessionis—non est peccatum mortale miscere aliquod mendaciam, sive affirmando sive negando; sed est veniale g•avias quam esset simile mendacium extra illum actum. In hoc conveniunt omnes doctores citandi, (viz. Richardus Paludan. Bonavent. Cajetan. Ledesma, Armilla, Angel•, Sylvest. Soto, Navar. Pen Soto.) Idem ibid. n. 3▪ & 6.
(o)Navarre. ibid. n. 37. Soto in opusc. d• secret memb. 2. q. 7. Sylvest. ibid. Est cert• mentiri in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in quo etiam omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (viz. jam laudati). Suar. ibid. n. 4.Navar. ibid. n. 37. Soto in opusc. d• secret memb. 2. q. 7. Sylvest. ibid. Est cert• mentiri in materia non necessaria negando factum, non esse peccatum mortale, in quo etiam omnes conveniunt quos statim referemus (viz. jam laudati). Suar. ibid. n. 4.
(p)Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali—non esse peccatum mortale per se l•quendo, hoc est secluso scandalo & contemptu, tenet Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Pe, Soto, Navarre. Idem ibid. N. V.
yea he may deny it, though he believe the Priest would absolve him, n. 8. Also he that is in the next occasion to sin, which he cannot avoid without great inconvenience or scandal; may, using equivocation, deny it, n. 9. Or if the penitent be known to the Confessor, who well understands that he has a Sister with whom he commits uncleanness, not removed out of his house, and so will not believe but he is in such occasion to sin: he may feign himself to be another, changing his voice, habit, name, Country, and the like, without plain lying; yet using equivocation (n. 10. after Navarre) yea though he be a Religious person, he may do thus, and deny his order with equivocation (ibid.) And as the penitents may thus delude their Confessors, so they may have their satisfaction on them, and delude them likewise: pretending to absolve them, when they neither do it, nor intend it, Idem disp. 35. n. 1. n. 7, & 8. Antonin. Dian. resol. v. equiv. Let the world judg where we may be assured of truth and honesty in Romanists, that walk by these rules (which the holiest of their Doctors give them); since they think not themselves obliged thereto, in any of the cases specified. If by their Doctrine, they may without danger be false to private persons, to Magistrates, to their Priests, to their God: where can they have credit? if they may practice lying and deceit in common conversation, in commerce, in Doctrine, in Worship, in Courts of Justice, and before that which they count Gods Tribunal; where may they be trusted?
yea he may deny it, though he believe the Priest would absolve him, n. 8. Also he that is in the next occasion to sin, which he cannot avoid without great inconvenience or scandal; may, using equivocation, deny it, n. 9. Or if the penitent be known to the Confessor, who well understands that he has a Sister with whom he commits uncleanness, not removed out of his house, and so will not believe but he is in such occasion to sin: he may feign himself to be another, changing his voice, habit, name, Country, and the like, without plain lying; yet using equivocation (n. 10. after Navar) yea though he be a Religious person, he may do thus, and deny his order with equivocation (ibid.) And as the penitents may thus delude their Confessors, so they may have their satisfaction on them, and delude them likewise: pretending to absolve them, when they neither do it, nor intend it, Idem disp. 35. n. 1. n. 7, & 8. Antonin. Dian. resol. v. equiv. Let the world judg where we may be assured of truth and honesty in Romanists, that walk by these rules (which the holiest of their Doctors give them); since they think not themselves obliged thereto, in any of the cases specified. If by their Doctrine, they may without danger be false to private persons, to Magistrates, to their Priests, to their God: where can they have credit? if they may practice lying and deceit in common conversation, in commerce, in Doctrine, in Worship, in Courts of Justice, and before that which they count Gods Tribunal; where may they be trusted?
They give as much liberty to violate Faith, as truth; and no less encouragement to perfidiousness, and breach of promises: either where faith is engaged mutually, as in compacts, and agreements; or singly as in pollicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious: to be perfidious merely for delight, is Venial; to deal perfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious, to pass for innocent. (t)Cajetan gives this reason, why the two former sorts of perfidiousness, are but Venial; because from a simple promise no duty ariseth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie•: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved, and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think, those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and humane society; should for this reason rather judg both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter; (u)To make a promise, without an intent to •e obliged, is but Venial, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe so; nor to be obliged to it, by that which should engage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but Venially. If all men should ⟨p. 260⟩take the liberty, which this rule gives Roman Catholics, (x)humane society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth; thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navarre after many others, determines else where, does it more fully. He (y)that promiseth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promise; if he be asked, whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise, that was obliging; and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lye; and swear that he did it not, when he did it, and so be perjured innocently, because he promised, as a perfidious knave.
THey give as much liberty to violate Faith, as truth; and no less incouragement to perfidiousness, and breach of promises: either where faith is ingaged mutually, as in compacts, and agreements; or singly as in pollicitations. They distinguish perfidiousness as they do lying, and accordingly make the like decisions for both. There is a pleasant perfidiousness, another which they call officious, and a third pernicious: to be perfidious meerly for delight, is Venial; to deal perperfidiously, if it be for the advantage of any, and no great hurt to others, is as harmless; and they have ways enow to make that which is pernicious, to pass for innocent. (t)Cajetan gives this reason, why the two former sorts of perfidiousness, are but Venial; because from a simple promise no duty ariseth, but that natural duty of not telling a lie•: for in each is a moral duty, without which moral honesty cannot be preserved, and both are reduced to the same virtue, to wit, that of veracity: and both respect others, being for the society, and advantage, and conversation of mankind. One would think, those who regard natural duty, moral honesty, or veracity, and humane society; should for this reason rather judg both to be great crimes, than either of them petty faults. But let us take notice of their rules for conscience in this matter; (u)To make a promise, without an intent to •e obliged, is but Venial, if no great hurt be done or intended to others. He promiseth, but while he is doing it, intends not to perform, though he make others believe so; nor to be obliged to it, by that which should ingage any one who has faith and honesty; and yet offends but Venially. If all men should ⟨p. 260⟩take the liberty, which this rule gives Roman Catholicks, (x)humane society would disband; all confidence on promises and assurances vanisheth; thereby I can never be sure of another, nor he of me. That which Navar after many others, determines else where, does it more fully. He (y)that promiseth any thing outwardly, without any intention to promise; if he be asked, whether he promised, he may deny it, understanding that he made not any promise, that was obliging; and he may swear it too. He may promise, and yet not intend to promise, and so cheat; he may deny that he promised, and so lye; and swear that he did it not, when he did it, and so be perjur'd innocently, because he promised, as a peefidious knave.
(t)Perfidia quidem jocosa & officiosa venialis est; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mentiendi: nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate & conversation humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.Perfidia quidem jocosa & officiosa venialis est; quoniam ex simplici promissione non nascitur majus debitum, quam sit naturale debitum non mentiendi: nam utrumque debitum est debitum morale, sine quo morum honestas salvari nequit: & ad eandem virtutem reduci creditur, scil. ad virtutem veracitatis: & utrumque ad alterum est, pro convictu, utilitate & conversatione humana. Sum. v. perfidia. p. 460.
(u)Navarre. c. 18. n. 6. Sylvester, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.Navar. c. 18. n. 6. Sylvester, v. pact. 4. Angelus, Sum. v. pactum.
(x)Nisi fide stet respublica •pibus non stabit. Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. Fides haec non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est ipsissimum justitiae sundamentem. Cicer. 1. de off. periret convictus humanus & fides, si sibi persuaderent hominus, in promissis frauger• fidem, & verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam venial. Lopez. p. 2. c. 30.Nisi fide stet respublica •pibus non stabit. Liv. 3. doc. l. 1. Fides haec non solum ad justitiam attinet, verum est ipsissimum justitiae sundamentem. Cicer. 1. de off. periret convictus humanus & fides, si sibi persuaderent hominus, in promissis frauger• fidem, & verba dare non esse genere suo plusquam veniale. Lopez. p. 2. c. 30.
(y)Qui promisit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promisisse, promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare, Vid. Navarre. in C. humanae aures 22. q. 5. q. 1 & 2. pro hoc doctrine adducit, S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adriau & alios.Qui promisit exterius aliquid absque intentione promittendi, si interrogatur, an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo, se non promisisse, promissione obligante, & sic etiam jurare, Vid. Navar. in C. humanae aures 22. q. 5. q. 1 & 2. pro hoc doctrine adducit, S. Thom. Scotum, Paludan. Ricard. de Sancto Victore. Major. Adriau & alios.
Sylvester inquires, (z)whether one by a promise alone or a compact, be obliged in conscience? he answers, he is bound under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters signifying that in other matters, it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navarre expresses their common opinion, when he tells us, (a)that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why should perfidiousness be a crime in great things, and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice, (b)great wrong is done, and so by accident perfidiousness becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of ⟨p. 261⟩injustice, is no crime, a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withal unjust too, there's no danger. And so the world must believe, that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness: as if those who may by their rules, without scruple be false and faithless; will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach, (c)that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin; though they confirm the promise with an Oath or a Vow. Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revoked, without mortal sin. Panormitan. Jason. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3. yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God too, it does not oblige him. Idem ibid. n. 2. And how can it be expected they should be faithful, as to any engagement to man, who think, they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concerned, either as a witness (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at so easy a rate.
Sylvester inquires, (z)whether one by a promise alone or a compact, be obliged in conscience? he answers, he is bound under pain of mortal sin, if it be of important matters signifying that in other matters, it is no mortal sin to break promises or agreements. And Navar expresses their common opinion, when he tells us, (a)that the violation of a promise in a small matter is not mortal, though it be Venial. But why should perfidiousnness be a crime in great things, and not in lesser; since it is no less perfidiousness in one than the other, and faith and truth is equally violated in both? The reason they give is, because in great matters there is injustice, (b)great wrong is done, and so by acccident perfidiousness becomes criminal, from whence it follows, that perfidiousness, how great soever, without the addition of ⟨p. 261⟩injustice, is no crime, a man may be as treacherous, and faithless as he will, if he be not withall unjust too, there's no danger. And so the world must believe, that they would oblige men to be just, though not to truth or faithfulness: as if those who may by their rules, without scruple be false and faithless; will make any conscience, or find any more reason, to be just and righteous. However they teach, (c)that they who promise but small things, and perform not, are excused from mortal sin; though they confirm the promise with an Oath or a Vow. Whether the thing promised be little or great, if it be an internal promise, though an Oath be added not to revoke it; yet it obliges not, but may be revoked, without mortal sin. Panormitan. Jason. Rebellus & alii cum Bonacin de contract. disp. 3. q. 12. punct. 2. n. 1. & 3. yea, if it be made in the form of a Vow, yet when it is of a thing indifferent or less good; as if a man inwardly promise to marry such a woman, and promise it to God too, it does not oblige him. Idem ibid. n. 2. And how can it be expected they should be faithful, as to any ingagement to man, who think, they are not bound to observe truth or faith with God, how much soever concern'd, either as a witness (in Oaths) or as a party (in Vows)? Well but when the matter is of great importance, may they not then break promises, bargains, or compact; may not perfidiousness, which themselves account pernicious, pass commonly for an innocent Venial; yes, they have ways enough ready to make this currant, at so easie a rate.
(z)Quaeritur utrum ex sola promissione sive ex pacto, quis obligetur in conscientia: & dico quod sic sub peceato mortali in rebus scilicet alicujus importantiae. Ibid.
(a)Nec violatio promissae rei exiguae erit mortalis, quamvis venialis sit. c. 18. n. 7. Soto, Canus, Victoria, Sylvester, in Lopez. pars 2. c. 30.
(b)Quando non per se est persidus, non jucurret mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocumentum sen •eandalam. Caietan. v. perfidia.Quando non per se est persidus, non iucurret mortale, nisi per accidens, hoc est, propter notabile nocumentum sen •eandalam. Caietan. v. perfidia.
(c)A mortali excusantur qui—parva pollicentur (& non implent) etiamsi juramento, aut v•to id ipsum confirmassent secundum eos quos sequimur, (viz. Antonin. Sylvest. Soto,) Navarre. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.A mortali excusantur qui—parva pollicentur (& non implent) etiamsi juramento, aut v•to id ipsum confirmassent secundum eos quos sequimur, (viz. Antonin. Sylvest. Soto,) Navar. c. 18. n. 7. c. 12. n. 10.
The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is engaged (the good nature of one party concerned, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and ⟨p. 262⟩faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a (e)man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is engaged, when he did not mean it): for, says he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloths to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f)that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an University, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those forementioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides those, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g)that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly ⟨p. 263⟩done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.
The worst perfidiousness in the world, may be excused from mortal guilt, according to Cajetan, (d)through ignorance of the fact; or through forgetfulness (if one forget to be honest, he may be innocently a knave); or out of confidence in him, to whom he is ingaged (the good nature of one party concern'd, may be a warrant to the other to break faith with him); or for any cause, which he thinks reasonable. He need have said no more than this, any one may violate all truth, and ⟨p. 262⟩faith; not only, when there is some reasonable cause; but when there there is any that seems but so to him: when any thing will seem so to him, who is disposed to play the knave. This is enough to Licence a world of perfidiousness; but this is not all. Sylvester after others tells us, a (e)man is not obliged to perform, promise or compact, if he had not a mind to oblige himself thereby; yea or if he had a mind to dissemble, (to feign that he is ingaged, when he did not mean it): for, saies he, though he offend, yet he is not obliged, unless there was a cause from some command, which, of it self, would oblige him: as for Example, if he had promised Cloths to his Father, and he is now starving for cold, in such a case (would ye think it?) one may be bound to keep his promise, to wit, when he would have been a monster, if he had not done the thing, though he had never promised it. He tells us else-where, (f)that a promise does oblige, when it is made to a City, or an Ʋniversity, the Clergy, the Church, or the poor of a certain place, in case it be for some cause, to wit, for the honour of God, or the like: but if there be no cause, it does not bind, though it be made to those foremenrioned; and it does not bind, when it is made to any other besides tbose, though there be cause for it. Others maintain (g)that a promise or compact does not oblige in conscience to performance, if the cause why it is made be not expressed; so Panormitan, Angelus and Rosella, with others: so that if a man forbear but to mention the cause (which is most commonly ⟨p. 263⟩done, and may be always), though he bind himself with ten thousand promises or covenants, he may with a safe conscience break them all, by their rules. They hold that the firmest promise does but bind under Venial guilt. Cajetan, Armilla, Rebellus, Garzias, in Bonacin. ibid. n. 12.
(d)Excusatur à mortali—ex parte formae, hoc est quia non per se, seu ex intentione peccatum illud fit—sed ex oblivione, aut ignorantia fucti, aut ex fiducia quam accipit de eo cui promisit, aut ex causa quae sibi videtur rationabilis. Sum. v. perfidia.
(e)Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum see obligandi see•s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing• di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi see. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.Est Theologorum doctrina (quod obligatur) si habuit animum se obligandi see•s si habuit animum essendi liber usque ad redditionem: vel si habuit animam fing• di: quia licet peccet non obligatur tamen, nisi subesset causa de se ex praecepto obligans: puta, si promissa est patri vestis, & frigoribus alget. Ibid. n. 4. Alias si non habuit animum obligandi, non tenetur subpoena mortalis peccati ad pactum nudum servandam: nisi subesset causa quae ad hoc obligaret de necessitate precepti, puta, promisi patri meo vestem, qui moritur ex frigore, quoniam tenetur quamvis non habuerit animum obligendi se. Angel sum. v. pactum n. 4.
(f)Utrum autem quis obligatur ex pollicitatione? & dico quod sic quando pollicetur civitati, universitati, clero Ecclesiae, vel pauperibus alicujus loci, & ex causa: puta, ad honorem Dei & hujusmodi: secus si fiat praedictis sine causa: vel aliis à praedictis etiam cum causa: quia non obligatur, nisi praetextu promissionis aliquid caeperit. Ibid v. pollicitatio. Ità & eisdem verbis. Angelus sum. v pollicitatio.
(g)In Sylvest. ibid. v. pactum n. 4. promissio sive pactum obligat in conscientia—hoc antem sum. Aug. & Rosell. & est limitatio Coll. quem sequitur Panor. quando exprimitur causa promittendi.
Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more then Venial guilt, whether the matter be small, or great, which is promised. ibid. n. 11. (h)Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite; that he who makes it, should have a mind to be so bound by it: and so in promising (as he says), unless there be an Oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual: they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin, and by this, says he, a multitude of scruples is removed. And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruple, break any promises that are not under (*)his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise, than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that (i)he who promises in word, without mind, or intention to oblige himself, is not bound in Conscience to perform it: and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed, are more than sufficient to excuse men from all saith and honesty in contracts, and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruin humane society; and to render ⟨p. 264⟩Roman Catholics less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity, than those which bid defiance to it.
Or if it did of itself oblige further, yet he that intends to bind himself no otherwise, may break any promise without any more then Venial guilt, whether the matter be small, or great, which is promised. ibid. n. 11. (h)Lopez, that a promise may bind under mortal guilt, concludes it requisite; that he who makes it, should have a mind to be so bound by it: and so in promising (as he saies), unless there be an Oath to confirm the promise, or a writing, as is usual: they are not thought to oblige themselves to mortal sin, and by this, saies he, a multitude of scruples is removed. And he says true, for hereby a man may without any scruplc, break any promises that are not under (*)his hand or Oath. But what if he had no mind so to oblige himself by his Oath, or writing? why then, by his own rule, he is no more bound by his written or sworn promise, than by any other. To this purpose he concludes again, that (i)he who promises in word, without mind, or intenion to oblige himself, is not bound in Conscience to perform it: and this is their common Doctrine. So that if a man intend not to be honest, he need not be so, whatever he promise. These rules observed, are more than sufficient to excuse men from all saith and honesty in contracts, and promises of all sorts; to fill the world with cheats and perfidiousness; to take away all confidence and security from men in dealing one with another; to ruine humane society; and to render ⟨p. 264⟩Roman Catholicks less conscientious, and more faithless and intolerable to mankind, than sober Heathens; nor are they more like the rules of Christianity, than those which bid defiance to it.
(h)Ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adsit animus in promittente, dumb promittit obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit juramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se censeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p: 175.Ut sit vera requiritur primo quod adsit animus in promittente, dum promittit obligandi se ad mortale. Et sic inter promittendum, nisi adhibuerit juramentum promissionis confirmatorium, vel scripturam ut pro more hominum contingit, fit ut non se censeant obligare ad culpam mortalem. Hinc tollitur scrupulorum multitudo. Pars 2. cap. 30. p: 175.
(*)Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere. Navarre. Garzias in Sa. v. promiss. Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum. Idem ibid.Promissio obligat nisi non habuisti animum te obligandi, sed solum proposuisti facere. Navar. Garzias in Sa. v. promiss. Vix autem quis promittentium obligari intendit, nisi juret aut faciat instrumentum. Idem ibid.
(i)Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intentione see obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi. Idem ibid. p. 176. Secundum cummuniter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur•, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi see. Angel. sum. v. puctum. n. 4.Qui dum aliquid promittit verbo tenus, animo & intentione se obligandi caret, non fit reus in conscientia obligationis promissi. Idem ibid. p. 176. Secundum cummuniter theologos, nemo ex quacunque promissione obligatur•, nisi qui habuit animum obligandi se. Angel. sum. v. puctum. n. 4.
Hitherto, thus much of deceit and lies, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisy is a lye indeed, both are equally sinful. (k)Aquinas after some of the Ancients asserts, that it is all alike to lye in deeds, as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signify and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated (as it is all one whether you kill a man with a Sword, or an Axe, as they express it): and both by their Doctrine are made Venial. Sylvester inquires (l)whether to make a false show of sanctity be a sin? he answers that if is he for the Honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin: but if it be to palliate his own wickedness; and that he may be accounted good, then it is a sin; because it is a false ostentation of sanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him, is no sin: either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan (m)will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common Doctrine ⟨p. 265⟩that (n)bare Hypocrisy, when one feigns he is good, and is not, or better than he is; is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lye, and be designed to deceive others, (o)otherwise it would not be so bad as a Venial. (p)Although he delight in thus playing the Hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving show, (q)for an evil end; to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God); such vain glorious Hypocrisy will be no worse: for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled; yet the double sin is but a single Venial. And if he do those works, (r)which are naturally ordained for the service of God, with an intention not to serve him, but for glory from men, it is but such Hypocrisy, and that with some extenuation, it is not so bad explicitly, seeing the intention to deceive, is but implicit. They have a reverence for Hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their Church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great Saints for their holy Hypocrisy.
HItherto, thus much of deceit and lyes, in word and promises, &c. Hypocrisie is a lye indeed, both are equally sinful. (k)Aquinas after some of the Antients asserts, that it is all alike to lye in deeds, as in words: as that is a composing of words, so this of acts, to signifie and make one believe what is false: both are used as instruments of deceit, and it is all one which way you cozen another, so he be but cheated (as it is all one whether you kill a man with a Sword, or an Axe, as they express it): and both by their Doctrine are made Venial. Sylvester inquires (l)whether to make a false shew of sanctity be a sin? he answers that if is he for the Honour of God, and the profit of others, it is no sin: but if it be to palliate his own wickedness; and that he may be accounted good, then it is a sin; because it is a false ostentation of fanctity. But so is the other too, which yet with him, is no sin: either both must be acquitted, or neither. So Cajetan (m)will have it to be evil, though the end be good; because we must not do evil, that good may ensue. But they agree, and it is their common Doctrine ⟨p. 265⟩that (n)bare Hypocrisie, when one feigns he is good, and is not, or better than he is; is no mortal evil, though it hath the force of a lye, and be design'd to deceive others, (o)otherwise it would not be so bad as a Venial. (p)Although he delight in thus playing the Hypocrite, it will not be worse; this is but vanity, not wickedness, unless it be for an end mortally wicked, such as will make an act, otherwise indifferent, to be criminal. But if he made this false and deceiving shew, (q)for an evil end; to wit, for vain glory, so long as it is not made his last end (to wit, his God); such vain glorious Hypocrisie will be no worse: for though the sin, says Cajetan, be here doubled; yet the double sin is but a single Venial. And if he do those works, (r)which are naturally ordained for the service of God, with an intention not to serve him, but for glory from men, it is but such Hypocrisie, and that with some extenuation, it is not so bad explicitely, seeing the intention to deceive, is but implicite. They have a reverence for Hypocrisy as a holy art: they honour it and their Church with the same title, both being holy alike (so much alike, some will think, that it is hard to know the one from the other). They extol their great Saints for their holy Hypocrisie.
(k)Paria esse factis aut verbis mentiri, Vid. Navarre. cap. 18. n. 8. Non solum in verbo sed etiam in facto mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque aequaliter peccat, quia verbum & factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, nutu, vel facto mentiri; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi. Sylvest. sum. v. mendacium. n. 5.Paria esse factis aut verbis mentiri, Vid. Navar. cap. 18. n. 8. Non solum in verbo sed etiam in facto mendacium consistit, cum in utroque sit eadem intentio fallendi, uterque aequaliter peccat, quia verbum & factum assumuntur ut instrumentum fallendi: nec refert quantum ad peccatum, verbo, nutu, vel facto mentiri; sicut nec quantum ad homicidium, uti gladio vel securi. Sylvest. sum. v. mendacium. n. 5.
(l)Sum. v. simulatio n. 4. ut pallietur iniquitas, & ipso bonus putetur, quod est peccatum—ad honorem Dei, & proximorum aedificationem—& hoc non est peccatum.
(m)Si f•nis ille sit bonus (puta, ad aedificationem aliorum) nihilominus peccatum est, quia non sunt facienda mala ut-bona eveniant. Sum. v. hypocris p. 340.
(n)Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, & hoc hypocrisis si nuda sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum quia mendacii vim haber. Cajetan. ibid. Sylvest. ibid. Navarre. c. 18. n. 8.Solummodo intendit simulare se bonum seu meliorem quam sit, & hoc hypocrisis si nuda sit, licet non sit peccatum mortale, est tamen peccatum quia mendacii vim haber. Cajetan. ibid. Sylvest. ibid. Navar. c. 18. n. 8.
(o)Facere opera quibus, bonus appareat, cum non sit, sine intentione ostendendi se bonum, non est etiam veniale, juxta mentem omnium. Idem ibid.
(p)Alias erit veniale, puta, cum in ipsa fictione delectetur,—magis vanus videtur quam malus. Sylvest. ibid.
(q)Si a•m finis ille sit vana gloria, non tamen ita quod in ea ponatur ultimus finis, peccatum est veniale quidem sed duplicatum. Cajetan. ibid.
(r)Qui opera ad Dei, servitium naturaliter ordinata (•ut sunt jejunium oratio eleemosyna) facit ex intentione non serviendi Deo, sed ob gloriam humanam, hypocrisis peccatum incurrit formaliter, implicite tamen. Cajetan. ibid. p. 341. Nonnunquam etiam fratres suos admonuisse, ut aliquam ostenderent virtutis, apparentiam in abstinentiis, vigiliis, verborum ac gestorum disciplina, quum apud saeculares essent; & sic eos sancta quadam hypocrisi, ad fidei reverentiam, & virtutis amorem propensius invitarent. Specul. histor. l. 29. c. 105.
It is amongst the commendations of Saint Dominic himself. Vincentius Bishop of Beauvais, in his praises, spends one Chapter upon this Subject de sancta ejus Hypocrisy, showing that it was not only ⟨p. 266⟩the practice of their Saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his Brethren (the Fryers Praedicaut). Hypocrisy being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest Saints; no wonder if they be so far, from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A Religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypoer. n. 1.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shows of sanctity or mortification amongst them; since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious, even for their Religious to deceive others with Hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concerned to speak favourably of Hypocrisy, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shows of piety, (if so much) needful in the worship of God; and yet would be accounted the best, or only true Christians on earth: if they should condemn Hypocrisy as a mortal sin, that Religion and Righteousness; which their Church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves, as damnably criminal.
It is amongst the commendations of Saint Deminick himself. Vincentius Bishop of Beauvois, in his praises, spends one Chapter upon this Subject de sancta ejus Hypoerisie, shewing that it was not only ⟨p. 266⟩the practice of their Saint, but that he commended the holy thing to his Brethren (the Fryers Praedicaut). Hypocrisie being such a holy quality in their account, and a special ornament of their greatest Saints; no wonder if they be so far, from branding it as a crime, that they declare it meritorious. A Religious person that feigns himself to have more holiness than he hath, that others may be edified, sins not, but rather merits (so Rosella v. Hypoer. n. 1.) Thus they give us warning not to trust any shews of sanctity or mortification amongst them; since they are so far from counting it a sin, that they conclude it meritorious, even for their Religious to deceive others with Hypocritical ostentation of what holiness they have not. Indeed the Romanists are concern'd to speak favourably of Hypocrisie, and treat it with kindness; for since they require no more truth and sincerity in their dealings with men, and make no more than exterior shews of piety, (if so much) needful in the worship of God; and yet would be accounted the best, or only true Christians on earth: if they should condemn Hypocrisie as a mortal sin, that Religion and Righteousness; which their Church counts sufficient, would be branded by themselves, as damnably criminal.
Disgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfy his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxim with them, that the (s)quality of sins in words, is regulated ⟨p. 267⟩by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t)of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u)materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withal they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this says (x)Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small judgment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navarre. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ⟨p. 268⟩ibid. n. 9. 5Also to charge him falsely with any wickedness, which they count Venial.
DIsgracing and defaming others to their face by contumelies, or behind their backs by detraction; reproaching them with charges true or false, to the impairing or ruining of their esteem or credit (though some of them say this is worse than theft or robbery, and others make it worse than adultery; and in the Canon Law, such are called murderers; yet) is allowed under the notion of a Venial, in so many cases, that he who is addicted thereto, may satisfie his humour fully in the practice of it without scruple. 'Tis a Maxime with them, that the (s)quality of sins in words, is regulated ⟨p. 267⟩by the intention. 'Tis this that gives this sin, and others besides, their formality, (which Cajetan often inculcates) and without that, they are no sins, or but Venial. Hence he tells us, that the contempt (t)of our Neighbour is a mortal sin, speaking formally, that is, with an intention of contemning him: for no man formally contemns another, but he that despises him, that he may despise him; so no man is a detractor formally, but he that back-bites, that he may back-bite; and no man is formally contumelious, but he that speaks reproachfully, that he may reproach. So that if he intend not thus to sin, let him say what he will against his Neighbour, he is not guilty of the sin formally, and in deed. Accordingly he tells us, that (u)materially, (i. e. without intention of dishonouring another) contumelious words may be spoken, either without any sin, or any but what is Venial. 'Tis true, some of them say, words may be a crime, if they grievously defame a person, though they be uttered without a design to do it; but then withall they allow of such reproaches as Venial, which are of no better consequence, but tend to disgrace him effectually. To reproach him with natural defects of mind, or body, or birth, is regularly but Venial; all agree in this saies (x)Sairus: To charge him with ignorance, to say he has little wit, and small jugment, to call him a fool, or an Hermaphrodite, or a Bastard, though the charge be false. To report one to be infected with the French-disease is but Venial, because that is no great disgrace. Pet. Navar. Sairus, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ⟨p. 268⟩ibid. n. 9. 5
(s)Aquinas, & Alexander, Alensis, in Sylv, sum. v. contumel. n. 2.
(t)Hinc patet quod contemptus proximi est peccatum mortale formaliter loquendo, hoc est ex intentione contemnendi. Nullus enim formaliter contemnit proximum, nisi qui speruit proximum ut spermat proximum: sicut nullus detrahit formaliter, nisi qui detrahit ut detrahat. &c. Cajetan. sum. v. contemptus.
(u)Materialiter (hoc est non ex intentione dehonorandi) possunt verba contumeliosà etiam absque ullo peccato dici. Ibid. v. contumelia, Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 10. art. 2.
(x)Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4. Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navarre. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.Lib. 11, c. 6. n. 4. Detegere falsos defectus naturales, puta quod▪ est Luscus, Claudus, Mancus, Gibbosus, Ignarus, & alia hujusmodi, que non pertinent ad bonam famam morum, non est suo genere, nec regulariter mortale. Navar. cap. 18. n. 23. Vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 2. q. 4. punct. 2.
5(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navarre. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navarre. Aragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.(y) Imponere vel detegire veniale, non est de se mortale. Idem Navar. ibid. n. 24: Sylvest. sum. v. detractio n. 2. non esse mortale in his quae sunt modicae importantiae, ut venialia quae communiter non infamant secundum Antoninum, & Angelus sum. v. detract. n. 2. Pet. Navar. Arragon. in Bonacin. ibid. n. 6. alii communiter.
Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsely, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Liar, a Perjured Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholics, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z)revile one in such terms as may signify either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruin any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a)if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you (b)may charge those falsely ⟨p. 269⟩for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c)may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stolen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretic, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresy. Or you may accuse others of any (d)wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e)with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a virtue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather then the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do (f)it out of levity, or pleasure in tattling;
Thus they may calumniate any man, and without crime charge him falsly, as a Blasphemer, a Thief, a Lyar, a Perjur'd Person, a Cheat, &c, since they count these, in many degrees, Venial: and if they be consistent with the Honour and reputation of Roman Catholicks, yet others, either Christian or Heathen, will think their credit blasted with such imputations. Likewise to (z)revile one in such terms as may signifie either great or lesser crimes, to accuse him as one greatly proud, covetous, wrathful: or any thing whatsoever, which may denote either the natural inclination, and first motions, or the outward acts; this is not mortal; because the hearers are to put the better construction on it. And here is liberty enough, to calumniate in such terms as may ruine any persons reputation; upon a presumption, that all who hear the slander will be always so wise, and good, as any rarely are. Or, (a)if a man be noted for wickedness already, you may charge him with crimes that are not known, and yet offend but Venially: because you cannot hurt his reputation, which is hurt already. As if when a man has dangerously wounded himself, you might give him more wounds, and dispatch him; when life and same are of like account. Or you (b)may charge those falsly ⟨p. 269⟩for committing a crime, when they did it not; if it hath been their practice before. Or you (c)may charge them with any crimes that are secret, if they be less than those that are known; as if one had been guilty of murder, you may accuse him of theft, and if he hath stollen, you may accuse him of fornication, and if he be a Heretick, you may charge him with any thing, since with them nothing is worse than what they count Heresie. Or you may accuse others of any (d)wickedness, which such sort of persons seem to make nothing of: as some young men, of fornication, and others of adulteries. Further, any terms tending to defame others may be used in passion, such as hinders full deliberation: for these will excuse blasphemy against God, much more the worst reproaches of men. Or you may do it in jest (e)with moderate facetiousness, when the reproach is set off neatly, then it is a vertue with those, who learn their Divinity of Aristotle rather then the Apostle: and think if a man have wit, he needs herein have no conscience. Or you may do
(z)Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclination & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graft. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navarre. Sayrus, Aragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.Qui ex loquacitate profert ea, quae & pro mortali & pro veniali possunt accipi, ut dicendo talis est magnus superbus avarus iracundus, vel hususmodi quae sumi possunt & pro naturali inclinatione & motu primo, non peccet mortaliter quia audientes debent in meliorem partem interpraetari. Sylvest. secundum Antoninum ibid. Angelus, ibid. Graff. l. 2. cap. 137. n. 26. Pet. Navar. Sayrus, Arragon, & alii communiter in Bonacin. ibid.
(a)Si ille cui dicit habebat eum pro scelerato: quia jam infamatus erat apud eum de alîis, & si non de isto. Angelus, ibid. Idem est in mortalibus notoriis secundum Archiepiscopum quia non laeditur fama jam laesa. Sylvest. ibid.
(b)Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graft. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.Mentitus es meretricem tali nocte admisisse lenonem, eo casu non restituere famam, non est peccatum mortale. Graff. ibid. n. 22. secundum Cajetanum. Excusatur à peccato mortali, qui aliquem infamavit cum secundum suum existimationem illa non esset infamia. ibid.
(c)Idem esset in criminibus mortalibus etiam occultis, si sunt minora notoriis, sicut non est infamia notorio homicidae & furi, quod sit fornicatus. Sylvest. ibid.
(d)Si sunt personae quarum famam simplex fornicatio in nullo laedit, ut juvenes saeculares—quod simile est de adulterio apud multos. Graff. ibid. (juxta Cajetanum) n. 28.
(e)Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limits moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.Respondetur quod convitiari, secundum Arist. 4. Ethic. c. 8. eatenus est vertutis Eatrapeliae, quatenus intra limites moderatae facetiae continetur: quando scil urbanitatis venustas in convitio adest. Soto de Just. l. 5. q. 9. art. 2. p. 172.
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferiors rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastened upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholic need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuits, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxim they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to calumniate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsely, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
unless the words be so exasperating, as to occasion some other deadly evil. Or it may be done (g)by way of recital, suggesting what tends to blast them, as reported by others. Or when the defamer (h)is not believed ⟨p. 270⟩or gives no just cause of belief. Or (i)for correction; for they may defame others to amend them; and reform them, by making them worse than they are. Or (k)through some want of cautiousness, as amongst women and persons of inferious rank, who vent what reproachful language comes next, how injurious soever. Or when their reputation does hurt, and may seduce others; to defame them, is absolutely lawful eos defamare esse licitum, absolute respondet. Adrianus. in Soto. ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Or (to add no more) if one accuse others, whom they think he ought not, though he impute nothing to them but what is true; they may charge him with false crimes, this will be no worse then a Venial fault. Bannes 22. q. 70. art. 3. p. 2. Thus as in other cases, so when any thing is said or writ, to the disparagement of their Church or themselves, how justly and truly soever: if they fix upon the Authors the most odious imputations that can be invente• (such as Bolsec and Cochleus would have fastned upon Luther and Calvin) and divulge them with a design to delude the world into a belief thereof, though their own consciences tell them there is not a syllable of truth therein; yet they incur no fault thereby, that a good Catholick need fear, or make conscience of. This is not only the opinion of the Jesuites, but the common Doctrine of Aquinas his Disciples, as Ledesma a Dominican assures us; and so we may spare those more then 20 Doctors, which Caramuel says, assert it. Hereby they give warning to mankind, that they are no more to be trusted in their charges against their opposers, to vindicate the reputation of themselves or their Church, than such persons will be trusted in a Court, which openly sentenced them to the pillory for false testimony; yea, in this maxime they have as good as set themselves upon a Pillory, and done that justice to the world, as to fix this Inscription upon their own Foreheads: We are they who declare it no crime to caluminate ⟨p. 271⟩most odiously and falsly, who ever speak ill (how truly soever) of us and our Church. These are some of their methods for destroying, the honour and reputation of others without any fault which they regard;
(g)Idem esse (veniale) secundum Scotum, quum ex loquacitate dicuntur infamatoria recitative. Sylvest. ibid. Cajetan. in 22. q. 73. art. 2.
(h)Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graft. ibid. n. 23.Quoties non dedit justam causam credendi, vel non fuit ei adhibita sides. Graff. ibid. n. 23.
(i)Nec qui per fraternam correctionem aliquem infamavit, & ad majorem emendam, &c. Idem ibid. n. 24. Soto, ibid. q. 9. art. 2.
(k)Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graft. ibid. n. 9.Ubi vero nonnullus est cautelae defectus, plurimum consuevit esse veniale, ut saepe inter mulierculas contingit, & homines infimae Classis, qui invicem se convitiis conspergunt, ut in buccam veniunt. Soto, ibid. Graff. ibid. n. 9.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsely with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruin his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
they deliver them in great variety, so that every one so disposed, may serve himself of such as suit his humour. And as a man may defame others, so he may do the same good office for himself; (l)not only by blazoning his secret wickedness, but by charging himself falsly with crimes he never acted: thus to impair, or utterly ruine his own credit, is but regularly a Venial fault according to Adrian, and Sotus, and others; for prodigality is but a Venial, and this is but to be prodigal of ones credit.
(l)Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navarre. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.Detegere propria peccata vera & secreta, & imponere sibi falsa suo genere & regulariter non est nisi veniale quamvis per illud notabiliter fama laedatur, aut omnino amittetur, ut Magister Sotus explicuit, & multo ante Adrianus sensit Navar. cap. 18. n. 27. & 24. & 28. prodigalitas regulariter non est peccatum mortale, ut S. Thom. & detectio proprii peccati non est injustitia, sed prodigalitas samae. ibid.
Flattery also (that falseness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and encouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the virtue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extol the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruin: because (says Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and encouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easy a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too. (t)'Tis no sin at all, if it be for his fault, and gives the Devil but his due. Cursing (u)may be ones usual practice as innocently. It is scarce so bad as a Venial, (x)when cursing is used for honest recreation. And he may (y)curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
FLattery also (that falsness of every sort, even the vilest, may not miss of their favour and incouragement) is reconciled to common practice under the notion of a Venial. To (m)praise one for the vertue which he has not, or the good that he does not; is little or no fault. To extoll the good he does above measure and desert, is as innocent, yea (n)when a man is to to be praised for a good work, though you ⟨p. 272⟩know he will thereby be transported with deadly pride, such as will destroy his Soul; yet you should not desist, hut may and ought to lay aside the sense of his future ruine: because (saies Cardinal Cajetan) there are twelve hours in the day, and a man may in an instant be illuminated and changed by Divine mercy. To (o)applaud one for his sins, if they be not mortal, is as harmless; when it is out of a design to please the sinner, without ruining him; or to gain some advantage by such flattery. So that when it is both wicked and sordid at once, yet will they scarce count it a fault. There's no more hurt in giving flatterers reward, and incouragement. Sylvester inquires if this be (p)a mortal sin? and in him Aquinas answers, no, unless a man affect, as Herod, to be extolled as a God; or design and desire to be magnified for mortal crimes. But (q)it is a virtue to give consent to false flattery, as when a woman who is secretly an adulteress, is praised for faithfulness to her Husband, that scandal may be avoided, and others deluded, by a good opinion of her. And so we may understand how the praises of the Church of Rome for her faithfulness to Christ, come to be a virtue. Or if one be not in so complacent a humour as to flatter others; he may curse them at as easie a rate, for, for it is but a Venial fault (r)to curse in words (if ⟨p. 273⟩not from the heart) any thing, any person (ones own Father not excepted); to imprecate any mischief or misery to them; to (s)wish Gods curse on them, or an ill end might befall them, or the Devil might have them. And when he is at it, he may curse the Devil too.
(m)Est adul•tio prima, quando quis adulatur, vel attribuit alicui bonum virtutis, quod ille non habet. Secunda quando nimium vel ultra debitum extollit bonum, quod habet, & utrumque istorum est veniale. Graff. decis, pars 2. l. 3. c. 3. n. 5.
(n)Quam aliquis debet ex officio aliquem de bono aliquo opere laudare etiamsi si stiat laudatum in superbiam mortalem se elaturum, non tenetur propterea desistere à debito officio: potest tamen & debet deponere hujusmodi scientiam de futura ruina illius, quia 12 horae su•t diei, & potest in instanti homo illuminari, & mutari à divina miserecordia. Cajet. Sum. v. adulatio.
(o)Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graft. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.Est autem peccatum veniale quando vel laudatur aliquis de malis venialibus, vel de bonis, sola complacendi intentione absque ruina, vel etiam ob aliquem utilitatem consequundam, vel non impediendam, ut de se patet. Cajetan. ibid. Graff. p. 1. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 1. 161. Aquinas 2. 2. q. 115. art. 2. Sylv. v. adulat. n. 4.
(p)Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortal? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis venial, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.Utrum dare adulatoribus sit peccatum mortale? & dicit S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 168: quod non: nisi nimius appetitus vanae gloriae—sicut delectabatur Herodes, quum ei Dei & non hominis, laudes dabantur: vel nisi intendat quis & cupiat laudationem de peccatis—Et hoc est quod dicit Alexand. de Alis, quod tale peccatum est ista datio, quaele adulatio propter quam dat, id est si venialis veniale, &c. Sum. v. adulatio. n. 6.
(q)Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graft. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navarre. cap. 23. n. 13.
I Have been long in viewing their account of Venial sins; the pernicious use made of it to corrupt the whole body of practical Christianity, and to give liberty to the acting of all sorts of wickedness, with this modification; Will excuse me. They venture hard, ⟨p. 274⟩to leave in a manner no mortal sin; and so none needful to be avoided. This will be further manifest, by what they determine concerning those few sins, which they style mortal, or capital: they are reduced, in their ordinary reckoning, to seven. Some of these they conclude to be in their own nature, or regularly Venial; in others of them, they state the mortalness so high, that those who will be satisfied with wickedness, which is not rare, and prodigious, may live in the sins, and not reach the mortalness; and so wickedness which is deadly, in their speculative account, may be practised without mortal danger.
Covetousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides charity. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former virtue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navarre (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signify no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withal, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawful, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
Covetuousness is one of these capital crimes, which in general they heavily aggravate, and inveigh against, as most pernicious: yet when they come to direct conscience, and give particular rules for practice; it is shrunk into a harmless Venial. Covetousness says Cajetan (z)simply and absolutely, is not a mortal sin in its own nature, because it is not against, but besides chartty. To deliver themselves more distinctly, they consider this sin, either, as it is opposed to liberality, or to justice: as it is opposite to the former vertue, they generally determine, it is but a Venial fault; so the same Cardinal, (a)as it is contrary to liberality, and signifies an inordinate desire of money, so commonly it is a Venial sin: thus Navar (b)and Sotus (c)and all after Aquinas. (d)So that by their Doctrine, if a rich man should be so sordidly so monstrously tenacious, as not to perform one act of liberality to himself or others, in all his life; yet would not this be a mortal sin, since the vice which is opposite to all liberality, and wholly exclusive of it, is but a Venial ⟨p. 275⟩fault. Only when it is opposed to injustice, it may be a mortal sin, that is, when a man gets riches by unjust practices and methods; or detains what he has, unrighteously. Thus covetousness, however it comes into the account of mortal sins; yet it will stand there as a cypher, and signifie no such thing, unless injustice be added to it. Let a man have the most extravagant passion for riches, let him be as greedy as Hell, or the Grave; and penurious, as the worst of misers can be: yet if he be not withall, a thief, or a cheat, and attempt not to get or keep an estate by fraud or violence, there's no guilt upon him, that he need regard: (e)In their sense only thieves and robbers, extortioners or cheats, are covetous, when covetousness is a crime. They speak of covetousness as little worse than an indifferent thing: injustice added to an act, otherwise lawfull, will make it criminal; and this vice will be no crime, upon easier terms. But is covetousness a mortal sin, indeed, with them, when it is accompanied with injustice? they would seem to say so sometimes; but then they unsay it again in their other decisions. They allow men to gain unrighteously, and to keep what they have so gained. They declare them not obliged to restitution of what they have got by sinful practices, yea, and such as are most abominable.
(z)Simplititer & absolute non est peceatum mortale ex suo genera quiá non est contra, sed prater charitatem. Sum. v. Avaritia.
(a)Ut contrariatur liberalitati, & sic significat inordin•um oppetitum pecu•ia: & sic communiter est peccatum veniale. ibld.
(b)Cap. 23. n. 70.
(c)De Just. l. 4. q. 5. art. 2. p. 11 •
(d)2• q. 118. art. 4.
(e)Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiators fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.Ut opponitur justitiae & sic significat injustam voluntatem accipiend• sen retinendi alienum, & est manifeste mortale peccatum, et juxta hunc sensum, usurarios, sures, latrones, negotiatores fraudulentos, &c. avaros dicimus. Cajetan. ibid.
I have showed before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they encourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the persuasion of them all: for says Navarre, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they signify no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted with will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloistered pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navarre seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navarre. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shows that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says (m)that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
I have shew'd before what unjust and fraudulent methods of gaming they incourage under the favour of Venial faults; let me here instance in gaming only. This with them is (f)Venial, though it be not only out of an ordinate, but an excessive desire of gaining, if there be no other mortal ingredient; yea, though not only the subservient, but the principal end, be lucre; and so ⟨p. 276⟩that which is only for recreation, be turned into a trade. And this is not only the opinion of some particular Doctors, but seems to be the perswasion of them all: for says Navar, (g)we see in all parts of the world, all sorts of people play for great sums of money, and the greatest part of them principally for gain; and yet the confessors absolve them, though they sign•fie no intention to give over the practice, which they could not do, if there were any mortal sin in it. And (h)such gaming is allowed, even that which they call Diabolical, in any place, though in their account (i)sacred; at any time, for whole days, even the holiest, that little time excepted wich will suffice the people to hear the chief parts of the Mass, or in any person, even their cloyster'd pretenders to perfection, so they omit not divine service. Their mode of devotion needs be no hindrance, for with them it is lawful to make a game of their Prayers. Lopez enquires (an licitum fit ludere preces sacras) if it be lawful to play at Prayers. He says it is the practice of devout persons, and that Navar seems to approve it, part 2. c. 32. so does Bonacina after Navar. Rebellus and others, de restit. disp. 2. q. 3. punct. 1. n. 8. and not only at Ave Mari's but other prayers also; and that it will be no irreverence against God to play with their prayers, if they do it reverently, ibid. To say nothing that (k)their Clergy and Monks may be spectators of games and shews that are mortally wicked, if they continue not a long time at it; and yet offend but Venially. They teach further, that it is not needful ⟨p. 277⟩to (l)
(f)Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Navarre. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.Multi ludo qui recreationis causa licitus & Sanctus est abutuntur, ut negotiatione ad lucrum—ludunt principaliter propter lucrum. Et hoc semper est peccatum: quoniam est dare operam turpi lucro, si tamen nulla alia deformitas immisceatur, non est peccatum mortale. Cajetan. sum. v. Ludere. p. 410. Na•ar. cap. 20. n. 3. Lopez. pars 2. c. 31. p. 183.
(g)In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navarre. ibid. n. 11.In omnibus mundi partibus cujusque ordinis laicos videamus magnam pecuniarum summam, & maximam eorum partem principaliter propter lucrum ludere, & à confessariis, sine proposito nunquam ita ludendi absolvi quod sacere nequirent, si in eo mortaliter peccar•nt. Navar. ibid. n. 11.
(h)Q•eritur utrum & quomodo ludus diabolicus alearis sit peccatum? & dico quod hic l•dus non •st pecca•um, vel est veniale quum luditur aliquid modicum, &c. Sylvest. sum. v. ludus. n. 4.
(i)Navarre. ibid. n. 3.Navar. ibid. n. 3.
(k)Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navarre. ibid. n. 14.Peccat clericus vel monachus quiludum mortaliter malum spectat, si multo tempore spectat, saecus si parvo. Navar. ibid. n. 14.
(l)Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navarre. c. 19. n. 90. (Toll. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navarre. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by virtue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the encouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villainous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a fact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navarre. & ally. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
Or to save himself the trouble of stealing, he may refuse to pay, what he loses; or if he have bound himself by Oath to pay it (not only the Pope, but) any Bishop may release him from the obligation of his Oath, and that without the citation of the party. So Navar. Corduba. Sotus. Penna. & alii in Bonacin. ibid, punct. 3. n. 2. Yea, they will not have those obliged to make restitution who have received any thing for acting enormous wickedness, for example, a Judg for passing an unjust Sentence, or a witness for false testimony and perjury, or a man for satisfying the lust of a lewd woman, or any sort of women for prostituting themselves, or an assassinate for murdering, or a rogue for firing Houses or Towns: all are comprised in this conclusion, (n)that which is unjustly received, freely of the giver, where there is wickedness on both parts (as in giving, so in receiving), is not, by vertue of any command, to be restored to any. Only (for the incouragement of covetousness, and injustice together) where money is given for the perpetrating of such crimes, if they be not acted, it is to be restored: but if the wickedness be done, the villanous actor may conscientiously detain it. As the Judg that receives a bribe for a false Sentence, (o)if he pass a just one, he is ⟨p. 278⟩obliged to restore; but not if he make an unjust award. And (p)a witness if he receive money for a true testimony, is bound to restore it; but not for a false deposition. He that is promised a reward for murdering a man, may not receive or keep it before he kill him: but after the murder is done, he may take it (and need not restore it) upon the account of his labour and hazard in killing him, and because therein he has done a sact profitable and delightful to him that hired him, Idem ibid. n. 5. Pet. Navar. & ali•. So an Astrologer who takes money for telling things, which he cannot know but by the help of the Devil, is not bound to restore it, after diligence and pains to get the Devils assistance therein; because that diligence and pains (with the Devil) is valuable, though it prove ineffectual. But he that pretends but to this skill, and makes no use of the Devil, is bound to restore; Pet. Navar. & alli cum Bonacin. ibid. n. 10. And that the poor may be cut off every way by covetousness, whether it be with injustice, or without it;
(n)Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navarre. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.Acceptum voluntarie ab alio, ità ut ab utraque parte admittittur turpitudo, nulli est de precepto restituendum, S. Antoninus Monaldus, Angel•s, Sylvester, (in) Navar. c. 17. n. 36. & n. 30. Sensit Thom. & Cajetan. quod quicquid turpiter accipit contra legis prohibitionem—ut in Simonia—lucro meretricis, (& idem diceret de datis & acceptis ob alia quaecunque crimina) quod non sit restituendum, nec pauperibus, vid. Vasq. opusc. moral. p. 134. dub. 9. n. 84.
(o)Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navarre. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.Quando malum ob quod datum fuit, non consequitur, ut si datum est judici quo inique judicaret, & recte judicavit, &c. datori, & non pauperibus restituendum est ut doctiffimus Medina, efficaciter probat. Navar. ibid. n. 30. p. 295. &c. 25. n. 45.
(p)Peccat qui mercedem accipit, ut verum testetur, cum obligatione restituendi ei qui dedit; & qui accipit, ut falsum testetur, sine tamen necessitate restituendi, vid. Bonacin. de restit. disp. 1. q. 3. punct. 2. n. 6. & punct. 3. n. 8.
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously enjoy the fruits of his villainy, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extreme covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extreme necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be embittered with one act of charity; he may enjoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others, (b)is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?
though they say, what is received for the perpetrating of wicked acts, may be restored to the poor: yet it is a rule with them, (q)that restitution to the poor in this, and other casts, is only a counsel, not a command; so that he who is hired to de villany, may restore what he received to the poor, if he will; but if he will not, he needs not; he may conscientiously injoy the fruits of his villany, and the poor have nothing. In short, not only disquietment of mind (r)through the tumult of worldly distracting cares, and the restless agitation of a covetous humour; but also hardness of heart (s)against the poor, and unmercifulness to them in ⟨p. 279⟩their distress, (the natural effect of extream covetousness) is as innocent •s its cause, no worse than Venial, unless, when one is obliged •der pain of mortal guilt to afford relief, And when is that? only (t)in extream necessity, when the starving man may (u)sell his own child to get bread; or when it will be lawful (x)to steal from him who would otherwise part with nothing; or when he may be compelled by Law (y)to part with something; then his heart must relent so far, as to let go what he cannot keep: but it is like he may never meet with such a case while he lives, and then the miser is excused; no moment of his life, need be imbittered with one act of charity; he may injoy the felicity of a petrified heart all his days, and not suffer by one dint in it. Or if he should unhappily meet with one in such extremity, yet may he escape without giving a farthing; it will be enough to exchange, or to lend: (x)yea he may be excused from either giving or lending, (a)if it be but likely that any other may do it. In fine, this unmercifulness, which admits no compassion from the distress of others,
(q)Est regula Vervecelli, recepta à. S. Antonino, Angel. Sylvest. & ab aliis complurimis, quod restitutis, quae non est facienda alicui certae personae, sed pauperibus non debetur ex praecepto, sed solum ex consilio. Navar. ibid. c. 17. n. 30.
(r)Cajetan. sum. v. inquietudo.
(s)Per duritiam cordis, & inquietudinem mentis peccant qui non subveniunt pauperi, quoties t•nentur de precepto obligante ad mortale—alias enim hac venialia tantum sunt. Navar. c. 23. n. 76.
(t)Idem. Cap. 24. n. 5.
(u)Idem C. 23. n. 95.
(x)Vict. supra.
(y)Glossa communiter recepta. Ibid. n. 74.
(x)(z) Idem ibid. n. 95.
(a)Idem c. 24. n. 5.
(b)Quia haec fere nunquam sunt mortalia nisi conjungantur aliis actibus mortalibus, • sunt necessario confitenda, quia satis est confiteri illa mortalia, quae per predictam duritiam & inquietudinem admittuntur. Idem c. 2•. n. 76.
But that they may not be partial, they show themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extreme; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, because i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navarre, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
But that they may not be partial, they shew themselves as favourable to the crime in the other extream; (c)pure prodigality is no mortal ⟨p. 280⟩sin, becaus• i• is a less fault than covetousness, contrary: to liberality; which is manifestly of it self no mortal sin, and the reason of both i•▪ neither of them is against charity to God or others, but only besides it. So Cajetan and others. So (d)Navar, prodigality (including both th• of a mans credit and his estate) is regularly no mortal sin; and this after (e)Aquinas.
(c)Prodigalitas non est mortale peccatum si pura est • quiae minus peccatum est, quam avaritia liberalitati contraria; quum sipura est, constat non esse mortalem. Et utriusque ratio est quia neutra, agit contra charitatem Dei aut proximi, sed pr•er. illam. Cajetan. sum. v. Prodigal.
Cloth or Silks may be sold for that of such a Countrey which is most esteemed, though it be of another.
shew false Reliques, to divulge false Visions, and Revelations, to obtrude on the world supposititious Writings; to corrupt the Monuments of former times, and expunge out of them all the truth that makes against them; to make even the dead speak lies, or disguise the truth.
and thought themselves concerned, only to avoid such monstrous lyes as
⟨p. 256⟩
the people would smell out. But this cautiousness, was not always thought needful;
7(i) Credunt non esse mortale mentiri in ambone, nisi ut illi dicunt, predicant maximas falsitates, quae deinde à saecularibus deprehenduntur. Ibid.
•
Mendacium affirmativum de peccato veniali—non esse peccatum mortale per se l•quendo, hoc est secluso scandalo & contemptu, tenet Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Pe•, Soto, Navar. Idem ibid. N. V.
(q)Sylvest. ibid. vel affirmando. Idem in Suar. ibid. n. 10.
(r)Non peccare mortaliter, ut dirimus, confitentem negantem see admisisse peccatum mortal, alias ligitime confessum. Navarre. ibid. n. 38.Non peccare mortaliter, ut dirimus, confitentem negantem se admisisse peccatum mortale, alias ligitime confessum. Navar. ibid. n. 38.
(s)Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam a•ittant, confessario cuidem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscaema, & postea alteri probo & gravi solum leviora,, quod de se non est malum, & si sinis verialls fuerit, peccatum venial erit, & si mortalis, mortal, & si bonus qualis frequen•r est, sanctus & probus, immo interdum necessarius. Idem ibid. n. 40. Vid. Sylvest. ibid. n. 8. Bonacina, (& in eo Victoria cum aliis) Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 6. sect. 2. punct. 2.Unde sequitur non peccare mortaliter eos, qui ne suam existimationem honestam a•ittant, confessario cuidem familiari suo confitentur omnia peccata sua, etiam obscaema, & postea alteri probo & gravi solum leviora,, quod de se non est malum, & si sinis verialls fuerit, peccatum veniale erit, & si mortalis, mortale, & si bonus qualis frequen•r est, sanctus & probus, immo interdum necessarius. Idem ibid. n. 40. Vid. Sylvest. ibid. n. 8. Bonacina, (& in eo Victoria cum aliis) Tom. 1. disp. 5. q. 6. sect. 2. punct. 2.
Also to charge him falsly with any wickedness, which they count Venial.
(f)Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum ucniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.Si autem ex animi levitate loquendive libidine ore labatur in summa propter aliquam causam non necessariam fiat: peccatum est plurimum vcniale. Idem ibid. q. 10. art. 2. Cajetan. sum. v. contumel.
curse the irrational creatures, or the Elements, and if he do it with his mouth only, or with both mouth and heart, without respect either to God or man:
Imo virtus est consentire laudi, sive se false laudanti, de virtute tamen suo statui necessaria, exemplum de uxore occulte adultera, quae de fidelitate laudatur, non eo intuitu ut laudetur, sed ut per bonam opinionem, quam alii habent scandalum evitetur. Graff. l. 2. cap. 138. n. 2. Navar. cap. 23. n. 13.
(r)Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parents siliis, & colon•, & mullions bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.Ore tantum maledicere non est mortale, ut communiter maledicunt parentes siliis, & colon•, & muliones bobus, & mulis. Idem ibid. n. 117.
(s)Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navarre. ibid.Vid. Soto de Just. l. 5. 5. q. 12. art. 3. Navar. ibid.
(t)Peccat qui maledicit diabolo ratione suae naturae quia illa bona est & a Deo facta secus si ratione suae culpae, & tradit S. Thom. modo nec plus nec aliter quam meretur. Idem. ibid. Cajetan. sum. v. maledictio.
(u)(Quum) malo usu bujusmodi profert & est veniale peccatum. Cajetan. ibid.
(x)Contingit tamen inquit (S. Tho.) quod aliquando sit veniale—vel propter affectum proferentis, dum ex levi motu vel ludo—talia verba profert, quia peccata verborum ex affecta pensantur. Sylvest. v. maledict. n. 3. sit veniale—quod ex levi motu seu lusu. Soto, ibid. Aliquando etiam culpa veniali carere possit, ut si fiat joco & ludo, vel causa recreationis honestae.
(y)Si paenitens dicat see maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graft. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navarre. ibid. n. 117.Si paenitens dicat se maledixisse creaturam irrationalem vel elementa interrogare debet confessarius maledixerit ne ore tantum, vel ore & animo, nulla ratione Dei vel proximi habita, quia in his casibus est tantum veniale peccatum. Graff. l. 2. c. 72. n. 3. Navar. ibid. n. 117.
restore what is wickedly gained. Sylvester after others, says
that filthy lucre (that is, dishonest or shameful gain,) is not necessarily to be restored, 'tis but matter of counsel. But he that hath lost much at unlawful games, may take another course for his satisfaction; for Pope Adrian and others, allow him to steal it from him that has won it, Vid. Lopez. ibid.
Nullus tenetur cum famae periculo rem alterius restituere. Est communis sententia. Cajetan. v. restit. Navar. c. 19. n. 90. (Tol. l. 5. c. 27.) This will go near to excuse most, if not all: dicitur non posse—qui commode non potest. Cap. 17. n. 56.
(m)Non tamen necessario tale turpe lucrum est restituendum secundum. Rodofred, s•d de consilio solum. Sum. v. Emptio, n. 10. Vid. Lopez. ibid.
is scarce ever mortal; unless it become so (accidentally) by some other mortal acts, and so there is no need to confes• it as a sin. How well does this indulgence to such monstrous covetousness as quite swallows up at once Christian charity, mercy, and morality, become those, who cry up themselves as the sole Assertors of the necessity of good works?