An. Although I should grant it too be so, yet cannot men be exempted from blame: first because this necessity of sinning wherewith mankind is now overwhelmed, cometh not of the Creat• ▪ but of the willing inclination of mans natural will unto evil, as I said afore. And who will think it strange, y• he should be burned, which hath willingly cast himself into the fire? Again, although it be not of hap but of necessity, that man is now carried unto evil, (considering that sith he is corrupted by sin, he is (as the Apostle sayeth) become the bondslave1 of sin, and so remaineth till he be set free by y• Son of god) yet notwithstanding, that which he doth, he doth it willingly2 and unconstrained. For like as he cannot but do evil, so also he delighteth not in any other than evil, albeit that the evil lurking sometime under the colour of good, do make him take it for good. And therefore not even this necessity which was brought in by willing fall, taketh away the willing moving of the will. Which thing being granted, it followeth that man is verily the cause of sin, inasmuch as although he sin of necessity, yet ⟨p. 69⟩he sinneth willingly. And yet say I not that happening is taken away by this necessity neither. For although that in man which is held bound under necessity of sinning and is not yet regenerated, there remaineth now no deliberating whether he may choose the true good, or the evil, as there was in mans nature afore his fall: yet notwithstanding there remaineth a deliberating between evil and evil. For where the case standeth not upon choice of this or that, there is no deliberating or debating. Now then, even the headiest and hastiest men that be, do deliberate: but neither can they understand any thing, nor thing any thing, and therefore much less deliberate of any thing but either with straying from y• good, or else plainly against their conscience: ergo all their deliberating is busied about the choosing between two evils or more. And their preferring of the one or the other, cometh altogether by hap as in respect of their own voluntary will, which happening y• unchangeable ordinance of God doth no more take away now in men corrupted, than it took it away in old time in mankind ⟨image 72⟩uncorrupted.
An. Although I shoulde graunt it too be so, yet cannot men bee exempted from blame: first because this necessitye of sinning wherwith mankinde is now ouerwhelmed, cometh not of the Creat• ▪ but of the willing inclination of mans naturall will vnto euill, as I saide afore. And who wil think it strange, y• he shoulde be burned, whiche hath willingly cast himselfe into the fyre? Againe, althoughe it bee not of hap but of necessitie, that man is now caried vntoo euill, (consideringe that sith he is corrupted by sin, hee is (as the Apostle saieth) become the bondslaue1 of sin, and so remaineth til he bee set free by y• sonne of god) yet notwithstanding, that which he dooth, he dooth it willinglye2 and vnconstreined. For like as he cannot but doo euill, so also hee delighteth not in any other than euill, albeit that the euill lurkinge sometime vnder the coloure of good, do make him take it for good. And therefore not euen this necessitie whiche was brought in by willinge fall, taketh awaye the willinge moouing of the will. Which thing being graūted, it foloweth that man is verely the cause of sin, inasmuch as although he sin of necessity, yet ⟨p. 69⟩he sinneth willingly. And yet say I not that happeninge is taken away by this necessity nother. For although that in mā which is hild bound vnder necessity of sinning and is not yet regenerated, there remaineth nowe no deliberating whether he may choose the trew good, or the euil, as there was in mans nature afore his fall: yet notwithstaning there remaineth a deliberating betwene euill and euill. For where the case standeth not vppon choise of this or that, there is no deliberating or debating. Now then, euen the headiest and hastiest men that be, doo deliberate: but neither can they vnderstand anye thinge, nor thinge any thing, and therfore much lesse deliberate of any thing but eyther wt straying from y• good, or else plainly ageinst their conscience: ergo al their deliberating is busied aboute the choosing betweene twoo euilles or mo. And their preferringe of the one or the other, commeth altogether by hap as in respect of their owne voluntary will, which happening y• vnchangeable ordenaunce of God dooth no more take away now in men corrupted, than it tooke it awaye in olde tyme in mankind ⟨image 72⟩
- 1Rom. 7. 14 John. 8. 36Rom. 7. 14 Iohn. 8. 36
- 2Rom. 8. 7.