Truth (as saith Tullius de Inuentione) is, whereby things which are,1 which have ben, & which shall be are spoken unaltered. Wherein we first note, that it consisteth in words: for (saith he) they are spoken, not that I am ignorant, that both dumb men, & also other men speak sometime by signs,2 but because (as saith Augustine in his first book de doctrina Christiana) words among other signs are the principal & most plain. Farther we are hereby taught, that truth is not only to be considered as touching one difference of time, but as concerning three differences, for he saith, both those things which are, and which have ben, & which shall be. These things undoubtedly are then spoken truly, when they are set forth unaltered, that is, even as they are, & by speaking made neither more ample nor less than they are.3 This self same thing almost hath Augustine said in his book de vera Religione chap: 36. where he writeth, that the truth is, whereby ye which is, is signified.4 And it is a virtue because by it men are made prone & ready to speak that which is true. The general word of it is equality,5 whereunto is joined in stead of difference, this voice, namely, of words, to the things which are signified. And as it is well known of all men, all virtues level unto the middest, & fly from extremities.6 Wherefore in kind of speeches thou shalt find two faults namely if thou shalt speak more than the thing is, or else less than the thing is. Neither is virtue content with the middest only: for we must add also circumstances, which use continually to follow it. Wherefore the truth is not alway to be spoken to every man, neither at all times, nor yet of every thing, & yet we must not lye: but it is wisdom sometimes to keep close those things which we will not for just occasion have known. He which should vaunt abroad every where & unto all men the gifts of God given him, he should be counted foolish & unwise: as contrary, he which should boast of a crime,7 whereinto by humane weakness he hath fallen, should rightly, and worthily be reproved. Truth therefore requireth this, that those things which we have within us as touching our sense or will, be signified of us as it is, prudently & rarely. Farther the virtue, whereof we speak, hath chiefly simplicity joined unto it, & it is very much contrary unto doubleness. Besides this it is a part of justice.
Truth (as saith Tullius de Inuentione) is, wherby things which are,1 whiche haue ben, & which shalbe are spoken vnaltered. Wherin we first note, that it cō sisteth in wordes: for (saith he) they are spokē, not yt I am ignoraūt, yt both dumbe men, & also other mē speake somtime by signes,2 but bycause (as saith Augustine in his first boke de doctrina Christiana) wordes among other signes are ye principall & most playne. Farther we are hereby taught, that truth is not only to be considered as touching one difference of time, but as concerning thre differēces, for he saith, both those thinges which are, and whiche haue ben, & which shalbe. These things vndoubtedly are then spoken truly, when they are set forth vnaltered, that is, euen as they are, & by speaking made neither more ample nor lesse than they are.3 This selfe same thing almost hath Augustine sayd in his booke de vera Religione chap: 36. where he writeth, that the truth is, whereby ye whiche is, is signified.4 And it is a vertue bycause by it men are made prone & redy to speake that which is true. The generall worde of it is equalitie,5 wherunto is ioyned in steade of difference, this voyce, namely, of wordes, to the thinges which are signified. And as it is well knowen of all men, all vertues leuel vnto the middest, & flye frō extremities.6 Wherfore in kinde of speches thou shalt find two faultes namely if thou shalt speake more than the thing is, or els lesse than the thing is. Neyther is vertue content with the middest only: for we must adde also circumstances, which vse continually to followe it. Wherfore the truth is not alway to be spokē to euery man, neither at all times, nor yet of euery thing, & yet we must not lye: but it is wisedome sometimes to kepe close those thinges which we wil not for iust occasiō haue knowen. He which should vaunt abrode euery where & vnto all mē the gifts of God geuen him, he should be counted foolish & vnwise: as cōtrary, he which should boast of a crime,7 wherinto by humane weaknesse he hath fallen, should rightly, and worthely be reproued. Truth therfore requireth this, that those things which we haue within vs as touching our sense or wil, be signified of vs as it is, prudētly & rarely. Farther the vertue, wherof we speake, hath chiefly simplicitie ioyned vnto it, & it is very much contrary vnto doublenesse. Besides this it is a part of iustice.
- 1Tullius.
- 2Augustine.
- 3Augustine.
- 4Truth is a virtue.Truth is a vertue.
- 5The general of virtue is equality.The generall of vertue is equalitie.
- 6Two faults in speeches.Two faultes in speaches.
- 7What truth requireth.