2 The philosophers think, that the rightness of the end and means, dependeth of mans reason, or natural understanding; as though that should suffice, to know the difference between things just and unjust. But this we deny, and in any wise require faith, and the word of God, as sure rules: 1which Augustine in many places testifieth, and especially in his treatise upon the 31. psalm, where he saith; Account not thy works good before faith, which (me thinketh) are nothing else, 2but great strength and hasty speed out of the way: and he which maketh such haste, runneth headlong into destruction. Wherefore a good intent maketh a good action, but faith directeth that intent; so that when we purpose any work, we must take heed that our hart have regard unto faith, whereby it may direct his endeavours. 3The school-divines will easily grant, that faith governeth the intent, and maketh it good. But we differ from them in three respects; §1first, because we affirm that faith dependeth only of the word of God: 4but they will have it depend both upon the fathers and councils, which may in no wise be granted them; forsomuch as faith must be constant, & altogether void of error: which two things are not found in the fathers and councils, for they speak one contrary unto another. Fathers do very oftentimes differ from fathers, and councils from councils. And few are the fathers, yea almost none, which have not sometimes erred, and that in most weighty matters. And very many of the councils have need of correction. Doth not the holy scripture in express words testify, 5that All men are liars. §2The second thing, wherein we cannot assent unto the Schoolmen is, because they affirm, that by a good intent our works are made meritorious, yea and that of eternal life. 6But how contrary this is unto truth, the nature of merit may teach; of the which I mind not at this present to entreat. §3Thirdly, we disagree from the Schoolmen, in that they affirm, that the work is made good (as they speak) by an habitual good intent; that is to say, 7done without any good motion of the hart. They feign that our actions, such as be prayers, reading of psalms, and giving of alms, do please God, although indeed we think nothing upon God at all: and they suppose that this habitual intent, which they place in him, is sufficient enough.
2 The philosophers thinke, that the rightnes of the end and meanes, dependeth of mans reason, or naturall vnderstanding; as though that should suffice, to knowe the difference betwéene things iust and vniust. But this we denie, and in anie wise require faith, and the word of God, as sure rules: 1which Augustine in manie places testifieth, and especiallie in his treatise vpon the 31. psalme, where he saith; Account not thy works good before faith, which (me thinketh) are nothing else, 2but great strength and hastie spéed out of the waie: and he which maketh such haste, runneth headlong into destruction. Wherefore a good intent maketh a good action, but faith directeth that intent; so that when we purpose anie worke, we must take héed that our hart haue regard vnto faith, whereby it may direct his indeuors. 3The schoole-diuines will easilie grant, that faith gouerneth the intent, and maketh it good. But we differ from them in thrée respects; §1first, bicause we affirme that faith dependeth onlie of the word of God: 4but they will haue it depend both vpon the fathers and councels, which may in no wise be granted them; forsomuch as faith must be constant, & altogither void of error: which two things are not found in the fathers and councels, for they speake one contrarie vnto another. Fathers doo verie oftentimes differ from fathers, and councels from councels. And few are the fathers, yea almost none, which haue not sometimes erred, and that in most weightie matters. And verie manie of the councels haue néed of correction. Dooth not the holie scripture in expresse words testifie, 5that All men are liers. §2The second thing, wherein we cannot assent vnto the Schoolemen is, bicause they affirme, that by a good intent our works are made meritorious, yea and that of eternall life. 6But how contrarie this is vnto truth, the nature of merit may teach; of the which I mind not at this present to intreate. §3Thirdlie, we disagrée from the Schoolemen, in that they affirme, that the worke is made good (as they speake) by an habituall good intent; that is to saie,
- 1Augustine.
- 2A similitude.
- 3Faith rules the intent.
- 4Faith cannot be tied to the fathers and councels.
- 5Rom. 3▪ 4.
- 6Our works by a good intent cannot be meritorious.
- 7The work cannot be made good by an habitual intention.The worke cannot be made good by an habituall intention.