THE SECOND PART.
pp. 8111,808 passagespart 25 of 46
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
THOSE things are said to be united in person, which are one person, that is, which although they differ in natural properties, yet exist in one and the same individual subsistence: or have altogether the same subsistence. So the soul and body of man are united and concur unto one person, because they being united do make one person, or one subsistent, incommunicable, not sustained in another, or of another. The Father, the Son, and the holy Ghost are not united in person, or personal properties: because they have these not the same, but distinct.
THOSE things are said to bee vnited in person, which are one person, that is, which although they differ in naturall properties, yet exist in one and the same indiuiduall subsistence: or haue altogether the same subsistence. So the soule and bodie of man are vnited and concurre vnto one person, because they beeing vnited doe make one person, or one subsistent, incommunicable, not susteined in another, or of another. The Father, the Sonne, and the holy Ghost are not vnited in person, or personall properties: because they haue these not the same, but distinct.
By this which hath been said, it is manifest, That the Union in nature and natural perfections, is an equality of properties and nature: but the personal Union is, when two unlike natures are coupled, so that each retaineth his natural properties and operations whole and distinct, but yet have both one and the same subsistence wholly: or, it is the joining of two natures different in properties, to constitute the substance of one individual, or person, that is, such a connection and knitting of them together, as that they are one individual subsisting by it self, or the substance of one individual.
By this which hath beene saide, it is manifest, That the Vnion in nature and naturall perfections, is an equalitie of properties and nature: but the personall Vnion is, when two vnlike natures are coupled, so that each reteineth his naturall properties and operations whole and distinct, but yet haue both one and the same subsistence wholie: or, it is the ioining of two natures different in properties, to constitute the substaunce of one indiuiduall, or person, that is, such a connexion and knitting of them together, as that they are one indiuiduall subsisting by it selfe, or the substaunce of one indiuiduall.