[figure]
pp. 213–6401,692 passagespart 19 of 43
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
138 An other evil there is in the affects, which in very deed proceedeth not of error; but for that there be some, which are adversaries unto right reason: such is the desire of other mens goods, of murder, of adultery, and such like. These affects must of good right be condemned; but yet for these sakes must not sentence be given generally; sith there be other affects, which are agreeable to right reason and sound judgement; namely, love towards virtue, and hatred and anger against sins. 2Which affects, being agreeable to reason, are not only honest and laudable, but also very profitable: for they are given as certain spurs to godly life. For it is not sufficient to know those things that are good, but we must be earnestly stirred up unto them. For the affects be as it were sinews, by whose stretching forth, or shrinking in, we are the earnestlier, or the lightlier stirred up. Who seeth not, that this is most true, that anger is as it were a whetstone unto fortitude? We should be very dull even unto honest actions, if we had not these provocations: we should be even as a ship in the sea destitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature it self of affects is not evil, since many of them be very profitable and honest. Undoubtedly, God gave the organs of these affects, and he appointed humours to attend on them, and knowledges to accompany them: so as it can not be denied, but that they are the works of God; and especially since he in his law requireth such affects. For he willeth us to love and to fear God, to love our neighbours, and servants to fear their masters: and full of such precepts are the holy scriptures.
138 An other euill there is in the affects, which in verie déed procéedeth not of error; but for that there be some, which are aduersaries vnto right reason: such is the desire of other mens goods, of murther, of adulterie, and such like. These affects must of good right be condemned; but yet for these sakes must not sentence be giuen generallie; sith there be other affects, which are agréeable to right reason and sound iudgement; namelie, loue towards vertue, and hatred and anger against sinnes. 2Which affects, being agréeable to reason, are not onelie honest and laudable, but also verie profitable: for they are giuen as certeine spurs to godlie life. For it is not sufficient to knowe those things that are good, but we must be earnestlie stirred vp vnto them. For the affects be as it were sinewes, by whose stretching foorth, or shrinking in, we are the earnestlier, or the lightlier stirred vp. Who séeth not, that this is most true, that anger is as it were a whetstone vnto fortitude? We should be verie dull euen vnto honest actions, if we had not these prouocations: we should be euen as a ship in the sea destitute of wind. Wherefore, the nature it selfe of affects is not euill, since manie of them be verie profitable and honest. Vndoubtedlie, God gaue the organs of these affects, and he appointed humors to attend on them, and knowledges to accompanie them: so as it can not be denied, but that they are the works of God; and especiallie since he in his lawe requireth such affects. For he willeth vs to loue and to feare God, to loue our neighbours, and seruants to feare their masters: and full of such precepts are the holie scriptures.