THE Common Places of the famous and renowned divine, Peter Martyr Vermilius a Florentine, selected into four parts: out of his books and Commentaries.THE Common Places of the famous and renowmed diuine, Peter Martyr Vermilius a Florentine, selected into foure parts: out of his bookes and Commentaries.
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He is compared to a man that sleepeth, to him that is drunken, & to a city wherein good laws are not regarded. Here Aristotle reasoneth; Choice is contrary to desire; But desire is not contrary to desire; Ergo desire is not choice. This argument is in the second figure. The reason is this; Those things that agree in one third, they also agree in themselves: Even so those ⟨p. 295⟩things that do not oppose themselves against one third, do not agree together at once themselves. But there ariseth a doubt: 1because desire seemeth to be against desire. Some man desireth fame, and to have his name renowned, and the same man is much desirous of money; one of these desires is repugnant to an other. Augustus desired sovereignty, and yet was desirous to imitate Sulla, in giving up of sovereignty. These things seem to be repugnant. Pamphilus longed to be with his lover Glycerie, and yet was desirous not to offend his father. These things declare, that desires be contrary. The answer is many ways to be made. Contraries must always be contrary: but these things are not always contrary, as appeareth in the Sophister, which at one time hath both these desires; namely, the desire of glory, and the desire of money. Moreover, it behooveth that contraries have respect to one and the self same thing: but the one of these desires respecteth fame, the other money. Those things that respect one thing, after a quite contrary manner, are very contraries, and cannot be both at once together. As, to desire to have fame, and to desire not to have fame; to be noble, and not to be noble; to be maintained, and not to be maintained: these be contrary desires, and cannot be both at once together. Aristotle was not of the mind, that among desires there is no contrariety, but that contrary desires cannot be together at once in one man. But evil desire is always an enemy to sound choice in one and the self-same man, and at one and the self-same time. Neither is every choice always an adversary to every desire: for the desire of theft is not against the choice, whereby a man determineth to become rich, though it be by unjust means. And the desire of slaughter is not against the choice, which a tyrant hath made. But a sound choice (as it hath been said) is evermore against an evil desire. But what manner of contrariety is this of desire & choice?
He is compared to a man that sléepeth, to him that is dronken, & to a citie wherein good lawes are not regarded. Héere Aristotle reasoneth; Choise is contrarie to desire; But desire is not contrarie to desire; Ergo desire is not choise. This argument is in the second figure. The reason is this; Those things that agrée in one third, they also agrée in themselues: Euen so those